



Perspectives on Thought Leadership for Africa's Renewal

Edited by Kwandiwe Kondlo



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Table of Contents

Acknowledgements	i
Foreword	ii
Speeches	iv
– Introductory remarks by the Patron of TMALI <i>Mr Thabo Mbeki</i>	iv
– Speech by the former Chancellor of Unisa <i>Judge Ngoepe</i>	v
– Statement by former Principal and Vice Chancellor of Unisa <i>N Barney Pitso</i>	viii
– Remarks by former Vice Chairperson of Unisa Council, <i>Dr Sebileto Mokone-Matabane</i>	xiii
List of Contributors	xv
– The Scientific Committee	xv
– Secretariat	xvi
– Rapporteurs	xvi
– Authors and their Affiliations	xvi

PART 1

CHAPTER 1

Introduction: Africa's 'Unended Quest' for Emancipation	
– North Africa and Beyond	1
<i>Kwandiwe Kondlo</i>	

PART 2

THEMATIC PAPERS	21
------------------------	----

CHAPTER 2

Wounded Healers and Transformative Leadership:	
Towards Revolutionary Ethics	23
<i>Catherine Odora Hoppers</i>	

CHAPTER 3

Responsibility and Governance	37
<i>Elias Kifon Bongmba</i>	

CHAPTER 4	
Evolving Thoughts on the Afro-optimism – Afro-pessimism Debate	56
<i>Locksley Edmondson</i>	
 PART 3	
SECTION 1: ALTERNATIVE LEADERSHIP PARADIGM FOR AFRICA'S ADVANCEMENT	61
CHAPTER 5	
Leadership, the Oldest Practice and Youngest Discipline: Clearing the Path to the African Renaissance	63
<i>Emmanuel Ngara</i>	
CHAPTER 6	
The King's Justice: An Example of Leadership	75
<i>Tshililo Liphadzi</i>	
CHAPTER 7	
Educating African Leaders about the Ideals of Leadership: Lessons from Mohlomi, the African Philosopher Chief	86
<i>Khali Victor Mofuoa</i>	
CHAPTER 8	
RARE Leadership: An Alternative Leadership Approach for Africa	110
<i>Hellicy Ngambi</i>	
CHAPTER 9	
Intellectual Leadership: The Alternative Leadership Paradigm for Africa's Advancement	130
<i>Greg Sako Kame</i>	
CHAPTER 10	
Epistemic Pluralism for Knowledge Transformation	145
<i>Lesiba Teffo</i>	
CHAPTER 11	
A Proposal for a Programme to Promote African Scholars: Lessons Drawn from the History of the World Council of Churches and its Programme to Combat Racism	157
<i>Thembeke Mufamadi</i>	
CHAPTER 12	
Securing Africa's Renaissance: The Youth as Potential and Challenge for African Leadership in the 21st Century	169
<i>Makhosini Lucky Kunene</i>	

SECTION 2: AFRICAN PERSPECTIVES ON GLOBALISATION AND INTERNATIONAL RELATIONS	195
CHAPTER 13	
African Ownership of Own Policy Agenda	197
<i>Tapiwa Benson Chari</i>	
CHAPTER 14	
Globalisation and Public Ethics: An African perspective	206
<i>Edwin Chikata Ijeoma</i>	
CHAPTER 15	
The Global Governance of Trade and Economic Development in Africa: Assessing the Impact of Neoliberalism	218
<i>Ojo Samuel Oloruntoba</i>	
CHAPTER 16	
The World Trade Organization: For Which World? Whose Trade? And Whose Organisation?	237
<i>Serges Djoyou Kamga</i>	
CHAPTER 17	
The Peace and Security Council of the African Union at Work: The Case of the Democratic Republic of Congo and Sudan	256
<i>Nyameko Barney Pityana</i>	
CHAPTER 18	
A Perspective on Paradigms for Africa and the African Diaspora's Involvement in a Globalising World	270
<i>Kwesi Dzapong Lwazi Prah</i>	
CHAPTER 19	
The Impact of Colonised African Historiography among Diaspora Populations: The Case of Kongo Kingdom Historical Narratives	285
<i>Paola Vargas Arana</i>	
CHAPTER 20	
Invention and Innovation for the Development of Africa	295
<i>Valentine Jingura</i>	
CHAPTER 21	
The Use of Technology and Leadership in Enhancing Strategic Cooperative Policing within the SADC	306
<i>Ingrid Sinclair and Mpho Matlala</i>	
CHAPTER 22	
The Significance of Infrastructure Development in the Realisation of Sustainable Development in Africa: The Case of Research and Development	320
<i>Mutshinyadzi Lucas Mutheiwana</i>	

CHAPTER 23	
Prosperous African Women Traders in the last decades of slavery in Brazil	334
<i>Christianne Silva Vasconcellos</i>	
CHAPTER 24	
The State, Politics and the Democratic Consolidation of Africa	346
<i>Sehlaré Makgetlaneng</i>	
SECTION 3: PAN-AFRICANISM AND THE AFRICAN RENAISSANCE	359
CHAPTER 25	
A Strategy for the Promotion of Swahili in Africa and its Relevance for Linguistic Decolonisation and African Cultural Renaissance Projects	361
<i>Samba Buri Mboup</i>	
CHAPTER 26	
African Renaissance and Leadership: A Critical Analysis of the Continent from a Multi-, Inter- and Transdisciplinary Approach	388
<i>Esther Kibuka-Sebitosi</i>	
CHAPTER 27	
Challenges and Prospects for Building on the Indigenous: An Appropriate Paradigm for Promoting the African Renaissance	403
<i>Mogomme Alpheus Masoga and Hassan Kayah</i>	
CHAPTER 28	
A working model for African development: Intra-African trade and investment	422
<i>Siphelele Zulu</i>	
CHAPTER 29	
African Economic Renaissance as a Paradigm for Africa's Socioeconomic Development	436
<i>Vusi Gumede</i>	
CHAPTER 30	
Pan-Africanism and the African Renaissance: Extracating Paradigms of Underdevelopment	458
<i>Shingai Ngara</i>	
CHAPTER 31	
New perspectives on integration in Africa	479
<i>Paul Bom Kondé and Maty BB-Lay Diakhaté</i>	
CHAPTER 32	
Merging, Streamlining and Mainstreaming Regional Integration Efforts – a Solution to Some of the Challenges to Regional Cooperation in Africa	508
<i>Phazha Jimmy Ngandwe</i>	

CHAPTER 33

In Quest of Regional Integration in Africa: Can NEPAD Reconcile Economic Plurilateralism with Developmental Regionalism 524

Zoleka Ndayi

SECTION 4: SCIENTIFIC, TECHNOLOGICAL AND CULTURAL DIMENSIONS OF AFRICAN DEVELOPMENT 541

CHAPTER 34

‘I am an African, I speak an African Language’ 543

Hilda Israel

CHAPTER 35

Our Own Regeneration of Ourselves: Challenges for Grassroots Mobilisation for Indigenous Knowledge Systems (IKS) 558

Wally Serote

CHAPTER 36

Diversity and Social Cohesion in Africa: A Blueprint for the Culture of Ubuntu 564

Onyiah Jonikul Obodozie

CHAPTER 37

Re-[membering] My Ways of Knowing and Learning while ‘Learning Otherwise’ 572

Ramadimetja Shirley Mogale

CHAPTER 38

South African Scientists and Engineers Leading the Walk to Innovation 581

Kedibone Aphane and Hendra Van Zyl

CHAPTER 39

African Research and Development Surveys: Highlights from the South African Success 590

Saahier Parker and Natalie Voltman

CHAPTER 40

A Call to Arms: Enlisting the Skills of University Graduates to Teach and Inspire South Africa’s Children. 611

Sara Muller, Siyabonga Mhlongo and Phathutshedzo Tshivhengwa

CHAPTER 41

Africa Unknown: Addressing the Effects of an Alienating Education among Learners in South Africa 622

Rachel Nyaradzo Adams

CHAPTER 42

Computing for Africa's Global Competitiveness: Examining the Use of Computational Electromagnetics as a Tool for Development

638

Siyanda Nazo

CHAPTER 43

Toward Positioning Africa at the Forefront of Science and Technology Advancements in the 21st Century

650

Ishmael Makitla and Jabu Mtsweni

CHAPTER 44

Exploring Developmental and Community Informatics

660

Kosheek Sewchurran and Eureka Sewchurran

CHAPTER 45

Innovation Gateway Provision for Rural Small Business Development for Global Competitiveness

675

Sivuyise Ndzendze

TMALI Launch Conference, 11–13 October 2010, Sandton Convention Centre, Johannesburg, South Africa

685

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We thank all the keynote speakers and the thematic speakers, namely, Catharine Odora Hoppers, Elias Bongmba and Locksley Edmondson. We also thank the various scholars and professionals (named in Part 3 of the book) who contributed chapters to this book. Their valuable contributions to the concept of 'Perspectives on Thought Leadership for Africa's Renewal' will remain a record for learning by current and future generations. The Scientific Committee's excellent work in crafting the content and structure of the conference and review of the conference papers is highly appreciated. Lastly, the Thabo Mbeki Foundation's indulgence in providing the financial support to the conference is a pointer to its commitment to the vision of developing and nurturing future African leaders.

Thabo Mbeki African Leadership Institute

Foreword

The challenges of development in Africa have remained intractable. The hopes and aspirations associated with political independence – that the living conditions of the people were going to improve – have not been met.

Leadership and knowledge are among very important factors as we continue to engage in the struggle for the further renewal of Africa. The general failure of leadership over half-a-century of gaining political independence in most parts of Africa triggers a new approach to understanding the essence of leadership in terms of responsibility, requirements, sacrifices and expectations. Thought leadership – understood as involving the ability to decipher challenges confronting a phenomenon and the capability to devise potential solutions – is equally important, if not more. The Thabo Mbeki African Leadership Institute (TMALI) was established to address the leadership challenges in Africa with the aim of achieving the goal of African renaissance, where every African is proud to be so called and identified.

TMALI's principal purpose is to train Africans for the political, economic, social and cultural renewal of the African continent and its people, from the pan-African paradigm and influenced by Afrocentricity, African renaissance, African-centred epistemologies and methodologies as well as informed by Africa-wide policies. Similarly, TMALI's research focuses on Africa's renewal. As we advance African renaissance, TMALI aims to become a centre of choice for research, teaching, learning and dialogue in the pursuit of African thought leadership for Africa's renewal.

The 2010 Inaugural Conference formally launched TMALI. The Conference brought together leading and emerging African scholars from home and the Diaspora. TMALI decided to assemble papers presented during its Inaugural Conference in 2010 into a book. We have since taken a decision to publish a series of books, emanating from TMALI's conferences, symposia and colloquia – this is an important aspect of thought leadership because knowledge generation forms the basis for the development of societies. The *African Development Challenge* requires that we fully and thoroughly understand factors that have constrained the further development of our Continent, in order that appropriate remedies are implemented. This Volume is part of the process of better understanding the *African Development Challenge* in our lifetime.

Contributors to this Volume have presented their views based on their practical experiences, original research, scholarly insight, and theoretical perspectives. Consequently, perspectives presented in subsequent Chapters do not represent the views of TMALI.

I would like to thank all contributors, the former acting Head of TMALI, Dr Maureen Tong, relevant colleagues for organising the Inaugural Conference in 2010, UNISA and its entire leadership, the Thabo Mbeki Foundation, and the funders who enabled the Inaugural Conference to take place.

I want to particularly thank the Editor of this Volume, Prof Kwandiwe Kondlo, who has worked tirelessly on this book and for ensuring that the decision to publish a book from the Inaugural Conference papers became reality. TMALI's Research Coordinator, Ms Victoria Qhobosheane, deserves special mention because of the role she played towards the publication of this Volume. Our publishing partner, the Africa Institute of South Africa (AISA), came to the party with enthusiasm and produced the manuscript in record time after significant delays in getting the manuscript published – I particularly thank AISA's Director of Publications, Mr Solani Ngobeni. I also thank the reviewers of the papers – this is a critical component of scholarship!

The Thabo Mbeki African Leadership Institute reports to a Management Board, made up of the selected Trustees of the Thabo Mbeki Foundation and the top management of UNISA. The Board has supported us as we rescued the project to ensure that this Volume gets published, for which I should thank the Board and also specifically our line manager, the Vice-Principal Academic: Learning & Teaching, Prof MC Maré, for guidance and support.

Last but not least, we thank all the people who attended the Conference, including the valued contributors to this Volume, without which this publication would not have been possible.

Lastly, we continue to be inspired by the Patron of TMALI, H.E Thabo Mbeki, to whom we draw strength to vigorously pursue the renaissance of our Continent.

I trust the book will serve its purpose of stimulating such dialogue and further research as would empower the African intelligentsia, Africa's policy makers and the African masses to ensure a sustained advance towards the realisation of the historic goal of the African renaissance.

Look out for the next Volume, scheduled to be published in 2014.

Professor Vusi Gumede
Head: Thabo Mbeki African Leadership Institute
University of South Africa

Speeches

Introductory remarks by the Patron of TMALI, Mr Thabo Mbeki

I am indeed very honoured to welcome you to this important academic conference and thank you most sincerely for responding to our invitation to join us here over the next three days. It stands to reason that what has brought all of us here today is a shared concern to ensure that Africa achieves her renaissance.

I am certain that over the decades all of us have witnessed the efforts Africa has made towards the achievement of this goal.

Nobody can contest the fact that despite all the challenges, much has been done to achieve the all-round development which our continent needs. And yet I know of no African who does not say that more and much more needs to be done, that we should constantly identify the mistakes and the false starts we have made and strive to correct them, that we should mobilise among ourselves the human and material resources we would use to accelerate Africa's advance towards her renewal.

All this derives from what we see happening on our continent, which is inconsistent with the aspirations of the masses of our people towards better lives of freedom from want, from fear and tyranny, from ignorance and preventable disease.

In this situation we cannot avoid asking ourselves the question – what is to be done?

This conference and the discussions we begin today, as well as the Thabo Mbeki African Leadership Institute which we launch at this conference, constitute an attempt to provide at least one answer to this important question.

The fundamental proposition from which we proceed is that the transformation which Africa needs to achieve her renaissance requires that our continent prepares the necessary human capital, the brain workers, who should both conceptualise such transformation and participate in its implementation. Immanent in this proposition is the assertion that that human capital should indeed be African, and therefore that to achieve our goals we must rely decisively on African minds.

However, I must hasten to add that I am not hereby suggesting an African intellectual autarky, but seek to emphasise the imperative that we do everything we can to build the critical mass of the human capital we need.

As indicated in the materials which explain the purpose of this conference, what we are trying to say was eloquently expressed by Paulo Freire, who wrote that the pedagogy of the oppressed should produce a people whose hands are 'extended less and less in supplication, so that more and more they become human hands which work, and working, transform the world'.

Precisely and correctly to define its purpose, this conference has as its theme – Investing in Thought Leaders for Africa's Renewal – which is also the motto of the African Leadership Institute. Accordingly, to make its own humble contribution to the task of building Africa's human capital, the Institute will focus on the development of these thought leaders, informed by the goal to achieve the renewal of our continent.

We are truly inspired that we have gathered here at this conference the great minds which will help us to answer some of the important questions about the pedagogy which would enable us to produce these thought leaders. Once more, please accept our sincere thanks for agreeing to extend to us a helping hand.

Before I close, I would like to take this opportunity to reiterate our gratitude to the University of South Africa for so readily agreeing to work with us as our valued partner as, together, we do what we can and should to contribute to the advancement of our continent. Once more, please accept our warm welcome to the conference and best wishes for its success.

Speech by Chancellor of Unisa, Judge Ngoepe

It is a signal honour for me to be here this evening, and to have the distinction of welcoming such an august congregation of men and women who share the dream and vision of a continent whose thought leaders are supported, nurtured and developed in pursuit of an African renewal that will reveal to the world Africa's true greatness.

Those of us who were at the Inaugural Annual Thabo Mbeki Africa Day lecture at the University of South Africa in May this year will have seen from the packed ZK Matthews Hall that the Thabo Mbeki African Leadership Institute and all that it stands for enjoys significant support, and I would venture to say that this speaks to a hunger amongst most Africans for an intelligentsia that is engaged, productive and an integral partner in the development of the continent. It seems illogical that the huge reservoirs of capacity that reside in our intellectuals (both public and private) in our institutions of higher learning and in our business communities seem somehow to have been ignored, relegated to the backburners, and that they are largely silent or non-committal at a time when more than ever before their voices need to be heard. It seems illogical somehow that so many of

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Africa's finest minds are dispersed across the world at a time when we need their particular brands of critical engagement to help achieve balance and roundedness in our deliberations and decision making. It seems illogical that nowadays our intellectuals, our thought leaders, are somehow deemed to be second-class citizens – the status of new knowledge and new ways of knowing often usurped by a short-sighted pursuit of power and money.

There can be no doubt that we live in a shrinking world. And as the world's population increases and the competition for natural resources becomes ever greater, more and more eyes are turning towards Africa, the last, vast and largely untapped reservoir of natural resources – and might I add market – in the world. Who are our guardians? Who are the protectors of our indigenous knowledge and the vast resources that ideally, morally and ethically should be fully utilised to the benefit of this continent? Who are our scientists, our sociologists, philosophers and teachers? Where are they? What is happening to our collective creative impulse – that impulse that excites the imagination and generates the kinds of knowledge that pave the way for growth and development? Where are those leaders who, confident in their own abilities, respect thought leadership and the role that it must play in our societies? While we acknowledge that Africa should be pursuing its renewal with vigour and perseverance, recent and not so recent history has shown us that we cannot rely on governments alone to achieve and sustain that noble goal. Governments on the continent – some good, some bad – have come and gone, and with them the impetus for renaissance and renewal has waxed and waned, and Africa's socioeconomic fortunes have been affected accordingly. Disconcertingly, while we all agree that education is a priority on the continent (one notes in this regard initiatives such as Millennium Goal two and the Education For All initiative), and that higher education as a public good should be making a direct contribution to socioeconomic development, we find scant instances where this holds true in the fullest extent – even in well-resourced countries. Furthermore, it seems somehow ironic that while higher education is expected to contribute to socioeconomic development, its academics and intellectuals – the teachers of this generation and generations to come – are often sidelined, silenced, maligned and even persecuted.

What is required, I would suggest, is the kind of sustained engagement with socioeconomic, political and cultural issues that is the hallmark of academic enterprise, and that forms the core of higher education's mandate – teaching, learning, research and community development – in partnership with the governments of the day. What is required, I would again suggest, is the kind of thought leadership that is not only creative and innovative, but also visionary to the extent that it is able to see beyond the here and now to a future that will proudly

provide the spaces that are required for future generations of thought leaders and their ongoing role in societal renewal. The intellectuals housed in higher education and those produced by higher education, whether they be at home or in the Diaspora, have not only the right to be heard, but also the responsibility to make themselves heard and to apply their minds and their knowledge and skills to the many challenges we face on this continent. They are arguably the thought leaders of our nations. The Thabo Mbeki African Leadership Institute has as its focus the training of Africans for the political, economic, social and cultural renewal of the African continent and its people, based in the first instance on the all-Africa policies already agreed through the OAU and the AU. It is a vehicle to enable Africa to respond on time to new developments which have an impact on the continent, which would also help to ensure that Africa's voice is heard in both the local and global contexts. Accordingly, TMALI will invest in thought leaders who will work to help ensure that adopted African policies are both accepted by the people and are implemented. The TMALI also aims to generate new knowledge about Africa, and Africa within the global context, by holding focused seminars and conferences, as well as by conducting research whose findings would be communicated expeditiously to Africa and the rest of the world. It is important to note that TMALI will be focusing on the younger generation and on students, given that the future intelligentsia of not only South Africa, but also the continent, resides in their ranks. Quite appropriately, and in keeping societal norms and academic traditions, former President Mbeki – and one would assume other African leaders and intellectuals – has undertaken to pass on the torch of knowledge and experience in leadership to Africa's youth, through personal sharing. I would suggest that this is a responsibility that should be shared by all of us.

As a key stakeholder, not only in knowledge production through teaching, learning, research and community engagement, but also in the creation of intellectuals and future leaders, the University of South Africa (Unisa), with its significant footprint on the continent and globally, aims to ensure that it facilitates thinking in Africa, on Africa, by African scholars, so as to arrive at an African understanding that is acknowledged by our global society. Unisa aims to make a direct and ongoing contribution to this country and this continent's intelligentsia – to our thought leaders and to our leadership. We are proud and honoured to be able to make that contribution. As Chancellor of the University of South Africa I am able to tell you that this Institute is fully supported by the Council of the University, who no doubt are cognisant of the imperative to ensure that this pan-African centre of excellence will foster critical engagement on the continent

with like-minded institutes, scholars and other parties or bodies in pursuit of the renewal of our continent.

The purpose of this conference, ladies and gentlemen, is to ensure an agenda for a programme for the TMALI, a programme which TMALI will lead in pursuit of its goals and objectives. We are most honoured that through your attendance and participation you have signalled your support for the Institute. There can be no doubt that your respective contributions will add gravitas and lustre to the body of knowledge that will flow from the TMALI, which in time to come will surely be regarded continentally and globally as the repository of knowledge on Africa, by Africans. It therefore gives me great pleasure, ladies and gentlemen, to welcome you once again to this launch of the Thabo Mbeki African Leadership Institute. If the programme is anything to go by, the illustrious line up will provide abundant food for thought, and sufficient impetus for it to gather momentum towards its bright promise for our continent.

Statement by Principal and Vice Chancellor of Unisa, N Barney Pitso

This country and this continent have a long tradition of critical and creative engagement and writing, which in a sense we are acknowledging today. In doing so we feed the sputtering flame of critical and independent thought which is so vital to a free society. I am especially conscious for example, of the great literary tradition of the Eastern Cape, of writers, poets/imbongi and storytellers, of the publishing houses like Lovedale, of Xhosa works and nurturing of writing in isiXhosa, of Imvo Zabantsundu, of the South African Outlook, that looked beyond Thomas Pringle and the first printing presses in Grahamstown. These form the core of that tradition which, in South Africa and in Africa, seems always to have been dogged by controversy and suppression.

I count it a great blessing that Bantu Stephen Biko came into my life so many years ago, and we formed a valuable intellectual bond. I owe it to Steve that I was introduced to a depth of intellectual learning and development much beyond mere prescribed texts, and to a critical engagement with the history and culture of our people. I count Steve as among this nation's greatest intellectual figures that circumstance denied the opportunity to blossom forth and to flower in this nation in his generation. I am bound to remember Steve at times when much kerfuffle and obfuscation in our environment holds sway, and men (and women) seem to lose their reason, to paraphrase Shakespeare.

Sadly, at a time when this nation should be celebrating its intellectuals, its writers, thinkers and creators, watch who are the most celebrated: it is the maverick politician, a thoughtless youth leader or a loudmouthed trade unionist; it is

that will draw Africa's intellectual resources, stimulate young Africans to become achievers bristling with new ideas and set the tone for a new positive inclination for Africa that honours its past, engages the present and shapes the future.

Remarks by Vice Chairperson of Unisa Council, Dr Mokone-Matabane

The University of South Africa has a long and proud history of being accessible to all. The late former Vice Chancellor of Unisa, Professor Theo van Wyk said at a celebration for his 90th birthday that even at a time when there was severe pressure on the institution to conform to the exclusionary regime and politics of the day, Unisa had stayed its course, and accepted students of all colours and creeds. Of course there was discrimination in terms of, for example, segregated graduation ceremonies, in line with the apartheid laws of the day, but sometimes one has to lose the battle to win the war.

And so it is that this morning I am able to assert with pride that I represent an institution whose inspiring vision encapsulates the determination to be accessible to students irrespective of their personal circumstances and to contribute to the socioeconomic development of this country and our continent, through the production of well-rounded graduates and relevant, quality research. Unisa's vision is to be the African university in the service of humanity. That says it all. However, it is one thing to have a bold vision and another entirely to ensure that the institution is properly led, managed and capacitated to make concrete progress towards those aspirations. The only way in which that can be achieved, ladies and gentlemen, is by ensuring that as a first step, the institution puts in place sound and transparent corporate governance – through its policies and more importantly, in its practice. I can tell you that immediately following the merger, Unisa's first task was to ensure that such a foundation was laid. I can also tell you that in the ensuing years Unisa's executive management, together with Council have established a governance and leadership framework that would be the envy of most higher education institutions and, in the view of many Council members, the corporate world – to the extent that it has as a strategic goal, to establish Unisa as a leader in sound corporate governance and the promotion of sustainability (in line with the King III and UNGC principles).

So you will understand that when Unisa's Council heard of an envisaged partnership to form the Thabo Mbeki African Leadership Institute, we were pleased to give it our full support. As a pan African centre of excellence the TMALI will undoubtedly foster in its students the principles of sound governance and moral and ethical leadership. As the single dedicated comprehensive Open and Distance Learning Institution in South Africa and one of the largest in the world, Unisa

is well placed and equipped to contribute to a 'borderless' region where, in the process of critical engagement, collaboration and the production of new cadres of thought leaders, sound principles of open and transparent corporate governance will permeate the continent and, ultimately, underpin and inform leadership.

It could be suggested that AU and NEPAD initiatives on our continent have not achieved their undoubted promise because of many debilitating power struggles that both disrupt and stunt socioeconomic and cultural development. It is our view as the Council of the University of South Africa that Unisa's partnership with, and involvement in, the Thabo Mbeki African Leadership Institute, will provide the opportunity to entrench – nationally, continentally and internationally – an underlying ethos of sound management and moral and ethical leadership that will help break that cycle and lend impetus to the African renewal that we all desire.

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CHAPTER 1

Introduction: Africa's 'Unended Quest'¹ for Emancipation – North Africa and Beyond

Kwandiwe Kondlo

Sometime in 1884, more than 125 years ago, John Ntsiko, a celebrated blind catechist and hymn writer at St John's mission in Umtata (former Transkei region of the Eastern Cape province), and early African patriot who denounced the colonisation of South Africa and Africa, wrote in one of his poems, 'The Harp of the Nation' – '*UHadi waseluhlangeni*', in the South African indigenous isiXhosa language:

Some thoughts will now never be spoken.
Make shreds of my innermost being.
And cares of and fortunes of my kin still journey with me to the grave.²
(Mutloatse, 1987).

His poem is important for two reasons: First, it underscores the philosophical urge 'to express the inexpressible', especially when examining questions such as – what kind of leadership and quality of renewal does Africa need to ensure that the 21st century is not, for us, yet another lost century? Secondly, it poses the question – how should we as Africans ensure that the 21st century marks the fulfilment of Africa's continuing quest for total emancipation? The 'inexpressible' does not refer merely to a lack of 'words' but to the lack of precision with regard to concepts that capture our thoughts through the nakedness of their spontaneity, which thereby fully explain our feelings and therefore the actions we must take to transform the 'inexpressible' into the concrete reality which represents our dreams and aspirations.

It is probably true that many Africans were shocked when they heard reports in February 2011 that the Muammar Gaddafi regime in Libya was slaughtering innocent civilians, and believed these reports, accepting them at face value. However, things got worse with North Atlantic Treaty Organisation's (NATO) involvement and the bombing of Libya under the pretext of 'civilian protection' from the Gaddafi forces – this despite the proposals for the peaceful resolution of the Libyan conflict from the African Union (AU).

As thinking Africans we could not but ask ourselves the troubling question – why were those who sought to convince us about the need to protect civilian Libyan lives so determined to obstruct the possibility for us, the Africans, to stop the alleged slaughter by organising for a peaceful resolution of the Libyan conflict? The weaknesses of the AU and its slow response to the Libyan crisis cannot be excused. However, its proposals were hardly given a chance to succeed or fail, because the governments of Britain, France and the US had made up their minds from the very outset.

The manipulation of the UN Security Council Resolution 1973 to justify the NATO intervention to overthrow the Libyan government, the dynamics of the entire war in Libya and the eventual death of Gaddafi, are issues which will require focused examination in a separate project. However, one would like to underline, for now, the denial to the Libyan people of their right to determine their destiny, the humiliation African leaders and the AU suffered during this period – they had to be granted permission by foreign forces (of NATO) to fly into Libya to negotiate a peaceful settlement of the Libyan conflict.

The inexpressible, if one stretches the interpretation of Ntsiko's poem, is not only the humiliation, shock and dismay the events in Libya (among all the countries affected by 'revolutions' in North Africa) caused among many people of African descent, it is not the difficulty to comprehend and articulate in precise terms the deep feelings of the people of the continent – it is the generalised feeling that Africa is somehow helpless in the face of Western military might.

The backdrop to current developments in Africa include the fragile 'stability' in the Sudan states, in Côte d'Ivoire, Zimbabwe, South Africa, Nigeria, Kenya, Senegal, Cameroon and others, the uncertain transition in Tunisia, Egypt and Libya, contrasted on the other hand with the determination by the world's 'big' Western powers to use military means to help determine the future of Africa. These powers have shown that they are ready and willing to intervene in Africa even in ways which flout international law and constitute manipulation of multilateral agreements.

The 'big' question is, in the end, what will be the future of Africa and humanity as a whole? In this regard we should recall the extraordinary appeal to all humanity, once made by two eminent 20th century thinkers, the scientist Albert Einstein and the philosopher Bertrand Russell, in 1955. Then, they asked the people of the world 'to set aside the strong feelings they have about many issues and to consider themselves only as members of a biological species which has had a remarkable history, and whose disappearance none of us can desire' (Chomsky, 2006).³ Addressing the threat of nuclear warfare, they cautioned that the choice facing the world was 'stark and dreadful and inescapable: shall

we put an end to the human race; or shall mankind renounce war?’ (Chomsky, 2006).⁴ On this note, it is not too far-fetched to say that if humanity cannot get things right, the absurd and melancholic, without the intervention of unknown fate, might be the determinants of our destiny. This emphasises the urgency and need to go beyond ‘common-sense reasoning’, accepted because of ‘custom and tradition’, thus to search for innovative solutions as we confront the misery of the world, (which) is a challenge of our time.⁵

This is important for thought leadership in Africa. The need to move beyond fashionable talk about Africa’s renewal to an examination of ‘nitty-gritty’ issues, i.e. critical questions and issues of praxis, is now very central and urgent, even more than before. Leadership and consistent ‘positive action’ is important in Africa. When the ‘roll is called up yonder’, ‘the cares of’ and sorrows of our kin should not ‘journey’ with us to our graves. For Africa, the 21st century should not be just another century of hope but should be one of ‘positive concrete actions’ leading to the fulfilment of Africa’s dreams for emancipation. Gumede’s chapter on ‘African economic renaissance as a paradigm for Africa’s socio-economic development’ in this volume, covers this issue but advances the view that the programme of the African renaissance in the 21st century is largely to do with the political, social and cultural emancipation of the African continent. In other words, the African renaissance during the 21st century is about laying a proper foundation for an African economic renaissance in the 22nd century.

But we face a daunting task as we strive for the total emancipation of Africa. Hence, to maintain a resolute attitude of mind, given the exceedingly onerous responsibility, we must understand that what is required of us is more than a slight feat of ingenuity. To recall Friedrich Nietzsche’s words, ‘nothing succeeds which exuberant spirits have not helped to produce’. (Nietzsche, 2007).⁶ Hence the concept of ‘a wounded healer’ in Odora Hopper’s chapter reveals the contradictions embedded in Africa’s condition: the ‘wounded healer’ could also infer a situation of sorrow which, because it is conscious of ‘its own condition’ and is determined to transcend it, is therefore not ‘sorrow’ but hope.

At the time when the papers incorporated in this book were presented, the so-called ‘Arab Spring’ had not occurred. Nevertheless Africa’s 2011 landmarks included the so-called ‘Arab Spring’ with all its wide and varied implications. The Republic of South Sudan, created from the territory of an existing state of Sudan in July 2011, had also not been established when the inaugural conference of the Thabo Mbeki African Leadership Institute took place. Hence, Barney Pitsoana’s chapter is useful in providing background on developments in Sudan before the new state of South Sudan was created. His chapter, dense and detailed, provides an important resource for further research.

It is inspiring to notice that something scholarly about developments in Africa is now growing and is authored by Africans themselves. This interrupts and challenges an unfortunate tendency in the realm of ideas, where everything related to developments in Africa is slowly becoming so dirt cheap, such that every 'speculative score-keeper' or self-proclaimed expert, can easily pronounce knowledge without thorough research. As a result, it has often not been easy to ensure that true African reality sees the light of day in the context of so-called African scholarship.

The history of Africa is a long struggle for true emancipation, which has not ended. Developments in North Africa have not only reminded us about the difficult road ahead but have also underlined the arenas on Africa's struggles still need to focus. The issue is how to find the right balance between, first, the domestic or 'the internal', and second, the external or international. Internally, the challenge is the incomplete project of state formation, national unity and economic development: externally we are faced with the unaccountable power of global corporations, and the continuing dominance of Western states, and hence their inclination and determination to intervene in African affairs, even when not invited by us, the Africans.

The choice for Africa is between a 'dependent emancipation' which emulates the West and leads to the establishment of African states along the prescripts of democratic state forms as dictated by the West or an 'independent' one. The latter could lead to the development of new state forms propelled by and grounded on the emancipatory aspirations of African societies. This may lead to total confrontation with and isolation by the Western powers. The possibilities include another kind of 'recolonisation' of Africa by Western powers or a total liberation which is authentic and consistent with the uniqueness of Africa's experience. The latter would require leadership which is prepared to take risks, leadership which even though ahead of the people at the level of thought, resonates with them. Claude Ake (2000: 174) correctly cautions about the emulation of Western democratic state forms in Africa. He argues that a distinction should be made between "the values and the principles of democracy from particular historical practices of democracy. Instead of making this necessary distinction, we have taken to conflating the historical democratic practices in the 'established democracies' with democracy". He argues that there are grave risks in approaching democratisation in Africa 'with the same frame of mind, as we are apparently inclined to do. In all probability, it will lead to distortions which will bear importantly in a negative sense on the feasibility of democracy in Africa' (Ake, 2000: 174). He concludes, 'there is no alternative to recreating democracy anew in every historical instance' (Ake, 2000: 174). The question is whether Africa

has the chance 'to go it her own way' given the present configuration of global power balances and imbalances.

In simple terms, America, Britain and France seem to be wielding the baton and expect Africa to dance to their concept of what is moral and correct in international relations: what is 'rational' and 'just' for the peoples of Africa, it seems, should always fall within the concepts and practices advanced by the 'big powers'. Otherwise, if this does not happen, they reserve to themselves the right to intervene to ensure that Africa complies with their dictates. Thus they have arrogated to themselves the moral right and duty to protect Africans from 'Africans' – in other words, to protect 'ourselves' from 'ourselves' with no regard for 'own' solutions to 'our own' problems.

The story of the involvement of NATO in the Libyan uprising will need another book to cover. But it raises the question of whether NATO really has an ethical duty to protect civilians against the brutality of national governments and how far it should go in exercising this supposedly 'ethical duty'. Why is this 'ethical duty' honoured with selective zeal, as shown in the case of Syria where, allegedly, many civilians are killed by forces loyal to the Syrian state almost daily?

Perhaps, at a deeper level, the question which arises from the way NATO intervened in Libya is: When 'responsibility deficits' (Thakur, 2002) due to the failure of the state to fulfill its primary obligation to protect its citizens arise, in what form and in what way should the shift of responsibility to the international community occur and how should it be handled? The issue is about finding the balance between 'intervention' and 'state sovereignty', 'sovereign independence' of the state and 'sovereign responsibility', the definition of 'moral duty' of the international community and the quest for a rule based international system (ICISS, 2001). But at another level, very indirectly though, the developments in North Africa, besides underlining the immediate need for 'democratisation' in our continent, draw attention to questions about the understanding of or the conceptions of Africa. In a way this opens a window for a fresh debate about the extent to which Africa is both 'a construction and reality' (Zezeza, 2006) and the implications this has for African unity and cooperation. In many circles, events in North Africa are referred to as the Arab Spring (*Daily News Egypt*, 29–30 October 2011) – the Arab world seeking to catch up with democratisation which has now become a world phenomenon. This discourse has the unfortunate tendency to excise North Africa from the rest of our continent, and to conflate Africa with 'sub-Saharan Africa or Black Africa', in a way which diminishes the continental pan-Africanism of the Organisation of African Unity and later the African Union. Paul Zezeza (2006: 16) is indeed correct in arguing that 'the characterisation of North Africa as exclusively Arab erases the history of the peoples

and cultures that existed in the region long before the coming of the Arabs and Islam and the subsequent creation of complex creolized cultures’.

In order to be able to act in concert to support the reconstruction of Tunisia, Egypt and Libya after their ‘revolutions’, it is important that Africa or being African is explained and understood in ways that bolster the goals of unity and this could be done without advancing a homogenising rhetoric or essentialist prescriptions. To refer to developments in North Africa as ‘Arabic’ and developments in other parts of the continent as ‘African’ indirectly posits an ‘Us’ and ‘Them’ which Africa does not need for her reawakening. It is unfortunate that a few chapters in this book disclose a thinly veiled epistemological fixity with black Africa and subdue the hybridity and ‘contingency of African identities’ and cultural life.

Theoretically, it is difficult at this point to fit the developments in North Africa in existing conceptual schemes. One cannot say with confidence, drawing from the theoretical schemata of Samuel Huntington (1991), that they mark the fourth wave of democratisation. The fluidity of the situations in countries such as Egypt and Tunisia, and Libya, require of us to allow the ‘dust to settle’ before we can identify and map out stable patterns.

One can confidently argue that the events in North Africa raise questions about the relationship between the leaders and the led. They raise questions about the legitimacy of state power, questions about how a government deploys power, especially ‘hard power’, to close emerging spaces of dissent and lawlessness, and ‘soft power’ to move society in the direction of a ‘people’s contract’ through influence and people-centred leadership.

‘Intermestics’ and ‘Domeintern’: North Africa, South Sudan and Implications for Africa

Almost the entire Africa and her people are ‘crossing fingers’ to see what will eventually emerge out of the ‘revolutions’ which swept parts of North Africa. So is the case with South Sudan. Given the manner in which the new republic (now Africa’s 54th African state) was formed, one wonders if it bears all the seeds of a ‘failed state’ and will therefore add to Africa’s failures or whether it has the potential to be another dawn of hope for the continent? The road ahead for the Republic of South Sudan is long, muddy and dusty but one hopes that with leadership ‘that matters’, South Sudan will succeed. It is exactly the situation in North Africa that makes the issue of investing in thought leadership a categorical imperative even more than it was before.

Thought leadership is, among other things, about people-centredness and the ability of those tasked to lead to rise above the 'ordinary' to chart a new vision for society. Perhaps one of the major questions which the developments in North Africa and South Sudan bring to the fore is in the scheme of international relations. This is so given the fact that up to now in studies of Africa there is hardly a theoretically comprehensive conceptual core to capture the relationship and locus of determinate force between international factors and domestic processes in state formation. The question is, should international factors be viewed as primary factors and domestic conditions as secondary, that is, the latter as merely shaping, reinterpreting the international primary influences according to domestic or state-specific logics? This question was raised by Steffan Lindberg (1998) in his paper, 'African transitions on the cross-road of external and internal pressures'. But his argument and conclusions only skirt the surface. In other words, the question is, in the development of the 'state' in Africa or in transitions towards new state forms, which one carries more weight and should therefore be regarded as central to meaningful change – the international or the domestic – where does the weight lie? It is not enough to say they both count. This is obvious but in the balancing act which often occurs where does the centre of the 'central nervous system' reside, especially in today's globalising world?

It is thus that the notions of '*intermestics*' and '*domeintern*' are invoked. The two are constructions which emerged when the question of 'domestic and international' relations was debated during the meeting of Global Experts on Political-Economy in Cairo, Egypt, at the end of October 2011. Prof Korany from the American University in Cairo invoked the notion of '*intermestics*' to define the prominence of the 'international' over the 'domestic' in the development of the 'state' in Africa. '*Intermestics*' is derived from 'international and domestic'. I invoke, instead, the notion of '*domeintern*' to capture the careful balancing act which is required in the handling of this matter. But the weight of priority should reside in the domestic front – it is crucial to be national, first, before being international. Kwesi Kwaa Prah (2010: 8) concurs as he correctly argues that 'we must be national before we become international. We cannot viably proceed in the opposite direction'. Hence the notion '*domeintern*' conjoins domestic and international but privileges the domestic conditions. The question is whether what will emerge out of the new state of South Sudan and also from the 'revolutions' in North Africa will, both in form and substance, be 'native' to the aspirations of inhabitants or will it carry the prescriptions of global powers.

The complexity of developments in North Africa escapes the singular cause-and-effect relationship as there might be different causes for distinct phases of the transition process. Lindberg got it right, the reasons why the 'revolutions'

start may not necessarily be the same as the reasons for their continuation and resolution – ‘the stabilisation of a process may have additional causes’ (Lindberg, 1998: 3). In the case of Egypt one can observe the state of flux and uncertainty regarding the future prospects of the ‘revolution’. There is a wide range of competing organisations, popular movements and lobby groups such as the Federation of the Egyptian Revolution, the Coalition of Political Salafi Youth, the April 6 Youth Movement, Second and Third Egyptian Revolution of Anger, Justice Movement, Get Up Egypt Campaign, Salafyo Costa and the Free Front for Change (*Daily News Egypt*, 29–30 October, 2011). The parliamentary elections and the eventual election of Mohammed Morsi as President, even though it signified hope, now seem to have been markers not of the end but of the beginning of another new layer of contestations. Even though there is agreement on the need for democracy there are differences on the nature, form and even practices the democratic transition should engender. In Tunisia, where the Ennahda party, dubbed as Islamist, won the October 2011 elections, electoral democracy has not delivered peace as yet. ‘New protests despite the first democratic elections last month’ (Legal Brief, 2011: 1) have occurred and are a challenge to the new dispensation. Building dialogic spaces, a culture of tolerance and respect for democratic decisions will take time in these countries. The most worrying factor is the prevalence of guns, lack of institutions of authority, unemployment and bitterness in some of the North African states that have been affected by the ‘revolutions’.

Africa and Liberal Democracy: The Paradox of ‘Borrowed Pants’

To wear borrowed pants, something many of us have experienced in some parts of rural South Africa, is an awkward experience – without alternatives and feasible options we had to borrow pants. The size, style and look were not even matters to consider when borrowing pants – the consolation was that ‘ultimately my disgrace has been rescued’. In this situation, the borrower is usually under the constant surveillance and tutelage of the owner of the pants. Now and then the borrower is told how to behave – he is told how to sit so that the pants do not get dirty and he also gets patronised with statements that he/she looks good in the pants.

Looking at the history of liberal democracy in Africa and Africa’s experiences with liberal democracy one cannot avoid drawing from the analogy of the ‘borrowed pants’, which in real life is the experience of communities in various parts of the rural Eastern Cape. From the early 1960s after the first wave of democratisation in Africa, to the 1980s – the time of structural adjustment

programmes – to the 1990s and even today, Africa is continuously being taught and is encouraged to look for best international experiences from Europe. This has to change if Africa's independence is to be authentic to Africa and her people. Liberal democracy is a borrowed concept; for that matter it is not democracy in the fullest truest sense. The analogy of the 'borrowed pants' is fitting given the lack of authenticity and vision of an alternative model of being democratic in Africa. In fact, Odora Hoppers's contribution in this book argues a similar point as she points out that 'part of the problem of post independence Africa is that we changed the colour of office holders, but did not change the rules of the game'. Hence the perpetual tutelage by the West. The 'borrowed robes' extend to areas of technology, science, commerce and innovation. Africa lacks conceptualisations derived from her language and experiences, culture and reality. The nature and form of state, as already indicated, is largely borrowed from the West. Africa, in whatever initiative, appears to be constantly seeking guidance from Western powers. This diminishes the stature and dignity of Africans among other nations.

The time has come to break the dependence, to interrupt the chain of reproduction of relations of subservience. The call to invest in thought leadership for Africa's renewal is long overdue. But the question is how to do it with consistency and unity. Will Africa, given the conjuncture of her domestic and international circumstances, eventually 'turn-over a new leaf'? (Fanon, 1964: 225). As Odora Hoppers argues, how can Africa generate new thought leaders who like Nelson Mandela interrupt the cycle of humiliation by triggering new cycles of dignity? At what point will Africa take off the 'borrowed pants' and dress up on her own? Will adherence to the basic designs of liberal democracy help Africa do this? Elias Bongmba's contribution in this book, titled 'Responsibility and governance' seems to suggest that Africans are the solution to their problems. Using practical examples to demonstrate the meaning of 'responsible leadership' and statesmanship which is propelled by a people focused on ethical commitment, Bongmba shows how we can do better with what we already have. Of course this doesn't discount the view that is gaining strong support among African scholars – the view that the basic designs of liberal democracy are flawed and it is time that Africa awakens and does something different (Ake, 2000). Liberal democracy is not democracy in the full sense but represents the surface of democracy. This view argues that liberal, formal democracy is 'low intensity democracy' (Santos and Avritzer, 2007: ix). It is threatened not only by increasing inequalities but also by the ever-widening gap between representatives and the supposedly represented. In other words, it is 'an abstract political inclusion made of concrete social exclusion' and it limits the realisation of the emancipatory aspirations of the poor majority.

Anthony Giddens (1996), in his book *Beyond Left and Right*, argues that ‘the extension of dialogic democracy would form one part of a process of what might be referred to as the democratising of democracy’ (Giddens, 1996).⁷ Besides that, democracy is not necessarily married to the free market, contrary to what Western powers would like us to believe.

In policy training sessions and conferences which Western powers sponsor and invite Africans as participants, the essence and ‘conferred’ meaning of democracy, development and stability rests on the representation, procedures of the ‘free market’ and technology. Africa has adhered to these prescriptions from the early 1960s but even today Africa is a struggling continent. A new democracy, a new model which is truly human; a new language of creativity and consciousness is what Africa needs for her renewal. The building blocks are there: they need to be pieced together and cemented. These issues are debated in the various sections of this book. The debates are obviously not without contradictions and the quality of the chapters is uneven in all the various sections of the book. The unevenness of quality has a lot to do with writing and research experience but not with the integrity and intentions of the contributors.

The Structure of the Book

The entire book, which includes contributions from young scholars (some first-time authors) and more established intellectuals, explores the discursive landscapes of theoretical and practical elements in the socioeconomic, cultural and political development of the African continent and among Africans in the African Diaspora. It postulates a particular reciprocity between the contents of theory and practice in Africa, and how these should converge in concrete expressions of a new emancipatory praxis. Some of the chapters in this book were initially published as articles in the Special Issue of the *International Journal of African Renaissance Studies*, of the University of South Africa Press. Permission was secured to publish the articles (after modification) as book chapters, since they were all presented at the launch conference of the Thabo Mbeki African Leadership Institute (TMALI). The papers by the following authors first appeared as journal articles in 2011: Hellicy Ngambi ‘RARE Leadership’, Lesiba Teffo ‘Epistemic Pluralism for Knowledge Transformation’, Edwin Chikataljeoma ‘Globalisation versus Public Ethics: An African Perspective’, Ingrid Sinclair and Mpho Matlala ‘The Use of Technology and Leadership in Enhancing Strategic Cooperative Policing within the SADC Region’, Zoleka Ndayi ‘In Quest of Regional Integration in Africa: Can the AU/NEPAD Reconcile Economic Plurilateralism with Developmental Regionalism?’ Shingai Ngara ‘Pan Africanism and African

Renaissance: Extricating Paradigms of Underdevelopment', Kosheek Sewchurran and Eureka Sewchurran 'Theorising about how the Use of the Internet in Africa can Contribute to Human Development', Hilda Israel 'I am an African, I Speak an African Language' Saahier Parker and Natalie Vlotman's 'African R&D Surveys: Highlights from the South African Achievement', Racheal Nyaradzo Adams 'Africa Unknown: Addressing the Effects of an Alienating Education among Learners in South Africa', Ramadimetja Shirley Mogale 'Re-[membering] My Ways of Knowing and Learning While Learning Otherwise'.

Section One deals with alternative leadership paradigms for Africa's advancement. The first chapter by Emmanuel Ngara, titled 'Leadership: the Oldest Practice and Youngest Discipline – Clearing the Path to the African Renaissance', besides examining the 'thin line' separating management studies from leadership studies, untangles the hermeneutic complexities in the term 'leadership'. He uses the African proverbs and idioms to unpack the true meaning of leadership. He also exposes distortions that have accompanied the rather inflated usage of the term 'leadership'. He examines how the term is used in language and expressions in various cultures and contexts (e.g. among the Chinese) and he concludes that 'leadership is not the important position you hold and the official pronouncements you make, but the significant actions you take, for leadership is a function. In other words, a true leader leads by example'.

Liphadzi's chapter, 'The King's Justice: An Example of Leadership' provides an interesting Christian evangelical perspective of leadership, despite its obvious positivistic orientation. This is a very spiritual and inspirational chapter which argues that the marginalisation of the spiritual and the ethical has contributed to the impoverishment of leadership and transformation in Africa.

Khali Mofuoa's chapter 'Educating African Leaders about the Ideals of Leadership: Lessons from Mohlomi, the African Philosopher Chief', draws from legendary African leaders usually forgotten in modern leadership discourses, such as Chief Mohlomi. Mofuoa raises the following crucial questions: 'Can Chief Mohlomi offer the prospect of enriching our understanding of how leaders ought to lead appropriately in contemporary times? Caught in the turbulence of a chronic political leadership vacuum and faced with the challenge of leading in scandalous times, can (African) leaders earnestly seek an appropriate way of leading, and exercise power and influence in ethically appropriate ways?'

Hellicy Ngambi's chapter, 'Rare Leadership: Alternative Leadership Approaches for Africa', debates the issues further. The chapter argues that 'a leadership which has integrity, is people-centred, committed to action and guided by appropriate knowledge, is what Africa needs'. She also argues that leadership

must foster a balance between engaging with current realities and developing leaders for tomorrow.

Greg Kame examines leadership at an intellectual level. His chapter titled 'Intellectual Leadership: The Alternative Leadership Paradigm for Africa's Advancement' argues that intellectual leadership is the underlying solution. Intellectual leadership is an ideal method of leadership that implements thought measures for a people's advancement. It is concerned with results and delivery rather than 'politicking and propaganda'. This kind of leadership has the capacity to initiate and advance the long desired renaissance in Africa. It can also advance the continent by promoting and defending issues of common interest in Africa to the rest of the world.

Teffo's chapter takes the debate on intellectual leadership to another level. His chapter titled 'Epistemic Pluralism for Knowledge Transformation', is about the best ways of reframing, restoring, naming, creating, discovering, and theorising the African existential experience. Teffo calls for full attention to a 'larger historical narrative grounded in Africa ... through a combination of archaeology, historical linguistics and the meticulous examination of oral traditions'. He concludes that African studies should promote epistemic pluralism by being open to other experiences. 'Because if it remains inwardly looking, it might end up 'ghettoised' and 'exoticised', as Negritude was in its heyday. Plurality is abstraction derived from various cultural experiences'.

Thembeke Mufamadi examines the experiences of the World Council of Churches and its Program to Combat Racism and derives insights for the development of a Programme to Promote African Scholars (PPAS). The last chapter in this section, by Makhosini Kunene titled 'The Youth: Potential and Challenges for African Leadership in the 21st Century', debates issues about the youth and development in Africa. It obviously needs further development and indeed fits awkwardly in the whole section. But what is interesting are the emerging ideas and how our young people are beginning to think about issues from a scholarly perspective.

Section Two covers African perspectives on globalisation and international relations. The first chapter by Tapiwa Benson Chari, titled 'African Ownership of Own Policy Agenda' debates the issues of co-creation and co-ownership of policy development and discourse in Africa. He examines the predicament of African governments in policy development. He concludes that as long as donors continue to provide the finances for policy implementation in Africa, conditionality will exist in one form or another. 'The reason that donors provide funds is not altruism but is related to specific interests. It is such interests that have run counter to the shared assumption of welfare maximisation for the Africans.'

Edwin Ijeoma examines the crucial issue of globalisation and public ethics and offers an African perspective. Drawing from Davidson and Mogg (1977), he argues that ethics has to be situated within relatedness and interrelatedness. The ethics of relationships reveals what kinds of relationships are being fostered in the world today. Within the context of neoliberal capitalism, relationships are motivated by self-interest and profit. Oloruntoba Ojo seems to be advancing an angle of critique similar to Tapiwa Chari in his chapter on 'African Ownership of Own Agenda'. Ojo's chapter titled 'The Global Governance of Trade and Economic Development in Africa: Assessing the Impacts of Neoliberalism', critiques both policy approaches and the ethics of global trade. His chapter interrogates the current complexities and credibility deficits in the global governance of trade that have engendered these problems, the corresponding erosion of state capacity and loss of policy autonomy which hamper appropriate domestic responses to the prevailing international economic order and the implications of these for African development.

In other words, what are the provisions and practices under the WTO which impede the effective use of trade to facilitate development within the context of economic globalisation in Africa? How has trade liberalisation contributed to the economic development or stagnation of African countries? Also, what led to a loss of policy autonomy and the erosion of state capacity under a neoliberal economic paradigm and what can be done to ensure that Africa does not remain on the margins of the world economy? These questions are answered and further questions posed in Serges Djoyou Kamga's chapter on 'The World Trade Organization: For which World? Whose Trade? And Whose Organisation?' The chapter argues that indeed the WTO through its various rules and agreements is nothing but a tool to ensure and perpetuate the hegemony of the Global North. The argument it advances is informed by a theoretically rich premise where the author invokes the notion of 'coloniality'. Informed by the work of Ndlovu-Gatsheni (2012), the author explains 'coloniality' as a structuring process within global imperial designs, sustaining the superiority of the Global North and ensuring the perpetual subalternity of the Global South using colonial matrices of power.

Barney Pityana's chapter in this section narrows down the focus to a more specific case of the Democratic Republic of Congo. Among the very key issues raised in Pityana's chapter is the question about 'the nature of the state in Africa today'. Pityana argues,

For one thing, a state can no longer be defined simply on the basis of its capacity to exercise power and coercion over its territory. There are many non-state actors who confront the power of the state, and there are also

other 'business' interests that exploit the resources of states in some remote regions without accountability to any central authority and for their own benefit; maybe this is evidenced in the phenomenon of 'blood diamonds', or oil-for-arms. The state in Africa needs more than its own resources to exercise state power effectively; it needs legitimisation both by its own citizens, as well as by the multilateral bodies like the AU and the UN. It also needs the support and goodwill of its neighbours.

The contribution by Kwesi Dzepong Prah (son of Kwesi Kwaa Prah) departs from the pragmatic issues raised in Pityana's work and deals with issues of theory. His chapter is titled, 'A Perspective on Paradigms regarding Africa and the African Diaspora's Involvement in a Globalising World'. Prah debates a complex issue and it will need more energy to expand the new concepts and perspectives he is introducing to the debate. He debates the notions of 'conscience and consciousness' in human development and progress. He uses this as a lens through which to interpret the involvement of Africa and the African Diaspora in a globalising world. As he puts it, 'the historical legacy of human consciousness and conscience, as both individual and collective experiences, attests to the metaphysical and physical conditions in which human beings find themselves today'. I must say, the chapter is not easy reading and requires a trained philosophical mind to make sense of what appears to be the emerging ideas of a budding intellectual.

Paola Vargas Arana's chapter, 'The Impact of Colonised African Historiography among Diaspora Populations: The Case of Kongo Kingdom Historical Narratives' also sits awkwardly in this section largely because it is a serious piece of historical scholarship. The chapter discusses 'learning African history' as an empowering tool for people of African descent in America, and how the potential that this offers has been diminished by mainstream interpretations that omit the analysis of important political decisions made by African societies over the past five centuries. The chapter also advances a critique of mainstream historiography.

Another awkwardly located contribution is the chapter by Valentine Jingura, titled 'Invention and Innovation for the Development of Africa'. The chapter debates, superficially, an interesting question: How can Africa advance in the arena of Science and Technology? But some of the issues which were supposed to have been highlighted in Jingura's chapter, for instance, technology cooperation and partnership in Africa, are fleshed out instead in the following chapter, titled 'The Use of Technology and Leadership in Enhancing Strategic Cooperative Policing within the SADC Region' by Ingrid Sinclair and Mpho Matlala, which examines the legacy of the FIFA 2010 World Cup in South Africa. The chapter argues that the integration of state-of-the-art information communication technology (ICT)

within an overall safety strategy plan of the regional policing and the tactical leadership, which was demonstrated during the 2010 FIFA-SWC tournament in South Africa, enhanced peace and security efforts in the region.

Mutshinyadzi Lucas Mutheiwana's chapter 'The Significance of Infrastructure Development in the Realisation of Sustainable Development in Africa: The Case of Research and Development' builds on similar themes as the previous two chapters as it focuses on the nuts and bolts of infrastructure development in Africa. The chapter covers technology infrastructure as well as items like sanitation and road infrastructure. But all these chapters leave room for further development, especially the refinement of the quality of research and writing.

Christianne Silva Vasconcellos's chapter 'Prosperous African Women Traders in Brazil during the Period of Slavery' provides a gender lens for entrepreneurship and development. She traces the experiences of African women in Brazil in the development of a culture of women's entrepreneurship. The last chapter in this section is supposed to provide an overarching view and thematic questions emerging from the project of state formation, politics and democratic consolidation in Africa. But the chapter, due to limited space, examines these issues rather scantily. In any case these are broad and complex questions which require more time and dedicated research.

Section Three covers the theme of pan-Africanism and the African Renaissance. Samba Buri MBOUP's chapter 'A Strategy for the Promotion of Swahili in Africa and its Relevance for the Linguistic Decolonisation and African Cultural Renaissance Projects' debates the issue of language and liberation. It is a 'must read' as it sheds more light and provides deeper insights into pan-Africanism and the African Renaissance.

The second chapter by Esther Kibuka-Sebitosi is titled, 'African Renaissance and Leadership: A Critical Analysis of the Continent from a Multi-inter and Trans-disciplinary Approach'. What is interesting about the chapter is that it compels the discipline-confined intellectual to 'think outside the box'. The MIT knowledge approach, as Sebotosi puts it, 'will help in the understanding of the reality of Africa both internally and in the global context. Secondly, the examination throws light on the policies relevant to the renaissance of Africa that would transform the continent to its optimal position to compete globally'.

It is interesting to read the previous and then immediately read Masoga and Keyah's chapter, titled 'Challenges and Prospects for Building on the Indigenous: An Appropriate Paradigm for Promoting the African Renaissance'. The chapter argues that the development of Africa should take African communities and societies as well as their cultures as a starting point otherwise development will not

be as effective and as meaningful as it is supposed to be. The authors extend this argument to the areas of knowledge production in Africa.

The paradigm of Africa-centredness is examined further by Siphelele Zulu in the context of intra-African trade and investment, in his chapter titled 'A Working Model for African Development: Intra-African Trade and Investment'. The theme of development in Africa is examined from various angles throughout the section. Gumede's chapter on 'African Economic Renaissance as a Paradigm for Africa's Socio-economic Development' falls in the same space where the paradigm of a renaissance is problematised and stretched to confront questions of socioeconomic development and the continued economic subjugation of the African continent. The last three chapters by Shingai Ngara, Paul Bom Kondé and Maty BB-Lay Diakhaté, Ngandawe as well as Zoleka Ndayi examine critical issues requiring a leadership with conscience, consciousness and community bases. Ngara's chapter titled 'Pan Africanism and African Renaissance: Extrapolating the Paradigm of Underdevelopment', focuses on global economic history and seeks to understand why Africa remains 'underdeveloped'. It also contrasts Africa's strategies and progress with working models in other countries.

Whereas Konde and Diakhate's chapter titled 'New Perspectives on Regional Integration' makes crucial points related to the imperative to develop an intellectual leadership to drive and manage regional and continental integration, promoting dialogue between civil society and national, regional and continental bodies. They also carefully examine the rhythm and regulation of regional integration. Ngandawe's chapter, 'Merging and Mainstreaming Regional Integration Efforts: A Solution to Some of the Challenges to Regional Cooperation in Africa' makes an important point that 'while regional cooperation is necessary in order to pool together the meagre resources of different African countries in a common repository for the common good of the peoples of Africa, the multiplicity and duplication of such efforts militate against the very objectives of integration'. Zoleka Ndayi's chapter, 'In Quest of Regional Integration in Africa: Can Nepad Reconcile Economic Puralism with Developmental Regionalism?', provides more insights into the whole debate about development in Africa. She critically examines NEPAD and argues that it is a catch-up liberal strategy that seeks to reconcile individualistic and collective developmental perspectives of member countries within the context of economic plurilateralism.

Section Four, the last section of the volume focuses on the theme 'Scientific, Technological and Cultural Dimensions of African Development'. The contributions in this section are diverse but are connected by a focus on issues of culture, development and learning from others. Hilda Israel's chapter, 'I am an African, I speak an African language' argues a strong case for the use of African languages

and relates this to creativity and inward strength. The chapter argues that language makes a difference to a person's life, giving pride to one's identity as an African.

Wally Serote's contribution is not really academic. It comes from the heart and is a reflection of personal experiences. His chapter, written in a journalistic style, 'Our Own Regeneration by 'Ourselves': Challenges for Grassroots Mobilisation For IKS' is a 'must read'. Whereas OJ Obodozie covers a difficult topic, 'Diversity and Social Cohesion in Africa: A Blueprint for the Culture of Ubuntu'. He examines the case of Nigeria and isolates important lessons for Africa. The contribution takes the form of a speech but makes important points about how to deal with and manage diversity.

Ramadimetja Shirley Mogale's chapter, 'Re-[membering] My Ways of Knowing and Learning while Learning Otherwise' interrogates 'the ontological and epistemological stances regarding nursing knowledge in the West and in Africa'. Furthermore, she deliberates on the development of nursing knowledge as the nexus by which she re-(membered) her African ways of knowing and learning.

From this point the contributions in the book focus on the roles of 'hard and soft' sciences in innovation, development, global competitiveness, education and critical consciousness. For lack of space, I will not summarise the contents.

These chapters include Kedibone Aphane and Hendra Van Zyl's chapter, 'South African scientists and Engineers Leading the Walk to Innovation', Saahier Parker and Natalie Voltman, 'African Research and Development Surveys: Highlights from the South African Success', Sara Muller, Siyabonga Mhlongo and Phathutshedzo Tshivhengwa's very interesting chapter, 'A Call to Arms: Enlisting the Skills of University Graduates to Teach and Inspire South Africa's Children', Rachel Adams's, 'Africa Unknown: Addressing the Effects of an Alienating Education amongst Learners in South Africa', Siyanda Nazo's, 'Computing for Africa's Global Competitiveness: Examining the use of Computational Electromagnetics as a Tool for Development', Ishmael Makitla and Jabu Mtsweni's, 'Toward Positioning Africa in the Forefront of Science and Technology Advancements in the 21st Century', Kosheek Sewchurran and Eureka Sewchurran's, 'Exploring Developmental and Community Informatics' and Sivuyise Ndzendze's contribution 'Innovation Gateway Provision for Rural Business Development for Global Competitiveness'. This chapter had to be seriously edited and compressed in order to give the discussion more meaning and direction. This discloses what I referred to as varying levels of experience in academic writing among the various authors.

It is worth noting that, as the editor, I tried as much as I could not to impose a particular form of structural unity on the book other than the thematic areas and sequencing during the inaugural conference of the Thabo Mbeki African Leadership Institute. However, in some instances I have had to interfere and tamper with the sequencing of conference papers informed by the internal consistency of individual chapters and the overall logic of narratives in the book. The chapters are therefore interrelated, not discrete. Nevertheless the quality varies, given the diverse experiences of participants. Some are emerging young academics (first time authors), others established scholars, and yet others non-academic intellectuals and participants of various professions. One of the difficulties has been to reconcile writing styles and arrange the referencing. Nevertheless I have absolutely no doubt this book will serve as an invaluable resource and impetus for further reflection and research which must, of necessity, contribute to our all-round emancipation as the billion Africans in Africa and the African Diaspora.

I feel honoured that I was given the challenging task to edit this unique contribution to independent and contemporary African scholarly inquiry. I commend the book to all persons, in Africa and the rest of the world, who are genuinely interested in acting in a principled and sustained manner for the achievement of the historic project of the Renaissance of Africa, the strategic objective of the Thabo Mbeki African Leadership Institute (TMALI) and its partner, the University of South Africa (Unisa).

1. The concept 'unended quest' is used by Karl Popper in his intellectual autobiography titled, *An intellectual autobiography: Unended quest*. It is adopted here to underline what now appears as the 'infinity' of Africa's quest for liberation.

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CHAPTER 2

Wounded Healers and Transformative Leadership: Towards Revolutionary Ethics

Catherine Odora Hoppers

Why we sing (Por que cantamos)

If each hour brings its death if time is a den of thieves
the breezes carry a scent of evil and life is just a moving target you will ask
why we sing

if our finest people are shunned our homeland is dying of sorrow and the
human heart is shattered even before shame explodes
you will ask why we sing

if the trees and the sky remain as far off as the horizon
some absence hovers over the evening and disappointment colours the
morning you will ask why we sing

we sing because the river is humming and when the river hums the river
hums; we sing because cruelty has no name but we can name its destiny;
we sing because the child, because everything, because in the future, be-
cause the people;

we sing because the survivors and our dead want us to sing
we sing because shouting is not enough nor is sorrow or anger

we sing because we believe in people and we shall overcome these defeats
we sing because the sun recognises us and the fields smell of spring;
and because in this stem and that fruit every question has its answer

we sing because it is raining in the furrow and we are the militants of life
and because we cannot and will not allow our song to become ashes.

Mario Benedetti 1979 – Translated by D'Arcy Martin

Ladies and gentlemen, colleagues

The objective of the Thabo Mbeki African Leadership Institute (TMALI) is to address the leadership deficit on the continent and the persistent problem of African underdevelopment. The theme of the conference is Intellectual Leadership Development for Africa's Advancement, supported by four pillars and/or sub-themes, which are linked to the mission and vision statements of this Institute. Central to this is the issue of gathering together a number of African thought leaders who will proactively affirm African identity, while also demonstrating versatility in handling complex issues.

After I received the invitation to participate in the TMALI conference, my mind reeled for several days as I thought of an issue I could address. I finally decided on the issue of wounded healers and transformative leadership, and how to move towards revolutionary ethics. I am an African living in South Africa, the most southern part of the African continent.

In my 2008 address to Unisa in my capacity as Department of Science and Technology and the National Research Foundation South African Research Chair in Development Education, I took a trip back in time to 'my father's homestead'. Fifty-three people formed part of my father's homestead. Needless to say we faced many challenges, some easy, some extremely taxing. The birth of the 53rd child was particularly difficult, as was the pregnancy, and we were not sure that our mother would survive the delivery. But the baby was healthy, and she is now an amazing, vivacious, young South African woman who has a positive effect on all of us. My father's homestead is Africa and it is one of shared joy, laughter, trials and tribulations. That baby is also a metaphor for South Africa (of course there is now, since July 2011, the 54th child, the Republic of South Sudan). As I stand before you, I feel the power and the strength of this homestead. Much has been said and written about the vastness of this homestead, this African continent (Odora Hoppers 2008a).

In terms of its size of 30 million square kilometres, Africa is larger than the combined sizes of the People's Republic of China (9,6 million sq km), the USA (9,4 million sq km), Western Europe (4,9 million sq km), India (3,2 million sq km), and Argentina (2,8 million sq km). Africa is 7 000 km wide and 8 000 km long. It is an enormously diverse continent; a multilingual and multi-ecological tapestry of regions (more than 1 000 languages are spoken); and home to an array of racial and ethnic groups, ecological and biodiversity systems, cultural and religious beliefs and practices, and social and political systems. The total population of Africa is estimated at 1 billion as of November 2009 (Odora Hoppers 2008a).

But in light of the issues that were outlined during the high-level panel discussions last night, I feel obliged to take the discussions and the prognosis a little further. I do this knowing that this might find scant resonance at this point in time. But something special resounds in me when I hear the spontaneous chorus of applause erupting at gatherings like the one last night.

I am acutely aware that every cry for 'justice' is underlined by two competing impulses: one a cry for revenge, the other for a rejection of the evil committed by others on our very own people. A future of coexistence is scripted into this. It is a conscious choice that must be made. Part of the problem of post-independence Africa is that we changed the colour of office holders, but did not change the rules of the game. We then proceeded to play the game with its precarious consequences, which have been commented on over the past 50 years. Metaphorically speaking, we stepped onto the stage without questioning the nature of the plot; and we ate the cyanide-laced biscuits that came with the package (Odora Hoppers, 2010). The symptoms are all around for us to see.

Education, one important proposition for our future, hangs around our necks like a convict's ball. On the one hand, it is our 'hope' encompassing our rights and the key to progress, but on the other it has condemned Africa to a one-generation aristocracy. This is because patriarchy as we know it defines humanity in terms of genealogical descent, and society in terms of relationships between the descendants of common ancestors. Persons with the same genealogical heritage were protected by a set of reciprocal rights, obligations and duties, constituting a covenant of kinship. Conversely, in patriarchal terms, non-kins were non-persons. They lacked genealogical pedigree and protection. They were aliens from rival lineages. They were outside the covenant of kinship (Miller, 1991: 121).

In the context of colonial conquest, the question became what to do with the conquered lineage. The first practice that developed was for the triumphant lineage to kill all the members of the defeated lineage: men, women and children. This was to ensure double death, death of the individual members, and death of the lineage itself, with their descent line permanently cut. The dead lineage had a history but no future.

The second practice in the ancient world was to make eunuchs of male captives. The original eunuch was a captive whose death sentence had been commuted. The male captive's life could be spared if his manhood was disposed of. Castration of all the vanquished males would achieve the same outcome as killing all the captives, or the men, in that it achieved the genealogical death of the defeated lineage while allowing the vanquished men to live.

The third method was slavery. Patterson (cited in Miller, 1991: 127) defines slavery as the permanent, violent domination of natally alienated (and thus

dishonoured) persons. The permanent loss of connection with one's lineage dishonoured the individuals so affected and made them powerless and defenceless in lineage society. They were socially dead. The institution of slavery itself was based on two principles: marginality and integration. Slavery was both institutionalised marginality, and institutionalised reintegration of natively alienated persons into the lineage system (Miller, 1991: 130–134). Next time African leaders sign up for education as a human right, I would like to ask whether they are aware of the role of education in ensuring the genealogical death at the cognitive level of African people.

I do this nodding appreciatively at Nelson Mandela when he said that institutions as systems of elements or rules are expressions of democratic intent. Core social values do not propagate themselves. Adults have to be reminded of those values and children must acquire those values in order that appropriate interventions that support those institutions are generated and structured on an ongoing basis (Mandela 2002).

'Leadership' in the way I see it demands both hardware and software components. There are contents we can package into a curriculum and teach to groups of students. But there is something more we need to think about and prepare for.

- When we mobilise and align strategic capabilities towards the goals of the African renaissance, we have to be fully aware that the casting of generative light at last onto subjugated peoples, knowledge, histories and ways of living unsettles the toxic pond and transforms passive analysis into a generative force that valorises and recreates life for those previously museumised (Odora Hoppers, 2008b; Prakash 1995). What this does is throw open for realignment the conflictual, discrepant and even violent processes that formed the precipitous basis of colonialism.
- In other words, it is a process of engaging with colonialism in a manner that produces a programme for its dislocation (Prakash, 1995: 6) – a dislocation that is made possible not only by permitting subalterns direct space for engaging with the structures and manifestations of colonialism, but also by inserting into the discourse arena totally different meanings and registers from other traditions.
- It is here that subaltern and heterogeneous forms of knowledge such as indigenous knowledge systems and related forms of agency that had no place in the fields of knowledge that grew with colonialism and science at last have a place. But it is not a vacation or honeymoon place.

- By their stirring presence, the subalterns, along with their knowledge systems, become revolutionary heuristics in a postcolonial transformation agenda (Rahnema, 1997).
- When we spell out concepts such as cognitive justice for instance, it is no longer about the pros and cons of debating whether the colonised peoples have a history, or a philosophy, but it is directly about the right of different forms of knowledge to survive – and survive creatively and sustainably turning the toxic hierarchy left behind by colonialism into a circle in which the inner cry for self-determination meets the outer voice of co-determination (Odora Hoppers, 2002).
- Out of this is born a method for exploring difference that rejects hierarchisation and the attendant humiliation, and provides for reciprocity and empathy.

Thus, if culture is the precipitate – the default drive – the taken-for-granted of a people, then when African or indigenous people for instance cry out that the education system throughout the continent lacks familiarity with the context and culture of its learners, what they are saying is that it is carrying another culture's default drive generation after generation. It is a process which disenfranchises and disadvantages the children epistemologically.

In fact it can be said that in Africa, social cohesion does not depend on state sovereignty, liberal democracy, the advance of modernity or the global economy, but upon the millions of African people willing to sacrifice what they 'take for granted' – their cultural script and default drive – by bearing the uncomfortable burden of speaking and acting in unfamiliar cultural idioms within all areas of everyday life. Social cohesion especially in the southern part of Africa would easily collapse if Africans as the natural majority were not willing to suspend 'that which is taken for granted' and bear the burden of unfamiliar cultural transformations. Cultural justice in the context of an African renaissance must require, at minimum, that this burden of the unfamiliar be shared more equitably by people from different cultural backgrounds across society (Kwenda, 2003).

In other words, cultural justice takes us from tolerance to respect in cultural politics, arguing that what is needed is functional respectful coexistence. By respectful is meant mutuality in paying attention, according regard and recognition as well as taking seriously what the other regards as important. By functional is meant that coexistence is predicated on a degree of interaction that invokes the cultural worlds of the players, in essence what they, in their distinctive ways, take for granted. In other words, cultural injustice occurs when people are forced by coercion or persuasion to submit to the burdensome condition of suspending – or permanently surrendering – what they naturally take for granted. This

means that in reality the subjugated person has no linguistic or cultural ‘default drive’ – that critical minimum of ways, customs, manners, gestures and postures that facilitate uninhibited, unselfconscious action (Kwenda, 2003: 70).

By its converse, cultural justice means that the burden of constant self-consciousness is shared or at the very least recognised, and where possible rewarded. The sharing part is very important because it is only in the mutual vulnerability that this entails that the meaning of intimacy and reciprocity in community can be discovered. It is in this sharing that, on the one hand, cultural difference is transcended and, on the other, cultural arrogance, by which is meant that disposition to see in other cultures not simply difference, but deficiency, is overcome. The cultural work that is entailed in constructing functional tolerance therefore goes beyond providing equal opportunities in, say, education to unclogging of hearts filled with resentment (Odora Hoppers, 2005; 2007).

What does this imply for the Building of this Leadership Capability?

- Non-authoritarian authority is justified by its ability to perform social functions. Social functions are significant because they are, in the end, physical functions. In much the same way that Plato justified the authority of pilots by their ability to steer ships safely to port, and of medical doctors by their ability to steer patients safely to health, we need to understand that sometimes the entities that perform the functions and wield the authority are actually NOT persons like pilots and doctors, but words (Richards, 2009).
- A second point of departure comes from Adam Kahane who said that opening our minds ultimately means opening our hearts, and wills. The path forward out of any situation is therefore not just about becoming more clever, but about becoming more human. It is about transcending our fears of vulnerability, not finding new ways of protecting ourselves. It is about how to act in the service of the whole, not just in the service of our own interests.

Here, I get into a tight embrace with the action-driven imperatives of TMALI, affirming, as Kahane did, that if we cannot see how what we are doing or not doing is contributing to things being the way they are, then logically we have no basis at all – zero leverage – for changing the way things are – except from the outside, by persuasion or force. This is because we can never address a problem situation from a comfortable position of uninvolved innocence. To solve tough problems, we need more than shared ideas. We also need shared commitment. We need a sense of the whole and what it demands of us. In other words, there is not ‘a’ problem out there that we can react to, then rush out and fix. Rather, there is a ‘problem situation’ of which each of us is a part

– the way an organ is part of the body. We affect the situation, and it affects us. The best we can do is to engage with it from multiple perspectives, and try, in action-learning mode, to improve it – more like unfolding a marriage than fixing a car, so to speak (Kahane, 2004).

- A third point of departure has to do with moral perception. Lawrence Blum has argued that an agent may reason well in moral situations, uphold the strictest standards of impartiality for testing maxims and principles, and even be adept at deliberation. Yet, unless he/she perceives moral situations as moral situations and unless he/she perceives their moral character accurately, their skills at deliberation will be for nought, and may even lead them astray. One of the most important moral differences between people is between those who miss, and those who see various moral features of situations confronting them. Perception is the setting for action, and salience – in other words the adequacy of an agent's consciousness concerning the situation, or ability to grasp the contours of a problem prior to being called upon to exercise that agency – is key to this (Blum 1991).
- A fourth point is about understanding prototypical violence. Ashis Nandy has stated that every age has a prototypical violence. Every age also has a cut-off point when the self-awareness of the age catches up with the organising principle of the age; when for the first time the shared public consciousness begins to own up or rediscover, often through works of art or speculative thought – what the seers or the lunatics had been saying beyond the earshot of the 'sane', 'normal', 'rational' beings who dominate the public discourse of the time. Thus, it was the mindless bloodshed of the First World War which created a new awareness of an old psychopathology of the times. As the range of human violence and the role of science in that violence began to weigh on the social conscience, a number of European intellectuals woke up, at around this time, to the dangerous human ability to separate ideas from feelings and to pursue ideas without being burdened by feelings.

Hannah Arendt was to later contribute to the same awareness with her portrait of Adolph Eichmann, a plain-thinking non-ideological, hardworking, bureaucratic killer who saw his genocidal responsibility as a problem of efficiency, organisation and objective planning. Arendt recognised that Eichmann was the ultimate product of the modern world, not because he established a new track-record in monstrosity but because he typified the evil that grew out of everyday isolation from training systems that inculcate the vivisectional mandate (or the theory of indifference to the Other) which is but only one step away from social triage (in other words the theory of the demise of the Other). We have to understand how

the sometimes harmless distance between the scientist and his subject becomes in politics that chasm between a self-declared elite – the ‘revolutionary vanguard’ and their theories of progress – and their increasingly voiceless objects of manipulation: the reportedly immature masses, underdeveloped, primitive, and carrying the heavy baggage of false consciousness (Nandy, 1997).

But there are further elements of the software in leadership building we need to articulate forcefully.

Investing in Building Trust as Bridging Social Capital

Here I note that we seem to be living in a world that appears to be caught in a ‘social trap’, in other words an increasingly negative cycle of distrust and negative cooperation owing to mutual distrust and lack of social capital, even where cooperation would benefit all – reflecting a real tragedy of the commons. In fact, it is not that there is no trust at all, but the problem is that the trust and loyalty extend only to fellow members of the particular grouping; and distrust and hostility mark our relations with non-members. This is especially the case where communities are formed by exclusions and often by violence (Sartwell, 2002).

We therefore need to draw a distinction between bridging social capital and bonding social capital, in which ‘bridging social capital’ is a broader concept and encompasses people across diverse social cleavages, whereas ‘bonding social capital’ is more restrictive and tends to reinforce exclusive identities within homogeneous groups and to exclude people from other groups.

Since the existing education system and processes have made it a prime goal to fragment, individualise and valorise competitiveness as supreme ideals, the education of the future needs to invest in the building of bridging, or generalised, trust which can enable us to embrace the ‘stranger’, and people who are not personally known to us in the first instance. It was this that the Delors segment on learning to live together implied. Because trust is infectious, a person with generalised trust believes that most people can be trusted, and is therefore an asset to the sustenance of democracy, and to the future we are seeking.

Towards the Integrative Paradigm Shift

In this second-generation indigenisation, the errors of the past are taken as starting points for new directions. For instance it is recognised that there has been the usual period in a lot of social change where, to establish recognition and strength as prerequisites to an effective presence in dialogue and discourse, there is a polarisation or overreaction against the incumbent (in other words defining

oneself as 'different from', as being important in the process of claiming space to define oneself through self-referencing). The force it takes against established and resistant hegemony to create this space is reflected in an exaggerated and confrontatory antithesis such as radical feminism, the anti-development lobby of the green movement, and in the white settler colonies, the anti-white elements of the black power movement – each spawning an equally distorted backlash (Fatnowna and Pickett, 2002; Odora Hoppers, 2002b).

With this new stream, the integrative paradigm shift recognises that there is a growing maturity of dialogue that is not the result of a paradigm shift, but is the shift itself. It takes off from what Plato once said that justice will only exist where those not affected by injustice are filled with the same amount of indignation as those affected by it. It means a different approach to international work and international collaboration.

Today, we can say that the knowledge paradigms of the future are beginning by reaching out to those excluded, epistemologically disenfranchised, and moving together towards a new synthesis. In this synthesis, it is recognised that shifting of power without a clear shift of paradigms of understanding that makes new propositions about the use of that power in a new dispensation leads to vicarious abuse of power by whoever is holding it – old or new (Venter, 1997).

In this new stream, modernisation proceeds, but without necessarily following Western values (Huntington 1998) or sequences, but rather with a re-strengthening of core values from different traditions of knowledge and living. It is about equal access as citizens of a nation and of the world into the mainstream society, with an emphasis on equality – in other words the right to participate on an equal footing in a negotiating partnership. This includes identifying and deconstructing the mechanisms of any form of assimilation or imposition of other cultures on others (Fatnowna and Pickett, 2002).

Where appropriate, it is about indigenous peoples reclaiming the custodianship over their knowledge in public spaces along with the right to speak and be determining agents of cooperative contemporary change and creative knowledge sharers of these knowledge systems. Western modernisation, progress and thought are seen as temporary epochs in human history with both advantages and disadvantages which must, and are, seeking to re-engage with the more holistic integrated conceptualisations of sustainable life held by cultures that have, fortunately, not been down the path of 'westernisation'.

In other words, it is a rapprochement of modern and older cultures, including modern culture's older roots where each complementing the other opens up the possibility of a viable future for humankind (Huntington, 1998; Fatnowna and Pickett, 2002). The generative adult or adults of the future are seen as standing

between the past and the future to be built and, looking into the future, make that crucial distinction between producing more offspring, and producing offspring who are not crippled (Odora Hoppers, 2008c).

Renewed Focus on Norm Change

Here I bring in the voice of Howard Richards, who addresses the question of changing cultures and argues that the move from one set of cultures to a different one demands a change in human behaviour, cognition and emotion – in other words in social norms.

According to him, a norm can be thought of as having three components: a social norm is an observed regularity in human behaviour. It is a standard humans use to think about and guide their behaviour. Transformations from warlike and violent cultures to cultures that ‘reject violence and prevent conflicts by tackling their root causes to solve problems through dialogue and negotiation’ can be conceived as norm-change. Thus when people come to see themselves as peaceful people who resolve conflicts by dialogue, negotiation and non-violence, they change their norms, adopting or strengthening peaceful ones.

A culture of peace for instance moves away from the norms of machismo and patriarchy, and toward those of gender equality and nurturance. It also moves away from social disintegration and towards norms that prescribe solidarity, and the inclusion of all individuals and groups. These are not innocent questions, guided by no ethics and presupposing no epistemological commitments. A commitment to working for a culture change implies taking stands on some controversial issues. Finding existing norms lending themselves to growth and transformation, and which culture change movements and projects can nurture to create cultures of peace, is an empirical project. It is an enquiry into a historically given culture, as it exists at a time and in a place (Richards and Swanger, 2008).

Interrupting Cycles of Humiliation

From the perspective of Africa, we recognise that it is in the continent’s transforming of the contours of its struggles from archaic resistance to domination that it holds the key to the world’s future. But to do this, a lot depends on how she questions her past (one which is still painful) and the kind of future she would like to see unfold, not just for herself, but also for humanity at large. Much will depend on how she articulates herself out of the experience of humiliation suffered under the hands of colonialism, and avoids adding to self-perpetuating

cultural cycles of violation and vindication that would seem to say, 'I have the right to be angry and make others suffer forever because someone hurt me in the past'.

How can Africa generate less humiliation entrepreneurs like Hitler and more people like Nelson Mandela who interrupt the cycle of humiliation by triggering new cycles of dignity? How can we, together, cultivate enduring instruments and practices that can disarm this singular weapon of mass destruction – HUMILIATED HEARTS AND MINDS – and turn them into weapons of mass creativity and solidarity?

In the context of postcolonialism, we have seen how in some instances the new cultural pride becomes a new nook for intolerance providing seedbeds for new forms of discrimination. Traditions threaten to offer unitary radicalism in which it is not always evident that tolerance and political commitment to diversity will be guaranteed. Human dignity is easily circumscribed in terms of ethnic, national, or religious identity – in short, allegiance to a deterministic (Béji, 2004: 29).

The illusion of self-expression seems to supplant the faculty of mutual understanding, while the disinherited of the earth employ the same devices to exist as the privileged do to dominate. Modern culture has become characterised by the fact that human rights of all kinds are turned into inhuman codes. Sovereignty is replaced by supremacy and tolerance, which is that the rejection of the intolerable has become the right to practise the intolerable. Many times, humanitarian action which professes to be on the side of the weak comes with superpower backing which quickly turns it into providential inhumanity. Antiracism becomes as intolerant as racism, and the rights of the weakest are modelled on the abuses of the rights of the strongest, with the result that the rights of the victims are turning into a morality of cruelty (Béji, 2004: 31).

Culture no longer offers access to humanity or the foundation for the ethic of recognition. Ethnic consciousness has liquidated ethnic awareness creating a costly humanist deficit in which decolonisation fails to live up to the promise inherent in its cultural potential – that of creating a more viable model of civilisation. In other words, because the confrontation between tradition and modernity remains locked in the suspicion and resentment that each has of the other, the confrontation and the poverty of heuristics inherent in this threatens to deprive both of inspiration in that it has stimulated them ideologically, but discredited them morally.

They both converge in terms of the shadows – not of the light they cast – and the destruction, not the creation, that they produce. It is here that the perspectives, methodologies and breakthroughs in unpacking these gross shadows that

are threatening to overwhelm humanity must be deployed with urgency – to precisely reverse this decline and plant new thought experiments in a transversal and transdisciplinary dispensation.

Conclusions

Clearly, the stakes are very high! Understanding and recommitting to human dignity entails understanding humiliation, deprivation, cognitive justice and related disenfranchisements, and the very real possibility that democracy and human rights, taken on their own, may not be enough. At the same time, when we transcend the set of discredited values connected with the past, we do not only retain those facts of history. Turning the facts of history into starting points for present and future action carries with it a tremendous catalytic and empowerment propensity, especially for the ‘wounded’ as they become ‘wounded healers’ (Nouwen, 1972) and innovators.

Once that agony and pain takes on a revolutionary relevance, recalling the facts of the past does not mean telling the old story over and over again. Rather, it begins to open channels through which people can discover themselves, clarify their own experiences and find vantage points from which to put new content, meaning and strategy into whatever developmental visions and provisions in legal frameworks have been made available to the citizen (Odora Hoppers, 2003). This is not part of an effort to incubate reverse assimilation, reverse hegemony or cultural imperialism. Rather, it is part of a search for coexistence, co-determination and cooperative action on a transnational and trans-societal level.

It is time for a rapprochement, an integrative coming together of worldviews in a way that is not just pluralistic tolerance and respect, but goes beyond that to effect transformation in the sense of the emergence of a new synthesis that incorporates the existing diversity of worldviews (Fatnowna and Pickett, 2002).

As mentioned earlier, the knowledge paradigm of the future is beginning to develop by reaching out to those excluded. It is a compassionate but strategic evolution through contemplation during which the outer voice of possibility meets the inner voice of disenfranchisement. Significant and intimate connections are then made between the pain and the creative impulses essential for the transcendence, which then become the very touchstones of healing and creativity. Plainly put, just as there can be no reconciliation without healing, it is only by embracing the profoundness of the agony both politically and intellectually that it is possible to begin the process of ‘turning the monster on its head’, so to speak, with the depth of force that can sustain a steadfast momentum in support of the new directions. It is a process that provides healing for both the oppressor

and the oppressed, and enables those who have been victims to recover the basis for their full citizenship and begin to participate in the Freirean project of 'naming the world' (Freire, 1972). And that is it! That is why we must sing!

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CHAPTER 3

Responsibility and Governance

Elias Kifon Bongmba

I wish to examine the idea of responsibility and argue that responsible governance is needed to address the healthcare crisis in Africa. For many people, responsibility means that one accepts that he or she is the source of a decision, action, or takes blame if something goes wrong. Responsibility is a place holder for examining political, moral, and social actions (Rawls 1976). Responsibility sometimes implies legal liability. As an idea, it has a long theoretical history in philosophy. Kallen (1942) has argued: 'A theory of responsibility, like any other theory, is a reflection of the social situation which generates the theory. Its matrix is some immediate relationship of human beings, as individuals and as societies, to one another. Responsibility is a function of their contacts, of their harmonies and conflicts, whose continual adjustments and readjustments compose the processes of social life' (Kallen, 1942: 350–376). This view of responsibility defines it as an ingredient of social interaction.

Understanding Responsibility

The discourse on responsibility is related to free will, determinism, and human agency. John Fischer and Mark Ravizza have argued that 'someone who is genuinely morally responsible must satisfy certain 'subjective conditions': he must see himself as morally responsible in order to be morally responsible' (Fischer and Ravizza, 2000: 467–480; Fischer and Ravizza, 1998). One could accept moral responsibility because he or she is a target of reactive attitudes from others or in anticipation of reactive attitudes, perceptions and judgements of their social roles. Political leadership entails this view of responsibility because whether the core values of a community are spelled out or not, people often evoke communal values to determine the responsibility of their leaders. Thinking of responsibility and freedom implies that a moral agent acts freely from a sense of duty. Freedom is related to the intention to act. Austin has argued that in assigning responsibility, one should consider if the individual acted intentionally. This view corresponds to what JL Mackie has called the 'straight rule of responsibility' (Mackie,

1977: 208). Mackie relates these principles to intentional systems where behaviour is explainable in light of beliefs, desires, hopes, fears, intentions, perceptions and expectations. If Mackie's rule stands and responsibility refers only to intended actions, then we are left to wonder why people are often held accountable for unintended actions. People do hold an agent responsible for unintended actions if the consequences of such actions affect people negatively. For example, if I forgot to call James on the phone as I planned to do, I may be forgiven. However, if I intended to call James to give him specific and important information but failed to do so, I should accept responsibility for my failure. Accepting responsibility is thus a function of an outcome. In both cases, the freedom to think and act is important. As a free moral agent I am accountable for what I think, say, do, or fail to do. Others insist that one is responsible for his or her action, regardless of the context. Annette Baier has argued that 'philosophical focus ought to be as much on collective as on individual responsibility when we seek to understand ourselves as persons' (Baier, 1991: 6).

Beyond individuals, can large units such as a community bear responsibility for actions that have gone wrong? Some scholars argue that responsibility cannot be attributed to large entities such as corporations or the state. However, such corporations do take blame for their action or negligence. British Petroleum (BP) has agreed to clean up the Gulf and has also promised to pay claims to people who have been affected negatively by the spill, meaning they accept responsibility for the crisis. Human rights activists have argued that the people who planned and executed the genocide in Rwanda, the conflicts in Darfur and post-electoral violence in Kenya are responsible for the fallout. However, Thomas Cushman and Stjepan G Mestrovic have rejected the idea of group or collective responsibility, especially as it was attributed to Serbian intellectuals (Cushman and Mestrovic, 1996: 18). HD Lewis, has also rejected group responsibility and described it as 'the barbarous notion of collective or group responsibility', largely because it lets individuals escape responsibility (Lewis in May and Hoffman, 1991). Furthermore, Michael Zimmerman thinks a person is 'morally responsible for an outcome if and only if he deserves to be blamed for it' (Zimmerman, 1985: 115–122).

The dismissals of collective responsibility and collective guilt ignore the fact that acts of genocide for example, happen because someone or a group planned (Rwanda) or, in the case of the oil spills that cause large environmental damage, someone failed to take the steps necessary to minimise the accidents. Corporate responsibility in the case of the recent Gulf oil spills may also be a way of securing the future of the company by demonstrating to the public that they will do what is right for those affected and for the environment. Nevertheless, assigning

or assuming such corporate responsibility could be challenging because one should demonstrate that in the case of the Rwandan genocide, the ethnic leaders planned, organised and incited the people to carry out acts of hatred. In the case of large corporates it requires proof of neglect or illegal practices aimed at deceiving the public about the threats and nature of the danger such threats pose to the general public. In some cases, the leadership might have deliberated but just made a wrong decision. In such cases, the review process or the search for responsibility and culpability could exonerate parties that are not responsible. Therefore it would be a mistake to dismiss group responsibility, especially after horrific events like the Holocaust, the Rwandan genocide and the apartheid system in South Africa. In the case of the Holocaust, the Nazis deliberately created the political climate that victimised and eliminated more than six million Jews. The Rwandan genocide was well planned and executed by the Hutu majority who felt excluded from power. In all cases there was no justification for the horrific acts that were committed. Corporate responsibility often involves liability for a bad product or environmental disasters like the oil leak in the Gulf of Mexico. In the case of the collapse of Enron, for example, the leaders were held accountable because they might have knowingly misled their employees and investors. Legal action was taken against such leaders to underscore the idea of corporate responsibility (Smith, 1998: 222).

Acknowledging or assigning group responsibility gives the global community an opportunity to address horrible crimes against humanity. Genocide and crimes against humanity constitute a gross violation of individual dignity and the rights of people. Individuals or groups may escape liability, despite the fact that the community is considered liable. For example, although the Rwandan genocide was carefully planned and executed, not all members of the political community bear the same responsibility for the crime. The Hutu, who experienced discrimination in top jobs and governance of the country did not like the Tutsi, who were favoured by colonial leaders and missionaries. The animosity festered and grew over the years and took a turn for the worse in 1994 when certain members of the Hutu community planned the killings to right historic wrongs against their community (Mamdani, 2001). It is not the case that all Hutus were responsible. However, since the Hutu majority targeted a specific group, people often assign responsibility to the Hutus because they carried out what Wole Soyinka has described as collectivised crime (Soyinka, 1998: 11).

Responsibility as a Function of Ubuntu

Responsibility has also been associated with moral virtue. The Greek philosophers used the term 'virtue' to refer to excellences that could enable individuals to function well in the polis (city-state). Ubuntu is also used to define humane acts which prioritise the rights of others. Ubuntu is an important concept in applied ethics. It affects the range of issues Africans face which call for responsibility and ethical ideals from political leaders who must redefine an ethos for the post neocolonial era. This is a perpetual task which should also restructure power relations, deal with political corruption, attack poverty, and improve healthcare.

Ubuntu as a conceptual tool is necessary to explore political virtues and promote wellbeing. It invites a disposition to think and act in ways that create a political culture where people flourish. Ubuntu places humanity at the centre of ethical analysis and action because it prioritises the human in ethical thinking and creates a space for communal and individual thinking and action. Ubuntu values include love, respect and support of a structure of justice. It inspires responsibility that is crucial in addressing the healthcare crisis by using the social and political tools and human resources available to promote the common good. As a basis for justice ubuntu calls for a change of social structures which have left people on the margins for a long time. It is necessary to clarify the range of the term 'ubuntu'. Ubuntu does not imply community at the expense of the individual. The Isizulu expression, *umuntu ngumuntu ngabantu*, which means 'a person is a person through persons', articulates individual and social relations. Similar expressions include phrases like 'it takes a village to raise a child'. These ideas underscore community but also recognise individuality through the idea of a person who has his or her worth because of others. The community does not grant personhood; and the community affirms it because a person lives in an interrelated world. Therefore, ubuntu has individual and communal dimensions and could serve as an important category for moral values even though one should be careful not to generalise it as the African term for moral virtue. Yet it provides anchorage for political responsibility. John de Gruchy has argued as follows:

Its [ubuntu] contemporary reaffirmation is essential for the renewal of democracy in Africa and more universally. This does not imply the denial of individuals or individual political rights. On the contrary, a respect for each person as an individual is fundamental. But it is very different from possessive individualism. The emphasis is on human sociality, on inter-personal relations, on the need which each person has for others in order to be herself or himself (De Gruchy, 1995: 191).

Ubuntu opens a space to realign intersubjective bonds as a vehicle for a new social vision that is founded on the common good.

Responsibility, Ubuntu and Health Care

A sense of responsibility grounded in ubuntu values is necessary for good governance that could address critical challenges in healthcare. Africans cannot depend entirely on the global community. The goals set by the Joint United Nations Programme on HIV/AIDS (UNAIDS) have not been met. Financial allocations for HIV and AIDS and malaria by the Global Fund have been misappropriated in some African countries. Leaders need a new sense of responsibility which will lead them to focus on what they could do locally to provide primary healthcare (PHC) as part of a broad effort to fight the HIV and AIDS pandemic. The World Health Organisation (WHO) and UNAIDS have been promoting PHC as a better way of dealing with health crises. The WHO first focused on PHC at the Alma-Ata meeting in 1978, when the delegates pledged to provide health for all by the year 2000. PHC was defined as 'essential healthcare based on practical, scientifically sound and socially acceptable methods and technology, made universally accessible to individuals and families in the community through their full participation and at a cost that the community and the country can afford to maintain at every stage of development in the spirit of self-reliance and self determination.'¹ This was a social justice project and national governments were to (1) educate people about health problems and prevention methods; (2) promote growing of food and insure proper nutrition; (3) provide sufficient and safe drinking water and proper sanitation; (4) provide and improve maternal and child healthcare; (5) immunise people against infectious diseases; (6) control local endemic diseases; (7) provide appropriate treatment for common diseases and injuries; and (8) provide essential drugs. In Cameroon, the Alma-Ata Declaration was central for public health officials and initiatives. It seemed feasible because President Ahmadou Ahidjo focused on health and created an educational and medical infrastructure to train professional staff. Faith-based organisations (FBO) operated hospitals, dispensaries and health centres.

The project failed in Africa for reasons that include climatic conditions, war, which has not only diverted resources from the agricultural sector but has also turned food into a weapon to be used during times of war, and policies that preferred mineral production.² A review by the WHO found that in Africa, health policies did not consider equity, community participation, intersectoral collaboration or affordability.

Although all countries say that they are committed to PHC implementation, the process has lagged behind due to a combination of factors. These include weak structures, inadequate attention to PHC principles, inadequate resource allocation and, in most cases, inadequate political will. Periodic monitoring and evaluation of PHC activities in most countries is either lacking or done irregularly and, as a result, most country PHC policies have no allowance for feedback mechanisms (WHO, 2008: 2).

The review recommended that health policy be discussed at all levels of the state before implementation and promote regional collaboration and community participation. States were called on to distribute resources equitably, engage in multisector coordination and participation, offer incentives to health professionals to reduce the brain drain to other countries, reform healthcare systems, revamp training procedures, develop tools to monitor PHC, and strive to achieve the UN Millennium Development Goals (MDGs). The review recommended that the WHO support countries to ‘institutionalise on-going good practice and effective measures before introducing new initiatives’ (WHO, 2008: 3). Finally, the ‘WHO should support member countries in capacity building that will enhance implementation of health programmes and actions through PHC and within the framework of health for all policy for the 21st century in the African Region: Agenda 2020’ (WHO, 2008: 3).

This was a call for states to assume responsibility for PHC in their countries. Combating the spread of HIV and AIDS and reversing endemic problems that have beset African countries was an important aspect of President Mbeki’s call for a renaissance. Although African states still face severe economic constraints, many leaders have showed no sense of responsibility. There is a lack of political will to plan effectively, and act boldly to combat HIV and AIDS. Many leaders have continued on the path of domination, despoliation, and the politics of destruction. Meanwhile the rise in healthcare costs demands new and bold economic measures in response to new epidemiological realities. Being part of the ‘bottom billion’, is a factor of the crisis of governance and lack of responsibility.

While recognising these failures, it would be incorrect to say that African leaders have done nothing to change the situation. Six years into the pandemic African leaders launched the Bamako Initiative, grounded on principles of equality, decentralisation of health management, collection of user fees, a commitment to maintain and promote PHC, and development of a national policy on drugs to complement PHC. States pledged to increase access to healthcare for the poorest in society and establish clear objectives for dealing with curative health services.

However, flagging economies and lack of adequate planning slowed down attempts to implement the Bamako Initiative.

Despite the work done by WHO, UNAIDS, non-governmental organisations (NGOs) and FBOs, Africa still lags behind in PHC. In 1993 the World Bank recommended concerted action by the private sector, introduction of a cost structure that would emphasise user fees and a consumer structure that would emphasise the insurance industry (WHO, 1981). This approach was supplanted by a broader United Nations Development Declaration prepared as part of the studies leading up to the Millennium Summit which set these goals:

1. Eradicate extreme poverty and hunger.
2. Achieve universal primary education.
3. Promote gender equality and empower women.
4. Reduce child mortality.
5. Improve maternal health.
6. Combat HIV/AIDS, malaria and other diseases.
7. Ensure environmental sustainability.
8. Develop a global partnership for development.

Although World Bank figures show modest economic growth, the masses have not experienced economic recovery. States have decided to establish a road map to accelerate the achievement of the United Nations MDGs and pledged to improve maternal and child health. The African Union Framework for Child Survival, the African Union Maputo Plan of Action, the African Union Health Strategy and the African Union Implementation Framework for Achieving Universal Access to HIV/AIDS, TB and Malaria Care are important strategies to restructure healthcare. These have been set up alongside major players such as the Global Fund against AIDS, TB and Malaria (GFATM), the United States President's Malaria Initiative (PMI) and the United States President's Emergency Fund for AIDS Relief (PEPFAR). The Paris Declaration on Aid Effectiveness underscored the need for donor countries to work closely with receiving nations. In 2005 the Paris High Level Forum discussed assistance development and issued a memorandum endorsed by 100 signatories of state representatives and international agencies involved in development aid. The protocol, called the Principles of Paris Declaration on Aid Effectiveness, requires developing countries to provide effective leadership in development policies and strategies to coordinate development initiatives. Donor countries were urged to consider their support in light of national development plans, available institutions, correct procedures and transparency.

Responsibility that prioritises PHC requires a national dialogue because what happens in the healthcare sector affects other parts of the economy. States should set reachable goals in light of the WHO Jakarta Declaration, which suggests that healthcare policy in the 21st century should include social responsibility in planning and execution. States should invest in good healthcare systems, and strengthen and expand collaborative efforts with other healthcare providers. States should develop adequate infrastructure to meet health needs. It is the responsibility of government to facilitate access to healthcare. In doing this government leaders should collaborate with religious groups, NGOs and the private sector.

The Ottawa Charter for Health Promotion of 1986 urged states to formulate health policies in dialogue with other providers (WHO, 1986). Members of the private sector – especially Christian healthcare providers – could contribute significantly to the development and articulation of meaningful policies if created through dialogue. In addition all stake holders should lead a healthy lifestyle to lessen dependence on hospital-based care and use technology to introduce a community-based healthcare system.

Responsible Leadership and Conflicting Religious Values

The responsibility of political leaders to provide good healthcare has run into conflict with the religious beliefs in some countries. Some religious communities emphasise faith healing and reject medicines because they believe that God heals through prayer. Faced with such views the state may recognise that as a legitimate religious belief even if state leaders question the sense of responsibility. State leaders could also engage in a dialogue with the persons and educate them on the value of therapeutic products. If the patient is a minor, the state might intervene and ensure that the minor receives the necessary healthcare. During the recent measles outbreak in Malawi some parents refused to have their children vaccinated on religious grounds. It is estimated that 52 000 people were infected with measles from January 2010 and 166 people died as a result of the outbreak. The Malawian government ordered that all children should be vaccinated during a campaign that targeted six million children. Members of the Zion Church refused to have their children participate because they believe in the healing power of prayer alone. Several members of the church attempted to take their children into hiding but the police arrived and rounded them up. The church members claimed: 'We believe in the divine intervention. We know that God will heal us and that no man has power over any illness. We believe that our children will be protected by God and not vaccines.' While this was going on twelve more

people died as a result of the outbreak, including Bishop Lumbani Amos's son. The bishop was later arrested and charged with neglect under section 165 of the Malawian penal code. Members of the Seventh Day Apostolic Church also hid in a building for a week in Namaona village, but police were able to enforce the vaccination order even though a member of the Emily Kalimalima said that members who sought medical help would be excommunicated. Members of this church do not seek medical help even for HIV/AIDS.

These cases raise questions about responsibility on the part of the religious and state leaders. The state assigned responsibility for indoctrinating church members and charged them in court. State leaders took this action because they have a responsibility to control the spread of infectious diseases. Malawian President, Bingu wa Mutharika, criticised these religious beliefs as 'heinous, unbiblical, and tantamount to murder'. He told those who tried to avoid vaccination: 'You are breaking the law if you allow your own children to die because you are barring them from getting vaccinated'.³

Another area that calls for responsible leadership is the debate on condoms as a prevention strategy in HIV/AIDS prevention. The condom has been fetishised as religious and political leaders have preferred abstinence from sexual activity out of marriage. The long saga about condoms ignores responsibility in the fight against HIV/AIDS. Some religious leaders still argue that using condoms promotes promiscuity. On his maiden visit to Africa as head of the Catholic Church, Pope Benedict XVI rejected the use of condoms as a strategy for fighting the HIV virus.⁴

The comments the Pope made on condoms were unfortunate and were a departure from responsibility. He said using condoms could make the HIV/AIDS problem worse. The Pope's position is incorrect and unscientific and should be rejected outright. The Holy Father also said that condoms and things such as divorce, abortion, prostitution, human trafficking and an acceptance of contraception threaten the lives of Africans and have resulted in 'a deficit of ethics in economic structures'.

In facing a pandemic, I have argued that a condom is nothing but a mechanical device invented to prevent sexual partners from sharing bodily fluids, which could pass on the HIV virus. Some political leaders like President Yoweri Museveni of Uganda, who has claimed that condoms do not work all the time, also opposes the use of condoms to prevent transmission of the HIV virus. What we forget is that when they do work, they have the power to save lives. Condoms are merely a 'victim' and the real issue here is the church's difficulty in coming to terms with human sexuality. Humans are sexual beings and abstinence is not the norm; that is why abstinence-only campaigns do not work. Religious leaders

have a responsibility to help people exercise the gift of sexuality in its proper context which includes using protective devices that could save lives. As political leaders failed to regard HIV/AIDS as the greatest challenge facing the human community today, one could say that religious leaders have joined the conspiracy against life with their rejection of condoms. This is a case where the state should intervene, thank the church for the good work it has done, but go ahead and promote the use of condoms and make condoms available everywhere.

The position of many religious leaders has been bolstered by Edward C Green, who has argued that global initiatives have devoted vast sums of money to the fight against HIV/AIDS, but these initiatives have benefitted only the drug companies, consultants and condom manufacturers, and he thinks that the money could have been better used (Green, 2003: 3). Green has argued that 'current business-as-usual approaches to HIV prevention are driven at least as much by politics, financial or business interests, and entrenched mindsets as by science' (Green, 2003: 5). He also argued that prevention methods designed by Westerners do not work (Green, 1994) and that 'AIDS prevention and behaviour change responses that have been to a large extent indigenous seem to have had significant impact on national HIV prevalence' (Green, 2003: 9). Green thinks that people changed their behaviour by reducing sexual partners, were faithful to one partner, delayed sexual debut (the onset of sexual activity) and practised sexual abstinence. He noted that condom use was rising and an 80 per cent effectiveness rate had been reported, although Green argued that this was 'a significant risk'. He also argued that 'condom use is most likely to have national impact on countries where HIV is highly concentrated among commercial sex workers and their clients, such as in Southeast Asia, especially during the early stages of local epidemics' (Green, 2003: 10). According to Green, sex workers in Asia are likely to have more success at insisting on condom use than in Africa where men have been reluctant to use condoms.

Green has argued that the ABC (abstain, be faithful, use a condom) strategy had worked in Uganda, where HIV rates peaked in 1991 and when condom use stood at five per cent, and had increased by only one per cent in 1995. He argued that condom use did not play a major role, but the Ugandan message of 'zero grazing' worked well (Green, 2003: 11). Green argued that studies in Senegal, Jamaica and the Dominican Republic suggested similar trends. Green defended his position, although he admitted that abstinence and a delay of sexual debut were luxuries unavailable to many African women. He noted correctly that strengthening African women employment could empower them to take a stance on condoms that could reduce the rates of infection. Green pointed out that most of the risk-reduction spending went to programmes that required medical

products, although, based on some studies, prevention programmes ought to have supported ABC. According to Green, the HIV/AIDS establishment, including the World Bank, ignored the evidence in Uganda and gradually sidelined him, even from the United States Agency for International Development (USAID), although that agency did publish his findings. However, the President of Uganda, Yoweri Museveni, gave Green the Philly Lutaaya Award for his work.

Green's argument has been challenged by other researchers, especially researchers who encourage the use of technology in addition to changes in sexual behaviour. There is nothing wrong with claiming – as many researchers do – that the behaviour-change strategy works as part of a larger framework, which includes medicalisation and the promotion of medical products like condoms, which Green himself admits have an 80 per cent success rate. Total abstinence might be impossible, but emphasis on fidelity and the delay of sexual debut among youths are goals that might be within the reach of the religious leaders if those campaigns are carried out effectively.

In July 2010, I participated in a summer school on HIV/AIDS at the teaching hospital of the University of Makerere University in Kampala. Condoms became a contested issue during a session with religious leaders on 7 July 2010. The religious leaders who spoke to us included Canon Gideon Byamugisha, who represented ANERELA+ and Christian Aid; the Most Reverend Sam Ruteikara, former director of the AIDS programme for the Anglican Church of Uganda; Frank Onago from the large Watoto Pentecostal Church (formerly known as the Kampala Pentecostal Church); Tamale Joseph from the National Healers Association; Salim Abdul Noah of the Ugandan Muslim Supreme Council; and Okiror Samuel from the secretariat of the Inter-Religious Council of Uganda (IRCU).

Byamugisha, who was the first cleric in Africa to disclose his HIV status, is taking responsibility. He argued that his organisation approaches its work from a theology of redemption and the scriptural teaching of a new heaven and earth to signify new beginnings. He argued that passages like Isaiah 65: 20 are important to them because the text stresses that no child will die in infancy and life expectancy will be over 100; therefore, AIDS is not part of God's loving and redemptive paradigm. They focus on SSDDIM – stigma, shame, denial, discrimination, inaction and mis-action. They also try to address the consequences of AIDS, and use liturgy to encourage people and to let them know that HIV/AIDS is a preventable situation.

On prevention of infection, Byamugisha's organisation works with SAVE – safe practices, access to treatment, voluntary counselling/testing, and empowerment. They pray for a vaccine in the near future. Since 1992 he has worked with the Friends of Gideon Foundation, formed with the support of the former

archbishop of Kampala. What is important to him is not that he was the first cleric to declare that he was HIV-positive but, rather, the reality that there are now more than 3 000 clerics in ANERELA+ in over 28 countries. They now have a global working group on faith and SSDDIM, which works for life and peace. They hold national workshops as well as a global conference every three years. They are determined to defeat HIV/AIDS before the 50th anniversary of its discovery in 2031.

Bishop Ruteikara, formerly the director of the AIDS programme for the Anglican Church of Uganda and co-chair of the Ugandan AIDS Council, admitted that HIV/AIDS has affected him in many ways because he knows many people who have been affected by the disease, but said that he would still be involved in combating it even if he did not know any one affected. First religious communities promote awareness of HIV and AIDS and carry out advocacy on behalf of those affected. Second, religious communities have human resources who work as volunteers. Religious organisations face the challenge of mobilising their members and the pressure to support the use of condoms even when abstinence and faithfulness to one partner are effective. Ruteikara said that while science claims that condoms work to combat the disease, religion favours abstinence.

Third, religious groups in Uganda provide as much as 60 per cent of the healthcare in some cases, but much of the international funding goes to government agencies. Fourth, he pointed out that some political decisions being promoted in Uganda could complicate the fight against HIV/AIDS. These issues include the criminalisation of the transmission of the virus, where one of the parties knowingly has unprotected sex, compulsory HIV/AIDS testing, and compromising the confidentiality of patients. Legislating some of these could jeopardise the fight against the pandemic. He argued that civil society in Uganda should unite and speak with one voice. Finally, he said that the major religious denominations want to focus on an effective message based on the fear of God, appreciation of the biomedical approach to AIDS, the role of the Scriptures as a guide, the use of religious infrastructure to fight AIDS and the expectation that individuals would exercise self-control to prevent the spread of the HIV virus.

Pastor Frank Onago of the Watoto Church pointed out that God is working in their midst and they are using the Bible story of the Good Samaritan as their model because Jesus told his listeners to go and help others as the Good Samaritan helped the person who was attacked by robbers and left for dead. In their church they focus on orphans, with the goal of placing them in homes, not orphanages. The Watoto Church has bought enough land for three villages, comprising 300 acres for individual homes, to house the most desperate people. About eight children live in a house and are cared for by a foster mother, who may bring

one to two children of her own. The church also provides father figures through its 'Father's Heart' programme. All children are required to attend school up to high school. There are currently about 2 200 children in these homes. Whereas previously the church used to provide care for these orphans in their original villages, it decided to phase out this outreach work because it could not reach the children in the villages.

The Watoto Church also cares for widows, enrolls them in a 12-week life skills course and provides capital to help them begin businesses. They currently work with about 1 800 widows. The church teaches advocacy to encourage members to be involved in the community and as well as in social advocacy, since in doing that they would see politics as the science and activity that manages the affairs of people and the community. For that reason, Pastor Onago believes that the church must be involved in managing community issues.

Mr Tamale Joseph from the National Healers Association indicated that fighting HIV/AIDS is an important part of their work. In the past, the Ugandan government believed that members of the National Healers Association were representatives of Satan. However, the work of traditional healers in the context of HIV and AIDS has made the government take notice of them. AIDS is a call from God to tell people that they have lost the way and should return to their Maker. They do not favour science because they believe that spirituality is superior and traditional religious beliefs could solve most problems. They organise themselves and do research together. They believe that they provide for 80 per cent of health issues in the various communities and they cooperate with international organisations. Their main problem is that the state does not give legal recognition to their practice. They therefore continue to seek the approval of government and would like a separate government ministry for their religion, one which recognises traditional medicines. Mr Salim Abdul Noah from the Ugandan Muslim Supreme Council indicated that the sheikhs are active in the AIDS ministry, but could do more. They have been active in promoting and providing support for People Living with AIDS (PLWA) and they work with the community to provide care and support for such people. This work is founded in faith, compassion and the call to provide care. In Islam, he argued, anyone who saves a life saves the world. He also talked about the community and the work they do in fighting stigmatisation. They support male circumcision and wish to educate people about it. They also deal with HIV in marriage and provide premarital counselling. As religious leaders, they bring religious teachings from the Koran, exhorting people to avoid alcohol and adultery. The Ugandan Muslim Supreme Council believes that their leaders could also serve as role models. In order to meet the needs of the community, they have expanded their services

in all 32 districts of the country. They continue to face challenges and look to donors to help fund their services although they have not received funding from PEPFAR to work on capacity building.

Mr Okiror Samuel from the secretariat of the IRCU said that his organisation was formed to bring unity among the different religious communities. This organisation addresses many issues that are raised by the media. Religious leaders are active in the HIV/AIDS ministry at all levels and the government listens to them. They have a broad and unusual constituency, ranging from family level right up to national and even global level. People respect them and they have credibility. Some of the leaders do not have adequate training to understand policy, and some lack research competence. These are areas that require development so that religious leaders can engage meaningfully to review policy. They plan to decentralise their activities, serve as advocates for those affected by HIV and AIDS and work with policymakers, journalists and all five member of IRCU (the Orthodox Church, the Church of Uganda, the Roman Catholic Church, the Seventh Day Adventist Church and Islam). There is strength in collaboration, but they also wish to build trust among themselves.

Following these presentations, a member of the summer school asked if they preach and encourage members of their communities to use condoms. This question seemed to catch the leaders off guard. The Islamic leader said they encourage the use of condoms among discordant married couples. In general, other leaders indicated that they do not encourage the use of condoms for religious reasons and that conservative religious groups and those he described as 'religious fanatics' do not support the use of condoms, whereas the progressive groups do encourage it at times. He said a mufti had declared a jihad against HIV/AIDS and told his listeners that it meant that they could use every means available to fight the disease, including condoms. Byamugisha said that the Gideon Fellowship Organisation's motto is, 'if it's not on, it's not in'. The Pentecostal pastor pointed out that it is unfair to think that the church is a culprit just because it does not promote condoms, and it is wrong to incriminate someone simply because they take a different approach to fighting the battle. He said others should fight using their own particular strengths and the church would fight using its particular strengths.

Ruteikara said that condom usage was not a point of debate; he felt that it should not be the main issue on the table because the real issues were whether people have access to condoms and know how to use them correctly, rather than whether they talk about it or not. He called for more research and capacity building. At this point, the author (Elias Bongmba) said that people were not making a fuss about condoms, but were merely calling for dialogue on the issue.

He (Bongmba) reminded the religious leaders that they were the ones who had actually fetishised the condom. He called the condom a simple mechanical device that is designed to prevent fluids from passing from one body to another during sexual intercourse; hence he could not understand why the religious leaders were so opposed to its use.

Another participant asked the leaders if they support gay rights. Byamugisha responded that, from his point of view, the issue is not about gay rights, but about health for all and all people needing protection, skills and medication. Byamugisha also said that the church needs more accompaniment than criticism. He acknowledged that every sexual act is a divine statement on procreation and an expression of love and no one engages in sex unless to express love. While he was correct, it should be mentioned that in the context of HIV and AIDS many of the women who have become victims were raped and the sexual act was not an expression of love. Byamugisha also pointed out that the church's view has a long history and one cannot expect the church to change its teachings overnight, simply because we became aware of HIV/AIDS in 1981. He indicated that it is hard for Catholics to make such a change and that the church members should help the leaders to change their perspective – through prayer, research, and so on – instead of criticising and attacking them.

The Pentecostal pastor added that their core values were based on the message of the church. At this point the author (Elias Bongmba) noted that the church was taking a magisterial posture on this issue and questioned when the church would undertake a Kierkegaardian teleological suspension of morality and support the use of condoms to save lives. Ruteikara responded that times are changing and the issue of condoms would have to be addressed at some other forum. But he said that the church had gradually changed and became more verbal on AIDS. Now the Ugandan AIDS Commission is chaired by a Catholic bishop – something unheard of 15 years ago; now bishops and priests talk about AIDS in their parishes; he said that they still don't understand issues of men having sex with other men – these topics are still taboo – but even this may gradually change. Byamugisha had the last word, arguing that a fanatic is someone who has forgotten his objective; activists must weigh how they are trying to reach their objective. He said that we have to gauge people's viewpoints and sensitivities and then slowly make inroads; if we try to change things too drastically and quickly, we are sure to fail.

The question here is what would count as a responsible and effective campaign? While there is no one single thing that would serve as a magic bullet, religious communities can work on a total package that includes the use of a variety of messages about HIV/AIDS. Taking responsibility seriously means that

the Christian community still needs to come to terms with protection methods that use the condom. It is a fallacy to claim that just because condoms are available, people will have more sex. If that were the case, at least they would be better protected since they would be using condoms. And if that is not the case, then the view that the availability of condoms encourages people to have more risky sexual encounters is not true. There is no hard evidence that sexual activity has gone up because of condoms. Some people say condoms sold in Africa are defective and as many as 20 per cent of them fail. If that is the case, there is still an 80 per cent success rate, an impressive success rate by any medical standard.

On 23 November 2010, the Vatican announced what should rightly be called a seismic shift in their policy on condoms. They indicated that the Pope thinks that condoms are a lesser evil if they are used to stop the spread of AIDS, even if using condoms might stop pregnancy. This news was greeted with relief by individuals and organisations who have long championed the use of condoms as an important prevention tool. Some tried to interpret the statement to mean that the Pope gave only partial support to the use of condoms and his core values have not changed. However, James Martin called the decision a game changer and added: 'By acknowledging that condoms help prevent the spread of HIV between people in sexual relationships, the Pope has completely changed the Catholic discussion on condoms'.⁵ The Pope's statement was generally welcomed as an important change in Africa.

I continue to see condoms as a very important weapon in the fight against HIV/AIDS, whereas other scholars support condoms only in the context of the ABC approach. Yet, if we ignore the use of condoms to prevent the spread of HIV/AIDS, we are assuming that everyone who is unmarried will abstain, that those who are married will not have extramarital affairs, and youths will delay sexual debut – and that when they do engage in sexual intercourse, will remain faithful to the first partner. We also assume that we can end commercial and transactional sex although we know that this is not possible since we live in a fallen world where condoms are not the problem because the real problem is unprotected sexual intercourse.

With its responsibility on this issue the state should promote the use of condoms and facilitate the importation of condoms and the manufacture, distribution and marketing of condoms in Africa. HIV infection remains a problem in Africa because by the time a person realises that he or she has the virus, he or she might already have infected someone. The idea of responsibility in the context that I have sketched involves governance. Governance is not something that just happens by virtue of having won an election or having taken over the country by means of a military coup. It requires intentional acts. Intentionality

suggests that those governing have thought about the various issues and possibilities that exist. It is important to stress that this is a rational exercise, given that those empowered to govern have to consider options and make judgements about approaches that will work in a given situation. Such deliberation leads to a choice of action or a set of actions. In the context of a political community, those actions are the kind of activities that would promote the wellbeing of all in the community. Those actions may be carried out in fulfilment of the leader's constitutional obligations, but sometimes these actions are not spelled out in constitutions.

Leaders could demonstrate their sense of responsibility by promoting justice which rejects structural violence. Structural violence refers to the notion that violence comprises not only individual acts that violate the dignity of other people, but also occurs because the structures in place ignore the rules of engagement or the structures are mismanaged, thereby failing to carry out or fulfil their obligation to members of the community. Violence in this context could also refer to the many things that are left undone, either because of ethnic, class or gender issues. In other words, discrimination for any of these reasons constitutes an act of violence. Then we know that violence also refers to direct acts of violence perpetrated either through human rights abuses or direct brutal actions against members of a community. Thus structural violence refers to a number of unethical practices that violate the dignity of another person, brutalise people, and create gender biases (Hall, 1993: 220).

But violence can also result from direct abusive acts. The overall picture is of a society that has structures that fail to promote the wellbeing of other members of the society. In such a society, the structures allow some people to dominate, exploit, manipulate and deceive others. Structural violence is difficult to address because in some places it is justified as cultural and religious practices. When random or organised acts are ignored or justified on the grounds of protecting the security of the state or the institution, violence has been normalised and legitimised (Moltman, 1996: 95). Often, the countries in which this happens have laws that prevent the actions that many engage in to protect the state. Many actions that do not protect and promote the dignity of others constitute structural violence. In light of this, patriarchal systems and relationships that fail to protect women and girls also constitute structural violence. The distribution of positions and power relations in a society or political community that continually ignores other sectors of the society could be seen as structural violence because such arrangements contribute to systemic violence. The dynamics of political leadership in many developing countries exclude many from participation in government. Being ignored and excluded from participation is violence in itself,

but in many cases, those excluded are brutalised. Accepting responsibility means that the state will pay attention to these issues by introducing a renaissance and governance structure that would foster justice.

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CHAPTER 4

Evolving Thoughts on the Afro-Optimism – Afro-Pessimism Debate

Locksley Edmondson

Outline of a presentation at the Thabo Mbeki Leadership Institute International Conference on Intellectual Leadership Development for Africa's Advancement, Johannesburg, 11–13 October 2010.

This is a preliminary version of a work in progress, thematic and idealistic in approach, and focused mainly on Africa's ongoing challenges of nation-building in historical and comparative international perspective. My basic thesis is that pessimistic outlooks (especially in the Western world) on Africa's postcolonial development are frequently flawed in their assumptions and conclusions and must therefore be constantly challenged.

In considering Africa's challenges, it is not to say that we should gloss over Africa's many political and socioeconomic setbacks but such a process should engage in constructive, not destructive, criticism. Pessimism is indeed dysfunctional in engaging the challenges of transformation and change.

A major flaw of many Afro-pessimists is the implicit and at times explicit equation of postcolonial African failures with African incapacities. Another flaw is the frequent assumption that short-term African failures will necessarily end up in long-run disasters.

In aiming for a more balanced and nuanced picture it is useful to engage temporal and international perspectives in assessing some of Africa's failings as well as achievements in comparison with other world regions over time. This is a perspective often overlooked in the ongoing Afro-pessimism versus Afro-optimism ideological and analytic encounters.

One compelling factor which impacts on negative images of African continent-wide political setbacks and failings is that most African countries (46 to be precise) acquired independence in the very short time frame of four decades (1950s–1980s) with little or no time for 'staggering' over centuries their new nation-building processes, as was the case in Europe.

The year 2010 is one for celebrating the fifty-year anniversaries of the achievement of independence by seventeen African countries but in a historical sense these are 'infant' nations, a status exacerbated by (1) the inheritance of colonial patterns of authoritarian anti-democratic rule; (2) the challenge of converting colonially contrived state-nations into viable nation-states; (3) achieving independence in the era of the so-called 'positive state' being thus challenged by domestic expectations from within for the provision of basic services (such as education, healthcare, transportation infrastructure); and (4) facing external constraints in an international system historically structured by and for the interests of others.

The older nation-states of the Western world initially developed in the absence of such domestic expectations or an overarching/limiting international system, let alone the early benefits acquired by many of these states through their occupations and exploitation of others such as through transatlantic slavery and colonialism.

In the context of historical stages of nation-building, it should be noted that the wave of military rule during the earlier post-independence years was not a peculiarly African phenomenon, given equivalent authoritarian patterns in early European development and a long history of militarism in Latin America until fairly recently.

Despite several African political failings it is commendable that there have been relatively few instances of trans-border warfare given the arbitrary imposition of colonial boundaries. Even more promising have been burgeoning steps to overcome the legacies and drawbacks of such artificially colonially created states with vertical ties to their respective metropolises, by developing horizontal relationships through regional and continent-wide political and economic institutions.

It is at once impressive and promising that within a scant thirty-nine year period, beginning with the formation of the Organisation of African Unity in 1963, the ideal of African unity has been strengthened, if not fully realised, in the formal launching of the African Union (AU) in 2002. By contrast it took Europe centuries to forge the idea of the European Union – in the aftermath of two world wars, the most destructive ever visited on humankind. Even in the face of operational setbacks, the AU's mission and promise provide grounds for optimism in its commitment to extend areas of collective responsibility in a cooperative framework.

Independent Africa has contributed to the search for a more viable and egalitarian world order in at least four respects:

1. Democratising the membership structure of the interstate/international system, evident in the fact that while there were four states from Africa among the fifty-one founding members of the United Nations in 1945, Africa today, with fifty-four members, has the largest continental representation in that body.
2. Contributing significantly to delegitimising the notion of colonialism as a tool of statecraft.
3. Helping to situate and expand economic development issues on the United Nations agenda.
4. Influencing the now widely accepted notion that racism is no longer confined to states' 'domestic jurisdiction', but is instead a central challenge in international relationships.

This October 2010 an international conference on 'Intellectual Leadership Development for Africa's Advancement', which will necessarily include critical analyses of Africa's postcolonial experiences, is nonetheless anchored in the framework of an African Renaissance, an unquestionably positive and optimistic notion. It would also do well to derive some inspirations from the early pioneering pan-Africanists on the African continent and the African Diaspora – operating in a much more hostile environment than today's – who in their liberation activities deployed or developed their intellectual skills (whether or not they were formally located within the 'professional' intellectual class).

In this context it is appropriate to recall the counsel by independent Ghana's founding father Kwame Nkrumah who once said words to the effect that one of Africa's primary needs was for 'men'/people of action who were thinkers and thinkers who were 'men'/people of action.

Alternative Leadership Paradigm for Africa's Advancement

CHAPTER 5

Leadership, the Oldest Practice and Youngest Discipline: Clearing the Path to the African Renaissance

Emmanuel Ngara

The story I was once told by a member of Professor Lule's government in the late 1970s goes as follows: If you walked the corridors of power in Kampala when General Idi Amin was president, the name plates you saw on the doors of ministers read Brigadier X, Brigadier Y, Brigadier Z and so on. When Amin was replaced by Yusuf Lule, the name plates changed overnight to Professor X, Professor Y, and Professor Z. This transformation from brigadier to professor has in a sense been replicated in the transformation that has taken place in the last decade or so from 'manager' to 'leader'.

Admittedly, this transformation has not been nearly as dramatic as the political one that took place in Uganda, but there is no doubt that the term 'leader' has become more popular than the term 'manager' among academics and business practitioners and in the writings of theorists. Leadership is the 'in thing' now. We now have company leaders, church leaders and academic leaders; leadership centres are being established where in the past we would have had management institutes. Books on leadership are being churned out in their thousands every month. We even have leadership theorists telling us about the '21 laws of leadership', which are presumably meant to work with the same consistency and regularity as the laws of physics.

The picture painted above of the relationship between leadership and management would seem to indicate two things: first, that as a discipline management is older than leadership, and second, that the phenomenon of leadership is beginning to claim an important place in the human psyche. Management as a discipline is in fact a very recent development, yet it is older than leadership as a discipline. Faculties of management science offering qualifications ranging from undergraduate certificates to doctoral and postdoctoral qualifications have been in existence for decades throughout the world. However, while diploma programmes in leadership are becoming common and some universities are beginning to offer postgraduate degrees in areas such as organisational leadership,

it is rare to find institutions that offer a full range of qualifications in leadership from undergraduate to postgraduate level. A clear indication that leadership is not yet recognised as a field of study in its own right is to be found in the Classification of Educational Subject Matter (CESM) in South Africa. Leadership falls under business, commerce and management sciences; and under philosophy, religion and theology (Ngara, 2007). This is comparable to saying that theology is a branch of philosophy or that mathematics is a branch of statistics.

The observations that leadership is beginning to claim an important space in the human psyche and that leadership as a discipline is still in its infancy is a fascinating phenomenon to ponder. Some authorities have even gone so far as to assert that leadership is the most important issue in our world today (Van Maurik, 2001: 1). An examination of disciplines such as accounting, business administration, engineering, economics and management sciences in general would seem to indicate that the emergence of these disciplines is closely linked to economic development and consequently to practices that have emerged as a result of economic development. Thus it can be argued that business administration is closely linked to the development of modern business, just as construction engineering is linked to the development of the construction industry. The question that arises is whether leadership as a discipline is beginning to emerge now because leadership as a practice is emerging only now.

If we take the basic requirement of leadership to be a situation where someone or some people have influenced others to follow them or have given direction to others and caused other people to complete a task or to come together for a common purpose, we can conclude that leadership as a phenomenon and a practice has been in existence since time immemorial. Here in Africa, leadership is evident in the history of the ancient civilisations of Ancient Egypt, Nubia, Ethiopia, Ghana, Zimbabwe, and many others. It is evident in the formation of nations such as the Zulu nation, the Sotho nation and the Swazi nation. All this points to the fact there has been effective leadership practice in the history of the African people. Leaders rose and as a result others formed nations and created kingdoms and empires. Leaders caused others to erect fortifications and monuments such as Great Zimbabwe, Mapungubwe and the pyramids of Ancient Egypt. These are symbols of powerful leadership practice.

The Development of Leadership as a Subject for Comment and Analysis

The argument presented in the previous section shows that as a practice, leadership has been a key determinant of human development throughout the recorded stages of human history. Why it is emerging only now as a key concept and

phenomenon for discussion and debate and as a discipline is a useful topic for further research. This chapter intends to show that the road to the present stage, where leadership is emerging as an academic discipline and a unique subject for discussion and debate at conferences, in boardrooms and lecture rooms, has been very slow and bumpy. Because of the time it took to emerge as a subject for debate and analysis, its development has been accompanied by misunderstandings, misconceptions and myths. Some of these, such as the following, have negatively affected leadership practice to the detriment of humanity:

1. Powerful individuals, among them rulers and leaders of organisations such as churches, have come to believe that it should be assumed that they not only lead, but also own the organisations and countries concerned, as well as the people who belong to those organisations or live in those countries. In other words, the organisations or countries concerned become something like private property, with people accepting the unwritten law that they owe their very existence to the leader.
2. Leaders are born, not made: leadership is an exclusive club for those who were born with this particular quality. In other words, someone not born a leader has no hope of ever becoming one. While philosophers, priests, doctors, engineers and teachers owe their positions to training, leaders have no need of training.
3. Leadership is synonymous with position. Someone is a leader if they hold an important position in society or in an organisation. Thus kings, queens, presidents of countries, bishops and chief executives of companies were considered *ipso facto* leaders. By contrast, no one who had no title or designated position could claim to be a leader.
4. Because leadership was equated with status, people tended to think of leadership only in relation to those domains in which people occupy important positions – politics, government, religion, business and so on.
5. In the academic and business world, leadership came to be confused with cognate disciplines such as management, politics and governance and public administration.

The road to the point at which we can talk of leadership as a discipline which is distinct from cognate disciplines has been slow. This is not to say that humanity was completely oblivious of the phenomenon of leadership, however. From time to time in different cultures and different parts of the globe, efforts were made to describe what leadership really was, despite its misinterpretation by those who occupied positions of influence in society. These people made pronouncements

or coined philosophical or cultural maxims that revealed some truth about the nature of true leadership. Some of these were the result of the insights of gifted thinkers, while others expressed the collective wisdom of a people.

Many are familiar with the following quotation from the play *Twelfth Night* by the famous English playwright, William Shakespeare: 'Some are born great, some achieve greatness, and some have greatness thrust upon them.'

With these words Shakespeare expanded the notion that leaders are born and not made. He recognised that in human history there have been leaders who achieved greatness – who worked hard to become what they became. He also recognised that there are indeed born leaders, and that there are some upon whom leadership positions are undeservedly bestowed. The Ancient Greek historian Thucydides is quoted as having said: 'The bravest are surely those who have the clearest purpose ... and go out to meet it' (Cooper and Sawaf, 2000: 147). A truly great leader has a purpose in life and exercises leadership in relation to that purpose. The challenge here to would-be leaders is to discover their true purpose in life and to reflect on their unique contribution to their society and to humanity. Leadership is not just a matter of gaining power or indulging in self-aggrandisement. There is a higher purpose to leadership.

In a very different part of the world, the Chinese in their collective wisdom coined an insightful proverb about the true nature of leadership: 'Not the cry but the flight of the wild duck leads the flock to fly and to follow' (see Adair, 2002: 61). By this the Chinese were making the important observation that it is not what you say that makes you an effective leader, but what you do. Leadership is not the important position you hold and the official pronouncements you make, but the significant actions you take, for leadership is a function. In other words, a true leader leads by example. When there is a function to be performed or a task to be achieved, followers are more likely to follow the leader who rolls up his or her sleeves and says 'Let's go!' than the leader who sits in his or her chair of authority and says 'Go!'

In our part of the world, the collective wisdom of our ancestors points to something fundamental about the true nature of the relationship between leaders and the people. Drawing from the African philosophy of ubuntu/botho, which teaches us that a person is a person through other people, our ancestors went on to extend this to leadership when they formulated the maxim which is expressed as follows in Southern Sotho and has equivalents in other languages of the Southern Africa subcontinent: '*Morena ke morena ka batho*', 'A king is a king through (or because of) the people'.

This goes to the very heart of the matter. A leader has no claim to leadership except as he or she expresses the collective will of the people. The leader does

not represent himself or herself, but exists for the sake of the people. This philosophy negates the notion referred to earlier that the ruler owns the country and the people he or she rules; or that the leader of an organisation necessarily owns that organisation and the people who belong to or work in it. This African maxim states that the leader was given his or her position for the benefit of the country and its people, not for his or her own sake. The leader is therefore a steward who holds the position and exercises the authority bestowed upon him or her in trust.

Two thousand years ago, a leader arose whose teaching on leadership captures the botho concept and went even further to clarify the relationship between leaders and the people they lead. The following is only one of a number of passages in which Jesus teaches about leadership:

When the ten heard about this, they became indignant with James and John. Jesus called them together and said, 'You know that those who are regarded as rulers of the Gentiles lord it over them, and their high officials exercise authority over them. Not so with you. Instead, whoever wants to become great among you must be your servant, and whoever wants to be first must be slave of all. For even the Son of Man did not come to be served, but to serve, and to give his life as a ransom for many' (Mark, 10: 41–45 (NIV)).

These views went unnoticed by scholars and other thinkers. Even Jesus's teaching has been largely ignored by his followers. It was not until the twentieth century that leadership as a discipline began to attract the attention of scholars in the West, that they began to think seriously about the nature of leadership, and leadership theories began to emerge. First, in the 1930s, came trait or qualities theory, which was based on the notion that leaders are born and not made. Later, adherents of a school of thought led by the likes of Ken Blanchard, author of *The one minute manager*, began to question qualities theory. This school of thought was concerned with the need to account for leadership behaviour, stating that there was more to leadership than possessing certain qualities or traits, as different situations demanded different styles of leadership. Success in leadership therefore depended in large measure on the ability of the leader to match his or her style to the demands of the situation and the level of maturity of the followers. Thus the situational theory of leadership developed, followed by the functional theory of leadership, the transformational theory of leadership, and others.

A breakthrough that deserves mention relates to endeavours to differentiate between leadership and management. A key figure in this development was

Warren Bennis, who formulated the following list of what distinguishes the leader from the manager:

- The manager administers; the leader innovates.
- The manager is a copy; the leader is an original.
- The manager maintains; the leader develops.
- The manager focuses on systems and structure; the leader focuses on people.
- The manager focuses on control; the leader inspires trust.
- The manager has a short-term range; the leader has a long-term perspective.
- The manager asks how and when; the leader asks what and why.
- The manager always has his eye on the bottom line; the leader has his eye upon the horizon.
- The manager imitates; the leader originates.
- The manager accepts the status quo; the leader challenges it.
- The manager is the classic good soldier; the leader is his own person.
- The manager does things right; the leader does the right thing (Van Maurik, 2001: 101–102).

A very important contribution to the full recognition of leadership as a discipline is that made by the businessman and thinker, Robert Greenleaf. It is necessary to state from the outset that some followers of Robert Greenleaf would probably object to the notion of linking his thinking with any religion. However, it is striking that Greenleaf came up with a concept of leadership that is strikingly similar to that of Jesus. It was Robert Greenleaf who popularised the concept of servant leadership as an approach to leadership that applies to all spheres of life – business, religion, education or governance. In answer to the question ‘Who is the servant-leader?’, Greenleaf responds as follows:

The servant-leader is servant first – as Leo was portrayed. It begins with the natural feeling that one wants to serve, to serve first. Then conscious choice brings one to aspire to lead. That person is sharply different from one who is leader first, perhaps because of the need to assuage an unusual power drive or to acquire material possessions. For such, it will be a later choice to serve – after leadership is established (Greenleaf, 1977: 27).

If Greenleaf were to express this view to Jesus, the latter would probably respond: ‘You are not far from the kingdom of heaven’, as it echoes Jesus’s own teaching cited above. Greenleaf’s definition of the servant-leader brings us to the realm of approaches to leadership, a topic to which we will return.

The brief discussion in this section of the chapter shows that no matter how slowly, leadership is coming to be a discipline of its own. For scholars concerned with birthing the African Renaissance, there are arguably two issues to consider at this point. First, leadership as a discipline is still in its infancy; can African scholars take this opportunity to exert a positive impact on its development? Second, assuming that there is a positive response to this question, where do we go from here? In the next section I offer a brief suggestion regarding tentative answers to these important questions.

The Discipline of Leadership and the African Renaissance

The first consideration as we begin to answer the question 'Where do we go from here?' is whether we should strive to develop an alternative leadership paradigm that is uniquely African in every respect – whether we should discard everything we have learnt from the West and the East and begin with a clean slate in building this discipline. My initial response is that developing a uniquely African paradigm that is objective and can stand the test of time and critical analysis is a noble goal to work towards. However, the danger is the temptation to romanticise African culture and the African past and turn a blind eye to what is bad in the African experience. There is also the temptation to please popular opinion by demonising everything from the West in particular, which is likely to lead to the unfortunate consequence of throwing out the baby with the bath water.

The African experience is both unique and similar to the experiences of other peoples. Every culture, every country and every continent has something unique about it, but all cultures and all races share with the rest of humanity the fact of being human. The African experience is in some ways similar to the experiences of other peoples in the south who have gone through a similar history of colonisation and a struggle to regain national independence and reassert cultural identity. What this indicates to me is that in our endeavours to bring about the African Renaissance we must on the one hand be guided by our unique experience as a people and a race, and on the other, take cognisance of our common humanity. Indeed, we have useful lessons to learn from a people as far away from us as the Japanese. Research indicates that following their defeat in the Second World War, the Japanese decided to go to the West to find out what they could learn in order to rebuild Japan and restore national pride. Their strategy was summarised in the simple motto: 'Imitate and overtake!' Within a reasonably short time, the Japanese were so successful that Western countries were imitating Japan when it came to how to invest in technology.

Where does this take us in terms of developing leadership as a discipline that serves Africa's advancement? I would recommend taking a leaf from Japan's book and developing our own strategy for acquiring knowledge from other nations, using whatever is useful and relevant for the benefit of Africa. Our motto might be 'Incorporate and domesticate!' Let us take any useful ideas and technologies and turn them around so that where they might have been used as instruments of domination, they become for us tools of liberation and development.

Fanon (2001: 166) presented us with a challenge when he said: 'Each generation must, out of relative obscurity, discover its mission, fulfil it, or betray it.' Part of the mission of the current generation, which is committed to the African Renaissance, is to turn leadership into a practice that facilitates African development and transformation. We will have betrayed our mission if we do not see that our intellectual endeavour must be linked to the struggle of the majority of our people for freedom, democratic governance, service delivery and freedom from hunger, disease and ignorance. The development of some disciplines has led to improvements in the realm of practice. Thus advances in clinical psychology have led to advances in therapy, just as progress in medicine has resulted in progress being made in the treatment of diseases. This presents at least two challenges for leadership scholars: first, leadership is essentially a practice that deals with relationships – those between the leader and followers. The discipline of leadership is one that should concern itself with, among other things, just, democratic, and ideal relationships between the leader and followers. Consequently, we as scholars should be concerned with the democratisation of leadership practice. Second, unlike the more advanced disciplines, leadership is still characterised by fuzziness and imprecision in terminology and language. Let us take just one example: when you read books on leadership you are likely to encounter the following, all used to refer to the same thing – style of leadership, form of leadership, type of leadership and approach to leadership. Is a style the same as a form, and is a form the same as an approach, and is an approach the same as a type?

The conclusion I draw from the above is that there are at least two challenges to the present generation of African scholars: first, to develop leadership into a more accurate and exact social science; and second, to influence its development as a discipline with the potential to exert a positive and significant influence on leadership practice. This is a tall order, and it cannot be fully discussed in a single chapter. The question is what steps do we need to take as we play our part in the development of the discipline. In the field of action research it is understood that nothing is so practical as a good theory, meaning that really good practices

are the result of good theories. It is with the idea of promoting sound theory and good practice that I suggest the steps below.

Step 1: Broadening Leadership Discourse to make the Discipline more Inclusive

I mentioned earlier that because leadership was equated with position and status, people have tended to use leadership only in relation to those domains in which positions of importance are obvious, such as politics, government, religion and business. The challenge here is to recognise that leaders arise in other spheres of life, and so leadership discourse should be extended to domains such as the creative arts, the sciences, the media, the professions and academia. In the creative arts, for example, Africa has produced great leaders who have introduced new innovations in the use of language and art forms, and have had a tremendous impact, not only in Africa, but in the West and other parts of the world. Names that come readily to mind are those of creative writers such as Chinua Achebe, Wole Soyika, Ngugi wa Thiong'o, Ayi Kwei Armah and Sembene Ousmane; singers such as the late Miriam Makeba; and scholars such as John Mbiti. These sons and daughters of Africa should rightfully stand side by side with renowned political leaders as heroes and heroines.

The inclusion of artists, scholars, musicians and others in the category of leaders gives us an understanding of some important facets of leadership. Gardner (1995) has made a useful distinction between direct and indirect leadership. By and large, political and religious leaders practise direct leadership. They address their followers face to face and can even exercise their power to force others to follow them. Creative artists, scientists and other scholars do not normally address their followers directly. Their leadership is indirect in the sense that they cannot impose their leadership on anybody. They are recognised as leaders in their areas of expertise on the basis of the quality of their work. Their followership is entirely voluntary, and people follow them because they have achieved. They lead by influencing and inspiring. This is true leadership, because their followers are not coerced. As we say at the Lead and Inspire School of Leadership: 'The mark of true leadership is the power to lead and inspire!' The person who coerces others to follow him or her is not a great leader.

Step 2: Investigating the Nature of the Relationship between Leaders and Followers

As explained earlier, powerful leaders throughout the ages have exercised their authority in a manner that makes leaders owners of organisations and the people who belong to those organisations, and masters of the people over whom they

exercise authority. As we saw earlier, the African philosophy of ubuntu or botho tells us that the king is king only to the extent that he represents the culture, welfare and collective will of the people. This should lead us to examine the true nature of the relationship between rulers and subjects in the African tradition.

In the modern state, the relationship between the employer and employees is regulated by industrial laws, and as a result workers have much more power over governments and other employers than they used to have. If we examine what was supposed to be the ideal between the ruler and his or her subjects in African tradition, we may find that it was never the intention to have a ruler who was an oppressor. What is being proposed here is not necessarily that leadership specialists should lead the masses to rebel against authority, but that through the education of leaders and followers about the true nature of their relationship, a more beautiful and symbiotic relationship which motivates followers to be more loyal, might be born. Gardner (1995: 36) makes the following observation about strengthening ties between leaders and followers: 'Ultimately, if the tie is to endure, leaders and followers must work together to construct some kind of an institution or organisation that embodies their common values.'

Step 3: Critically Examining Leadership Styles and Approaches to Promote Greater Awareness of Good Governance

It is useful to study styles of leadership and approaches to leadership in order to identify models that promote democracy, productivity, prosperity and the welfare and happiness of all. The following are some of the styles and approaches that merit special attention:

- autocratic/dictatorial leadership
- democratic leadership
- populist leadership
- the leadership of domination
- ubuntu-/botho-based leadership
- collaborative transformational leadership
- servant leadership

The characteristics, strengths and weaknesses of each of these models should be identified and subjected to comment. Some useful work is already being done in this area.

Step 4: Creating Leadership Performance Categories

Once leadership discourse has been democratised to include all domains in which leaders can emerge, it would be useful to introduce performance measures that enable us to compare leaders. While leaders can emerge in any social domain, we should be able to distinguish between, say, good leaders and great leaders. We should be able to develop criteria that enable us to classify leaders according to the extent of their influence, their relationships, their abilities and their contribution to the nation, to Africa and to humanity.

What follows is a preliminary set of criteria for leadership, with level 1 representing the lowest level of leadership achievement and level 5 representing the highest level of leadership achievement that a human being can aspire to.

Level 1: People who have influenced others at family and local community level and been recognised as leaders in one or more areas of human endeavour, such as politics, the arts, religion, community or scholarship.

Level 2: People who have made a significant sustainable contribution to their communities in their domains and are looked up to as leaders at both community and national level.

Level 3: People whose influence has advanced the cause of human freedom, empowering them to extend knowledge or to touch a significant number of people across the continent and across the world. They may have achieved this by means of their ideas, their creativity and their scholarship; or by their dedication to the cause of the poor, the marginalised and the oppressed. Their lives have told stories that have touched others and changed lives.

Level 4: Strategic leaders who have not only served their fellow human beings, but have founded nations or made achievements equivalent to the founding of nations. These achievements may be in the realm of ideas through which they have changed the course of history.

Level 5: This is the highest level, reserved for icons who have not only exercised strategic leadership at the highest levels, but are models of inspirational leadership, virtue and integrity. They are nation builders and peacemakers who have reconciled opposing forces. They are icons who have left a legacy, not only for Africa, but for the world. These are the likes of Nelson Mandela, Julius Nyerere and Moshoeshoe I of Lesotho.

Step 5: Researching Leadership Role Models

Having advanced leadership as a social science and developed criteria for recognising and classifying leaders, we now need to carry out thorough research to identify leaders able to serve as role models for us and for future generations of leaders. Our search for role models should go as far back as Ancient Egypt, Nubia and other ancient kingdoms and empires of Africa.

Conclusion

This chapter has set out to show that leadership as a practice has been a facet of human life since time immemorial. In it I have also argued that the development of leadership as a discipline has been very slow, and that this has possibly had negative consequences for human development, since theory helps to shape practice. For the African scholar, this is a mixed blessing. The absence of good theory might have contributed to bad leadership practice that resulted in human suffering and the oppression of ordinary members of society. The good news is that our generation has the opportunity to change the course of history by shaping the development of the discipline to serve African advancement. Ayi Kwei Armah titled his book *The beautiful ones are not yet born*. We have the opportunity to create conditions for the birth of the Beautiful Ones who will usher in the long awaited African Renaissance. Let's join hearts and minds and clear the way!

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CHAPTER 6

The King's Justice: An Example of Leadership

Liphadzi Tshililo

Introduction

Participating in the television show 'Inside Out', broadcast on 8 August 2010, Professor Achille Mbembe stated that: 'Most Africans do not want to be where they are. They want to be somewhere else.' Professor Mbembe was referring to the poverty endured daily by the majority of Africans, and cited leadership on the continent as an important factor contributing to this situation.

Andrew Hacker, as quoted by Curtiss Paul DeYoung (1995: 61), has made the observation that: 'No white American, including those who insist that opportunities exist for persons of every race, would change places with even the most successful black American.' By contrast, many black people, if asked to change places with white people, would do so with alacrity. Because of their life circumstances, black people experience uneasiness about who they are. The woes that this continent is facing are attributable, to a great extent, to leadership failures in the continent. In the words of Ayittey (1992: 7): 'The economic exploitation and political repression of the African people continued unabated. More treacherous perhaps was the continued denigration and, in some cases, the destruction of indigenous African institutions and culture by the very African nationalists and heads of state who claimed to have liberated Africa.'

In what way have leaders contributed to the unfortunate situation on the African continent? They are usually criticised for their failure to build their leadership on the cultural values that form the foundation of African society. Some African leaders import leadership principles that are alien to African society. They have embraced alien ideologies which have turned them into dictators, their dispensations characterised by conspicuous consumption on the part of the rich and the powerful, and the suppression of the poor and the weak (Ayittey, 1992: 105).

The purpose of this contribution is to explore the role of the king as described in chapters 28 and 29 of the biblical book of Proverbs. Although the focus of the article is on the role of the king, the king may be understood here to represent all leaders in private and public sectors of our community, including political, religious and business leaders. It is argued that this description could serve as

a foundation upon which to build our understanding of what an African leader should be. Particularly worthy of note is the similarity between the leadership role of a king in pre-colonial Africa and the depiction of a king in Proverbs 28 and 29. The book of Proverbs contains experiential knowledge and wisdom that goes beyond the borders of its original society, and has the capacity to illuminate our definition of the role of leader in contemporary African society. With regard to this nature of proverbs, Von Rad says, 'Proverbs deal with the experience of orders, indeed of laws, of the truth of which men have become convinced in the course of many generations' (Von Rad, 1979: 57). This definition of wisdom implies that the truth expressed in Proverbs is accessible to every person anywhere in the world.

In this chapter I will explore the following themes: first, the basis upon which the king's justice is to be built and understood; second, what distinguishes the righteous king from the wicked king; and third, the relationship between the king and the poor. My underlying argument is that the special focus of the king's justice is the poor, the weak and the vulnerable. A leader who turns his or her back on the poor has no leadership future; such a person is depicted as a beating rain which brings no food (Prov. 28: 3), and a roaring lion or a charging bear which is a danger to the poor (Prov. 28: 15).

The Foundations upon which the King's Justice is to be Built and Understood

In this section I will focus on the definition of justice and the foundations upon which it must be built. I will use the descriptions of a just king as given in Proverbs 28 and 29 and of a pre-colonial African leader as foundations upon which I propose that our contemporary understanding of a king's justice should be constructed.

Understanding the Meaning of Justice

In attempting to determine what a king should do in order to be considered just, I would like to begin with a definition of justice. In the *Oxford English reference dictionary*, justice is defined as 'just conduct, fairness', and to do justice is defined as 'to treat fairly or appropriately, and to show due appreciation of others'. Jose Garcia Oliver has the following to say about justice: 'Justice is so subtle a thing, to interpret it one has only need of a heart' (*Dictionary of quotations*, 2000: 303). In similar vein, the Byzantine emperor Justinian 1 (482–565 AD) defined justice as 'the constant and perpetual wish to render to everyone his

due' (*Dictionary of quotations*, 2000: 303). Thus we can conclude that justice is a sincere desire to treat everyone equally and without prejudice.

In biblical terms, justice is the realisation of shalom, with human beings living in peace in all their relationships: with God, with self, with fellows and with nature (Wolterstorff, 1983: 69). In Isaiah 11: 6–8 we find the following illustration of shalom:

The wolf shall live with the lamb,
the leopard shall lie down with the kid,
the calf and the lion and the fatling together, and a little child shall lead them.

7 The cow and the bear shall graze, their young shall lie down together; and the lion shall eat straw like the ox.

8 The nursing child shall play over the hole of the asp, and the weaned child shall put its hand on the adder's den.

There is no shalom when a society is a collection of individuals all out to make their own way in the world (Wolterstorff, 1987: 70). In such a society, human beings compete with rather than complement one another. It is the survival of the fittest. There is no justice in such a society. Hence a just king is one who is constantly and perpetually committed to the wellbeing of his followers. He is not alienated from their despairs and joys. He finds the agenda for his leadership in their mourning and grievances. Thus, a just king strives for the equal treatment of all his followers. He yearns to bring about equilibrium in society, and his concern for the poor goes beyond mere election slogans rhetorically designed to gain votes.

A Just King as described in Proverbs 28 and 29

Why have I based my argument on Proverbs 28 and 29? Those who are familiar with the structure of the book of Proverbs know that chapters 28 and 29 can be studied as a unit; this approach is supported by formal, structural and thematic analyses of the text. Concerning the form of the text, Malchow (1985: 239) classifies all the verses as individual two-line proverbs, and most of them as antithetic couplets. Malchow also observes that the structure of Proverbs 28 and 29 is achieved through the use of strategically placed proverbs employing the words *qydx* (righteous) and *[ovr* (wicked), which are the most frequently repeated words in these two chapters. They occur in the first proverb (28: 1) and in the last one (29: 27), forming an *inclusio* that allows us to view

Proverbs 28 and 29 as a unit (Liphadzi, 1994). Malchow (1985: 239) further recognises relationships between a number of the proverbs within the unit thus formed. There are lines that are similar (28: 12a and 29: 2a), lines that can be matched word for word (28: 12b and 28: 28a), lines that have the same focus (28: 28b and 29: 16a), and finally lines that are comparable (29: 2b and 29: 16), prompting him to argue for the thematic unity of this passage. He explains: 'The four proverbs as a unit point out the responsibility of a sovereign to reign righteously. Since this whole collection is structured around these four proverbs, this seems to be its primary exhortation to its reader, the future leader' (Malchow, 1985: 239). Hubbard (1989: 106) agrees that the proverbs in Proverbs 28 and 29 focus on the obligation of rulers to judge with integrity and to care for the poor. Kidner (1985: 32), too, acknowledges that there is a marked emphasis in Proverbs 28 and 29 on rulers and on those who set the tone for a society. It is therefore possible to conclude that there is a thematic unity in Proverbs 28 and 29, and that the editor of this collection arranged these two chapters on the basis of the theme of the role of a king or ruler in a society. This is a section of the Bible that has the capacity to enlighten us and deepen our understanding of the role of a leader in a community.

An analysis of Proverbs 28: 5 and 29: 25–26 reveals that a king who enjoys a good relationship with Yahweh has the capacity to rule with justice and righteousness. Yahweh is depicted as a true source of justice; those who have a good relationship with him therefore understand the importance of justice and how it works. This relationship is to be distinguished by trust and obedience on the part of the king (Liphadzi, 1994). In the book of Proverbs, trust in Yahweh points to the order created by Yahweh which controls the entirety of life. Trusting, therefore, means embracing and living by this reality. A king has an obligation to conduct himself according to this created order. Von Rad (1979: 92) says: 'If experience taught the awareness of order, then it was teaching ultimate truth, truth about God.' Thus a king who is aware of this created order and lives by it is viewed as trusting Yahweh. From Proverbs 29: 26 we see that Yahweh, not a king, has absolute authority in all matters related to justice. A king has to submit himself to Yahweh if he is to succeed in the administration of justice: he serves as a representative of Yahweh. In the words of Kraus (1992: 119): 'In the act of enthronement and of basic legitimation, the anointed of Yahweh received the royal charisma and the concrete commission which he was to carry as representative and administrator of the splendour of his God.' Therefore it is a king's responsibility to be the representative of Yahweh's kingdom among his followers. His kingship should promote every individual becoming what they were created to

be in the beginning: the image-bearer and servant of Yahweh, the object and agent of divine benediction, fruitful and having dominion, and destined for life (Stek, 1978: 160). It is this king whose kingship will express the true purpose of exodus, which is an exodus back to the real land of spaceship earth where we learn again to live in obedience to Yahweh and relate to one another in harmony with the everlasting covenant of creation (Ruether, 1974: 207). A just king should therefore be defined according to the measures which God chooses and creates for humanity.

It is my contention that there is a close similarity between the role of a leader as contained in the book of Proverbs and the African pre-colonial understanding of the role of a leader in the community. Of course, this may not be understood as an endeavour to romanticise the pre-colonial times, but as an attempt to show that leadership principles at that time were enacted from the local context and not imported from an alien context, as has occurred after colonialism. Not all pre-colonial African leaders deserved praise, as there were some who exploited their followers. According to this understanding, an African chief or king serves as a representative of the ancestors. He has an obligation to maintain good relations with the ancestors if he is to rule justly and peacefully, and acts as an umpire to ensure fair play and equal justice for all (Ayittey, 1991: 125). As Ayittey (1991: 125) notes: 'If he oppressed his people he can incur displeasure of the ancestors. He could not expect the blessings or cooperation of ancestral spirits. He is the guardian not the oppressor.' Thus, in terms of both the biblical and African understanding of the role of a leader, a leader has an obligation to lead as a representative of the divine Being. A leader has to go beyond himself or herself and his or her followers to define his or her role. This is the foundation on which an understanding of leadership in Africa should have been built. It has, however, been rejected by leaders in Africa, who have built their understanding of leadership on foreign concepts that have nothing to do with the African context. They have alienated their leadership from the African context. They no longer viewed their leadership as a tool to deal with contextual issues in order to bring life to their followers. Leaders are so imbedded in the historical realities of our world that they draw the frameworks of their leadership from them. Hunter (2010: 168) says: 'Politics is always and everywhere the framework.' In consequence, we have a leadership crisis on the continent.

The modern secular humanistic tendency to dethrone God from the position of source of life in all spheres and unwillingness to submit to created structures and orders are repudiated by this biblical and African understanding of a leader. If humanity is left to its own devices, nothing good and just is to be expected – indeed we can expect nothing more than a return to Babel (Liphadzi, 1994).

Ramphela (2008: 18) decries the marginalisation of religion in our struggle for a better life for all in the new democratic South Africa, noting that: 'Material freedom disengaged from inner spiritual freedom puts us at risk of losing the focus on the larger purpose of freedom ... freedom to be fully who we can be in our democracy.' We have therefore lost what she calls the voice of morality in our public discourse. This explains the shameful leadership squabbles that take place in the political formations of our society. In our society today, a person's dignity and worth is measured by their education, position and material wealth. If this were not the case, how do you imagine our politicians would be able to sleep peacefully in the face of the abject poverty of our people in the townships of Tembisa or Alexandra? How do you imagine churchgoers would be able to assemble on Sundays and disperse in peace without being traumatised by the abject poverty in their neighbourhoods? Indeed, faith has now become acceptance, rather than protest against the dehumanisation of people. Willis (1975: 70) reminds us: 'One whose attitude is Godlike respects the poor man because he is made in the image of God, he is moved with compassion for him, he puts himself in his place, and he does all he can to help him overcome his problems and needs.' Leaders who define themselves as Willis suggests have an obligation to share and contribute to the growth of life of the whole community, and to safeguard the common welfare of the community (Kobia, 2003: 96).

The implications of the non-realisation by leaders of their responsibility in representing God are far reaching. This is why Ramphela considers the marginalisation of religion as one of the obstacles to transformation in South Africa. It also explains why corruption in our society is rampant, and it accounts for the growing divide between the rich and the poor, between urban areas and rural communities. Leaders who are unconscious of their delegated authority from God will always be susceptible to the temptation to abuse their power. They will become leaders who are obsessed with power for its own sake, not as an instrument to be used for the good of the followers. They will be indifferent to the welfare of their citizens, and will subordinate national interests to personal aggrandisement (Ayittey, 2005: 402).

The Means of Distinguishing a Just King from a Wicked King according to Proverbs 28 and 29

Proverbs 28 and 29 compares the just king and the wicked king. In Proverbs 28: 5 the distinction rests on the ruler's attitude towards justice. A wicked ruler does not understand justice, because he has no relationship with God. The

righteous ruler knows and understands the constructive quality of justice and the destructive quality of injustice because he has a relationship with God.

Proverbs 28: 12, 28 and 29: 2, 16 deal with the contrast between the consequences of the actions of righteous and wicked governments. People benefit from the actions of the righteous leader, whereas they suffer as a result of the actions of the wicked leader. When the righteous achieve victory and come into power, they bring great glory and happiness to the community. The righteous leader discourages wickedness and pursues righteousness, whereas the wicked ruler brings fear and terror to the people. Righteous people are forced to go into hiding, because the wickedness of a leader is the ruin of his soul.

In Proverbs 29: 4 a just king brings stability, which manifests itself in his care for the poor and the weak. Stability builds up community and restores dignity to the weak and the oppressed. His leadership promotes the ideal of living in harmony with other people and the land. A wicked leader, by contrast, brings misery and distress, and is responsible for introducing instability and infertility to the land. Proverbs 29: 7 further illustrates that a righteous king and a wicked king are compared on the basis of their attitude towards the poor: a righteous king identifies himself with the needs of the poor, whereas a wicked ruler pays this no attention.

Thus we can conclude that a just leader is familiar with the concept of justice and rules; accordingly, his or her leadership brings happiness to the people and stability in the land, and he or she defends the rights of the poor and ensures that they are justly treated. The recognition by the king that poverty is a lack of shalom invites the leader to take sides (Wolterstorff, 1987: 77). He sides with the poor, and the poor become the special focus of his justice. This is God's position: God sides with the poor. Isaiah 10: 1–2 reads: 'Woe to those who make unjust laws, to those who issue oppressive decrees, to deprive the poor of their rights and withhold justice from the oppressed of my people, making widows their prey and robbing the fatherless.'

This leads us to reflect on the leadership of our society. What is society gaining from our leaders? Since the inception of democracy in our country, how have our leaders responded to the plight of the poor? Where do our leaders get their agenda? Of course we have to appreciate what we have achieved as a society since the inception of democracy. But we also have to agree that our leaders are not yet prepared to receive their mandate and agenda from the poor. The continued contestation between labour and capital is a clear signal to me that our leaders are not sensitive to the needs of the poor. In fact, I suspect collusion between our leaders and capital against the poor. This is evident in an article by Rev. Frank Chikane published in *The Star* of 28 October 2010, in which he

reveals how the pharmaceutical companies influence our governments against the poor. They make a profit at the expense of poor people and their governments. Recently, we are reading in our papers of the influential Gupta family, being suspected of building close relationships with politicians for building the Gupta empire against the poor (*City Press*, 6 March 2011, p. 5). We need leaders, both in the governments and civil societies, brave enough to stop this kind of collusion; leaders who can stand for the poor and the weak. If this situation is true and if it continues, we are faced with a time bomb in our country. We must exhort our leaders to side with the poor.

Relationship between the King and the Poor in Proverbs 28 and 29

Seven proverbs in these two chapters, namely Proverbs 28: 3, 8, 15, 16, 27 and 29: 13, 14, deal with how a leader should relate to the poor. It is therefore appropriate to briefly consider the terms used to describe the poor. Who are the poor that the king has to relate to? In Proverbs, only two Hebrew words are used to designate the poor, namely *ld* and *vr*. Both words may be translated as 'poor'. Although there is a difference between the people designated by these terms, in general both are used to refer to those of lower socioeconomic status. *ld* refers to those people without riches and possessions, or to people without lasting resources (Harris, Archer and Waltke, 1980: 190), whose prosperity has been reduced and who lack physical and psychological strength. The *ld* is poor because she has been unjustly deprived (Malchow, 1985: 122). Poor people such as these are often oppressed by the powerful. *Vr* refers to the destitute, the orphan, the widow, the person with a disability, all of whom are powerless. These are the people that leaders are expected to have a relationship with and rule with their interests at heart.

A leader may relate to people such as this as either an oppressor or a protector. In Israel a king was always expected to be the guardian of the humble and the needy, the weak and the helpless (Jer. 21: 12). He was the final hope of the unfortunate (Wolverton, 1959: 278). Proverbs 28: 3, 15 clearly deals with the king as oppressor of the poor. A leader who adopts this stance is described as 'beating rain which brings no food', and also as a 'roaring lion and charging bear' – in other words, one who poses a danger to the wellbeing of his people. Proverbs 28: 8 indicates the means by which poor people are impoverished by the powerful, namely usury and interest: the leader accumulates wealth for his own benefit, and not for the wellbeing of his people. Here one thinks of our leaders in the banking industry and their way of charging interest. Do they have

the interests of the poor at heart as they conduct their banking business? Are the poor not charged excessive rates by the banks?

This kind of relationship is condemned. Because of the injustices he commits, the leader's days will be numbered.

On the other hand, a just leader is a blessing and hope to the poor. He judges the poor with justice. He knows that power of whatever kind (social, economic or political) is to be used on behalf of the powerless. It is given for service (Stek, 1978: 154). Such a king is described as one whose throne will be established forever, and who will never lack anything. His care and love for the unfortunate brings blessings back to him and to his throne. Thus justice and righteousness are essential for the foundation of the throne. The failure or success of leadership depends on how a leader treats the poor. Thus the poor become the particular focus of the leader's justice. The poor are also created in the image of God, and failure to protect this image in the poor is a way of inviting God's wrath, as he will intervene to see that the oppressors of his people are punished.

This helps us to reflect on the leadership in the continent, which, in my view, most Africans find wanting. Modern-day Africa is rife with hunger, civil wars, corruption and fear of the unknown. Power is sought for its own sake, and not for the sake of doing good for others. This obsession with power has led to many dictatorship presidents-for-life and many one-party states. We can see the same obsession with power in our society. This is due to the prevailing belief that political power is a framework which can hold life together. The language of politics has framed our understanding of our common life, our public purposes, and ourselves individually and collectively (Hunter, 2010: 103). Political identity becomes a measure for success in life. Consequently, people want power and influence for personal enrichment, and not for the wellbeing of the society. We therefore need Jeremiahs and Isaiahs, who will remind our leaders that they should be accountable to the Being beyond themselves. We need leaders who will encourage the cultivation of other aspects of our life for the balance we need in our communities.

Conclusion

Proverbs 28 and 29 show without doubt that the special concern of the king's justice is the poor. He has a duty to protect them against the powerful so that they become what God intended them to become. This is the approach that the leadership in our communities ought to adopt, and we would then see the vulnerable and the weak being affirmed and empowered by our leaders.

If this approach is to be promoted among our leaders, African Christian churches should be an example to society of how to 'incarnate' in people's lives. If the church in Africa is to succeed in leading communities, it has to do much better at being and doing what it preaches. Christianity must be far more evident in the character, attitudes and behaviours of those who claim to be Christians. We count political and business leaders among the members of our churches. They fund churches' ministries. But what are the churches instilling in them? Are the churches encouraging them to use their power for the wellbeing of the poor and the vulnerable? What is the witness of the Western churches to their members who are leaders in their governments and multinational companies that are involved in the destruction of other nations?

The church in Africa must become genuinely African if it is to be an effective agent for God's kingdom in Africa. It has to develop contextual theology that solves the problems that Africans face in their daily lives. Its theology has to become genuinely biblical and African. Its dependency on the Western church for ideas, theology and money is unhealthy and detrimental to the witness of the church in Africa. The church has to come up with a theology that investigates and comments on the socioeconomic and political structures and gives moral direction to the country.

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CHAPTER 7

Educating African Leaders about the Ideals of Leadership: Lessons from Mohlomi, the African Philosopher Chief

Khali Victor Mofuoa

Introduction

Perhaps of all the tributes to the idea of delving into the classical thinking of those who have preceded us (of whom Chief Mohlomi is one) to obtain wisdom and valuable insights, none is more remarkable than that contained in the letter Niccolo Machiavelli wrote to Francesco Vettori describing his evening routine:

On the coming of evening, I return to my house and enter my study; and at the door I take off the day's clothing, covered with mud and dust, and put on garments regal and courtly; and reclothed appropriately, I enter the ancient courts of ancient men, where, received by them with affection, I feed on that food which is only mine and which I was born for, where I am not ashamed to speak with them and to ask them the reasons for their actions, and they in their kindness answer me; and for four hours of time I do not feel boredom, I forget every trouble, I do not dread poverty, I am not frightened by death; entirely I give myself over to them (Machiavelli cited in Hallowell and Porter, 1997: 233).

Can African leaders today benefit from Machiavelli's example? Will they take the time to explore what Chief Mohlomi said and thought about leadership? Can Chief Mohlomi offer the prospect of enriching our understanding of how leaders ought to lead appropriately in contemporary times? Caught in the turbulence of a chronic political leadership vacuum and faced with the challenge of leading in scandalous times (Ladkin, 2006: 88), can (African) leaders earnestly seek an appropriate way of leading, and exercise power and influence in ethically appropriate ways? Indeed, this is the most daunting task that confronts African leaders today, for two reasons. First, guidance as to how to achieve the best way forward may be not readily discerned through recourse to established rules or guidelines (Ladkin, 2006: 89). Second, leading has to occur in an environment

that undergoes a general crisis of legitimacy (Wheeler and Silanpaa, 1997) and trust, which has been lost over the years of scandals and ethical misconduct (Maak and Pless, 2006: 99).

Seeking to explain what dashed postcolonial hopes of freedom and led to the desperate conditions in Africa today, Meredith (2005) puts the blame squarely on a leadership vacuum. Indeed, Rubongaya (2006) bemoans the conspicuous poverty of leadership in Africa today. Such poverty has largely presaged Africa's economic decline, social upheaval and political decay, as African leaders continue to flounder in mediocrity (Obiakor, 2004). For instance, it has become normal practice for African leaders to enrich themselves with little or no attention to the socioeconomic and political crisis faced by their fellow citizens (Museveni, 2000; Ayittey, 1992).

Consequently, Africa has witnessed many leaders who have had devastating effects on Africa's cultural, socioeconomic and political future (Museveni, 2000; Nyerere, 2000). Obiakor (2004) therefore asks: what kind of educational philosophy has the capacity to produce nationalism and patriotism in African leadership? And how can the stability of such a philosophy be maintained? Of course, these questions could engender extensive debate. This chapter intends to draw on Chief Mohlomi's wisdom and teaching on the idea and ideal of leadership in attempting to address the questions posed by Obiakor (2004) above.

The Idea and Ideal of Leadership in Various Contexts: A Historical Overview

The concept of leadership is somewhat amorphous (Rost, 1991), and although it is said to be one of the world's oldest preoccupations, Burns (1978) classifies it as the least understood. As Bass (1990: 3) states, 'the subject of leadership was not limited to the classics of Western literature. It was of as much interest to Asoka and Confucius as to Plato and Aristotle' – and to this list we could add Chief Mohlomi. Indeed, the understanding of leadership has figured strongly in the quest for knowledge over centuries. Bass (1990: 3) continues: 'purposeful stories have been told through the generations about leaders' competencies, ambitions, and shortcomings; leaders' rights and privileges; and the leaders' duties and obligations. Myths and legends about great leaders were important in the development of civilized societies', and further goes on to discuss the civilising idea of leadership as follows:

The study of leadership rivals in age the emergence of civilisation, which shaped its leaders as much as it was shaped by them. From its infancy, the

study of history has been the study of leaders – what they did and why they did it. Over centuries, the effort to formulate principles of leadership spread from the study of history and the philosophy associated with it to all the developing social sciences. In modern psychohistory, there is still a search for generalizations about leadership, built on the in-depth analysis of the development, motivation, and competencies of world leaders, living and dead (Bass, 1990: 3).

It is not surprising, therefore, that written philosophical principles of the idea and ideal of leadership emerged early in the history of humankind. The Egyptian hieroglyphics for leadership (seshemet), leader (seshemu) and the follower (shem-su) are said to have been written approximately 5000 years ago (Bass, 1990: 3), and indeed in 2300 BC three qualities of ideal leadership were attributed to the Pharaoh; these were authoritativeness, perception and justice (Lichtheim, 1973 in Bass, 1990: 3). Written as early as the sixth century BC, the Chinese classics are filled with advice to the Chinese leaders about their responsibilities to the people, such as Confucius's exhortation to leaders to set a moral example and to manipulate rewards and punishments for teaching what was right and good (Bass, 1990: 3).

Similarly, early Greek ideas and ideals of leadership were exemplified by the heroes in Homer's *Iliad* (Bass, 1990). As Sarachek (1968 in Bass, 1990: 4) observes, Ajax symbolised inspirational leadership, law and order. Other qualities the Greeks admired and thought were needed (and sometimes lacking) in heroic leaders were (1) justice and judgement (Agamemnon); (2) wisdom and counsel (Nestor); (3) shrewdness and cunning (Odysseus); and (4) valour and activism (Achilles). Later, Greek philosophers such as Plato and Aristotle also emphasised the idea and ideal of leadership in their respective writings. As Bass (1990: 4) states, to Plato in the *Republic*, the leader was to be the most important element of good government, educated to rule with order and reason. In politics, Aristotle was disturbed by the lack of virtue among those who wanted to be leaders, and emphasised the need to educate youths for such (virtuous) leadership.

Thus the classical Greek and Roman ideas and ideals of leadership influenced the works of Machiavelli in *The prince* (1513) and Montesquieu in the *Spirit of laws* (1748) on the subject of leadership. As Bass (1990: 4) states, Machiavelli's thesis that 'there is nothing more difficult to take in hand, more perilous to conduct, or more uncertain in its success, than to take the lead in the introduction of a new order of things is still a germane description of the risks of leadership and the resistance to it'. In this regard, Kellerman says the following about Machiavelli and his ideas and ideals of leadership:

Machiavelli was the ultimate pragmatist. He believed that leaders needed steadiness, firmness, and concern for the maintenance of authority and power and order in government. It was best if these objectives could be accomplished by gaining the esteem of the populace, but if they could not, then craft, deceit, threat, treachery, and violence were required (Kellerman, 1987 in Bass, 1990: 4).

Other famous works on the idea and ideal of leadership include Shakespeare's *Richard II*, and the writings of John Locke. In *Richard II*, Shakespeare provides a chilling account of Richard as the king of England who made many errors of judgement, especially with regard to people, which caused a rift with his nobles and ultimately led to his forced abdication and imprisonment (Payne, 2000 in Bass and Bass, 2008: 6). In his *Two treatises on government* (1690), John Locke wrote that which we could now call leadership had to reach beyond institutional authority to create and maintain a liberal society (Weaver, 1991 in Bass and Bass, 2008: 5). To paraphrase the words of St Augustine, regardless of the outcome, the first and final job of leadership is the attempt to serve the needs and the wellbeing of the people led. A fundamental principle of leadership taught at West Point today can be traced back to Hegel's *Philosophy of mind* (1830, 1971), in which he argues that by first serving as a follower, a leader is subsequently better able to understand his or her followers. Hegel considered this understanding essential to effective leadership (Bass and Bass, 2008).

An African approach to leadership is conspicuously absent from the above overview of ideas and ideals of leadership from various historical contexts. Indeed, African thinking about leadership on the African continent today is not only thin, it is almost non-existent, despite the rich deposit of pre-colonial African thinking on the subject. However, a quick review of the status of leadership thought in Africa today reveals the hallmark of various Western leadership ideas and ideals, and the evident and often glaring neglect of African ideas and ideals of leadership (Metsäpelto, 2009: 6). Thus, although African ideas and ideals are relevant for our thinking about leadership, they are barely represented in leadership literature on the African continent. If their existence is acknowledged at all, they are tagged 'pre-scientific', implying uncivilised (leadership) practice (Inyang, 2008: 123) and/ or qualified as providing limited information about how to actually lead (Bartol and Martin, 1991: 41). This paper intends to draw on Chief Mohlomi's wisdom and teaching on the African idea and ideal of leadership. In it, I attempt to highlight Mohlomi's views as an example of traditional African thought on the idea and ideals of leadership. I will also argue that from his views modern-day African leadership can draw lessons and inspiration on

leadership, a kind of renaissance of African leadership, as a point of departure in correcting what have been described as desperate conditions in Africa today as a result of a leadership vacuum (Meredith, 2005).

Indeed, there are some undeniable African ideas and ideals of leadership relevant for our thinking about leadership today (Obiakor, 2004). These ideas and ideals of leadership epitomise 'African leadership', that is, leadership forged in the crucible of African community life that gives shape, meaning and direction to the path of African civilisation. They have the potential to yield an ideal form of leadership behaviour that others would be anxious to embrace and imitate, and indeed to be exported to the mainstream of current leadership thinking. It is important, therefore, that such ideas and ideals of African leadership should be investigated. Hence the current calls to awaken leadership genius in Africa today for enhanced service delivery and to craft administrative interventions that are appropriate for the contemporary African context.

The Idea and Ideal of Leadership: Calls to Awaken Leadership Genius in Africa

In his article entitled 'Strengthening African leadership', Rotberg (2004: 1) comments:

Africa has long been saddled with poor, even malevolent, leadership: predatory kleptocrats, military-installed autocrats, economic illiterates, and puffed-up posturers. By far the most egregious examples come from Nigeria, the Democratic Republic of the Congo, and Zimbabwe – countries that have been run into the ground despite their abundant natural resources. But these cases are by no means unrepresentative: by some measures, 90 per cent of sub-Saharan African nations have experienced despotic rule in the last three decades. Such leaders use power as an end in itself, rather than for the public good; they are indifferent to the progress of their citizens (although anxious to receive their adulation); they are unswayed by reason and employ poisonous social or racial ideologies; and they are hypocrites, always shifting blame for their countries' distress.

Rotberg (2004: 1) continues:

Under the stewardship of these leaders, infrastructure in many African countries has fallen into disrepair, currencies have depreciated, and real prices have inflated dramatically, while job availability, healthcare, education standards, and life expectancy have declined. Ordinary life has become

beleaguered: general security has deteriorated, crime and corruption have increased, much-needed public funds have flowed into hidden bank accounts, and officially sanctioned ethnic discrimination – sometimes resulting in civil war – has become prevalent.

This depressing picture has been painted at the same time as there has been a call for an 'African renaissance', in terms of which Africans are urged 'to be true to themselves' (Louw 2002: 14), to re-engage with African values (Mbigi, 2000; Mulemfo, 2000; Koka, 1997; Teffo, 1997). A distinctive renaissance of African leadership is at the heart of this call. As Festus Obiakor (2004: 417) observes, 'theories of effective African-centred leadership must be taught in African schools from pre-kindergarten to universities. Africans need African-centred leaders and not European-centred leaders. African-centred education is the key to building patriotic African leadership'.

Leadership is thus seen as a catalyst for social change and transformation in modern Africa, but only where it is deeply rooted in African values (Olojede, 2005; Prinsloo, 2000; Mbigi and Maree, 1995). The lack of recognition of certain African values by new African leaders in modern Africa was a flaw in the organisational arrangements subsequently set up in most modern African societies (Oyeshile, 2003). As Oyeshile (2003: 81) observes, 'these socio-ethical values cannot act as a grand solution to the present (moral) crises. Yet, in their modest forms, they can provide some ways out of our present (moral) chaos and help us to avoid the necessary consequences of the Hobbesian state of nature in which life is solitary, brutal, nasty and short'.

To resolve the 'organisational moral crisis' faced by African society that 'comes from the fact that Africans have shifted away from their own value system and the moral values that go with it, to other value systems underpinned by other metaphysical foundations' (Ntibagiriwa, 2003), it is necessary to examine the roles which traditional socio-ethical values can play in engendering a workable polity in Africa (Oyeshile, 2003). The moral crisis in contemporary Africa can therefore be traced to a dearth of particular enduring socio-ethical values in contemporary African society. Is organisational power acquired for its own sake or for the sake of service to others? Scrutiny of contemporary leadership in African organisations reveals that laudable socio-ethical values, which ought to serve as a foundation for leadership, are in fact missing, although lip service is paid to them. As Oyeshile (2003: 83) observes, 'in just about every African society, leaders have been charged with corruption, nepotism and tribalism'. Lack of moral probity in leadership thus seems to be the most significant missing ingredient in modern Africa. As Hope (2002: 100) observes, 'corruption [due

to lack of moral probity] reflects the general and legendary climate of unethical leadership found throughout most of the [African] continent'.

Ayittey (1992, 1998) argues that the African continent has in fact been betrayed and is in economic chaos owing primarily to corruption stemming from the unethical behaviour of its leaders. Echoing the same sentiment, Hope (2002: 103) states, 'corruption is one of many African development problems ... [and] it thrives for many reasons. However, the primary catalyst is the fact that (exemplary) ethical leadership ... is seriously lacking'. This explains the current call for exemplary (ethical) leadership to deal with the resultant organisational crises associated with the lack of moral probity in modern Africa (Hope, 1999, 2002; Perry, 1997; Ruzindana, 1997).

Although an account of the insights relating to, and meanings and connotations of leadership in, Africa are varied and diverse (Kirk and Bolden, 2006), the African understanding of leadership is fundamentally understood to relate to the African value of *botho*, the spirit of community (Ntibatigirwa, 2003; Louw, 2002; Prinsloo, 2000; Chiwanga, 1995; Mbigi and Maree, 1995; Ndaba, 1994). *Botho* envisages individuals and community as relational entities, each giving value, purpose and identity to the other. In *botho*, individuals and community find their ends and means, their being and their doing, in their interactions. In terms of this perspective, the individual and the community are truly recognised in their interrelatedness. As Louw (2002: 8) observes, '*botho* dictates that if we are to be human, we need to recognise the genuine otherness of our fellow citizens'.

Perceived in the spirit of *botho*, ethical leadership does not emerge from a historical vacuum, but arises from the life worlds of African beliefs, traditions and histories, and speaks authoritatively and acts responsibly with the aim of serving the collective good. Within *botho* as an African socio-ethical value system, ethical leaders are therefore leaders whose characters have been shaped by the wisdom, habits and practices of particular traditions (often more than one), yet they tend to be identified with a particular ethos and cultural narrative of a particular community. Accordingly, from an African perspective, ethical leadership is understood to refer to the critical appropriation and embodiment of moral traditions that have historically shaped the character and shared meaning of a people in a particular social context.

In his article 'Creating a desirable 21st century Africa', Okpaku (1994: 1003) states that 'Africa has not been such a failure and is certainly nowhere near a declining point of no return'. He therefore asserts that not only is Africa a land well primed for positive transformation, given excellent leadership, but also a land in grave need of statesmen – leaders who must be 'responsible, responsive,

gracious, accountable, effective, creative, self-sacrificing, humane, fair and good. Such leaders must be educated, informed and enlightened, and trusting of the primal authority of the people to assume joint responsibility for charting the continental course'. Above all, he asserts, 'an efficacious 21st century African leadership must have a vision, inspired and inspiring, while remaining grounded in the solid knowledge of what is, what can be, what ought to be, and how to effect a transition from one to another' (Okpaku, 1994: 1009). Clearly, Okpaku's assertions and remarks echo the plethora of calls to awaken leadership genius in Africa already alluded to. As Malunga (2006: 12) notes, 'there is a great need for African leadership practitioners to dig deeper into who they are for a reawakening of their own and Africa's leadership capacity'. The section below explores the state of leadership development in Africa in contemporary times, with the intention of investigating the extent to which it has managed to unlock the leadership potential in Africa, and, of course, the extent to which it has succeeded in awakening leadership genius in Africa. Leadership education has far-reaching implications for society: an educated person lives in a room with all its windows open towards the outside world.

Educating African Leaders about the Idea and Ideal of Leadership: Reawakening African Learning

It is unfortunate that the leadership in Africa is far too often presented to the world in the form of dysfunctional and derailed leadership. Africa has an abundance of sound and responsible leaders on all levels and dimensions of society. These leaders need to emerge and become visible. Leadership development is a key leverage point in the development and transformation of our beautiful continent. *Frik Landman*

The importance of leadership development for the success of Africa cannot be overemphasised. The former president of South Africa, Thabo Mbeki, in addressing the Association of African Universities conference, stated:

Education has an important role to play in the economic, cultural and political renaissance of our continent and in the drive for the development of indigenous knowledge systems. This implies that all educational curricula should have Africa as their focus, and as a result be indigenous in their grounding and orientation. To address this state of affairs we need a distinctly African knowledge system (Mbeki, 2005).

In the context of leadership education there are calls for a leadership that is suited to the epoch, a leadership that is distinctively African. Olojede (2005) speaks of the 'challenge of leadership as a catalyst for transformation' in Africa. In similar vein, Okpaku (1994: 1009) argues for what he calls the role of educated leadership in the following words:

Development is masterminded and executed by an excellent leadership ... which gives definition to the vision of a common great reality, assumes responsibility for the attainment of the dream, and supervises that process in such a manner that each citizen can enjoy maximum benefit from it without curtailing the right of others to similar participation and enjoyment, and without the inhibiting of society itself progressively to improve the social condition and the common good.

Despite the recognition by some scholars that everything depends on leadership, there is a shortage of leaders all over the world because leadership development receives inadequate attention. Africa is no exception in this regard, as the continent's perennial leadership failures continue unabated (Jackson, 2004; Ayittey, 2006). The Nigerian writer, Chinua Achebe, in *The trouble with Nigeria*, identifies leadership failure as the bane of development in Nigeria and, by implication, in most of Africa. As a matter of fact, even renowned African leaders such as the late Nnamdi Azikiwe of Nigeria, the late Kwame Nkrumah of Ghana, and Nelson Mandela of South Africa have drawn attention to the leadership malaise in development on the continent, and the critical need for leadership development in the pursuit of meaningful development in Africa.

Although leadership development is currently a very high priority for capacity building in Africa, the track record of leadership development discourse in Africa is mixed at best (Fiedler, 1996; Jackson, 2004; Ayittey, 2006). Malunga (2006: 2) notes that although leadership development in Africa is a high priority for capacity building, 'the plethora of initiatives are largely imported from the West, they tend to have limited application to the specific African contexts and cultures in which they operate and as a result they achieve only limited success in developing leaders'. Malunga (2006: 2) further asserts that:

To stand any chance of being effective, leadership development in Africa must be rooted in the influential cultural heritage. To promote ongoing behaviour change in leaders, it is essential to tap into the energy, commitment and authenticity that reside within the culture concerned. New ideas should

be grafted onto existing indigenous cultures, rather than simply uprooting them and transplanting foreign models.

Malunga (2006: 12) also argues that 'there are many principles of leadership that are universal. (However) it is the (leadership) practice that needs to be modified to suit the (African) context (given) the value of the indigenous models'. Malunga's views are corroborated by Obiakor (2004: 413):

Africa needs leaders who have the zeal to make a difference. Such leaders must be schooled at all levels on African-centered ideals, nationalism, patriotism, and democratic ideals. These leaders must also be knowledgeable about individual rights and freedoms of African people. It is common knowledge that the kind of education the citizens receive reflects the kind of leaders it produces. Educational programs must be aimed at changing attitudes of Africans and their leaders.

Obiakor (2004: 416) continues:

Africans must design programmes to develop their leadership talents. They need proven nationalistic leaders who view themselves as success-oriented people ... Theories of effective African-centered leadership must be taught in African schools from prekindergarten to university levels. School curricula must be revamped to incorporate African-centered problem solving, partnership building, and collaboration and consultation. Interestingly, these skills used to be evident during the pre-colonial Africa and were lost during the colonial and postcolonial periods. As Africa advances into the 21st century, these African-centered skills must be reinstated.

Like Malunga, in his call for African-centred leadership development, Obiakor (2004: 416) makes the following appeal:

Africans must shift their leadership paradigms. Educational think tanks must be organised to present innovative ideas that meet the cultural, socio-economic, and political needs of the people. To a large extent, exchange programmes must be instituted to revive African-centered, community-based collaboration, consultation, and cooperation.

Acknowledging the critical role that leadership can play in Africa's development challenges, former Vice President for Africa of the World Bank, Callisto Madavo

states that, 'if Africa is to make progress it will require a strong, consistent leadership' (Madavo, 2005: 7), schooled in African-centred education and leadership (Obiakor, 2004). The primary goal of such leadership, according to Obiakor, 'must be to initiate African centered policies that can positively change the current social, economic, political, and cultural trends ... [and] focus on African-centered education and leadership [that in the long run] will reenergise the thinking of Africa as the cradle of human civilisation' (Obiakor, 2004: 417–418). As former president of South Africa, Thabo Mbeki, in his address at the launch of the African Leadership Initiative, at the Sandton Convention Centre, Johannesburg, on 13 July 2006 succinctly stated:

If Africa is serious about its claim to make the 21st century the era of its rebirth, we need to invest considerable resources in the reconstruction of credible and competent leadership capacity. New generations of leaders will not mushroom naturally. Leadership development cannot be left to chance it requires a deliberate, calculated, well-researched effort. The crux of our argument is that there must be an institution that serves as the backbone of leadership development and that this institution must be African (Mbeki, 2006).

In the same address, the former president further highlighted the danger of complacency on the part of South Africa (and by implication Africa):

Because we have successfully negotiated a transition from oppression to freedom, from tyranny to democracy, it is tempting to believe that effective leadership emerges 'automatically'. The truth is perhaps more sobering. As we enter the second decade of democracy, we run the risk of complacency in leadership development: yet the context of the struggle in which our most effective leaders emerged has given way to a new democratic framework (Mbeki, 2006).

Mbeki warns that Africans must not become complacent with regard to leadership development. Africans have a duty to establish strong leadership development influenced and shaped by an African worldview to produce the cadre of leaders the continent needs to ensure the African renaissance:

[Africans] have a duty together to build the Africa of the Entrepreneur, the Scientist, the Artist and the Visionary. We [Africans] must bring back the Africa that lies within us; the Africa that gave the world civilisation; the

Africa whose high priests of knowledge taught the Greeks mathematics, philosophy, medicine and the alphabet (Mbeki, 2006).

Given where Africa has been and what needs to be done to improve the lives of the millions who live on the continent, the value of leadership development in Africa is a non-negotiable imperative, as Obiakor (2004), Callisto (2005), Malunga (2006) and Mbeki (2006) have shown. There is no doubt that great leaders are the basis of all human achievements. Hence, it is important for African leaders today to be schooled in understanding the ideas and ideals of leadership in general and of African leadership in particular. Hence the need for a paradigm shift from the Platonic-Cartesian leadership education that currently dominates leadership development in Africa to that of the Socratic tradition as represented by Chief Mohlomi, nicknamed the 'African Socrates' and the 'black Confucius'. In the next section I will offer a summary of the ideas and ideals of leadership associated with Chief Mohlomi's teachings on leadership as adduced from the creative mental and physical experience of Basotho society.

The Idea and Ideal of Leadership: Lessons from Mohlomi, the African Philosopher Chief

The thinking of a leader is what separates him or her from the followers. I have found that true leaders are distinguished by a unique mental attitude that emanates from an internalised discovery of self, which creates a strong, positive and confident self-concept and self-worth. I call this unique mental attitude the spirit of leadership.

Myles Munroe

This quote encapsulates the idea and ideals of leadership as viewed through the eyes of Chief Mohlomi. Regrettably, the heart and soul of leadership as espoused by Chief Mohlomi long before colonialism is missing from the leadership discourse in contemporary Africa. Ohiorhenuan (2009: 140) laments the depressing state of Africa today and the image of Africa beamed to the world via global media networks – one of a continent ravaged by wars, poverty, greed, corruption, famine, hunger, guilt and shame: shame that, on average, most Africans are worse off today than their parents were; and guilt at the fact that we are an embarrassment in the community of nations.

Ohiorhenuan (2009: 155) concludes his preamble by asserting that 'there is no need for guilt, shame, or defensiveness because the problem is not that we are Africans – but in our leadership, who fail to recognise that the people are the

foundation of African development'. He offers the following sage advice to the future African princes and princesses:

To break out of the paradigm trap requires the blooming of a million flowers. The starting point is recognition that, in today's world, the legitimacy of the leader derives not from divine authority, nor from tradition, nor from the mere fact of having been elected. Legitimacy derives from the fulfilment of a social contract, from the delivery of what citizens want. Unlike Machiavelli's Prince, it cannot be assumed that the African Prince/Princess knows what his/her people want. Political leaders are expected to engage in dialogue and consultations with a large number of actors in order to define the common good. The African Princess must engage her people in dialogue on the critical issues of Africa's future. Some obvious issues for such dialogue would include: The role of leadership – what is the moral responsibility of the African leader?

Advice similar to Ohiorenuan's was given by the extraordinary sage and philosopher, Chief Mohlomi in the nineteenth century to the then African prince and founder of the Basotho nation, Morena Moshoeshoe, born in 1786. History has it that, although he came to be known as an extraordinary man and leader, Moshoeshoe started off quite differently from the man who became one of the great statesmen of his time. As a young man Moshoeshoe was angry, impatient and power hungry, driven by an insatiable desire to become a great chief. Growing up with the ambition to lead, he was a formidable foe to many small clans, who fell victim to his cattle-raiding escapades. Indeed, at an early age, Moshoeshoe displayed commendable skills in fighting and unmatched tactical ability in military strategies. Fairclough (1905: 196–197) notes: 'As he [Moshoeshoe] attained manhood he showed remarkable powers of organisation, uniting other small clans to his own, some by friendly means and others by force.' It was his violent temper and aggressive behaviour that caused his father, Ntate Mokhachane, and grandfather, Ntate Peete, to fear that he might meet an early death, and so they sent him to Chief Mohlomi (see Guma, 1960; Motsamai, 1952), who had established a leadership academy at his kraal in Ngoliloe, to study law and acquire wisdom.

At Mohlomi's leadership academy, Moshoeshoe became an outstanding student, and indeed became a disciple of Mohlomi. Mohlomi's knowledge and teachings very soon made a great impression on the young Moshoeshoe, and this was reinforced when, after his initiation, Moshoeshoe became Mohlomi's protégé. When Mohlomi met Moshoeshoe, he sensed that the young man was destined

for great things – to be a great chief and leader of many clans. According to Du Preez (2004: 53), the young Moshoeshoe declared to Mohlomi that it was his burning ambition to be a chief over chiefs, a powerful man with many subjects and cattle. Mohlomi was, however, concerned at what the young man's notion of being great chief entailed, and the means by which he intended achieving his aspirations, which included intimidating, bullying and inspiring fear in others; the use of medicines for chieftainship; and a special balm or talisman to enable him to become a great and respected chief (Mokhehle, 1976: 17–21). He therefore devoted himself to educating the young Moshoeshoe about the ideas and ideals of leadership, and it is from Mohlomi's teachings as presented to Moshoeshoe that we gain insight into the former's views concerning the idea and ideals of leadership. For Mohlomi, leadership is not about being feared, but being respected and loved for what you are able to do, through peace, not war.

He taught Moshoeshoe that the practice of virtue and discipline was the first prerequisite for the successful governance of men, and that the wise ruler sought to live in peaceful coexistence with his neighbours and encouraged habits of thrift and industry among his people. He further taught him dignity, self-restraint, patience and leadership. He taught him the value of hard work, that the powerless merited justice, and the poor compassion. He taught that leadership that is able to respond in the best possible way to any given situation, is one that is guided by 'Botho'. He also taught him that only Botho can motivate a leader to be a responsible leader in every kind of situation (see Thompson, 1975; Sanders, 1975; Mokhehle, 1976; Du Preez, 2004).

Mohlomi's concept of botho as being central to the idea and ideals of leadership is closest in meaning to the teachings of Jesus about leadership, greatness and service in the Christian Bible. According to the Gospel of Matthew (20: 24–27), Jesus said to his disciples, 'You know that among the Gentiles the rulers lord it over them, and the great men make their authority felt. Among you this is not to happen. No; anyone who wants to become great among you must be your servant'. It is also closer in meaning to the notion of love in the teachings of Paul, one of Jesus' chief followers: Paul describes love as kind, patient, not envious, and never overbearing (Coggin, 2009). Taking cues from Jesus and Paul, I endeavour below to identify parallels between them and Mohlomi's idea and ideals of leadership lessons as imparted to Moshoeshoe, which left a lasting impression on him, and contributed to his becoming one of the most successful rulers of his era under the most trying circumstances.

Lesson 1: Leadership is having a Humane Conscience – A sense of Right and Wrong

Mohlomi taught Moshoeshoe that conscience is humanity's only guide above and beyond law, and told him, 'Conscience is the faithful monitor of man; she invariably shows him what his duty is. If he does well, she smiles upon him; if he does evil, she torments him. This inward guide takes us under her guidance when we leave the womb, and she accompanies us to the entrance of the tomb' (Du Preez, 2004: 47). Stated slightly differently, 'Conscience is the true guide of a man, it shows him his duty always: if he does well it smiles on him and reproaches him if he does ill' (Mokhehle, 1976).

Lesson 2: Leadership is having the Wisdom of the Balimo – The Wisdom of the Ancestors

When Moshoeshoe asked for medicine or a talisman that would allow him to be a great and respected chief for all time, Mohlomi told him, 'You need the wisdom of Balimo, not medicine to become a great chief and leader. Learn to understand men and know their ways. Learn to bear with their human weaknesses and shortcomings. In their disputes, adjudicate with justice and sympathy. Your closer friends should be the children. The poor and the troubled need you more than those with wealth and status. The land you shall rule should be a home to travellers and fugitives. Always be slow to take up arms – lean heavily on the rod for peace' (Mokhehle, 1976: 31–32).

Lesson 3: Leadership consists in Performing Acts of Genuine and Humane Love for Others

When the young Moshoeshoe arrived at Ngoliloe to ask for medicine that would make him a great chief, Mohlomi is said to have answered, '*Borena ha bo na setlhare; setlhare ke pelo*' – meaning 'chieftainship is not acquired by medicine; the heart is the medicine'. Put differently, Mohlomi is said to have answered Moshoeshoe thus, 'There is no herb, no medicine and no form of talisman that can be used to help anyone to become a chief. The only talisman that I know of is a man's own heart – performances of simple acts of genuine and human love change human hearts toward good and have the power of winning people's hearts' (Mokhehle, 1976: 31). Another version of Mohlomi's answer to Moshoeshoe indicating that love is the heart and lifeblood of leadership reads thus, 'Love and you will be loved; hate and you will be hated. If you are kind and generous to others, especially the unfortunate and weak, fate will be your friend. If you are selfish and cruel, misfortune is sure to cross the path of your life sooner or later' (Du Preez, 2004: 48).

Lesson 4: Leadership is being Motho – Humane – and having Botho – Compassionate Humanism

When young Moshoeshe asked Mohlomi, 'Wasn't it true that many ordinary people have become chiefs by intimidating, bullying and inspiring others with fear?' Mohlomi is said to have replied:

It is often so. But you have to know that chieftainship founded on people's fear of someone who becomes their chief, not based upon peace, justice and botho (humanism), such chieftainship never goes far; it never stands the test of the difficulties of governing; and even if it holds it never brings benefit to anybody ... If you drive people away from you by inspiring people with fear for you and killing some, who then are you going to rule? Experience I have gained as a chief as well as also through extensive travels among other small and great chiefs in different parts of the world has brought me a clear realisation of the fact that a chief becomes and remains a chief only by the people's will, recognition and support (Du Preez, 2004: 53).

Therefore, *morena ke morena ka sechaba* meaning – 'A chief is a chief only by the grace of his people' – was one of Mohlomi's famous sayings.

Lesson 5: Leadership is Performing Duties in Setho – Humane Purity of Thought and Truth

Mohlomi is credited with having advised Moshoeshe as follows: 'One day you will truly be a chief and the ruler of men. You should then perform your duties in all their affairs in "Setho" – i.e. with humane purity of thought and unmitigated truthfulness. In disputes, adjudicate with justice, perfect justice and sympathy ... you must be a friend and helper to all those who are in tribulation – the poor and needy' (Mokhehle, 1976: 31–32). Indeed, Mohlomi was renowned for putting into practice the notion that no person, however poor, should be denied justice. In this regard, Sanders (1975: 21) says of Mohlomi: 'He was also probably the first chief to carry out on an extensive scale a policy of paying the bohali (i.e. lobola), or marriage cattle, for those of his retainers whose families were too poor to pay it for them.'

Lesson 6: Leadership is the Use of Instruments of Power in the Service of People

It is said that Mohlomi taught Moshoeshe his first lessons in statecraft, impressing on him that greatness lay not in holding power for its own sake, but in using power to defend and protect the weak; and that the great ruler was one who could attract people through persuasion and moral example rather than

by force or bullying. He told Moshoeshoe that, 'At the heart of leadership is civilizing mission: where there is war and devastation, chaos and internecine destruction, the ideal leader pursues peaceful and productive alliance, succours refugees, and uses the instruments of power to provision and repopulate the land' (Du Preez, 2004). In this regard, Spronk (1984: 638) contends, 'Mohlomi and Ndlebe greatly differ in their concept of power. The former indicates a love and concern for the people'. It was this notion of power that prompted Mohlomi to have told Moshoeshoe that it was a pity that he could not accompany him on his travels, saying: 'You would then have learned how men are won by truth and justice and not by the use of spears. If you were to go around with me, you would find where, by justice alone, I established peace; and by genuine and effective healing, love abounds where hatred and suspicion reigned before' (Du Preez, 2004: 54).

Lesson 7: Leadership is being Compassionate and Hospitable to Strangers in your Land

Mohlomi is likewise credited with having advised Moshoeshoe as follows: 'Travellers of all types should be fully protected throughout the areas of your chieftain. Fugitives escaping death and persecution in their homelands should find a ready sanctuary in your land. You should protect them. The land you shall rule should be a home to travellers and fugitives' (Mokhehle, 1976: 32). Du Preez (2004: 54) states this as follows: 'You must be a friend and helper to all those who are in tribulation, the poor and the needy. Travellers of all types should be fully protected throughout the areas of your chieftain. Fugitives escaping death and persecution in their homelands should find a ready sanctuary in your land. You should protect them. The land you shall rule should be a home to travellers and fugitives.'

Lesson 8: Leadership is being Virtuous, Tolerant, Patient and Disciplined in Governance

According to Dreyer (2005: 40), Moshoeshoe stood apart from Shaka (with regard to tyrannical outbursts) in line with his charge received from Mohlomi the Seer, namely 'not to kill people, to provide a safe haven, during the wars of devastation'. He advised Moshoeshoe to always be slow to take to arms, to learn to understand men and know their ways, to learn to bear with their human weaknesses and shortcomings, and always be determined to direct them along the paths of truth and purity. Mohlomi convinced Moshoeshoe of the political value of diplomacy as opposed to military alliance and subjugation, and instructed him about the political capital to be gained in the acquisition and judicious exchange, lending, and donation of land, cattle and women as the means of state-formation.

Lesson 9: Leadership entails pursuing Peaceful and Productive Alliances with Others

Concerned about the problems of his time in Southern Africa, namely hostility and armed conflicts between chiefdoms, Mohlomi preached tolerance, peace and conciliation to Moshoeshoe. In this regard, some of his famous sayings that have endured are: 'Peace is my sister – peace is plenty' and 'It is better to thrash the sorghum than to sharpen the spear' (Du Preez, 2003: 16). It is said that he advised Moshoeshoe as follows: 'At all times, I beseech you, lean upon this "rod of peace". You must always keep it clear in your mind that it is far more profitable to harvest sorghum than to sharpen spears; a knobstick by far becomes an instrument of value when it is used to harvest sorghum in the grain fields than when it is engaged to kill men in the battlefields. The word "khotso" – that is Peace – should be the word of greetings among all the people that you are going to rule, as it has always been among us, the Basotho, now for a long time' (Mokhehle, 1976: 32).

Lesson 10: Leadership is being Responsible for One's Actions, even in Unusual Situations

Mohlomi taught Moshoeshoe that diplomatic immunity lies at the heart of leadership. In fact, Mohlomi is lauded for establishing the concept of diplomatic immunity in Southern Africa, although it hardly existed in most parts of Europe at the time. As Du Preez (2003: 16) explains, 'he declared – and it became the custom – that messengers between chiefs should never be attacked. Even if it is a messenger from your worst enemy, you are not allowed to kill him, instead, you have an obligation to give him food and shelter and help him on his way'. Du Preez reports that in the years of great conflict that were to follow, this custom was mostly respected, even by the great warriors of the time such as Shaka and Mzilikazi.

Eventually, Mohlomi declared that Moshoeshoe's tuition had come to an end. Du Preez (2004: 54) recounts the anointing of Moshoeshoe as the African Prince of the Basotho during his graduation thus:

Mohlomi took off one of his earrings and fixed it to [young Moshoeshoe's] ear as a symbol of authority. He gave him a black cow as a symbol of hospitality, and a knobkerrie as a symbol of power. He took [Moshoeshoe's] head in his hands and rubbed his forehead against [Moshoeshoe's forehead], saying: 'All the experiences, knowledge and wisdom with which Molimo [the Supreme Being] and our Balimo [Ancestors] have endowed and enriched my mind shall also be nurtured in, inhabit and enrich your intellect for the great work you are to perform.'

Soon after his graduation, there was a marked change in Moshoeshoe's behaviour. Applying Mohlomi's philosophy and advice, Moshoeshoe established himself and his small chiefdom on top of a virtually impenetrable flat mountain top, Thaba Bosiu, and collected and gathered individuals and groups fleeing from Lifaqane – even groups of cannibals, including the group that captured and ate his beloved grandfather, Ntate Peete. He quickly became famous all over Southern Africa for his masterful diplomacy. He ruled wisely and peacefully, and within a few years had established a prosperous nation, the Basotho. His territory later became the British Protectorate of Basutoland, and is now the independent Kingdom of Lesotho.

Conclusion

A leader ... is like a shepherd. He stays behind the flock, letting the most nimble go on ahead, whereupon others follow, not realising that all along they are being directed from behind.

Nelson Mandela

This statement by Mandela encapsulates the essence of the idea and ideals of leadership that Mohlomi espoused and taught Moshoeshoe at the leadership academy at his kraal in Ngoliloe. From Mohlomi we thus learn that Africa has traditionally been the cradle of leadership philosophy and great leadership. We learn that Africa has a rich deposit of intellectual thought and lessons on leadership. As Dr David Frederic Ellenberger, to whom we owe much of the written records of Mohlomi's life, reflected: 'Mohlomi was born great.' He also wrote that Mohlomi was famous for his love of peace, his charity to all and his wisdom: 'He was a teacher of men, and his teaching had far-reaching effects in humanizing all the Basotho tribes. He established confidence between men and men, and chiefs and people with one voice sought to honour Mohlomi for his wisdom and for the love he bore to all men.' The Afrikaans missionary JP Bruwer called Mohlomi 'a counsellor with deep wisdom' (Bruwer in Du Preez, 2004: 49). Similarly, the French missionary Eugene Cassalis referred to Mohlomi as a chief of great benevolence 'whose name is often invoked in times of public calamity' (Cassalis in Du Preez, 2004: 49).

Meredith (2005) draws attention to the leadership calamity that Africa faces today. Similarly, scholars such as Rotberg (2004), Jackson (2004), Ayittey (2006), Rubongoya (2006) and Metsäpelto (2009) all lament the state of leadership in Africa, which has prompted Peter Pham (2008) to ask: What happened to Africa? Perhaps it is time that Africa and Africans should invoke the

name of Mohlomi and ask for a new African prince or princess of the stature of Moshoeshoe, the African prince of the Basotho, to guide us along the road to Africa's sustainable development. Indeed, Africans themselves also declare that better leadership lies at the heart of sustainable development.

Today, though, the demand for effective leadership and systematic leadership development in Africa is growing more rapidly than ever before. A critical shortage of upcoming leaders is responsible for the underdevelopment of organisations in many African countries (Ugwuegbu, 2001). These organisations are not achieving their potential and could improve their performance by strengthening their leadership. As we learnt from Mohlomi's encounter with Moshoeshoe, it is possible to bring out the continent's future African princes and princesses in the current crop of leaders we have in Africa. History has it that, great leader though he was, Moshoeshoe, the African prince of the Basotho, started off differently. However, the short-tempered and aggressive Moshoeshoe changed when he met Mohlomi. In fact, it is said that Moshoeshoe's interaction with Mohlomi represented his own Damascus experience. Moshoeshoe went into Mohlomi's academy seeking medicine or a talisman for great leadership, but came out having learnt from Mohlomi that the heart is the medicine.

Through the medium of this chapter I am not necessarily identifying Chief Mohlomi as the highest authority for leadership in Africa. I have simply tried to open up new vistas, to transcend prevailing assumptions and paradigms by entering, and taking seriously, ways of thinking quite different from our own. I encourage you to view this chapter as an experiment to see whether it is possible to shed light on certain leadership issues by hypothetically removing the notion that renowned thinkers of the past are fundamentally circumscribed by the exigencies of their time. Indeed, as Ali Mazrui (in Mbigi and Maree, 1995) rightly observes, 'Africa can never go back completely to its pre-colonial starting point but there may be a case for re-establishing contacts with familiar landmarks of modernization under indigenous impetus'. In the words of Theophilus Okere (2002: 7), 'the hidden hand manipulating the destinies of African countries has not been the hidden hand of God' – rather, it has been the hidden or the exposed hand of the mediocrity of Africa's leaders over the ages (Obiakor, 2004). And so Òkè (2006) writes: 'Given that in the context of our historical past things have not worked out favourably, the rational thing to do is to step back from routine activities and try to fashion out a genuinely African blueprint of social, political and economic life. Such a blueprint will be largely analytical of our experiences. It will also have to be sufficiently comprehensive to take cognisance of the various cultural influences that have now become integral parts of the African life.' Osundare (1998: 234) suggests that the solution to the present predicament of

Africa 'involves throwing off the yoke of history, turning that prison into a palace of hope, understanding Africa, denouncing her vices, nursing her virtues' – such as those taught and represented by Mohlomi, the African philosopher chief.

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CHAPTER 8

RARE Leadership: An Alternative Leadership Approach for Africa

Hellicy Ngambi

Introduction

Africa presents a paradox. It is the richest continent in natural resources and yet it is the poorest and most underdeveloped; the majority of its population live on less than US\$2 per day (Global Competitiveness Index, 2010). Despite pockets of improvements and good examples, overall socioeconomic, political and leadership indicators are poor. As much as diversity can be an asset, the continent's diversity contributes to its dysfunction and to destructive conflict. The major challenge facing Africa is not the absence of leaders, but the absence of appropriate and effective leadership for its diversity of people and resources:

I believe that what is at fault is not so much that we are at a loss as to what to do to realise the goal of development, but that we have not evolved the social movement with its leadership, which will ensure that we do indeed make the necessary advances on this front (*Thabo Mbeki, 1998*).

Leadership is the catalyst that keeps organisations and nations focused on their objectives and ensures that they deliver on promises to their clients and stakeholders. This chapter examines existing literature on leadership and diversity and argues for and recommends an alternative African leadership approach that would leverage the benefits of this diversity. The chapter advocates for RARE (responsible, accountable, relevant and ethical) leadership.


Leadership Status Quo: The African Context of Poverty Despite Richness in Wealth

Africa appears to be caught in a developmental pause. Approximately 61 per cent of the population lives in rural areas, and in some countries less than 50 per cent of the population has no access to safe water (African Development Bank Group, 2007). Furthermore, poverty, poor health (including higher incidences of malaria and HIV/AIDS, among others, and high mortality and maternal rate) and

unemployment characterises Africa. This is worrying given that most of Africa has been independent for close to five decades. Both internal and external factors contribute to this stagnation, with slavery and colonialism as well sharing the blame. Between the 16th and early 19th centuries Africa experienced the exploitative evils of slavery and the slave trade (Ogbunwezeh, 2006). This was followed and compounded by a century of ferocious colonial rule. Far from improving conditions on the African continent and ensuring sustainability, colonial rule left Africa in a state of mental subjugation with few educated citizens and leaders (Ogbunwezeh, 2006). As an example, Bob-Millar (2005) reveals that at independence in 1964, Zambia had just 109 African graduates; the imperialist regime never considered education important for 'savages'. In Portuguese colonised Africa the illiteracy rate was very high. In 1960 the Belgian colony of Congo could only claim 16 university graduates from a population of thirteen million. Today the statistics on education are still worrisome. The Nation Master (2005) surveyed 100 countries worldwide and reported that the average number of years adults spend on schooling is 6,2 years. Botswana (ranking 47 with an average of 6,3 years) and South Africa (ranking 50 with an average of 6,1 years) were the only two African countries to appear in the top 50th per centile.


In addition to (and as a result of) deficiencies in education, there are high levels of unemployment and underdevelopment. The Global Competitiveness Index (2010) found that more than 72 per cent of the sub-Saharan African population lives on less than US\$2 per day and 40 per cent on less than US\$1,25 (as shown in Figure 1 below). Poor health and high rates of HIV/AIDS; inadequate institutional planning; abuse of power; lack of accountability; a high violent-crime rate and natural disasters are other challenges facing Africa. Countries in Africa are also generally perceived as corrupt. Transparency International (2009) rates corruption among the top ten hindrances to doing business in South Africa (as shown in Figure 2 below). Furthermore, African countries are prone to political instability and to coups d'état (Collier and Hoeffler 2005) with brutal acts being committed within the context of ongoing civil wars (Okafor, 2005).

Figure 1: People living on less than US\$1,25 a day in sub-Saharan Africa



Source: <http://siteresources.worldbank.org/INPOVERTY/Images/Povetrends> (Accessed 20/09/2010)

Figure 2: Top 10 most serious constraints to business



Source: <http://gcr.weforum.org> (Accessed 20/09/2010)

These figures may have changed slightly but still provide a useful baseline to understand contemporary Africa.

The success or failure of every nation is a reflection on its leadership. Nweke (2010: 12) in expressing his disappointment with Africa's leadership asks:

How can people so hungry for self-rule become so dispassionate about a future they had fought for and lost so much to have? How can a people destroy the very thing they love so much with the same hands that they used in building it? Why should it be that Africa keeps going round in circles instead of moving forward?

The challenges of Africa, much like the challenges facing other regions of the world, have evolved and crept into the domain of electoral contestations. Violence surrounding the December 2007 elections in the once stable Kenya resulted in the deaths of more than a thousand people (Paul 2008). Amnesty International (2009) reported that Zimbabwe's elections, held on 29 March 2008, were marred by arrests of political opponents and the silencing of human rights activists. And in September 2008, South Africa witnessed the unorthodox removal of former president Thabo Mbeki prior to the national general elections. Unfortunately, some African presidents are motivated by a desire to cling to power at all costs. A case in point is Zimbabwe. Whereas President Mugabe fought for the liberation of the then Rhodesia and made Zimbabwe one of Africa's most desirable economies, he missed the opportunity to step down gracefully. Zimbabwe has become the disappointment of Africa, owing to failed policies and electoral manipulations that have forced millions of its citizens to flee the country and seek refuge in neighbouring states. This is a sad and painful chapter in Zimbabwe's history. As a result, today's generation will remember Mugabe more as someone who drove Zimbabwe near to breaking point, than as the freedom fighter he once was.

The 2010 FIFA World Cup hosted by South Africa seemed to bring unity across the diverse spectrum of South Africa. For a moment, it looked as if the nation, perhaps even the continent, was moving forward in unity with a common and shared goal. It was expected that the visionary approach, passion and dedication to delivering a great football experience would have been a template for meeting the country's developmental goals. Unfortunately, the event seems to have been treated as a 'thing to honour' the visitors. A tendency in African culture (and other cultures) to reserve valuable items for visitors' use only – once they are gone the precious items are packed away or placed back on display. Sadly, still simmering xenophobic sentiments towards African visitors during the games and other recent immigrants stood in stark contrast to the open arm welcome extended to visitors of European descent – further testimony to the colonised mindset still alive in Africa.

Africa's wealth is legendary:

... 40 per cent of the world's potential hydro-electric power supply; the bulk of the world's diamonds and chromium; 30 per cent of the uranium; 50 per cent of the world's gold; 90 per cent of its cobalt; 50 per cent of its phosphates; 40 per cent of its platinum; 7,5 per cent of its coal; 8 per cent of its known petroleum reserves; 12 per cent of its natural gas; 3 per cent of its iron ore; 64 per cent of the world's manganese; 13 per cent of its copper;

vast bauxite, nickel and lead resources and millions of untilled farmlands.
(Ogbunwezeh, 2006: 12).

So is its poverty. Although Nigeria is the world's seventh largest exporter of crude oil, over 75 per cent of its population lives in poverty (Ogbunwezeh, 2006). It is reported that from independence in 1960 to 1999, past Nigerian rulers jointly stole or mismanaged 220 billion pounds sterling (Ogbunwezeh, 2006). Nigeria is certainly not alone. King Mswati III of Swaziland and Teodorin Nguema Obiang (son of the oil-rich Equatorial Guinean president) are examples of bad or toxic leaders in this regard.

Highlighting the impact of leadership on follower behaviour, US Second World War General Douglas MacArthur once said: 'A general is just as good or as bad as the troops under his command' (cited in Offermann, 2004: 55). If an African leader (or any leader) fails to lead and live by the values that he or she espouses, it will result in destructive and unproductive behaviour by the followers. An illustration of this toxic followership could be seen during the South African public service wage strike in August 2010. Striking personnel disrupted schooling and left the sick unattended (South African Press Association, 2010).

Poor, incompetent and toxic leadership is in part to blame for Africa's misery. It is a form of leadership that, Kets de Vries and Miller (2003: 395) argue, displays narcissistic personality disorders and it is characterised by

- a grandiose sense of self-importance or uniqueness
- preoccupation with fantasies of unlimited success, power, brilliance, beauty or ideal love
- exhibitionism: the person requires constant attention and admiration
- cool indifference or marked feelings of rage, inferiority, shame, humiliation or emptiness in response to criticism or defeat
- at least two of the following features of disturbances in the interpersonal relationships:
 - entitlement
 - interpersonal exploitativeness
 - relationships that characteristically alternate between the extremes of over-idealisation and devaluation
 - a lack of empathy.

Chenoweth (2005) claims that this form of leadership is unethical, immoral, self-centred, and lacks vision. In addition, Reed (2004) asserts that the key elements of toxic leadership include a noticeable lack of concern for followers,

a negative personality, self-interest, perplexing for followers and often strains communication. Furthermore, Lipman-Blumen (2005) confirms that a toxic leader violates the basic human rights of their supporters; engages in corrupt, criminal and unethical activities, lacks integrity and misleads their own followers. This is the leadership I have elsewhere described as emotionally illiterate, unfit and shallow (Ngambi, 2002b).

Africans need to develop leaders who can embrace the rich and diverse heritage of our continent, learn from the past, accommodate the present, but determine our future. Certainly, there are examples of fine leadership in Africa. Former president of Botswana, Seretse Khama, was one of such leaders. He created a participatory, law-abiding political culture that continued under his successors, Ketumile Masire and Festus Mogae (Rotberg, 2004). The leadership of Botswana has demonstrated democratic principles, integrity, tolerance, visionary leadership and a spirit of entrepreneurship. The former president of Tanzania, Julius Nyerere, another of Africa's most respected leaders, was a politician of principle and intelligence. Known as *Mwalimu* (a teacher), he had a vision of education and social action that was rich with possibility and he demonstrated the importance and power of education in helping to bring about socioeconomic and political advances among African people (Obiakor, 2004). The former presidents of Namibia and Mozambique, Sam Nujoma and Joaquim Chissano, not only built institutions of democratic law in their respective countries, but also ensured sustained economic growth. In addition, these leaders stepped down after their mandatory terms ended and allowed their successors to be chosen in free and fair elections (Reddy, 2010).

South Africa too has demonstrated effective leadership. Credit must be given to former President FW de Klerk (despite criticisms) who demonstrated decisive leadership in his role in ending apartheid in South Africa. His decisions paved the way for a global statesman, former President and Nobel Laureate Nelson Mandela, who exercised inclusive and visionary leadership (Rotberg, 2004). Mandela advocated for reconciliation in a society that would otherwise have emerged from apartheid far more fractured. His successor, former President Thabo Mbeki, articulated the idea of building a new, progressive and modernised Africa (Olivier, 2003). He popularised the notion of the African Renaissance, was instrumental in the development of the New Partnership for Africa's Development (NEPAD) and succeeded in placing Africa high on the global agenda (Olivier, 2003).

In addition, the Africa Progress Panel (2010) highlights other success stories. For example, it records how Malawi has transformed from a food-deficit to a food-exporting country, and how Africa is increasingly considered an

interesting business destination for the world. The African Development Bank Group (2010) reports that African economies have continued to recover from the global economic downturn, led by favourable external demand for African products. Although still not able to meet the overall targets, the Africa Progress Panel (2010) also reports that Africa has seen a decade of improvement under the Millennium Development Goals.

The Importance of Leveraging Diversity in Leadership for Development

Lumby and Morrison (2010: 4) argue that the 'production of knowledge about diversity shapes and limits how we conceptualise it'. Diversity by its nature concedes that a similar situation can be perceived differently by a diverse group of individuals; hence the subject is fertile ground for empirical research and also fertile ground for interpersonal conflict. In addition, Reichenberg (2001) highlights the fact that embedded in the meaning of diversity, is the mindset and climate of the organisation and the different perspectives people bring to the organisation. Elsewhere I have defined diversity as 'the mosaic of people who bring a variety of backgrounds, styles, perspectives, values and beliefs as assets to the groups and organisations with which they interact' (Ngambi in Smit, Cronje, Brevis and Vrba, 2007: 240). This analogy to a mosaic recognises the value in a diverse workforce and acknowledges that people do not have to fit in, but rather bring their own diverse experiences to add value in building a colourful mosaic. It implies a respect for differences.

Furthermore, it is fundamental to note that the notion of diversity is itself diverse, as asserted by Harrison and Klein (2007) and Klein and Harrison (2007). These authors postulate three forms of diversity (1) variety or information diversity, where a group member adds unique knowledge to the group; (2) separation diversity characterised by group members with extreme and opposing views, opinions or attitudes; and finally (3) diversity as disparity where there is a hierarchy in superiority, wealth or other resources. In addition, Page (2007) argues that diversity fosters innovation. People with different perspectives increase the probability of innovation, which in many cases is the cause of most of the world breakthroughs, a notion he refers to as *superadditivity* (Page, 2007).

In the business world, Johnson and Redmond (2000) suggest that the benefits of diversity include a wider search for talented and scarce people, the ability to operate in a diverse populated global business environment, teamwork and good citizenship. The European Commission (2003) found that companies that invest in diversity, strengthen their long-term value drivers (tangible and intangible assets that allow them to remain competitive) and generate short- and

medium-term opportunities to improve their return on investment. Furthermore, high performance of senior managers, organisational productivity and creativity has been reported as a benefit of diversity by Reichenberg (2001). Professional Practice Curriculum (2010) further identifies an ability to move into emerging markets; improved employee morale; improved retention and improved communication between employees as key benefits of a diverse workforce. Improvements in decision making, increased flexibility, innovation and learning, reduced labour turnover and market competitiveness are benefits proposed by Barbosa and Cabral-Cardoso (2007). This would explain why many organisations in countries like the United States of America (USA) and South Africa are becoming more interested in effectively leading and managing workforce diversity. To realise the benefits of workforce diversity calls for a certain kind of leadership. This leadership issue is explored in more detail in the next section.

The Significance of Leadership

Some definitions of leadership are descriptive of the behaviour and/or traits of a leader while others relate to the process of leadership. Leadership can be defined as the process of influencing others' commitment to realising their full potential in achieving value, adding shared vision with passion and integrity (Ngambi, 2010a). This definition encompasses a followership that is voluntary and not coerced, and a value system based on respect, integrity and authenticity. This implies that there is a distinction between management and leadership. Leadership implies effectiveness and influence, whereas management entails efficiency and authority. But the two are the two sides of the same coin. Effective leadership without a proper understanding of management principles can, at best, waste organisational resources and at worst become toxic. Similarly, an efficient manager with no leadership skills will miss important opportunities while the competition thrives (Nienaber and Roodt, 2008; Bennis, 1989).

This article advocates that the most effective leadership approach in a diverse environment is the one that is RARE (responsible, accountable, relevant, and ethical). RARE leadership fosters what Ely and Thomas (2001) call integration and learning (IaL), also known as the learning and effectiveness paradigm in organisations. Thomas and Ely (1996) and Ely and Thomas (2001) suggest that it is only this perspective that enables organisations to adequately leverage the benefits of managing diversity. They found that groups that apply the IaL perspective outperformed those that did not by a margin of 37 per cent (Thomas and Ely, 1996; Ely and Thomas, 2001). The aim is to incorporate diversity in the heart and fabric of the mission, work and culture of the organisation and nation

where all employees and citizens feel respected, valued and included and where appropriate values are reinforced.

RARE Leadership Qualities for Africa

Leadership must foster a balance between engaging with current realities and developing leaders for tomorrow. This requires an eye for targeting potential talent and supporting it. It calls for a leadership dedicated to educating, training, developing, retaining and rewarding talent not mediocrity. Leadership that does not support the incompetency that arises from misplaced loyalty and that is value driven and principled enough to reject any form of toxic behaviour even from close allies.

Leadership that can realise and exploit the benefits of diversity is cooperative, team-oriented, collaborative, transparent and fair in a RARE and contextual way. It aims to achieve optimum worker productivity, combine risk taking and innovation, foster the participation of employees, empower the workforce (Beaty, 2007) and promote learning (Van der Heide, 2007). In addition, it is leadership that aims to bolster development in its organisations (Charan, 2005), that excels in tapping into the needs and fears of employees (Buckingham, 2005) because it is sensitive, recognises and rewards talent (Dicocoo, 2007) and is operationally aware and active, but does not micro manage. This is the leadership that sets the vision, and motivates everyone to rally behind that vision. It is leadership that creates organisational ownership among employees, and values morals and integrity and respects cultures. Leadership that focuses attention on the developmental needs of communities and the nations it serves.

This is the breed of leadership I call RARE (Ngambi, 2010b). It is informed by responsible behaviour among employees, citizens and all stakeholders; it does not seek benefit at the expense of others; but is responsible for the future state of the institution or nation under its stewardship. Leadership that is accountable to itself and to all stakeholders, taking ownership of its decisions. RARE leadership remains relevant in a value-adding way to all stakeholders and is of service to the community in which it serves.

Responsible leadership is visionary and is a catalyst for change

Responsible leadership cultivates an envisaged future in the hearts and minds of followers. But most importantly it recognises when there is a need for this change. Responsible leaders are change catalysts (Goleman, Boyatzis and McKee, 2002). They challenge the status quo, persuade and agitate for change

(Aitken and Higgs, 2010; Garvin and Roberto, 2005) and champion the new order. While they appreciate barriers to and fear of change, they find practical ways to overcome these barriers and effect needed change. Responsible leadership advocates what the Centre for Ethical Leadership (2007) and Friedrich, Vessey, Schuelke, and Mumford (2009) call 'collective leadership'; Lumby (2003) calls it 'distributed leadership'; Arnone and Stumpf (2010) refer to as 'shared leadership'. I call it 'community leadership' (Ngambi, 1999); and Beaty (2007) labels it 'participative leadership'. This is leadership that moves followers towards the desired new future without transforming them into monsters, but into disciples. Heifetz, Grashow and Linsky (2009) refer to this kind of leadership as 'adaptive' in that it fosters adaptation in order to thrive in tomorrow's world and it embraces disequilibrium as necessary in order to get things done. Visionary leadership embraces creativity (Ready, Conger and Hill, 2010; Sternberg, 2007) and innovation (Carmeli, Gelbard and Gefen, 2010; Elenkov and Manev, 2009; Robinson, 1989; Tice, 2007), is inspiring (Coutu, 2004), and believes in lifelong learning and invests in future leadership.

Accountable Leadership fosters Connectivity

If you are to be an accountable leader you must connect with the people you are responsible for. Maxwell (2010) asserts that connecting is the ability to identify with and relate to people in such a way that your ability to influence them is enhanced. For many authors in the field of leadership, this connectivity with the followers requires that a leader have a sincere emotional and spiritual connection with the people (Clark, 2004; Alon and Higgins, 2005; Antonakis, Ashkanasy and Dasborough, 2009). In addition, a leader must at all times actively communicate his/ her actions and intentions. Words and actions should be integrated, because people do not care until they know the leader cares – only then will they commit to the vision.

Responsibility and accountability from the leader comes first; expecting responsibility and accountability from others comes second. It is common for leaders to scapegoat and blame others when they make a mistake – blaming the environment, the circumstances and everybody else but themselves. To cultivate and develop a culture of responsibility and accountability, here are some guidelines:

Establish achievable **goals and outcomes** – without goals and outcomes employees and managers, citizens and leaders end up being frustrated. Demonstrate and clearly define what exceptional performance and

behaviour is expected, what it looks like, because this sets a platform of where the organisation intends to go.

Gain **commitment and buy-in** – when there is no commitment all we get is compliance. Leaders need to be attentive to people's concerns and create a conducive environment for high performance.

Build a **culture of high performance** – there must be solid core values that guide behaviour and performance in the organisation.

Monitor what you anticipate – create an environment of follow up and monitoring, as it creates a culture of early intervention and corrective criticism.

Provide feedback and consequences – feedback allows people the space to know whether they are still on the expected and agreed path or not, it also allows people to **get early intervention** where needed.

Relevant Leadership is Engaging

Relevant leadership is in touch with the environment. It drives organisational and national performance by analysing future trends (Beinhocker, Davis and Mendonca, 2009) that will have a positive impact on challenges facing institutions (Kulati, 2000; Siaciwena, 2006). It continuously develops 'best practices' (Ansari, 2002; Glatter and Kydd, 2003) in pursuit of excellence. Engaging leadership embraces and leverages the benefits of diversity (Klein and Harrison, 2007), commits to the execution of strategy without excuses (Stewart and O'Brien, 2005; Tice, 2007) is decisive (Robinson, 1989) and has courage (Garvin and Roberto, 2005; Hayward, 2010; Van der Heide, 2007; Van der Merwe, 2006). It acknowledges that what is relevant in one environment may not be relevant in another and thus is flexible, innovative and adaptable. Thus it is leadership that leverages the benefits of diversity. This leadership allows leaders, managers and workers to make the mental connection between diversity and how work is done so that they are able to reap the full benefits of workforce diversity by adding value in all that they do. This leadership actively seeks opportunities to explore and identify the way group differences affect work relationships and how they affect the way work is done in an organisation and how to respond to them positively in an emotionally intelligent way (Ngambi, 2002a, b, c). This is the leadership that fosters respect amongst teammates and values synergy that results from team work.

Ethical Leadership Maintains Integrity


The Centre for Ethical Leadership (2007) describes ethical leadership as knowing your core values and having the courage to live them in all parts of your life in service of the common good. Ethical leaders need to demonstrate integrity by being authentic. Cashman (1997) suggests that being authentic requires a leader to know thyself and by practising what they wish others to become. Listen with a giving attitude that seeks to bring forth the other's contribution; express oneself in a manner that creates value; appreciate self-expression that creates value; and be in service, because the leader is ultimately not judged by how well he or she leads, but by how well he or she serves.

To overcome the destructive and unethical behaviour of some political leaders, civil society needs to be responsible and stop electing leaders based solely on loyalty and emotions attached to liberation politics. The impetus should be the vision for the country and the capabilities of leaders to deliver on such a vision. Secondly, there needs to be more shareholder activism to fight corruption in the private sector, which too often colludes with the state to rob the nation of its resources.

Framework for Developing RARE Leadership

In the 21st century, organisations and nations will thrive depending on how well they build people, networks and relationships. The framework for developing RARE leadership (see Figure 3) demonstrates an interaction among the three factors:

Figure 3: Framework for RARE leadership development



Identify Leadership Potential: To be Responsible and Relevant

When identifying leadership potential with an aim of developing the RARE leadership for Africa's advancement, it is appropriate to start by looking at the big picture. From there we can establish connections from the continental level down to the national and departmental level at which implementation takes place. Nations and organisations need to ensure that there is alignment of the priorities, objectives and strategic focus of these institutions to ensure that they all have a shared vision and sense of purpose. Using higher education institutions as an example, Table 1 illustrates the driving framework that could be utilised to identify leadership that will enable organisations to play a role in harmonising internal success with broader continental success.

Table 1: Some strategies and priorities of NEPAD, South Africa, Unisa and CEMS

Continent level – NEPAD	Country level – RSA	Organisation level – UNISA	College level – College of Economic and Management Sciences
NEPAD's strategic focus To create the conditions conducive for investment, high economic growth and sustainable development. To increase Africa's competitiveness in the world economy. Source: www.nepad.org	SA priority areas Improving education Creation of decent work and sustainable livelihoods. Source: 2010 State of the Nation Address	Unisa strategic objectives • Position Unisa as a leading provider of quality distance education programmes through an academic product range that expands on its comprehensive character • Promote research, increased capacity and productivity aligned with national priorities for knowledge development • Establish service-orientated, technology-enhanced learner support to increase retention and throughput • Establish a performance-orientated approach to management, promote quality assurance, assess outcomes and reward productivity and excellence. Source: www.unisa.ac.za	CEMS operational plans • Review and develop relevant curricula to promote innovation, and reinvigorate 'graduateness' • Develop an integrated student support model • Develop, implement and monitor college research plans and initiatives • Utilise technology-based methods like MyUnisa to enhance learner support • Implemented an integrated performance management system.

At the continental level the focus is on ensuring Africa's competitiveness, economic development and sustainability. To achieve this, the country (South Africa) aims to improve the standard of education (which is critical for achieving competitiveness in the 21st century) and ensure that it also focuses on the creation of decent and sustainable livelihoods, which will make possible the attainment of economic development and sustainability. Accordingly, at the organisational level (for example in this case an institute of higher learning, Unisa) the role of institutions is to make available resources and commitment to research and technology-enhanced process to learner education, and to also improve access to learners. At the college level (Unisa's College of Economic and Management Sciences) the goal is to ensure that a relevant graduate with appropriate skills is produced, that research initiatives are implemented and monitored, individuals assisted within the college to exert their potential to the optimum and finally to enhance people's performance so as to be able to contribute meaningfully. In this approach there is no disconnection between individuals, organisations, nations and the continental agenda. This then serves as a foundation to identify the leadership that will ensure the attainment of these key goals. This links back to our definition of leadership that speaks to the importance of a shared vision.

Build Leadership Capacity: To be Accountable and Relevant

Building capacity in leadership is a continuous and a developmental process that starts at an early age. It encompasses the *self, others and the organisation*. Building leadership capacities of self includes the responsibility of self-awareness and being proactive in developing personal strengths and values. To achieve this, leaders need to learn to be responsible, show discipline and accountability, and conduct themselves ethically. In the same manner, to build the leadership capacity of others involves the mechanism of interpersonal influence which produces not just followers but disciples, and how leaders engage with others to ensure relevance. Organisations engage in strategic partnerships (through public-private partnerships) to expand their reach for building Africa's leadership – this relationship is also illustrated in Table 1. In doing, so higher education institutions and industry merge resources to build new partnerships and relevant organisations. For instance, the Thabo Mbeki African Leadership Institute (TMALI), a partnership of Thabo Mbeki Foundation and Unisa, is a move towards the realisation of this envisaged future. Once the capacity has been built then adequate support needs to be given to these leaders.

Support Leadership Performance: Ensure Moral and Ethical Behaviour

It is important to support leadership performance if we are to reach developmental goals such as competitiveness, improved provision of education by nations while institutions ensure excellence in tuition, research and a technology-driven environment. As set forth in Table 1, resources need to be made available for the leadership to deliver on this strategic focus. Systems and processes need to be put in place to ensure the success of leadership in attaining strategic organisational goals. The cumulative effect of nations' excellence will result in the attainment of continental competitiveness and sustainability. This approach requires of leadership to be accountable and relevant by ensuring that those driving leadership connect with the people and engage in building one prosperous continent. Leaders need to identify credible and morally aware and sensitive role models for their own successes and must seek to be mentored and coached. This will strengthen them against the temptations of power and self-enrichment.

Utilise and Export Leadership Excellence

Once we learn how to develop and utilise our knowledge we also need to share it. It is essential that individual nations of Africa believe in themselves and then share their expertise with other African nations and the rest of the world. Institutions like Brand Africa would be helpful in addressing Afro-pessimism. For example, South Africa hosted a successful 2010 FIFA World Cup and astounded the pessimists of the world. The country needs to leverage organisational skills learnt from this experience to improve other industries in the country. This is an act of being responsible and acting with integrity (being ethical), leveraging the benefits of our success. The next step will be how South Africa assists other African countries to host successful events, as the country did by lending a hand to Angola in organising the 2010 Confederation of African Football Cup. In addition, organisations need to engage in responsible strategic partnering across Africa and the globe, to engage in developmental debate so as to remain relevant, and to finally conduct their business in an ethical manner. Throughout these steps RARE leadership is developed, and provides a framework that is not static and repeating itself but continuously changing in a flexible way.

Conclusion

If Africa is to break from its grim status quo, it has to do something different. It is commonly said that doing the same thing over and over again and expecting different results is a form of insanity. If African countries are to leverage their

rich diversity in natural and human resources, they have to start doing things differently and innovatively. No country has ever achieved high levels of development through imitation or using resources that are not indigenous. This chapter argues for an African leadership approach that is responsible, accountable, relevant and ethical (RARE) if Africa is to galvanise her resources and create a better future. The chapter has proposed a framework for developing and applying RARE leadership at continental, national, institutional and departmental level. It is recommended that further studies be conducted to explore the application of RARE leadership and the developmental framework in individual organisations and countries in Africa for sustainable development.

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CHAPTER 9

Intellectual Leadership: The Alternative Leadership Paradigm for Africa's Advancement

Greg Sako Kame

Introduction

An intellectual examination of Africa since independence reveals that the continent is indeed stagnant. Assigning colonialism all the blame rather than examining the reasons for this situation is simply an unconscious endeavour to avoid paying the inevitable price for Africa's renaissance. Although criticism of the West may afford some African nationalist a false sense of security, in my view no amount of Western bashing for colonialism will restore Africa. Africa cannot advance simply by her ranting with the Western scapegoat mentality. The true solution simply lies in an alternative leadership paradigm. This can only be affected by carefully examining the causes of Africa's stagnancy and deriving better ways to deal with them; for as Socrates, the ancient Greek philosopher once said, 'the unexamined life is not worth living'.

The fact that colonialism devastated Africa cannot be gainsaid. History bears witness that, by cunning and coercion, Europe once fleeced Africa to feed herself by the resources and sweat of the African people. Colonialism resulted in the redrawing of the boundaries of African nation-states to facilitate colonial administration, but this subjected the continent to constant flux as people of dissimilar cultures were unequally yoked together. While it can therefore be admitted that colonialism left Africa in a parlous state, it cannot be held accountable for Africa's stagnancy today. It is largely a problem of African leadership. Hence, instead of heaping all blame on Western imperialism, it will be more helpful if Africans were to examine issues of leadership. The global image of African leadership as pinpointed by Robert I Rotberg (2008), President of the World Peace Forum, who reveals that Africa is indeed leadership-sick. In his article, 'The roots of Africa's leadership deficit', he gives a depressing but truthful summary of African leadership performances. 'During the past three decades,' he wrote, 'roughly 90 per cent of sub-Saharan African leaders have behaved despotically, governed poorly, eliminated their people's human and civil rights, initiated or exacerbated existing civil conflicts' (Rotberg, 2003: 18).

To suggest therefore that poor leadership is fundamental to Africa's problem is simply stating the obvious. As Sappor, cited on the Africa unchained BlogSpot, comments: 'Common sense dictates looking both ways before crossing a street, or risk being hit by a truck. For decades, African leaders looked only one way.' By failing to make an intellectual assessment of their policies within the context of Africa before implementation, some African leaders have forfeited their right to be described as intellectual leaders. If it is true that the problem of stagnancy in Africa today can be attributed to bad leadership, then the advice of Bewaji (2003) could be useful: he argues 'a philosophically robust concept map of "leadership" is critical to understanding the socioeconomic, political and technological challenges faced by African ... polities'.

The point this chapter seeks to advance is that an alternative leadership paradigm has the capacity to initiate and advance the long desired renaissance in Africa. I also wish to exhort contemporary African leaders to develop critical and balanced policies from an intellectual perspective aimed at achieving political, economic, social and religious advancement on the continent. For this to happen there is a need for an alternative leadership paradigm. Specifically, intellectual leadership is required.

Intellectual Leadership Development

Intellectual leadership is an ideal method of leadership that implements thought measures for a people's advancement. It is concerned with results and delivery rather than politicking and propaganda. This pattern of leadership has the capacity to easily accelerate both the political and the socioeconomic advancement of the African people. It can also advance the continent by promoting and defending issues of common interest in Africa to the rest of the world.

The parties involved in this form of leadership want their actions to decide their legacy and public persona and not the other way around. Motivated by a strong sense of patriotism, unselfishness and self-sacrifice, they take the time to carefully examine the pros and cons of any policy before implementing them for the good of the masses. Why has it been so difficult for Africa to develop this pattern of leadership over the years? This is examined in the sections below.

Challenges

Over the years, many have sought reasons for the challenges prevailing in Africa. In response, some have blamed the plight of the continent on several aspects central to our identity – for example they believe that there is something wrong

with being black. To others, our situation is attributable to our geographic location especially within the tropics. The African sun, they say, is so hot that it fries the brains of its natives. In the views of yet others, Africa is stagnant because of how we were treated by our colonial masters. While these views lack convincing and scientific justification, they cannot be completely discounted. One tends to believe that the root cause of Africa's stagnancy today lies chiefly in our beliefs and our actions as Africans.

In a sermon on African leadership issues, the Ghanaian preacher and Christian statesman Mensa Otabil once declared: 'You can never act beyond what you believe and you cannot believe beyond what you know.' Renowned physicist, philosopher and author, Albert Einstein stated, 'the significant problems we face cannot be solved at the same level we were at when we created them'. This in context means that, to solve the problems that have come about as a result of our flaws, we must correct those flaws before we can overcome our problems. However, we cannot work on improving ourselves if we are ignorant of the nature and magnitude of the obstacles we face in Africa. Some of the most significant challenges to development in Africa today are globalisation, Afro-pessimism, the African past, disunity among leaders and a decline in morality and spirituality.

Globalisation

Even though colonialism is said to be dead in Africa, through globalisation the West is nevertheless still at the helm of African affairs and this has not worked to Africa's advantage. Globalisation goes beyond merely the international trade in goods, and includes the way those goods are produced, the delivery and sale of services, and the movement of capital. The key players include multinational enterprises that carry out business across national boundaries; the World Trade Organization (WTO), through which international trade agreements are negotiated and enforced; the World Bank and the International Monetary Fund (IMF) which are meant to assist governments in achieving development aims through the provision of loans and technical assistance; and national governments, who together with these international institutions are instrumental in determining the outcomes of globalisation.

Globalisation has the potential to generate wealth and improve living standards as it removes trade barriers and throws the world's markets open to all buyers and sellers. Nations that buy less but sell more, gain. However those that buy more but sell less, lose. It is generally admitted that globalisation has increased the gap between rich and poor. A Kenyan analyst, Oduor Orgwen noted in the *New African* of 1 November 2007 that 'Africa extracts and exports primary

commodities and imports and consumes value-added products. Thus, as regards global free trade, Africa is a consumer of what it doesn't produce and a producer of what it doesn't consume'. The disadvantage of this is that most African nations extract and export raw materials at the low prices determined by the West, and import finished products at the high prices likewise determined by the West, thus putting Africa at the losing end. Some economic analysts have estimated that 46 per cent of Africans live in absolute poverty and this figure continues to rise. According to statistics in 1960, the income gap between the 20 per cent richest and the 20 per cent poorest countries in the world was 30 to 1; this rose to 60 to 1 in 1990 and to around 75 to 1 at the end of the last century.

Over the last twenty years average incomes in industrialised countries grew by two per cent over the same period. Thus, globalisation is extremely detrimental to Africa's advancement because its design concedes considerable advantage to Europe and industrialised Asia, thus making Africa a loser in the world free markets. This has been one of the significant setbacks to Africa's advancement. The challenge has been to find ways to manage change and regulate globalisation so that it brings prosperity to as many Africans as possible. If Africa is to advance, then we must devise some solutions to this problem.

Afro-pessimism

To be Afro-pessimistic is to believe that Africa is backward, underdeveloped and poverty stricken and consequently unable to advance and be on par with other developed continents. This mindset is one of Africa's biggest challenges to development. The continent is for the most part plagued by an inferiority complex and a mindset that other races and continents are better. With many Africans not believing in themselves or in a promising future, Africans are like a soccer team that has lost the match before it has even begun.

The African Past

The vestiges of colonialism continue to exert a negative influence on present-day postcolonial Africa and this poses a further great obstacle to development. Some colonial masters still have a selfish hold over their former colonies as they indirectly manoeuvre their politics and economy for their own personal aggrandisement, thus depriving Africa of a chance to develop on her own. Colonialism resulted in severe losses for Africa in the form of vast quantities of minerals, human resources through the brain drain, and valuable African culture, particularly where the French policy of assimilation was applied. This has greatly weakened

the uniqueness of Africa as many Africans today try to identify themselves in the world by mimicking the Western cultures. This has not only reduced the African uniqueness on the global scene, it has also undermined the rich African diversity and creativity. All this has greatly affected Africa's socioeconomic and political advancement today.

Disunity among African Leaders

African leadership suffers from disunity which has greatly hampered progress. There is disagreement and a lack of cooperation among leaders, which makes it difficult for Africa to advance. Some leaders claim to be omniscient veterans in politics. It is common to hear African leaders denigrating their fellows who are trying to make a difference. For instance, the Mo Ibrahim Foundation, founded by Mo Ibrahim of Sudan to promote African leadership aims to encourage good governance in Africa by awarding a \$5 million prize to the African leader whose government is proven to be the most exemplary in Africa. This initiative has however drawn criticism; some African critics have claimed that the amount is too large to be awarded to a single person and that it would be better spent on improving educational and medical systems and poverty relief programmes as leaders should not be rewarded for simply doing their job (Rotberg, 2009: 13). While such objections may have some merit, they have greatly discouraged some Africans from integrity when investing their resources in good governance to the detriment of Africa's advancement.

A Decline in Morality and Spirituality

Christian Scholar, D Elton Trueblood (in Foster, 1998: xi) made the following trenchant observations:

The greatest problems of our time are not technological, for these we handle fairly well. They are not even political or economic, because the difficulties in these areas, glaring as they may be, are largely derivative. The greatest problems are moral and spiritual, and unless we can make some progress in these realms, we may not even survive. This is how advanced cultures have declined in the past.

One of the obstacles to Africa's advancement is the high rate of moral and spiritual decadence that is permeating every nook and cranny of the continent. Every day brings further reports of brutal killings, incest, rape, corruption, child abuse,

human rights abuse and drug addiction. The decline of moral values in Africa such as respect for human life, love for others, honesty in business, accountability in governance, respect for hierarchy and respect for the Almighty God has greatly hindered Africa's advancement. For the most part, there is no fear of God or respect for His values in the continent and this has only opened Africa to vicious practices that have made development difficult to achieve. African youths who are the workforce of Africa and the hope for the future are the worst affected by this moral and spiritual decline and this worrying problem must be overcome if Africa is to see better days in the near future.

Potential Solutions

The development of a stable intellectual leadership pattern in Africa would undoubtedly be of benefit to the continent and her people. However, it is a phenomenon that every good thing has its own obstacles or challenges. To an intellectual therefore, the issue is not the existence of obstacles but how we can overcome them. The main problem in Africa today is not the challenges we face but our reaction to these challenges. Pessimism has a way of generating stagnancy. Albert Einstein rightly noted that: 'The greatest inconvenience of people and nations is the laziness with which they attempt to find the solution to their problems'.

There is a global wind of change blowing and we must ensure that it touches Africa too. *Leadership* of November 2009 noted that, according to the 2008 UN Habitat statistics, the world urban population had more than doubled over the previous 30 years from 1,5 to 3,3 billion with Africa's urban population projected to double in the next 20 years. If this is true, then Africa is on its way to development. African leaders need to start leading as intellectuals by also thinking 'outside of the box' and this entails queuing up in the move toward global development if we really want to enter the 22nd century as a developed continent. 'The African renaissance is upon us. Those who have eyes to see let them see!' Below are some possible solutions to the challenges hampering Africa's development.

Solutions to the Challenge of Globalisation in Africa

In clearer terms, the major challenge facing Africa today is to design public policies that will maximise the potential benefits of globalisation, and to minimise the downside risks of destabilisation and/or marginalisation. This does not imply, however, that no efforts have been made or are being made to ameliorate the situation; many sub-Saharan African countries are making some significant

efforts towards macroeconomic stability and this positive trend is expected to continue.

As such, while globalisation has not always worked in Africa's favour, it does not imply that African countries should continually isolate themselves from this trend of change. Because, as with any structural change, there will be some segments of the society that will be at a disadvantage in the short term, while other segments, and the economy as a whole, are benefiting. Hence, African leaders should rather embrace globalisation in the awareness of its potential risks, and seek to provide adequate protection for the vulnerable segments of society during the process of change. While some African nations are currently on the right track, there is still more to do. African leaders need to reform their economic infrastructure.

A people are not said to be independent until they gain economic autonomy. America for example understood that to fight for independence did not just mean political or psychological freedom from England. They understood that to be independent, they needed to fight for an economic independence and an economic infrastructure. To achieve economic independence in Africa, intellectual leaders must insist that foreign investors may partner with other nationals in various industries and businesses abroad but in Africa, the African people must own greater shares in businesses that are established on African soil. They may also have to insist that non-Africans may rent land in Africa but not buy it. In this way, Africa will be in control – Africans must not allow other nations to own Africa. For us to start benefiting from what we never benefited, we must start doing what we never did.

Also, African leaders must ensure that fundamental human rights are respected and not violated in the name of international trade. These include the abolition of forced and child labour, the right to effective and collective bargaining, and freedom from discrimination. If these rights are upheld in Africa, it will go a long way to help Africans break out of the shackles of poverty.

Another solution to the downside of globalisation in Africa is that African leaders must insist on fair trade with their international partners. Fair trade is a growing international movement that ensures that producers in poor countries get a fair deal. This means a fair price for their goods (one that covers the cost of production and guarantees a living income). It gives consumers an opportunity to use their purchasing power to tilt the balance in favour of the poor.

But fair trade alone cannot address the crisis faced by the millions of small-scale farmers and producers whose livelihoods are threatened by low commodity prices and unfair competition from rich countries. This can only be achieved by

changing the rules of world trade so that the rules work for small-scale producers as well as for the rich multinationals.

In his address at the Southern African Economic Summit in Harare on 21 May 1997, the then deputy managing director of the International Monetary Fund, Alassane D Ouattara identified five main areas where African countries need to achieve greater progress in order to speed up their participation in globalisation. They are:

1. Maintain macroeconomic stability and accelerate structural reform
2. Ensure economic security
3. Reform financial sectors
4. Achieve good governance
5. A partnership with civil society

It would be very helpful if African leaders could seriously consider these suggested courses of action in their endeavours towards good governance.

Solutions to the Challenge of Afro-pessimism

Africa is what it is today because of what we believed about ourselves in the past and shall be tomorrow what we believe about ourselves today. The breakthrough is all wrapped up in the mind.

God did not create Africa to be average and others good. He loves all that He has created. Hence our missing out on God's best is entirely our fault. By now we should reject being looked upon by others as poverty stricken and underprivileged. It is time for Africans to overcome pessimism and hold their heads high in the world and be on the lookout for the new thing that God wants to do in Africa. If the population of Africa is indeed set to double in the next 20 years, Africans cannot afford to wallow in defeat lest the 22nd century finds us still underdeveloped.

Solutions to the Challenges Posed by the African Past

In a public address, Nelson Mandela once noted that, 'the task of undoing that past is on the shoulders of African leaders themselves, with the support of those willing to join in a continental renewal'. Africa must learn to focus on the future and not the past; this requires overcoming a number of mental barriers. If Africa is to succeed, her leaders must cast an intellectual look at the future and plan wisely. The days of colonialism and ruthless postcolonial despots like Idi Amin

and Mobutu Sese Seko are gone. This is a new era for Africa as many Africans are increasingly aware of the duties and responsibilities of their leaders and now demand better services. We therefore cannot allow the past to determine our future and thereby miss the new things that God has in store for Africa.

The North African theologian St. Augustine of Hippo (1958) once said God gives what he commands and commands what He wills. In the present context, this means that God will not want to do a new thing in Africa without providing the means through which it will come to pass. The establishment of pan-African organisations such as the African Union (AU), the New Partnership for Africa's Development (NEPAD) and the Thabo Mbeki African Leadership Institute (TMALI) without doubt are some of the means through which God wants to do something new in Africa. He wants Africa to turn from the past, turn away from Afro-pessimism and face the challenges to development. We have to let go of the past hurts, pains, losses and failures and start believing in God for bigger and better things.

At a time when he and his fellow black Americans had no reason to hope for better days, given the torture and discrimination they received from the whites in the USA, Martin Luther King Jnr was able to put the past behind him and look at the future with the eyes of a prophet and say: 'Even though we face the challenges of today and tomorrow, I still have a dream.' To see the beauties tomorrow holds for Africa today, we must discard the obstructive memories of the past. We cannot afford to keep going in circles since independence, doing the same things the same way year after year; from one poor leadership term to another, we must dream and hope for something better.

Solutions to the Problem of Disunity among African Leaders

Apart from its patriotic inclinations, courtesy itself demands that appreciation be given to those who have served in one way or the other. It is true that most (if not all) African leaders may not come out of power with their political robes spotlessly clean, but there is at least something good in every bad leader for which he or she deserves appreciation. This applies in particular to those who make some effort to come up with developmental organisations like NEPAD and even the Mo Ibrahim Foundation aimed at encouraging good governance in Africa. When Africans start appreciating some of the efforts made by these leaders, they will be spurred on to do more and that will be for the greater good of Africa.

We must try not to only focus on the negatives of every endeavour for development in Africa. We need to stand by our leaders with an attitude of support and encouragement that will go a long way to improving the continent. Leaders

must however understand that, in this modern age of improved information technology, wisdom is not only limited to the old and experienced but to anyone who really wants to be enlightened, whether old or young, in office or not. They must therefore consider the ideas, advice and wishes of others because it is in this consultation mechanism that wrongs can be corrected and right opinions can be clarified all for Africa's advancement.

Solutions to the Challenge of Moral and Spiritual Decadence in Africa

If it is admitted that a decline in moral and spiritual values can destroy a nation, then intellectual leaders who want to see Africa move forward cannot afford to underestimate their importance. If the most vulnerable are the young people on whose shoulders the future of good governance and ethical leadership in Africa rests, then an expedient way to secure the future of Africa is to fight the demise of morality and spirituality among young Africans. To ameliorate these within the youth circles is a sign of hope for Africa's future. Every religion in Africa, especially Christianity, has high values for morality and spirituality.

Therefore, appealing to religion in combating this challenge in Africa would be a wise decision for an intellectual leader. It has been sociologically proven that there is a huge difference between the culture of the older Africans and that of the young who are captured by the excitements of modernism. To depend therefore on the old religious authorities with their old fashioned culture, whether in speech, attitude, and dress, to spearhead this fight may not be the right strategy to draw in modern day youths. It takes the young to get the young.

In the recent past, God has been moving in amazing ways in Africa as many young talented men and women have been answering the call as spiritual leaders. This is very common in Christianity, being one of the main religions in Africa and the world. In Africa today, many universities have good faculties of Theology where young people enlist to be trained as ministers. There are also recognised theological seminaries and Bible colleges under different Christian denominations where young Africans are trained to fight immorality and ungodliness at every level and aspect of the community through preaching and teaching. These institutions have produced talented young preachers, pastors and evangelists and experts in theological scholarship. These young men could be instrumental in ameliorating the moral and spiritual decadence among African youths, which will in turn affect the continent as a whole. Since some of these young ministers have the skills and passion but lack the resources to carry out programmes or establish institutions that could provide significant help to the continent, a

potential solution to this challenge could be that intellectual leaders should invest more in helping these young ministers with their ministry goals in Africa.

Governments should allocate budgets to support those ministers who come up with clear and convincing ministry goals that could help Africa out of the moral decay. A committee composed of elderly, educated and experienced clergymen and religious authorities should be set up and supported by the government and charged with the responsibility of evaluating the ministry goals and plans of these young ministers of God in Africa. To put this responsibility in the hands of young, dynamic, talented and intellectually trained African ministers and to direct their focus mainly towards the youth is simply planting a seed for good governance that will surely result to the future advancement of the continent.

Reliance on Christian or religious bodies alone may not give the desired result. It takes individuals from these bodies with an uncommon sense of passion and talent to make the difference. One has only to think of John Knox who is considered the father of Scotland's 16th century religious reformation (Cambell, 2003). The Baptist Rev. Martin Luther King Jnr in the USA is another good example. Through his efforts, inspired by moral and spiritual values, the once deprived and relegated African Americans are now emancipated. Gone are those days when atheists propounded that 'religion is the opium of the masses' for in actual sense, true Godliness, according to William Penn (1981: xii), 'does not turn men out of the world but enables them to live better in it and excites their endeavours to mend it'.

Today, religions such as Christianity that have developed academic programmes could be a lodestone for excellence in politics, the secret to success in a nation's economy and the code for morality in the society. It is obvious that a solution to this problem in Africa is indispensable. It should therefore not just be an issue of individuals striving to achieve their ministry goals but an issue of national concern. Governments will have to make a significant investment if this invasive canker is to be eradicated.

Good Governance

The World Bank views good governance as 'a public service that is efficient, a judicial system that is reliable and an administration that is accountable to the public'. In the *Sunday Times* of 18th September 1991, the former British Minister for Overseas Development, Lynda Chalker described good governance as including a fair consideration on gender, class, race and ethnicity. She stated: 'Good governance is a concerted effort to rent corruption, nepotism and discrimination based on sex, ethnic origin, religious affiliation, social or economic status, free

political participation, empowering of women and the poor and a guarantee of peaceful change of personnel in ruling positions.' This indicates that an enforcement of good governance will not only result in Africa's political, economic and religious advancement but also in social improvements that will restore human rights and ameliorate discrimination based on gender, class, race and ethnicity.

Irrespective of the bloody conflicts in some countries, such as the Democratic Republic of Congo (DRC) in the 1990s where several millions of civilians were brutally murdered, the civil wars that took place in Ivory Coast between the Northerners and the Southerners, the killings in Darfur between Arabs and Africans since 2003, the battles in Northern Uganda waged by the cultish Lord's Resistance Army against the DRC and the Ugandan governments, and the battles in the oil rich Niger Delta, an objective evaluation of Africa from her recent past to her present day situation will conclude that African governance is greatly improving.

This is because, in Africa today, most economies are open, and there is a wind of change that is blowing away most of the mediocre Afro-socialist ideas that have kept the continent bound for decades. There is a greater sense of democracy as most countries can now demand that their leaders step down from power after their term limits. African countries known to have been well governed since their achievement of independence from colonial rule are, among others, Mauritius, Seychelles, Cape Verde, Botswana, South Africa, Namibia, Ghana, São Tomé and Príncipe, and Senegal. Citizens of these countries are comparatively wealthier, literate, free of internal conflict and accustomed to solid rule of law performances with moderate levels of corruption (Ibrahim Index of African Governance, cited in Rotberg and Gisselquist 2008).

Even though there seems to have been a significant improvement on good governance in Africa, the situation in many other countries indicates that Africa is still in a desperate need of good governance. According to the Ibrahim Index of African Governance (2008), some countries in sub-Saharan Africa, such as Nigeria, Guinea, Eritrea, Côte d'Ivoire, Central African Republic, Angola, Sudan, Chad, the Democratic Republic of the Congo, Somalia, Zimbabwe, Equatorial Guinea, that are known to have deprived their citizens of security and safety, are among the worst governed countries in Africa. For instance, in 2008, because of the complete absence of good governance in Zimbabwe under 'the despot', President Mugabe, who publicly declared Zimbabwe as his personal property (Shaw, 2008: 4), hospitals were closed down for lack of medical personnel and medication, schools were shut down for lack of teachers, there was a great decline of the GDP per capita level from \$850 in 2000 to \$150. The rate of unemployment in the country rose to about 90 per cent. There was a severe shortage

of food and corruption was rampant (Dugger, 2008; McGreal, 2008). Equatorial Guinea is another example of poor governance in sub-Saharan Africa. According to Heilbrunn (2007), the nation is known for her deficiencies in the rule of law and corruption. It is ruled by Teodoro Obiang Nguema, who curtailed the human and voting rights of his people thus making the government less exemplary in Africa. (Heilbrunn, 2007: 223–249)

The examples of good governance in sub-Saharan Africa signal hope for Africa. But the bad examples cited illustrate the challenges Africa has at hand. The secret is hard work and determination and not mere procrastination. Rotberg (2009) views good governance more from a performance point of view rather than mere political propaganda; as he states that, 'good governance is the delivery of high quality political goods to citizens by governments of all kinds. In Africa, as everywhere else, those political goods are security and safety, rule of law, participation and human rights, sustainable economic opportunity and human development'. The goal is almost within our reach, with a little more hard work, we will attain it.

Conclusion

Having seen the relevance and the outcome of intellectual leadership if fully employed in Africa, the researcher therefore calls on African leaders all over the continent to see the need to stand as a united front and enforce this alternative leadership paradigm. In the 1960s, many African countries were better than those in Asia. In fact some West African countries like Ghana and Nigeria had a higher per capita income than many Asian counties like Singapore, Taiwan, Malaysia, and even South Korea (Rotberg, 2009: 4–11). Today, the opposite situation prevails; many of these Asian countries have comparatively excelled while Africans have regressed (during the 1970s and 1980s in particular) under single-party rule and cruel tyrants like Mobutu Sese Seko and Idi Amin. The secret behind the advancement of many Asian countries today is largely attributed to good governance that came as a result of the implementation of intellectual leadership.

Africa today is changing fast; the growing rate of African literacy now causes many to expect intellectual input from their governments in order to enhance good governance. The eye-catching light of good governance shining in some African countries today like South Africa, Ghana, Botswana, and Senegal is attracting the attention of Africans who are now expecting more from their own governments. There is a growing awareness in Africa that the way forward for our political, economic, social and religious advancement can only come as a

result of good governance. The era of ignorance on political issues by the African populace is fast becoming a thing of the past.

These are no longer the days for politicking and mere propaganda, these are no longer the days to entertain the old fashioned Afro-socialist ideas, these are no longer the days for the accommodation of despots in the African corridors of power. 'The African Renaissance is upon us' and the African leaders are called upon to shun egocentrism and embrace this alternative leadership paradigm for the general good of Africa. This will clearly demonstrate to the world that, the primary purpose of African leadership is rooted in a deep desire to serve and help Africa's advancement.

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CHAPTER 10

Epistemic Pluralism for Knowledge Transformation*Lesiba Teffo***Epistemic Pluralism**

Over the centuries, philosophies have grappled with an adequate understanding of epistemology, a notion that encompasses both theories of knowledge and the nature of the knower. Two traditional schools of thought have since emerged: the rationalists and the empiricists. Rationalists like Plato and Descartes argued that the idea of reason, intrinsic to the mind, is the only source of knowledge. Whereas empiricists like Hume and Locke argued that sensory experiences are the primary source of ideas (Speake, 1979: 109). A third position is that of the transcendentalists, with Kant as one of its champions. This school of thought contends that both reason and experience are utilised in the acquisition and application of knowledge (Flew, 1979: 354).

Modern and postmodern theories of knowledge seek to de-centre human beings from the seat of knowledge. These theories, as championed by Richard Rorty (1967), among others, seek to introduce a social dimension to epistemology. They are less concerned with what knowledge is per se (an essentially metaphysical question) and more concerned with the benefit that society derives from knowing. In this sense the normative aspect of knowledge is privileged. It should have a utilitarian end that benefits humanity. Science, engineering and technology, which are products of knowledge and are obtaining in all cultures (albeit, at varying degrees of development) should aim at the betterment of life for all. No sector of humanity is exempt from knowledge acquisition, either through experience, reason, or both. Accordingly, it can only be concluded that human beings are by nature rational beings. They can acquire and generate knowledge, using all modes of knowing.

Knowledge transformation as advocated in this chapter, with a focus on indigenous knowledge systems, seeks to liberate the African voice and the African genius so that his/her existential experiences and conditions are incorporated and mainstreamed in the general corpus of scientific knowledge. The era of the marginalisation of non-Western knowledge systems is past. Epistemological hegemony has to give space to pluralism, a new epistemological approach. As Hountondji writes:

There exists within our oral cultures a corpus of knowledge sometimes very elaborate. What becomes of such corpuses? What of their relations with assumedly modern science, that is, the progressive, conquering, heuristic activity now developing in our universities and other centres of intellectual production, the institutional research that depends structurally on the west? (1973: 13).

Modern literature on this subject acknowledges the modern dominance of Western philosophical thought and its claim to wider dissemination and access in the world. But dominance and originality do not and can never mean the same thing. The East, West and Africa have each played historic roles in the generation and dissemination of knowledge, science and culture. However, with racist and intellectual arrogance, Hegel once declared that Africans have not and are incapable of contributing to human development. One of his most infamous quotes reads:

At this point we leave Africa, not to mention it again. For it has no historical past in the world, it has no movement or development to exhibit. Historical movements in it, that is, in its northern part – belong to the Asiatic or European World. Carthage displayed here an important transition phase of civilisation, but, as a Phoenician Colony, it belongs to Asia. Egypt will be considered in reference to the passage of the human mind from its Western phase, but it does not belong to the African spirit. What we probably understand by Africa is the unhistorical underdeveloped spirit, still involved in the conditions of mere nature, and which had to be presented here only as the threshold of the World's history (2007: 99).

Political conquest and scientific racism disorientated and stunted the growth and development of other knowledge systems and philosophies. However, we are witnessing a renaissance in the knowledge systems of the world, in the universities and the political corridors of power. Initiatives like the New Partnership for Africa's Development (NEPAD), the African Renaissance, African philosophy, and indigenous knowledge systems (IKSS) all seek to affirm the humanity of the African person in the universal order of things. According to Smith, the political and intellectual worlds are witnessing:

Increasing ideological multiplicity, heterogeneity, shift, clash and conflict. Thus we have the emergence of a multi-cultural university, cultural studies, identity politics, and the associated 'culture wars'; revisionist history and

historiography, both left-wing and right-wing and the associated 'history wars'; post Kuhnian science studies, constructivist-pragmatist epistemology and the associated 'science wars'; and finally the continued playing out of post structuralist thought in the humanities and social sciences, and the associated 'theory wars' (2005: 33).

It is important to stress that the validity of western epistemologies, minus their hegemonic assumptions, are not being questioned. Within a certain cultural background and material conditions, they are well founded and are thus valid and dynamic. This is because human thought processes are strongly social and, more specifically, cultural in their origins and are dynamic: hence the dominance of various theories in the history of humanity. The challenge arises when a different yardstick is used to measure and appraise the validity of another culture, including its claims to knowledge. Each culture should be judged on its own terms while it strives for universal principles and values that allow for harmonious coexistence.

Therefore, discourses on IKS and socialisation are more about the humanity of the African people than the rejection of Western cultures, with all that it represents. In this connection, Tuhiwai Smith made the following observation:

Decolonisation however does not mean and has not meant a total rejection of all theory or research of western knowledge. Rather, it is about entering our concerns and world-views and then coming to know and understand theory and research from our own perspectives and for our own purposes (1999: 39).

Legislative Framework for IKS in South Africa

The study of IKS is still relatively new, and as such often poses a challenge to trying to define it. Several working definitions have emerged, with great consensus articulating that IKS refer to the knowledge that grows within a social group or community, incorporating learning from own experience over generations but also knowledge gained from other sources and fully internalised within local ways thinking and doing (Mascarenhas, 2004: 3). It is also important to note that indigenous knowledge systems contribute to the sustainable livelihood of local communities, both rural and urban.

The transformation of society through education has always been an integral part of the ideology sustaining the struggle for liberation. Perhaps even in the early days of the resistance movement, people were already familiar with Francis

Bacon's dictum that 'knowledge is power'. Truly, knowledge no less than virtue should be its own reward, and all without exception should aspire for it (Teffo, 2000). And this knowledge should be founded on and resonate with people's existential experiences. Appreciating the significance of different knowledge sites and systems and in pursuit of epistemological pluralism, the South African government adopted a policy in 2004 that laid the groundwork for the protection and promotion of the country's IKS. The Department of Science and Technology established the National Indigenous Knowledge Systems Office (NIKSO). This new office is responsible for convening workshops aimed at the promulgation of legislation to protect indigenous knowledge, possibly within a *sui generis* intellectual property regime, to be administered by the Department of Trade and Industry.

Another important entity, the Ministerial Advisory Committee on IKS, is mandated to advise the government on all matters pertaining to the recognition, promotion, development, protection and affirmation of IKS. It also provides expert advice to NIKSO, analysis and research and development trends in IKS, as well as their application and exploitation. Members of the advisory committee, who are experts and practitioners in their own right, take part in NIKSO advocacy programmes. They also assist educators, learners and researchers in interpreting the changes in knowledge production and dissemination, to make them a part of the new science curriculum so that they become meaningful, and take root in the consciousnesses of the people of South Africa. The active participation of IKS practitioners and holders of IK is of critical importance; their faith and trust in the system is key, given the history of knowledge appropriation and exploitation. It was through the help of African indigenous knowledge holders, including the slaves, that botanists and anthropologists acquired local knowledge without acknowledging the sources and the valuable contribution they made in developing a codified corpus of knowledge (Augusto 2007: 159).

African Area Studies

Some area studies – studies based on territorial boundaries – on Africa date back to the 18th century. African area studies seek to use African epistemologies to explain and explore the contribution Africans made to human civilisation and development over the centuries. It is about reframing, restoring, naming, creating, discovering and theorising the African existential experience from a lived African experience. Without being defensive and reconstructive, it calls for a full attention to a 'larger historical narrative grounded in Africa ... through a combination of archeology, historical linguistics and the meticulous examination

of oral traditions'. Anthropologists, missionaries, geologists, astronomers and ordinary traders showed great interest in the way of life of Africans that they encountered. But the more formal concept of African studies was first introduced, and enjoyed legitimacy and support in academic circles in the mid 1900s (Hountondji, 1995). The African continent is vast and with no less than fifty five sovereign states, thousands of languages and over one billion inhabitants by the year 2011. In addition, a significant portion of Africans live in the Diaspora. Therefore, when we speak of the continent, we should not only draw the similarities, we must also acknowledge its significant Diaspora population. This requires an approach that does not assume homogeneousness or differences. As Gutto observes 'shared values in Africa are historically embedded and are multifaceted and multi-dimensional. They inform and are in turn informed by the vision of African Renaissance' (2011: 21). Africa is heterogeneous, but in its diversity it should also forge and celebrate unity where possible. When we project Africa as a monolithic and homogenous culture, scholarship on Africa becomes reductionist, and thus impoverished. It is precisely because of a lack of unanimity on the scope of African studies that it is often accused of being 'irrelevant' and 'atheoretical' as a discipline (Martin and West, 1995). Only its detractors would argue the point. The advocates and champions have no qualms. In their scholarship, they remain objective and critical of certain aspects of their history and culture. Similarly, they acknowledge the complementary roles cultures play. Theirs is also neither static nor immune to external influences.

The generally weak performance of Africa in areas of political governance and economics has led to its marginalisation in world affairs. Her history is seldom written in accurate and glorious terms, despite her contribution to the civilisation and modernisation of the world. The world is partly what it is today due to Africa's enormous natural resources that are highly sought after. The science, mathematics, and technology that built the Egyptian and the Nubian pyramids, and the scholarship of Timbuktu and Alexandria, among others, need to be celebrated and researched further from an Afrocentric perspective. To this end contemporary African scholars under the banner of the African Renaissance are producing original research books, articles and reports of high quality and historical significance. In their article entitled 'The role of mathematics and scientific thought in Africa: A Renaissance perspective' Rambane and Mashige present evidence 'which refutes the theory that Africans had "no intelligible sense of numeracy" before contact with the West, and demonstrates that the propagation of this myth was part of the larger colonial project to marginalise and "other-rise" African knowledge systems' (2007: 183)

It is against this background that African studies programmes that focus on African epistemologies, languages, history, culture, socioeconomic development, shared values, politics and governance, among others, should be introduced in tertiary institutions, colleges, and high schools. The pan-Africanist and other ideologically neutral scholars and researchers in these areas should be much bolder and intellectually rigorous. They should reject the undervaluation of African research. Africans themselves should set boundary conditions for the area studies and theories (Bates 1993). More importantly, there is need to go beyond the treatment of Africa as a mere 'area study' subject but more fundamentally as a continent and people of history of the past, present and future – an integral part of humanity.

African studies should promote epistemic pluralism by being open to other experiences. Because if it remains inwardly looking, it might end up 'ghettorised' and 'exoticised', as Negritude was in its heyday. Plurality is abstraction derived from various cultural experiences. The dominant globalisation paradigm tends to lead to reductionism since only the dominant Western paradigm prevails. The best example in this regard would be the tyranny of econometrics.

Research in African studies programmes and, more importantly, those in African Renaissance studies should emphasise the normative aspect of knowledge. Knowledge should have as one of its objectives, the commitment to changing for the better the material conditions of the people. New knowledge derived from research, especially indigenous knowledge systems, should be disseminated and mainstreamed in the discourses related to human development and fulfilment. African scholars should not shy away from espousing the utilitarian aspect of knowledge. Widespread poverty, illiteracy, corruption, famine, civil wars, and the plundering of natural resources by non-Africans, demand a response from Africa scholars. The vexing moral question would be, is blue sky research adequate for Africa's development? The unholy trinity of poverty, ignorance and disease needs a more pragmatic approach. The floundering attempts at creating developmental states need urgent attention, lest the masses rise against the leadership for promises not fulfilled. Telling lessons should be learnt from recent popular peoples revolts and uprisings in North Africa and the Middle East. A new era has been ushered in by these developments and the world should embark on the process of seeking a new political order entrenched in democracy, as currently understood and practised (Thomas, 2000; Terreblanche, 2008).

Integrating IKS and Innovation

The privileged status of Western knowledge as the source of all knowledge will persist if concepts like IKS, innovation, science and technology are not demystified and their origins traced in all cultural groups. In history, different groups have engaged in science communication using concepts and methodologies that may appear incongruent with our times. For example, in his seminal work entitled *African philosophy: The Pharaonic period: 2780–330 BC*, Obenga, ‘introduces the lay reader to essential Egyptian hieroglyphic texts on subjects ranging from philosophy, astronomy, medicine, mathematics and mapmaking, to justice; providing comprehensible translations and giving insightful commentaries’ (Rambane and Mashige, 2007: 186). Some African Renaissance scholars take issue with the widely accepted view that Hippocrates was the father of modern medicine. Egyptian medical knowledge may have predated Hippocrates. Moreover, who would deny the genius of the Africans who built the Egyptian and other Nubian pyramids? Therefore, when we engage in discourses on these subjects, historical facts and the evolution of science should be reported without prejudice:

Popularisers and explainers of science have a longer history than professional scientists – communicating ideas or insights drawn from scientific research to a wider public was part of the enlightenment enterprise of the 18th century; the term scientist was first used in the mid 19th century (Bucchi 2008: 1).

A new and emerging research area called Public Understanding of Science and Technology (PUST) has gone a long way in demystifying the concepts and correcting historical inaccuracies and epistemic prejudices. The principle focus of PUST is science literacy. It exists in all societies. There is no society that is science illiterate. Science history is often influenced by educational and economic levels. The more politically and economically stable a country is, the more likely that its science, engineering, innovation and technology is advanced and competitive. According to Bauer (2008: 115), two tenets drive scientific literacy. The first is reading, writing and numeracy as all are essential for the normal conduct of business and domestic chores. The second is science literacy as a sine qua non of civic competence. This is the bare minimum required for the discharge of public office and public service. Therefore basic reading and writing skills, and knowledge of one’s civic responsibilities are essential for one to lead a reasonably meaningful life, especially in a knowledge-based society.

In South Africa the primary responsibility of the National System of Innovation is to ensure that institutions, organisations and policies are stimulated to interact constructively in order to produce new knowledge and transfer technology. In this connection it then becomes imperative to integrate IKS into the National System of Innovation. This integration will facilitate beneficiation, protection of intellectual property and the validation of inventions and discoveries. 'Innovation within South African IKS is a continuous process in response to changing community needs and conditions. The very act of knowledge or technology transfer in rapidly changing times may become an act of innovation in itself' (DST Publication on Indigenous Knowledge Systems).

The innovation and diffusion of technology, for example, in rural and agrarian transformation, can contribute both to increased non-farm income generation, small-scale enterprise and enhanced agricultural productivity. Empowerment of small-scale and emerging African farmers through the supply of equipment, fertilisers, basic numeracy, literacy and financial skills would contribute to job creation and food security. Therefore the process of land restitution should be expedited and the beneficiaries should be given appropriate technical and financial support. Similarly, environmentally friendly technologies coupled with IK can be used in both conservation and in the sustainable use of natural resources, as well as in the reduction of poverty. Research and debates on the merits and demerits of innovation and technology on the biosphere can lead to a more informed and responsible citizenry (DST Publication on Indigenous Knowledge Systems, 48–49).

Rural community innovations underpinned by the *Letsema/Ujima* (communal/collective or corporative work) concept contributes to local economic development. Similarly, the communitarian ethics undergirding collective self-help projects also contribute towards a higher yield, materially and spiritually. Social cohesion and nation building are also enhanced and promoted in the process of integrating IKS into innovation. It would be easy to realise all these positive spin-offs once IKS is recognised as being much more than indigenous medicines and historical sites. Embedded in IKS is, among other things, democratic principles, values, human rights regimes, and environmental management methods and techniques.

Afrocentrism: A Contested Concept (ion)

Movement and concepts such as Black Star, African Unity, Pan African Unity, Africanisation, Afrocentrism, and African Renaissance, inter alia, arose because of the belief among Africans that African civilisations contributed to world

civilisations, and will continue to do so. These civilisations epitomised by economic and educational centres in Timbuktu, Alexandria, Mapungubwe, and the Egyptian and Nubian pyramids, were achieved without non-African participation or influence.

It is important to approach the world from this perspective because white intellectual arrogance and imperial agendas espoused by historians and missionaries alike tended to distort and dismiss with scorn such realities. When Marcus Garvey, WEB Du Bois and Steve Biko, among others, espoused the philosophy of Black Consciousness, they were inspired by the achievements of their forebears, and were intellectually challenged by the arrogance of their white oppressors and or colonisers. Indeed, many Africans believed in the fallacy of white supremacy, and consequently perceived and conceived the world through jaundiced eyes. They interpreted the world according to the Eurasian cultural mix.

The notions alluded to earlier, including Afrocentrism, are a consequence of a concerted effort by Africans at pan-African forums aimed at liberating themselves mentally and physically from the yoke of servitude, and the dependency under which colonialism and the fragmentation of Africa by Europe had placed them (Koka, 1985: 2). The Elder, Kgalushi Drake Koka, a world renowned pan-Africanist at whose feet I learnt about Afrikology, and co-wrote and presented several papers with, writes as follows:

The seeds of disunity that Europe had planted in Africa through the balkanization and acculturation of the whole continent, followed by artificial territorial boundaries they imposed to divide brother from brother, will finally be destroyed by the process of the decolonisation of the African mind. Then Africa will once more, experience its 'Golden Age' of development and restore its leadership in the forum of nations as the creator and the preserver of those values that once benefited humankind (Koka, 1985: 3).

Africanisation is about the 'being' of an African person in the global village. It is about the thoughts, ideas, concepts and cultural norms and values that constitute his/her being as a mode of existence. Afrocentrism, like Africanism, is a systematic worldview that generates and provides an emancipatory attitude of mind. It is a relational mode of existence through which a human being perceives and conceives of himself/herself, with and/or against others. As existentialist Jean Paul Sartre once said, being for others also implies being with others. The presence of others is a *sine qua non* for self-identity and actualisation. I am because the other is, and the other is because I am, though without emphasising the differences. Being with others, therefore, is a defining trait of human

existence and relations; with the other always considered as the touchstone of value.

The process of mental exorcism is an enormous task requiring fortitude and resilience. This process often leads to self-appraisal and self-awareness that ultimately result in the rejection of a 'false self' in search of an 'authentic self'. It is in this sense that Africanisation becomes arguably the only factor that can rescue the African from the curse of mental fatalism. Africanisation enables the African to see through the hoax of white supremacy. It instils in him/her a sense of identity and independence. It makes Africans look for African solutions to African problems, and beyond. It lends Africans a sense of national maturity as a people, and makes them custodians of their own destiny (Koka, 1997: 17–18).

In general terms, and also in concurrence with the Elder, Kgalushi Koka, Africanisation should be understood as:

- The injection of African values, concepts, beliefs and ethics into all sectors of our human activity – these including a workplace, economic and political activities, educational and health institutions, industrial relations and labour practices, social interactions and moral codes.
- A deliberate, yet essential activist movement which is necessary for the transformation of the African continent into a 'paradise' that is worthy of human habitation (Koka, 1998: 3).

Africanisation – like Westernisation – is not exclusive or conflictive. All existing worldviews must accommodate each other by mutual agreement, respect and acceptance and can never substitute each other, nor can they be assimilated into an amorphous 'oneness' with one dominant racial identity and history.

Conclusion

The processes of change and development are historical, socially conditioned, and passed on from generation to generation, driven by various methodologies. Due to our capacity to reason, and as both biological and cultural beings, human beings interact with nature in a way that transforms both themselves and the environment. There exists a symbiotic relationship between the environment and human beings, across the races and ages, that helps shape our destiny. This destiny may need material and spiritual tools to shape and achieve it. Hence each cultural group was, and still is, seeking fulfilment by generating new knowledge, sciences and technologies in order to progress to new heights of development.

Africans should focus on studying how the knowledge systems of Africa can enter the global knowledge system on their terms rather than terms laid down by the West. Africans should seek knowledge systems which will complement the global system rather than supplement it. The current historical conjuncture is characterised as the knowledge economy where leading nations are driven by knowledge as the key factor of production. It is further noted that a nation's ability to convert knowledge into wealth is a determinant factor of its position among other nations.

There is a widely shared expectation that knowledge, and scientific knowledge in particular, has the potential to make the lives of people healthier, longer and generally more pleasant. The extent to which the advancement of knowledge promises to improve the human condition reflects its potential for transformation. Within this context, therefore, we submit that many flowers (epistemologies) bloom and flourish for the benefit of humanity.

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CHAPTER 11

A Proposal for a Programme to Promote African Scholars: Lessons Drawn from the History of the World Council of Churches and its Programme to Combat Racism

Thembeke Mufamadi

Introduction

The World Council of Churches (WCC) and its Programme to Combat Racism (PCR) is not widely known. People such as former President Thabo Mbeki, Professor Barney Pitsoa and Judge Ben Ngwenyane had links with both of these entities whose contribution to the campaign against apartheid provides lessons to take forward for the rebirth of Africa. This chapter provides an analysis and systematic examination of lessons that can be drawn from the history of the World Council of Churches and its Programme to Combat Racism.

The WCC is a global church body that strives to improve the lot of the world community. It was inaugurated in the same year that the National Party gained the victory that would see it implement apartheid in South Africa. The WCC positioned itself as a bulwark against further agony in the world, and therefore opposed the evils of racism. In 1968, after two decades of verbal, usually rhetorical protests, the WCC took a decision to act against racism at its General Assembly in Uppsala, Sweden. Brigalia Bam was part of a small group of WCC staff members who exposed the repeated failure of the churches to participate in the struggle for racial justice (Mufamadi, 2010). This group underscored the gap between talk and action, and agitated for action against racism. In his speech on 'White Racism or World Community', James Baldwin accused the Christian church of betraying black people in the world. He reminded the delegates that the church still ruled the world and specifically challenged it to use its power to change the structure of apartheid in South Africa (Baldwin, 1968: 376). Kenneth Kaunda,¹ who gave the keynote speech, commended the church for its concern about the socioeconomic problems confronting the world. He emphasised development as a moral issue and appealed to the WCC to play its part in saving humankind from destruction (Kaunda, 1968: 334–335).

The outcome of these deliberations was a new approach, which linked racism with political and economic exploitation. By the end of the Assembly, the WCC had made sure that 'words were not cheap and empty' (Adler, 1974: 10). It pledged to make the church relevant through active involvement in the transformation of racialised societies. The following year, the WCC instigated a process of global consultation to obtain advice on how to act against racism. Significantly, it brought together an array of people from virtually every shade of political opinion, from extreme left-wing politicians, representatives of black power organisations, conservative white business people and politicians, to non-believers or members of religions other than Christianity (Thompson, 1969: 9–10; Mbali, 1987: 16). The presentations made on this occasion were diverse, yet there was a unity in the expressed desire to eradicate racism. The South Africans considered for participation included² Professor Absalom Vilakazi, Helen Suzman, Frederik van Zyl Slabbert, Alex Boraine, Beyers Naudé, Bill Burnett, Gabriel Setiloane, Joe Matthews, Ian Thompson, Michael Scott and Oliver Tambo.

By the end of 1969, the WCC had launched its global Programme to Combat Racism (PCR). The final product was a focused campaign by the WCC to mobilise international opinion and diplomatic influence against racial domination in the world. As an institutional response to racism, the PCR became a significant enterprise in concentrating world attention on social and political injustice under neocolonial rule. In the process, its trans-national nature and ecumenical spirit brought political and religious lobbies into a potent relationship that turned moral disapproval of racial discrimination into decisive activism through legal, legislative, diplomatic, military and political means. It had a staff, a budget and multiple strategies for tackling racism. Darril Hudson, a political scientist, distinguished the PCR as 'a non-spiritual entity, a very practical organisation in the perception of many Christians and non-Christians alike' (Hudson, 1977: 17). Such a characterisation captures the wide appeal of the WCC, as well as the non-sectarian and profoundly political nature of the PCR's work and explains its capacity to attract a broad audience of international interests, at the same time as it professed a moral stance based on Christian principles.

The PCR activities, configuration and challenges yield lessons which have the capacity to take the endeavour to develop Africa through the promotion of African scholars.

The Multiple Strategies of the PCR

The approach the PCR adopted against apartheid rested on a four-pillared strategy involving funding, mobilisation, political action and bridging. The four pillars

were interconnected, and all were important. Even though their implementation created a disharmony among the WCC policymakers and within the broader ecumenical Christian community, these multiple strategies were sustained throughout the 1970s and 1980s until the mid-1990s.

- **In the area of funding**, the PCR had a special fund to combat racism aligned to the wider understanding that the real problem related to the just distribution of economic, political and scientific and technological power. The WCC therefore provided symbolic funding to the groups subjected to racial oppression as a means of redistributing that power. For a quarter of a century, the ANC, the Pan-Africanist Congress (PAC), the South African Congress of Trade Unions (SACTU) and later the South African National Civic Organisation (SANCO) and the Women's Development Foundation benefited from this PCR special fund.
- **The second pillar on mobilisation** aimed to deal with ignorance about the dangers of racism. The PCR therefore ran a political education campaign which mobilised the global ecumenical Christian community against racism. It conducted action research on the then South African government and developed programmes on racism in an attempt to engage Christians (and non-Christians) in the global struggle against the apartheid system.
- **Political action** involved the activities of the WCC aimed at dislodging the apartheid system. In the context of the broader economic sanctions campaign, the WCC spearheaded the campaign on financial withdrawal from institutions which gave bank loans to the apartheid government. The PCR initiated the WCC bank policy which resulted in the WCC selling its holdings in banks that lent to the South African government. The WCC further encouraged its member churches to do likewise.
- **The bridging aspects of the WCC and the PCR** were concerned with bridging the gulf that existed among South Africans who were separated by the apartheid system. At their annual meetings and consultations held in different parts of the world, the WCC and PCR created platforms which enabled South Africans who were resident in the country and those who were political refugees to engage in dialogue about apartheid. These continuous engagements from the 1970s until the 1990s fostered a potent relationship between the exiled ANC and PAC and the South African Council of Churches (SACC). For the first time in 1987, two anti-apartheid leaders, Oliver Tambo and Beyers Naudé (an African and an Afrikaner) met and warmly embraced each other in Lusaka, under the

aegis of the WCC and its PCR. The significance of that WCC/PCR initiated consultation was its adoption of the Lusaka Declaration. The participants sought to provide theological justification for the armed struggle against the apartheid government. They also recommended to the WCC to send a delegation of the Eminent Church Persons Group on a mission to persuade the major foreign investors to implement comprehensive mandatory sanctions against South Africa as a final all-out attempt to dismantle apartheid (PCR Collection, 1987).

The PCR Configuration

The organisational structure of the PCR was a jigsaw puzzle consisting of a number of layers of control, not necessarily arranged according to rank or hierarchy, but with staff working as colleagues in various spheres of operation to achieve a shared goal. The first layer consisted of three full-time staff members based in Geneva: a director and a secretary for each of the two sections that dealt with research and the development of programmes respectively. Although they were all WCC employees, they had diverse professional backgrounds; one was a sociologist, one a lawyer and one a theologian. More important, the three were not all Christians and did not all have inside information about the WCC operations.

The second layer consisted of about 30 members of the WCC Commission, appointed by the WCC Central Committee, who were resident in various countries throughout the world. The Commission comprised an array of activists and technocrats from both secular and church organisations in addition to the ecclesiasts from within the WCC. There were individuals connected to the groups who suffered racial discrimination, international solidarity groups, the United Nations (UN), the Commonwealth, the Organisation of African Unity (OAU), and governmental structures such as parliament and official opposition parties. It was this PCR Commission that gave advice and guidance to the new PCR. It took decisions on the PCR projects and budget and made recommendations to the WCC Central and Executive Committees. The PCR Commission members met once a year in different parts of the world. Their responsibilities were, however, ongoing and had to be carried out throughout the year. They used their grassroots insights to inform the PCR, and promoted PCR activities in other forums. They also helped with research, projects and convening the consultations initiated by the PCR. In addition to the Commission members, there were consultants who were invited to the annual PCR meetings. These were individuals with specialised knowledge and experience of the anti-racism struggle; Abdul Minty was one such person.

The significance of the PCR Commission lay in three attributes. First, it consisted of an assortment of independent-minded individuals, many of whom were

committed and loyal primarily to the cause of anti-racism rather than to the WCC. The second was the variation in the nature of their activism against racism. The third was their connection to various institutions with the influence to persuade the world community to become involved against racism. The third layer in the PCR organisational jigsaw puzzle was the PCR Executive Committee. This was made up of roughly ten people, three of whom were the full-time employees and the rest selected from the PCR Commission. The group had a moderator and a vice-moderator. The Executive Committee met regularly to take decisions on urgent matters. Those involved in this committee included Judge Annie Jiaage, Paul Boateng and Reverend Sam Kobia. Jiaage was the first woman on the Supreme Court bench of Ghana. She was commended for her bravery, given that the South African agents had no qualms about crushing apartheid opponents in those days (WCC, 1996). Boateng was the first black Briton to be elected to the House of Commons. During his victory speech as an MP, he declared in the British parliament that people with a conscience would only be free when South Africa had gained its freedom (Wikipedia). Kobia, a Kenyan, was the first African to be appointed WCC General Secretary.³

The fourth layer consisted of a Staff Coordinating Group (SCG) appointed by the WCC Executive Committee. It comprised about 25 to 30 Geneva-based individuals from the various departments and divisions of the WCC. Its purpose was to coordinate the WCC's overall efforts towards combating racism, and it acted as a watchdog over the PCR from within the WCC (WCC Minutes, 1971: 238–245). Brigalia Bam who was the head of the Women in Church and Society Division and who participated in the WCC Central Committee meetings was also part of this group (Bam, 2008). Of significance was the fact that there was no uniformity in the way the SCG members supported the PCR. The fifth layer of the PCR was Unit II of Justice and Service, which consisted of five commissions. These were the Commission on Inter-Church Aid Refugee and World Service (CICARWS), the Commission of the Churches on International Affairs (CCIA), the Commission on the Churches' Participation in Development (CCPD), the Christian Medical Commission (CMC), and the Commission on the Programme to Combat Racism (CPCR). Some of these commissions had been in existence for longer and were well resourced. The CPCR and the CCPD were new formations, however, and were underresourced. Of note is the fact that to carry out its mandate to fight racism effectively, the CPCR relied on support from the other commissions within the unit. Again, there was no uniformity in the way the unit supported the PCR.

The sixth PCR organisational layer was that of the WCC Central and Executive Committees. The individuals serving on these committees had the final say with regard to all PCR activities. Although all the members of these two committees

were opposed to racism, they did not all agree unreservedly on the radical approach the PCR embraced. The seventh layer was that of the individual Christians and member churches globally – the target audiences who in effect had to implement the PCR strategies. There was clearly no uniformity in the way the world community at large (whether Christian or non-Christian) supported the PCR.

Profiling this PCR organisational jigsaw puzzle is relevant in many respects. First, it demonstrates that the PCR was in the hands of independently minded individuals. They were not all Christians, nor were they all members of the WCC. For that reason, there was impartiality with regard to how the PCR activities were carried out. Second, there were different kinds of activists within the various layers of the organisational jigsaw puzzle, who introduced a diverse range of insights into the WCC's anti-racism commitment. Third, despite the small complement of full-time PCR employees, there was a wider network of individuals and establishments connected globally, who assisted in carrying out the WCC's struggle against racism.

Andrew Young, a prominent black US civil rights activist, congressman and ambassador to the UN, was also a member of the PCR Commission. He personified the contradictions in the PCR organisational jigsaw puzzle. He was outspoken in his criticism of the apartheid government, yet he supported peaceful change and found the armed struggle impractical in Southern Africa. He believed in majority rule through an evolutionary process that was to come about not as a 'black take over' but as a matter of black and white people learning to live together (Hasselblad, 1994: 133–138). He visited South Africa, 'the bastion of apartheid', at a time when the WCC was banned because of its PCR.⁴ This left some of the PCR Commission members feeling betrayed (PCR Collection, 1975). This example illustrates the strength of the PCR in its diversity of personalities and influences, as well as the fact that the implementation of the multiple strategies against apartheid were not, by any means, reached effortlessly by their proponents.

Challenges

From the outset, the launch of the PCR and its campaign against racism were fraught with disagreements within the WCC and the broader ecumenical Christian community. The singling out of 'white racism', among other forms, had a discomfiting effect on the then Archbishop of Cape Town in 1968. A secret consultation was held at Ulvenhout in the Netherlands only a few months after the WCC launched its PCR. A group of liberal white Western churchmen attempted to provide an alternative to the radical outcome of the PCR.⁵

Even though the financial support extended to the banned liberation movements was sustained from 1970 until 1994, the moderate members within the WCC continually contested this strategy. They doubted the wisdom of funding liberation groups that promoted revolutionary ways to overthrow the apartheid government. Importantly, these conservative members were however outnumbered. The continuous mobilisation of Christians and churches by the WCC/PCR around the world to become aware of the dangers of racism and to join the political struggle against apartheid did not go unchallenged. The South African government embarked on a vicious drive against the WCC. Dr Connie Mulder, the Minister of Information, supported 'enthusiastically' by Prime Minister Vorster, launched the Ecumenical Organisation Bureau, whose task was to counter the anti-apartheid policies of the WCC (*The Star*, 1979). Abroad, the WCC was also accused of venting its biblical rage and abandoning its concern about spiritual matters (*San Francisco Examiner*, 1977; *The Guardian*, 1977).

Although the WCC was at the forefront of the campaign for financial withdrawal from institutions which gave bank loans to the apartheid government, it faced difficulties. There were no non-blacklisted banks capable of performing all the transactions considered necessary by its finance department. This created a strain between the WCC policymakers and implementers. Moreover, the ANC held an account with the Midland Bank, which was part of the European-American Banking Corporations boycotted by the PCR because of its links with the apartheid state. ANC treasurer Thomas Nkobi instructed the PCR to deposit the special fund grants into that account.

Bridging the divide between South Africans did not have instantaneous results. Opportunities were lost and suspicion lingered for many years. It took the WCC 18 years to unite Oliver Tambo and Beyers Naudé. As early as 1969 in Notting Hill in London, the WCC had afforded them the rare opportunity to resolve their differences on the subject of economic sanctions and the support for the armed struggle against their apartheid government. It was only in 1987 that the two finally met and engaged in a dialogue about apartheid in Lusaka.

As a means of promoting the rebirth of Africa, what can Africans learn from the experience of the WCC and its PCR in its campaign against racism? This chapter proposes a **programme to promote African scholars (PPAS)** along the lines of the PCR. An African includes any black, white, coloured and Asian person or person of other ethnic origin who has citizenship in an African country. However, in the past, black, coloured and Asian people were discriminated against as a result of their racial identity. For the purpose of redress, this paper refers to 'African', with a bias towards those who suffered racial discrimination.

Aim of a Proposed PPAS

The PPAS should be aimed at mobilising opinion and influence (scholarly, diplomatically, politically) against the existing racial imbalance in knowledge production within academic institutions. This should be placed under the spotlight because of the negligible representation of African scholars. The PPAS should lobby widely for the condemnation of the dearth of African representation, glaring in academic engagements and publications, during this postcolonial rule in the African continent. More importantly, the condemnation should be turned into decisive activism through various means (legislatively, diplomatically).

Strategies for the Proposed PPAS

The PPAS should employ manifold ways to redress the underrepresentation of Africans in academic institutions. The handy examples from the PCR of the WCC, such as funding, mobilisation, political action and bridging, serve as a start. In the area of **funding**, the PPAS should ideally have a special fund to promote African scholars. This fund should be generated largely from Africa, and not from China or the West. This would be a fitting occasion for the beneficiaries of the PCR Special Fund to reciprocate. In that way, the African saying *isandla sihlamba esinye* (in Xhosa) or *zwanda zwia tanzwana* (in Venda) will become a reality. The money would be distributed to African postgraduate scholars doing research relating to African development, according to criteria governing the allocation of grants as determined by the PPAS. It would also be used for translation services, editing and publishing houses committed to promoting and popularising African thought.

The mobilisation aspects of PPAS should focus on encouraging Africans to be concerned about the dangers of ignorance and exclusion and to advocate the African Renaissance, as the world continues to advance. Action research should be encouraged among Africans involved in producing knowledge within academic institutions. For instance, an audit could be conducted to determine how many African students register for postgraduate studies, how many achieve the qualification for which they register, the obstacles they face, the quality of their research proposals, whether their bibliographies include African scholars, the nature of the supervision they receive, how their research is examined, and whether they are encouraged to publish journal articles during their postgraduate studies and convert their research into published books thereafter.

The PCR compiled profiles of the banned liberation movements in English, translated them into French and German, and sent them to the WCC member churches and solidarity groups in various parts of the world for wider readership.

Prexy Nesbitt observed that in the United States, Professor Ben Magubane's book, *The political economy of race and class in South Africa*, became 'the metronome text for anti-apartheid activists and progressive students and teachers'. On campuses and in some churches and trade union caucuses, study groups were formed around it. The PCR purchased multiple copies of this book and sent them to member churches and action organisations all over Africa and the world. It did the same with the *African liberation reader* volume 3, edited by Aquino de Braganca and Immanuel Wallerstein (Nesbitt, 2010). These are but a few examples of activities that the PPAS can emulate, perhaps starting with the works of the late Professor Guy Mhone, a specialist in African economic development.

The political action the WCC took was its support of economic sanctions against the apartheid government. It was the PCR which pioneered the process that culminated in the WCC selling its holdings and closing its accounts with financial institutions linked to apartheid. This particular campaign against apartheid was the PCR's flagship achievement. HM de Lange had observed the impact of the bank loan campaign by the WCC and its PCR. He argued that it led to extensive discussion and greater awareness about foreign investment in South Africa, inside and outside the churches (De Lange, 1977: 383–393).

How about successful African activists, (professionals, politicians, diplomats) imposing sanctions on all engagements which show a dearth or nominal participation of Africans in academic institutions, from now onwards? How about a serious commitment to hunt, mentor and include aspiring African scholars in their activities? A cursory survey of current academic publications still indicates the skewed overrepresentation of the previously privileged groups in knowledge production. Political action and organisation among African scholars will undoubtedly go a long way to promote African scholarship.

Bridging the Gulf between African Scholars

It should be viewed a crisis that, to date, there are very few professional Africans operating in academic institutions. The few that exist within individual countries and in different parts of the continent as well as beyond, do not know one another. One of the tasks of the PPAS could be to bridge the distance by arranging opportunities for them to meet and discuss methods of overcoming African underdevelopment. Focused workshops for various professions (historians, engineers) could be held where participants would not only share their research and experiences, but will also engage themselves with the serious business of tackling underdevelopment in Africa.

Financial resources are an essential. Persons with proficiency in raising funds would be required. The funds could be generated from governments and their departments, such as Education, Arts and Culture, Science and Technology, as well as the business sector, churches, political parties, labour movements, civic organisations and individual citizens of the African continent.

Persons would be required to work full-time on the PPAS programme. Activist professionals with commitment, clout, zeal and energy could turn around the landscape of academic institutions in the African continent. The staff would run various projects that would directly encourage and promote African scholars. One concrete example would be a project which tightly monitors the registered African postgraduate students in various departments; their progress to complete their research; available opportunities for them to publish; existing employment opportunities for them within their departments; potential opportunities for them to thrive and be specialists in their field of work; and opportunities for them to travel widely and exhibit their work, particularly on the African continent.

Advisors to guide the work of the PPAS would be important. These could be a dedicated range of independently minded individuals loyal primarily to the cause of African renewal. They should also have connections to institutions of influence which would have the power to transform academic institutions. A person such as Professor Jimi Adesina has displayed his commitment to recognising contributions by African scholars within academic institutions. He is already consciously giving opportunities to Africans to be involved in activities such as the examination of masters and doctoral theses and editing work for publications. These are some of the activities which are predominantly monopolised by the previously privileged Africans. He would therefore be recommended to be part of the PPAS structure.

The PPAS should be a continental structure, located strategically at Unisa, an academic institution already reaching out to different parts of the African continent. Unisa could lead the way by having a Staff Coordinating Committee comprised of individuals from its various faculties and departments. These activist individuals would assist the PPAS to take off and develop. In the future, similar committees could be replicated in other academic institutions to help in consolidating the efforts of the PPAS and speeding up transformation in these institutions.

Conclusion

A militant endeavour that seeks to promote African scholars will guarantee a forward-looking movement towards resolving the many challenges the African

continent faces. Politically and socially conscious African scholars should take ownership of the responsibility to solve the problems of the continent. There is certainly a need for a concerted investment in the transformation of academic institutions. This chapter suggests a carefully and responsibly designed intervention that will encourage and direct the promotion of African scholars to claim their rightful places in knowledge production – which could ultimately contribute to the African Revival.

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CHAPTER 12

Securing Africa's Renaissance: The Youth as Potential and Challenge for African Leadership in the 21st Century

Makhosini Lucky Kunene

Introduction

In Africa, policy development and government intervention programmes usually come about as a response to problems and challenges. The experiences of the African youth are rarely incorporated in meaningful engagements regarding the form and character of interventions programmes and policies be they social, political or even economic policy. As a result the African youth continues to play a marginal role in their countries. In an attempt to deal with this situation, regional and continental initiatives have been launched and the most notable among these was the promulgation, in Banjul (Gambia), in 2006, of the African Youth Charter. This is a very important document which is examined and debated in this chapter. In this chapter I emphasise the necessity of including the youth in Africa's current and future social, economic and political developments, and indeed argue that any African continental initiative that sidelines the African youth, especially with regard to the facilitation of their autonomy and confidence in dealing with 21st century problems such as HIV/AIDS, risks jeopardising the potential success of long-term African development plans, strategies and ideas, such as the African Renaissance.

I therefore begin with a general overview of how young people and children are regarded and viewed in Africa. The chapter proceeds to analyse the youth development policy initiatives in Africa in order to determine their strengths and weaknesses in tackling youth underdevelopment. Critical here is an assessment of the intentions of the policies, and the actual socioeconomic problems facing the African youth. In the second part of the chapter, I discuss two significant potential threats to the abilities and potential of African youth to make a meaningful contribution to Africa's development, namely, war and conflict as well as HIV/AIDS. In this context, and as part of the examination of how continental policy mechanisms are poised to respond to these issues, the chapter also considers certain gender issues, as African women and girls of all ages continue to bear

the heaviest burden arising from wars and diseases. I conclude by proposing a way forward based on the available methods of social governance suitable for holistic youth development. In particular, I consider the weaknesses and challenges facing the African youth and how these weaknesses could be turned into opportunities in order to turn the tide against conflicts and HIV/AIDS.

Youth in African Society Today: The African Youth Charter

Many major policies both in Africa and elsewhere, when referring to the youth, seem to disclose the same mantra, namely, that the youth or young people are the future of each nation, meaning that the youth are the hope of any country. The *World youth report 2005*, published by the UN Department of Economic and Social Affairs, states that: 'Young people hold the key to society's future. Their ambitions, goals and aspirations for peace, security, development and human rights are often in accord with those of society as a whole' (UN, 2005b). An earlier United Nations report on youth cited the then Secretary General of the UN, Kofi Annan, who insisted that: 'Young people should never be seen as a burden on any society, but as its most precious assets' (UN, 2004). Also, a Human Science Research Council report (2005: 11) recalls Africa's history as being 'marked by efforts to promote youth development. In the 1970s the United Nations Economic Commission for Africa hosted a meeting on national youth service as part of the UN's mission to promote action orientated national youth policies'. So important was the UN's effort that the African Union and its key partners (including NEPAD) soon also affirmed the necessity of working for the betterment of the lives of the African youth, and African children in particular. The authors of the 2005 HSRC report cite a statement from the African Union on the direction to be taken regarding youth development in Africa, a statement that asserts that 'we do not need to make any additional promises to children. Instead we need to honour those commitments already made. This is an era of implementation'.

But how far has implementation really gone in Africa? It is appropriate, then, to review the situation on the continent with regard to youth leadership, empowerment and development, and the degree to which the African youth are prepared for their future role as leaders. In other words, we need to consider the security of the African future with regard to the social wellbeing of the African youth and their expected role in leading the continent, particularly in the face of the challenge posed by HIV/AIDS. So who, then, are the youth of Africa? There is no general agreement either in Africa or the rest of the world as to the age parameters for this category. The African Youth Charter (AU, 2006), in keeping

with the United Nations ceiling age level for defining youth, defines a youth or young person as anyone between the ages of 15 and 35 years.

In considering the role of the African youth in social development, it is prudent to enter the debate using an existing and recognised continental social, political and economic framework. In this case, the African Youth Charter provides an ideal document for this purpose; a brief discussion of this document and how it relates to the health and development of the African youths would therefore be useful at this juncture.

The African Youth Charter is a policy document concerned with mainstreaming the development concerns of the youth of Africa, and providing essential indicators, programmes and activities aimed at dealing with the problems facing the youth on the continent of Africa (Panday, 2006; AU, 2009b). The African Youth Charter is a coherent regional programme of action for member states of the African Union (AU) with regard to appropriate issues and steps to take in order to respond to concerns of the youth and to deal with policy implementation challenges in their respective countries. The charter was adopted by the Assembly of the Heads of State and Government of the AU at its seventh ordinary session held in Banjul (Gambia) in July 2006. Despite slow ratification, a contribution to the AU Monitor entitled 'Slow ratification of African Youth Charter' notes that, 'of the 53 AU Member States, only 11 have so far signed the Charter and three of them took a further step to ratify the document' (AU, 2009a). The African Youth Charter has since its adoption in 2006 gained significant political momentum: the Assembly of Heads of State and Government of the AU declared the years 2009 to 2019 the decade of youth development in Africa (AU, 2009a), an important affirmation by the continent's regional political community of the importance of young people on the continent. An extract from the press statement released to announce the African decade of youth development by the Assembly of the Heads of State and Government of the AU merits quotation: 'The decade is an opportunity to advance the agenda of youth development in all member states across the African Union, to ensure effective and more ambitious investment in youth programmes and increased support to the development and implementation of national youth policies and programmes' (AU, 2009a).

The declaration of the years 2009 to 2019 as the decade of youth development is a clear acknowledgement of the vital role played by the young people of the continent (Panday, 2006) in Africa's social, economic and political spheres both now and in the future. Among the important developmental priorities identified by the charter are youth participation, national youth policy, skills and development, poverty eradication and socioeconomic integration of the youth, sustainable livelihoods and youth employment, and peace and security.

An important aspect of the African Youth Charter is its approach to policy issues affecting the youth in Africa. In this regard, it adopts a multidimensional, holistic approach to the myriad of challenges affecting young people on the continent (HSRC, 2005: 9–12). This is a response

to the need of young people for a wide array of skills at emotional, physical, spiritual, social and economic levels to achieve positive human development. The focus is on developing social and psychological capacities of young people. This is especially important when the complexity of disadvantages sap the emotional resources of families and communities, the primary sites of socialization, to build a sense of self-worth and self-confidence in young people (HSRC, 2005: 9).

The importance of the latter approach for youth policy and youth empowerment strategies cannot be overemphasised in the context of Africa, particularly since the African youth have challenging conditions to contend with. One must not forget to mention the context of the African continent – this is a continent that has for many years been subjected to serious social, political and cultural violence in the form of colonialism, imperialism, underdevelopment, repressive policy and repressive economic regimes (from both within and outside the continent), all of which have caused the alienation of many young people in Africa (HSRC, 2005: 9). The value of an integrated, human-based approach to sustainable human development lies in the priority accorded to people and their wellbeing as essential ingredients of social change; thus, its adoption by the AU as the preferred model of youth emancipation in Africa is a welcome move.

However, answers are necessary to the question of how the African youth are to respond to the immediate challenges facing them, and what form their role as future leaders of the continent should take. Young people are increasingly being recognised and appreciated for their potential role as supporters and active members of the region and local communities. They are therefore poised to be actors and not merely spectators, as has been the case for centuries and arguably, by omission or commission, continues to be the case to date (Honwana and De Boeck, 2005).

Perhaps the most important and sustained manner in which African youth issues can be coherently defined and articulated, however, is through the existing mainstream socioeconomic and political plans and frameworks. NEPAD and its agenda for the youth of the continent is an important issue to examine.

NEPAD and the Youth of Africa

Virtually no discussion of present-day Africa is possible without consideration of the sociopolitical and economic effects of colonialism, imperialism and, recently, poor leadership, conflict, poverty, diseases and genocide (Meredith, 2005). African analysts and scholars must constantly bear this in mind, as it influences the basic values and thinking relating to the continental strategies formulated to unite and uplift the African continent and its people. NEPAD offers one such solution to the degeneration and marginalisation of Africa. Ever since African independence, the continent has experimented with various methods of governance to support self-governance in order to improve the living conditions of the people in the previously colonised states, and ultimately change the long-standing perceptions and exclusive practices that have arrested major development on the continent's social, economic and political and cultural front. But the latter national and regional projects have been dealt various blows (Meredith, 2005). Despite the various failures and intractable challenges that have bedevilled the continent ever since the struggles for independence, modern-day African leaders, intellectuals, policymakers and activists across the continent have learnt an important lesson. This was eloquently expressed by former President of South Africa, Dr TM Mbeki in March 2001, when he addressed the African Renaissance Festival in Durban, encouraging the peoples of Africa to realise that they are not, and must not be, wards of benevolent guardians but instruments of their own sustained upliftment. He subsequently, in 2010, encouraged his audience to acknowledge the vital contribution they had to make to the advancement of human civilisation, and that Africa has a strategic place in the global community (Mbeki, 2010b).

Despite its limitations, failures and continuing challenges, the African independence movement has left a lasting legacy in Africa's political imagination, and has given Africans everywhere the psychological strength to assert that Africa's destiny lies in her own hands. It must be recognised that to advance in an increasingly interdependent global order, Africans must establish working relationships among themselves first as Africans, and then reach out to other similarly placed developing societies, and ultimately to the former colonial rulers in Europe and America, as strategic economic partners to promote economic growth and social stability in Africa. The above position is defined and articulated in the South African foreign policy framework, stating very clearly the importance of South Africa's role on the African continent in the areas of strengthening economic development and relations with other African countries, peace building, and promoting continental integration by supporting the African Union and its organs. The second pillar of the policy is the strengthening of

South–South relations through participation in the IBSA triad (India, Brazil and South Africa) – an initiative for common economic, political and social cooperation and exchange among the major countries of the developing global order.¹ The latter position of South Africa's foreign policy framework has significant implications for Africa's regional integration agenda generally, and for African youth development specifically, since South Africa is widely perceived within the continent and beyond as an example of Africa's future economic and political development potential and stability, and a beacon of good governance for the African continent as a whole, due to its world acclaimed liberal Constitution.

The NEPAD Framework (NEPAD, 2001) is clear on the core motivation and drive behind the establishment of development initiatives. It states the following:

this New Partnership for Africa's Development (NEPAD) is a pledge by African leaders, based on a common vision and a firm and shared conviction, that they have a pressing duty to eradicate poverty and to place their countries, both individually and collectively, on a path of sustainable growth and development and, at the same time, to participate actively in the world economy and body politic. The Programme is anchored on the determination of Africans to extricate themselves and the continent from the malaise of underdevelopment and exclusion in a globalising world.

NEPAD offers an African strategy for developing Africa at a time when the continent faces continued marginalisation in the global political economy, resulting in unequal distribution of political and economic power, and therefore a need for unity on the continent to strengthen Africa's hand with regard to development issues affecting the countries of Africa and their peoples. NEPAD has eight core areas of development through which it intends to uplift African economies towards sustainability as a means of eradicating poverty. These are (1) agriculture and food security; (2) infrastructure (water and sanitation, transport and energy); (3) human resources development (education and health); (4) science and technology; (5) trade and market access; (6) environment and climate change and culture and tourism; (7) governance and capacity development; and (8) gender development (NEPAD, 2001). These are all intended to encourage sustainable economic growth in Africa's economies by mainstreaming development areas important for the development of African countries. A question, however, is does NEPAD say anything about the youth and youth development on the continent?

NEPAD does not devote a specific section of the development agenda to the youth, although the broad category of gender development can be assumed to include young African women. Other than that, NEPAD as a blueprint for Africa's

development has no coherent approach regarding the youth in Africa – its authors appear to have taken it for granted that what is good for the people of Africa in general, or the various African communities, is good for all, and will also serve the best interests of the youth of the continent. The latter is an assumption that this chapter wishes to warn the African political leadership against. This is done by drawing on the experiences of the contemporary African youth and the significant implications these have for the enrichment of African development ideas, policies and the general wellbeing of the African people.

Inhabiting an Inhospitable Continent, and a Deteriorating Planet? African Youth at the Crossroads

Owing to the increasing pressure created by human inequalities and poverty at both global and regional levels, the success of any development policy in the 21st century is measured in terms of the advancement of social, economic, cultural and political equality, freedom and security of the most vulnerable and poor (UNDP, 2000). The notion of connecting human rights with development is, or was, influenced by the realisation of the importance of the connection of basic human rights to the rights to work, food and emotional wellbeing and security. This, as noted in UNDP (2000), is ‘the new rights agenda of the 21st century – and proposes bold new approaches to political and economic governance that deliver social justice’. However, what is interesting about the above UN report, as observed by Orest Nowosad (2002) of the National Institutions Team of the United Nations High Commission for Human Rights (UNHCHR), is that its innovative linking of human rights and development was influenced by African continental initiatives for social justice for the people of Africa, a struggle articulated in the 1981 African Charter on Human and People’s Rights. Nowosad (2002: 08) notes that:

in 1981, Africa recognised the right to development as a basic human right in the African Charter on Human and Peoples’ Rights. From these regional efforts came the 1986 International United Nations Declaration on the Right to Development. These initiatives spurred current thinking about a rights-based approach to development which contributes to the fulfilment of universal human rights and dignity.

It is not entirely surprising that Africa was able to influence a social justice approach to the Western, individualistically oriented human rights discourse. Africa’s development challenges are closely associated with a rigid and structurally

biased global economic system in which Africa as a continent and its people are exploited and vastly underrepresented, and therefore suffer as communities and families rather than individuals.

Thus, another critical issue in youth development policy and practice in the continent is that of finding the means to balance an understanding of the global dimensions of the social, economic and political challenges facing the African youth with the localised conditions and manifestations of such problems for young Africans as a specific category in the African community and part of a large regional and global humanity. The HSRC report above observes that:

... while there are some unique challenges facing youth on the Africa continent, a review of the literature suggests that the majority of youth concerns are in fact global. However, the extent to which youth in Africa are disadvantaged by factors such as globalisation, illiteracy, unemployment, poverty and HIV/AIDS, juxtaposed against the pace at which the developed world is forging new frontiers, places African youth in the tenuous position of struggling to meet fundamental needs.

Globalisation is by and large an ideology for modern capital accumulation which puts profits before people. In all of this, Africa is at the bottom, and not allowed to propose any alternatives to challenge or mediate the status quo. Therefore, its poverty and attendant ills such as structural violence continue to expose the poor sections of developing continents such as Africa to indignity and squalor while their continent possesses the resource bases that could overcome such dire socioeconomic conditions (Amuwo, 2002; Tandon, 2002; Adesina, Yao Graham and Olukoshi, 2006).

It is possible to suggest, as the African philanthropist and scholar, Dr Aina (2003), has done, that what Africa, or sub-Saharan Africa broadly, has perhaps been doing with regard to development as a process ever since independence and at the beginning of the 21st century has involved understanding the fundamental meaning of development itself, and that that meaning lies in an acknowledgment that development involves a whole lot of people, institutions and players, but, most important, interaction leading to a definition of power and suffering for the poor. In his own words:

After almost forty years of political independence, and many more with experimenting with different forms of 'development,' we still have to grapple with the first principles. We have to get back to the basics of the nation and practices of development as they relate to the lives of ordinary peoples, to

its constitution, the nature of its wide players, to the distribution of power and knowledge, and of course, that of suffering and misery.

Dr Aina goes further to put into perspective the lessons of development practice as it relates to poverty, stating that: 'poverty provides a fertile terrain for the flowering of suffering and distress, and that the poor, often denied power and privilege, and ravaged by diseases and want, bear the brunt of this harvest' (Aina, 2003: 89). Dr Aina further asks a devastating question regarding what many analysts and indeed all social leaders in Africa and elsewhere take for granted as a major priority for social progress, the development process or concept: 'Can we approach development without confronting the inherent inequalities and inequities that are located in the organisation of ordinary human existence? Can we transform and transcend development, as we know it, without confronting the hierarchies and scales of suffering and distress, and the inequalities in the orders of emancipation?'

What Dr Aina is directing our attention to, from an African governance perspective, is not just talking about development, states and NGOs or businesses, human rights and poverty or their modalities for our society's development, as is customary with global governance agendas currently exemplified by the various documents of the UN cited here already. He is directing African people and leaders not just to commit to a few minor, sometimes misdirected interventions or reforms related to development or poverty reduction, but to act in fundamental and bold ways to transform the African development landscape towards a more human centred and social justice oriented path, and build an Africa that the people as a whole, and for the purposes of this chapter, the African youth, can be feel belonging to and work on behalf of in social, economic and political projects to achieve growth and development. The young people of Africa and the measures aimed at empowering these groups must pay serious attention to creating environments, practices and strategies designed to go into the deep roots of poverty and other disadvantages that 'constrain the energies and creativity of large numbers of Africans currently compelled to function below their optimal capacity' (Aina, 2003: 78), in order particularly to foster young people's self-worth and meaning, and should come closer to their daily experiences of distress and the suffering they often face (Aina, 2003; HSRC, 2005).

The latter is the challenge of the African Renaissance too. Giving recognition to Africa's young people by explicitly paying attention to their immediately felt concerns and opening spaces for their participation in the social, political, economic and cultural development of their communities is a key governance issue for Africa's political future (HSRC, 2005). In my view, youth policy in Africa

must work to restore and preserve the hope of the many young people on the continent who have lost hope, and offer more humane spaces for healing, reconciliation and reintegration to the many young people traumatised and embattled in their communities by conflicts (Parmar, Roseman and Siegrist, 2010). Thus, I argue for increased serious efforts at addressing some of the related social challenges imposed upon the African youth by endemic conflicts and diseases such as HIV/AIDS on the continent. The long-term effects of these conditions are an immediate threat to the renewal of the African continent and must be understood and dealt with swiftly in order to strengthen the foundations of equitable communities and an Africa that all can be proud of. In such an Africa, all people, its current youth in particular, will be able to openly proclaim that they are part of the continent, and thus learn to work, think and fight for the good of the people of this continent, and ultimately for the good of all humanity.

The most important point underlying the urgency of matters affecting the youth in Africa today and possibly in future too, in the context of developing countries, is that young people already play a key role in shifting and reconfiguring social, political and economic norms and structures and this is evident when they are properly mobilised or included in a positive way in constructive programmes (HSRC, 2005; UN, 2005b). There is a strong, widespread optimistic view regarding the potential of young people worldwide, that if empowered through inclusion in youth development policies and programmes, young people are capable of making sustainable social improvements in their own lives and those of their communities (UN, 2003: 291).

This is the central argument of this chapter, and it is supported by current population research regarding the distribution and human potential of developing countries in terms of human resource capacity. As there are large numbers of young people in the developing world, they therefore stand a great chance of making a difference politically, socially and economically in their respective countries (UN, 1998).

Youth Statistics and the Social Conditions (Conflicts and HIV/AIDS) Affecting Youth Development in Africa

Africa, according to HSRC research work, has 'a youth bonus', that is, it has one of the highest numbers of young people in the world, second only to Asia (Bremner, Haub, Lee, Mather and Zuehlke, 2009: 3). According to the United Nation's estimates, there are an estimated 1,03 billion young people inhabiting the earth, which accounts for 18 per cent of the population (Bremner et al, 2009: 30). The authors of the Population Reference Bureau report cited above

note that 'between 2009 and 2050, virtually all population growth will take place in the less developed countries' (Bremner et al, 2009: 32). Africa is said to have a high birth rate, with 43 per cent of the population in sub-Saharan Africa under the age of 15 (Bremner et al, 2009: 32). It is therefore clear that the African youth and their contemporaries in other developing countries have a significant amount of symbolic political power and thus a definite importance both currently and in the near future. Depending on the prevailing conditions of life in their respective countries, these groups of young people have the potential to make a positive contribution to their societies. However, the youth of Africa experience problems related to poverty and marginalisation as a result of the high levels of youth unemployment and underemployment, leading to exclusion and vulnerability to drug abuse, gangster or crime networks and other anti-social behaviours (HSRC, 2005: 29–30). Cincotta, cited in the 2005 HSRC report, found that, generally, countries in which young adults make up 40 per cent or more of the population – known as a youth bonus – in an environment of high rates of unemployment and rapid urbanisation, are at significant risk of civil conflict. Cincotta's report further identifies sub-Saharan Africa, the Middle East and South Asia as having the highest demographic risk of civil conflict.

The insight by Cincotta makes plausible the endemic civil conflicts and unemployment in Africa. High population levels, coupled with acute levels of income inequality, food insecurity and the state's heavy reliance on single commodities, as is the case with many African countries, is responsible for the volatility and instabilities experienced in some regions of Africa endowed with natural resources; the DRC is a good example. With regard to the latter, Paul Collier (2010: 02), reflecting on his comparative statistical analysis of leading causes of civil wars especially those in Africa, advances the view that 'the big brute fact is that civil war is heavily concentrated in countries with low income, in economic decline, and dependent upon natural resources'. It is painful to realise that, in fact, economic problems and social or human insecurity, posed by difficult socio-economic conditions, precede many wars and conflicts from which many young people in the continent are caught up either as victims or fighters, on one side or other. Colonialism and Africa's subjugation is the starting point.

The involvement of the youth in conflicts and wars is one of Africa's miserable legacies. In 2001, it was estimated that approximately 120 000 child soldiers were participating in conflicts across the continent. The main reason given by those who recruit children for combat was that child soldiers are expendable and also courageous.² According to the World Bank, 60 per cent of the population of the African continent comprises unemployed young people, while young people make up 40 per cent of Africa's working-age population. The World Bank further

notes that the failure of many African governments and economies to create short- to long-term employment for these young people has led them straight into industries of crime and armed conflicts (World Bank 2009). It moreover asserts that countries emerging from conflicts in Africa must assist young people to succeed by providing opportunities for accessing meaningful employment, and for those who have not yet experienced conflicts, youth employment is a precondition for poverty eradication, sustainable development and lasting peace (World Bank 2009).

From the existing literature and actual situations in Africa involving young people specifically, particularly the various examples of inter-state and intra-state conflicts on the continent and their effects on the youth, two main points deserve particular attention: first, the economic collapse and radical political changes and instability experienced by the various societies have brought about a breakdown in community institutions of leadership; second, the enormous number of deaths and displacements resulting from wars have created a devastating humanitarian and social crisis for victims, which include young people and children, severely disrupting their daily lives (Office of the Special Representative of the Secretary-General for Children and Armed Conflict and UNICEF, 2009; Kaarsholm, 2006). The socially engineered instabilities caused by intra-state conflicts profoundly affect both the short- and long-term development of young people caught up in these conditions. Speaking at the Global Conference on Research and Child Rights in Addis Ababa, Ethiopia, Marta Santos Pais, United Nations Special Representative on Violence on Children, made the following observation regarding the influence of violence on children: 'violence impacts the enjoyment of all children's rights, it has serious, life-long emotional and health effects on children's lives; it undermines child development, learning abilities and school performance, it inhibits positive relationships, provokes low self-esteem, trauma and depression; and often, leads to risk-taking and aggressive behaviour, and at times, self-induced harm' (Pais, 2009).

The devastating effect of wars is widely acknowledged but nevertheless a disturbing reality or factor for African people (Akopari, 2007), and in particular for the African youth and children who either get involved in conflicts or become targets of 'killings, disappearances, under-age recruitment, sexual violence, torture and other grave violations of their fundamental human rights' (UNICEF, 2008: 3). Generally, however, research suggests that many young people, given the parlous state of their societies, participate in conflicts primarily for survival and the security of their families (UNICEF, 2008; Office of the Special Representative of the Secretary-General for Children and Armed Conflict and UNICEF, 2009; Boas and Bjorkhaug, 2010). The social danger posed by

situations of war on young people on the continent lies in the cycle or means and strategies of violence being unleashed or legitimised through the exercise of violence as a means to attain social objectives among the youth and children, a situation that has already seen horrific blood-letting episodes in many conflicts in the continent, with young people slaughtering defenceless women, men and children (Abdullah, 2005).

The horrifying effects of war on children and the youth on the continent have implications for issues of societal cohesion and overall development and must be treated as a matter of priority if any meaningful youth development endeavour is to take place. The real challenge for African political, religious and other sector leaders of the 21st century therefore lies in building viable, caring and inclusive political systems that are, in addition, democratic and genuinely responsive to the pressing concerns of the current generations of children and young people on the continent. This is a commitment that the current crop of leaders on the continent have willingly made (Gawanas, 2004), but they need to live up to it. Gawanas (2004) notes further that the issue of war and youth in Africa, and indeed anywhere, has an important bearing on the question of a future for a society. What kind of society does a nation wish for itself, and exactly who must lead in that process? In Africa, the political will to make a difference in young people's lives exists; however, at issue is the implementation of the various charters and conventions adopted by the leaders through the Africa Union at national level. Having acknowledged the fundamental importance of peace and stability as prerequisites for achieving the rights of children in Africa, Gawanas (2004) goes on to elaborate on the challenges even more clearly, stating:

The complexity and ambition of achieving the goals and their dependence on factors such as resource flows, international action to overcome HIV/AIDS and progress towards peace and stability, requires the participation of all stakeholders. The International Community and partners should give priority to the needs of African children and work collectively to attain positive results.

The challenges arising from the devastating social conflicts in Africa are not restricted to restoring order and peace and then working for economic and social prosperity alone, but also involve deep issues of personal or individual hurt, anger and healing of those who experience the brutalities and trauma of the violence. The loss and displacement suffered during wars and political violence, especially by the children, boys and girls alike, and their subsequent inclusion in transitional processes, is the issue gaining serious momentum in international

human rights discourses (Parmar et al, 2010). The key issue is the inclusion of the youth; it is about giving 'voice' to the youth and providing unimposing guidance. The latter move is critical given issues faced by countries or communities recovering from divisive, and at times brutal conflicts whereby those who were part of conflicts yesterday (with children or youth included) the next day find themselves taking part in community reconciliation. The situation can be worse for child soldiers who have to reintegrate into communities which they once pillaged and destroyed, as child soldiers sometimes do. What is important to convey here is the pain and suffering experienced by young people as a result of the devastating impacts of wars or the losses and stress and social disconnection suffered as a result of HIV/AIDS; all these impose great strain on the psychological capacities of the youth and are the key reasons why many young people from the continent engage in life-threatening journeys out of their countries of origin to seek opportunities elsewhere, or become co-opted into militias as either rebels or government-supporting troops both of which are safer options than being a civilian in a war situation (Economic Commission for Africa, 2009; HSRC, 2005), while yet others engage in violence and other forms of risky behaviour that further put their lives at risk, including disease (Africa regional consultation with youth on HIV/AIDS 2007).

Referring to the effects of war on the status of children, the Executive Director of UNICEF, Ann M Veneman, notes:

However appalling the consequences that stem from the complex interplay of conflict, poverty and discrimination are often overlooked. Children living in war-affected contexts are less likely to be in school or have access to clean water and basic sanitation. They are more vulnerable to early mortality as a result of diseases and under-nutrition, and they have less chance of becoming adults able to play a constructive role in their societies (Veneman in Office of the Special Representative and UNICEF, 2009: v).

Veneman, like numerous others, confirms the challenge confronted by the youth in contexts that are characterised by violence and a vicious circle of abuse, neglect and opportunism suffered by the most vulnerable segments of society, adolescents in general (Parmar et al, 2010) and women and young girls in particular. This has been noted in many cases of civil war, where women and girl children become targets of violence, especially rape, through which they are exposed to venereal diseases, including HIV/AIDS (World Bank 2009; Office of the Special Representative of the Secretary-General for Children and Armed Conflict and UNICEF 2009; Maluleke 2010).

HIV/AIDS and the Youth of Africa: Stigma and Exclusion?

Indeed, while it is recognised in Africa that political instability creates a foundation for serious human rights violations and hampers the socioeconomic development of countries and households affected by conflict, the effects of war are not as debilitating and devastating as those of HIV/AIDS. Just as there is reason to understand conflicts and their effect on the youth and children, there is equally compelling reason to consider the impact of HIV/AIDS in Africa among the youth and children, especially since they constitute the long-term resource base for putting into effect the development agenda, strategies and ideas relating to empowerment. Associated with poverty and disadvantage are many forms of suffering, pain and grief. The concern shared by many concerned Africans and their friends all over the world is the fact that, despite the many acknowledged and affirmed virtues of the youth and the possibilities available to them as a result of local (continental) and global transformation and changes, the socioeconomic outlook of the majority of the African youth remains extremely bleak (Chigunta 2002). As a result of the generally parlous socioeconomic conditions, young people become increasingly susceptible to conditions and behaviours that expose them to HIV/AIDS with the risk being especially high for women (Economic Commission for Africa, 2009).

Adding to the burden of resource constraints and associated stresses experienced by young people in coping with the challenges facing them is the issue of stigma and the further violence and marginalisation that alienates them in their communities and families, and ultimately from their broader social ecologies and institutions. The United Nations Secretary General, Ban Ki-Moon (2008) has observed that the critical challenge in the fight against HIV/AIDS remains stigma: 'One of the biggest hurdles to AIDS is psychological ... That is the stigma factor. To greater or lesser degrees, almost everywhere in the world, discrimination remains a fact of life for people living with HIV.' The Secretary General elaborated further on the negative effects of stigma, warning that:

Stigma remains the single most important barrier to public action. It is the main reason too many people are afraid to see a doctor to determine whether they have the disease, or to seek treatment if so. It helps make AIDS the silent killer, because people fear the social disgrace of speaking about it, or taking easily available precautions. Stigma is a chief reason why the AIDS epidemic continues to devastate societies around the world.

Most feared of diseases, it remains the leading cause of death in many parts of the world, particularly in the developing countries, with the highest concentration

occurring in sub-Saharan Africa. It would therefore be appropriate at this point to consider the prevalence of HIV/AIDS among the youth of sub-Saharan Africa. This would provide a clearer picture of whether the greatness and prosperity envisaged in the notion of an African Renaissance, and expressed through NEPAD, is possible or not when considered from the perspective of health and disease.

Impact of HIV/AIDS in Southern Africa

Southern Africa remains one of the epicentres of the global HIV/AIDS pandemic. The area – comprising Botswana, Lesotho, Mozambique, Namibia, South Africa, Swaziland, Zambia and Zimbabwe – has an adult HIV prevalence exceeding 15 per cent (*Turning off the tap*, [sa]). HIV/AIDS is a leading cause of death in sub-Saharan Africa (WHO, 1999). The United Nation's World Youth Report of 2003 notes that:

Some 8,6 million of the 28,5 million Africans living with HIV/AIDS are young people. The majority of new infections in the region are among those 15–24 years of age. AIDS has become generalised among youth in almost the entire sub-Saharan region. In nearly 20 countries in the region, it is estimated that at least 5 per cent of young women aged 15–24 years are infected with HIV (UN, 2004: 336).

This report also cites the disaggregated effects arising from the distribution and shape of the epidemic in various African countries and emphasises that the Southern African region is the hardest hit of all regions on the continent, with the highest infection rates being recorded among women specifically. Other statistical information requiring serious consideration for policymaking and leadership with regard to HIV/AIDS relates specifically to the children of the continent. According to the United Nation's AIDS Programme Annual Report of 2009 (UNAIDS, 2010), in 2008, of all new infections in children worldwide, 91 per cent were in sub-Saharan Africa, and 14 million AIDS orphans live in sub-Saharan Africa. The HIV/AIDS pandemic is mired in controversy owing to its highly publicised and political nature. However, there nevertheless seems to be a general understanding, supported by scientific information, that the threat of AIDS is real, devastating and totalistic in nature as it affects all spheres of life including politics (Chirambo, 2006). HIV/AIDS therefore has far-reaching implications even for the highest decision-makers and political leaders or the leading stratus of the continent too. This makes the disease everyone's business,

and urgent steps are needed to pre-empt its consequences for the renewal of the continent (Chirambo, 2006).

There are other influential and important ideas in the HIV/AIDS discourse that suggest that while HIV/AIDS is severe and is taking a toll on societies in Africa, and specifically in Southern Africa, it has not been empirically proven to be the major cause of the social, economic, political and cultural devastation. In this regard, the authors of the *Turning off the tap* (s.a.) report by the Nelson Mandela Foundation write:

Although the appearance of 'normality' (to the extent that societies in which more than half the population lives in poverty can be deemed 'normal') may conceal severe stress and tension, it is difficult to disentangle the epidemic's effects from other causes of wretchedness, such as growing inequality, deteriorating service infrastructure and systems, disadvantaged terms of trade, poor governance, debt and climate change. The impact and costs of HIV/AIDS are not distributed evenly across societies, nor do they necessarily spill far across the boundaries of poor households and communities. The burden of care, for example, is largely absorbed by the unpaid labour of women and girls (Turning off the tap, s.a. 18).

This is important for the insight it offers into the type of resources (physical and otherwise) and interventions both necessary and appropriate for effectively combating the pandemic, as it reiterates that HIV/AIDS is real and can and will continue to cause serious social, economic and political problems, resulting in massive losses to individuals, families and communities, and ultimately causing the restructuring of countries' economies. The most important aspect of the debate and intervention on HIV/AIDS in many countries in Africa, especially in South Africa, have concentrated on preemption or management of the pandemic (Fourie, 2006). The debate relating to care and the impact of HIV/AIDS on the lives of young adults in Southern Africa, and Africa more generally, is already taking place internationally through organisations such as the United Nations, with world experts emphasising the need for expanding care services and resources to improve the working conditions of health workers, parents and individuals who provide care and sustenance to the weak and sick, particularly in light of the social crises arising from increasing AIDS deaths and the resulting losses (UNRISD, 2010: 185). The debate on improving care seems to challenge states to take the lead in advancing and promoting proactive health services and the care of those who are ill, but are not in specialised healthcare institutions. The UNRISD report (2010) cited here generally argues that, when care work is

decently paid and protected, it can meet the interests of both workers and users of those services. In Africa, the importance of relief provided to health workers and children affected by HIV/AIDS cannot be overemphasised, as this support forms the basis for promoting resilience, ensuring that children and youth are able to attend school while sick parents and younger siblings are taken care of by well-remunerated and capable home care workers.

With regard to the youth and their role in the solutions to HIV/AIDS, internationally, in various forums on youth and HIV/AIDS, it has been noted that young people are eager and proactive in lobbying governments to facilitate youth access to information and resources that can improve young people's access to health services (UN, 2004). African leaders must take the lead in creating initiatives that build on community resources such as training and paying community health workers as a strategy for supplementing inadequate healthcare institutions and the likely increase in the burden on health services in the near future, but to also enlist young people in health peer education training programmes and initiatives in order to create spaces for young people to empower themselves and their peers in areas of sexual and reproductive health and wellbeing more generally. The latter programmes for youth should take seriously the context of deprivation and poverty in which many young African people are immersed (Economic Commission for Africa, 2009).

Further, in order to preempt the transmission of communicable diseases among people in Africa, it is vital that knowledge and information on the social conditions obtaining in many African communities and regions be taken seriously, or at least be closely scrutinised and acted upon (UN, 2004). This knowledge is essential for gauging the likely extent of the effects and their interplay with various causes in shaping the outcome of the manifestations of the HIV/AIDS pandemic, particularly among the youth. In this regard, it is critical to bear in mind the high levels of violence and structural disadvantages (particularly against women) that characterise Africa and their impact on the vulnerability of women and young girls to HIV/AIDS and other diseases (Economic Commission for Africa, 2009). Also to be taken into account are factors such as the political fragility of many countries, livelihood insecurity, forced and voluntary migrations and income and social inequalities, as these are an important backdrop to understanding the social contexts in which HIV/AIDS occurs, especially in Southern Africa (Turning off the tap, s.a.). Indeed, the authors of the study cited above make special reference to understanding the particularities of the Southern African context as an important factor in understanding the spread of HIV/AIDS in the region: "The distribution of entitlements and resources, systems of social regulation, social divisions of labour, gender norms, patterns of migration – all

this might feature among the underlying factors that help shape the terrains of sexual networking that favour the HIV epidemic' (Turning off the tap, s.a. 18). The authors of the UNRISD study note further that,

A disproportionate share of the impact of HIV/AIDS is borne by already impoverished and stressed individuals, households and communities – especially those who are unable to deflect and redistribute the costs. An analysis of the damage done by HIV/AIDS requires an understanding of the ways in which the unequal distribution of privilege, risk and responsibility in societies shapes and funnels the epidemic's impact – and how impact might reinforce patterns of inequalities (UNRISD, 2010: 18).

The Third National Survey on HIV/AIDS of 2008 (Shisana, Rehle, Simbayi, Parker, Jooste, Pillay-van Wyk, Mbelle and Van Zyl, 2008), released in 2009, identifies a number of contextual factors that perpetuate the spread of HIV/AIDS among the youth (young people between the ages of 15 and 24) in South Africa. Significant among these are intergenerational sexual activities, involving younger males and females having sex with people five years and more older than themselves. In such a situation young people are at risk in terms of power to negotiate or determine safe sex, and a higher incidence of HIV infection was found among those with older sexual partners. It was also noted in the report that the main motivation behind these intergenerational relationships are materialism and consumption, an insight echoed in the African Youth Report of 2009, in which it is argued that the prevalence of HIV/AIDS among the youth cannot be attributed solely to the sexual behaviour of young people alone, or even poverty per se, but rather to the combination of inequalities, with those based on age being the most crucial determinants of the vulnerability of the African youth to HIV/AIDS. The report states: 'Behind the vulnerability of young women in Africa are issues of nutritional deficiencies and the impact of other diseases; sexual abuse and exploitation; early marriage; and migration and urbanisation' (Economic Commission for Africa, 2009: 74). Another generally disturbing element, identified from other studies conducted in the sub-Saharan region, is the extensive use of alcohol and other drugs and its association with risky sexual behaviour such as having multiple sexual partners, which increases the risk of HIV infection and also violence, particularly young men as perpetrators and victims (Economic Commission for Africa, 2009). The report notes a significant decrease in the prevalence of HIV among teenagers, but immediately states that this is just a small achievement in the context of a very much larger problem.

Coordinated and intensified efforts to quell the epidemic in South Africa, and arguably on the rest of the continent, are needed.

Nowosad (2002: 05), in discussing the challenges facing regional or continental mechanisms for African development, makes the following observation:

An important challenge for NEPAD will be attention which needs to be paid to vulnerable and marginalized groups. NEPAD reinforces the social, economic and cultural rights and the right to development provisions of the Africa Charter, but adopts a gender-neutral approach. A conscious effort should be made to ensure that the human rights approach to development that is explicit in the documents sufficiently recognises the needs of women and young people at the implementation stage.

From this we can infer the need for AU member states to act decisively at national level to design and implement an African youth agenda based on the African Youth Charter and other conventions, such as the African Charter on Human and People's Rights. The NEPAD Secretariat has responded positively to Nowosad's challenge by introducing the NEPAD Youth Programme to streamline African youth development issues, concerns and strategies through the various continental organs such as the Regional Economic Communities (RECs) and the AU (Ijeoma, 2009). This is a further indication of positive political commitment to the cause of the youth by the current cadre of leaders on the continent.

The Potential of African Youth for Realising Progressive Social Change

A tipping point has been reached in the international youth development fraternity and this point is characterised by the shift away from negative stereotypes regarding the youth to more positive, empowerment-based approaches with young people being seen as architects of change and progress in their respective societies (HSRC, 2005; UN, 2004). The latter shift is directly reflected in the African Youth Report 2009 already cited in this paper, especially if one considers the Report's title: 'Expanding opportunities for and with young people'. 'With young people' simply puts into perspective the fact that the youth in Africa are regarded as competent to identify and drive their own interests with the assistance and support of other political formations like the African Union. The positive approach to youth development is important in two significant ways: firstly it directly calls for the accountability of all social actors for youth underdevelopment, including the youth itself. Secondly, the shift in question has been an impetus for many youth empowerment projects currently directed towards

the betterment of the lives of youth, thus directing governments and private and public donors towards recognising the structural problems that hamper effective youth development, especially in Africa.

Under the new thinking around youth empowerment, the youth have not become angels in the eyes of society, but have been given a duty and responsibility to exploit opportunities whenever they are created, thus effectively allowing young people and youth partners worldwide to make use of platforms out there aimed at representing the youth. So it is the very same spaces that have been used in the African continent by African leaders in their attempts to shape a better Africa by recognising the importance of young people in changing Africa's course of development. They do so with enough historical information and lessons learnt regarding the capacity of young people to act in ways that change social events for the better; for example, South Africa's youths became world famous for standing up against the apartheid system in the 1970s, a struggle that culminated with 16 June 1976 massacre.

Despite continuing pessimism among some people regarding the youth's potential for constructive change, there is still evidence of contemporary youth's endeavours and engagements with society in the continent (HSRC, 2005), although some are punctuated by pragmatic, narrow and individualistic motivations (Kamete, 2007). For example, Linda Richter and colleagues' study on South African youth established that many young people regard going to a religious service as a key form of their community participation (Richter et al, 2005 in HSRC, 2005). At the heart of the youth's role in positive change in any society, the major factor that can ensure the type of space created and the approach taken directly involves the youth in the initiatives and programmes which seek to advance their interests (UN, 2004). In the chapter on 'Youth participation in decision-making', the World Youth Report of 2003 points out: 'if young people are not involved in the development of the laws, policies and programmes that affect them, even well intentioned actions on the part of adults will often fail to protect their best interests' (UN, 2004:129).

The form and quality of space that the leaders of the African Renaissance will afford to the majority of the African population and particularly to the African youth will go a long way in ensuring a lasting legacy of the idea and its associated social, political and economic goals and actual projects. Democracy and wide participation of young people is critical in garnering support for African ideas and strategies for social emancipation. The more open and context sensitive are the processes of change contained in the African Renaissance and any other similar idea or initiative, the more the likely there will be meaningful interests

among the masses of people on the continent, especially the eagerly awaiting African youth.

Conclusion

This chapter acknowledges that NEPAD, the African Youth Charter and the NEPAD Youth Programme are an affirmation in principle of the willingness of African leaders to work with and for the youth to improve youth development in the 21st century. However, Africa still needs to build implementation-based institutions and mechanisms leading to an African-oriented political agenda that, at its core, must prioritise the young people of the continent and their needs as part of building an inclusive political, social and economic African future, free of the inequalities and insecurities that breed many wars and act as a foundation for the spread of epidemics such as HIV/AIDS. As mentioned in the African Youth Report 2009, the most significant threats facing the young people of this continent stem from the disadvantage of age and structural challenges arising from various African political settings. Such conditions make young people vulnerable to drug abuse, recruitment into gangs, violence and risky sexual behaviours. These exponentially increase their risk of contracting HIV/AIDS, with harmful consequences, not only for their individually aspired futures, but also for those of the African continent.

The chapter also argues that the political instabilities bred by wars on the continent and their deleterious effects on social development and the advancement of many of the young people of Africa, combined with epidemics such as HIV/AIDS, call into question the sustainability of African solutions for Africa's problems such as the African Renaissance, since the harm done to young people and African people tends to embed deep trauma: fear, suspicion, stress, violence and hopelessness – key factors behind much constrained human development on the continent. Further, the waste and devastation of wars, violence and diseases in our continent have empirically been shown to diminish capacities of youth, as many young people who grow up under the above conditions tend to suffer from anxiety (post-traumatic disorders) and other mental disorders, negatively affecting young people's creativity, richness and idealism – hallmarks of youth universally. Thus, emotional abuses and losses suffered by the youth of Africa as a result of wars and diseases require articulation at the spiritual level, as much as they require practical social and political solutions, and some wisdom aimed at addressing the heavy toll manifested in pain, fear and suffering that induces loss of hope (apathy or avoidance) among many young people in African proactive social, political and economic concerns.

That any of the youth survive at all is nothing short of a miracle, given the tribulations many face on a daily basis. Thus, rhetoric alone is not sufficient. The challenges faced by the African youth require decisive concrete actions towards strengthening and, where necessary, building new African political institutions for strong, ethical and democratic (inclusive and accountable) social justice-driven governance programmes and processes, with the youth at the heart of the reforms. Young people have shown themselves to have a capacity for doing great things. The challenge and further possibilities lie in the political and social arenas of power and the way these forces incorporate the voices of youth in African emancipatory projects such as the African Renaissance and others like it.

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African Perspectives on Globalisation and International Relations

SECTION 2

SECTION 2

CHAPTER 13

African Ownership of Own Policy Agenda*Tapiwa Benson Chari*

What is ownership? The International Monetary Fund (IMF) (2001c) defines ownership as a ‘willing assumption of responsibility for an agreed program of policies, by officials in a borrowing country who have the responsibility to formulate and carry out those policies, based on an understanding that the program is achievable and is in the country’s own interest’. The assumption is that for policy ownership to occur, the relevant authorities tasked with policy formulation in Africa do not necessarily have to think up the policies themselves, and the policies do not necessarily have to be independent of conditionality. Other definitions stress the degree of control that is exercised by the owner in the preparation and implementation of one’s own policy. It is important to note that such a degree of ownership, of ‘own’ policy agenda, is difficult to measure but is reflected in the options adopted whenever there is conflict between the interests of the owner and the other parties. Ownership of an ‘own’ policy agenda can also be measured by the level of participation of external parties during the process of setting the policy agendas (Whitfield and Fraser, 2009).

The main role of ‘external parties’ in African policy is to be providers of funds. In NEPAD these external parties are referred to as the international community and as such include developed nations and multilateral institutions (the World Bank, the International Monetary Fund, the United Nations and its related organisations and the World Trade Organization). These parties are assumed to be policy partners in that they seem interested in maximising the welfare that accrues to the African populous. Whenever these partners of Africa provide assistance, which is mainly in the form of funds, they attach conditions, which are meant to be safeguards against abuse of the funds by African governments. These conditions are also important if the donor is to be seen as dispensing funds provided by their taxpayers responsibly (Mold, 2009).

However, others have argued that such conditions run counter to the idea of ownership of policy on the part of the African.

One of the conditions attached to donor funding is the use of funds to buy materials from external sources. The suppliers of such materials should be from the fund provider’s own country irrespective of price considerations. This has

led Mold (2009) to conclude that, for as long as donors continue to provide the finances for policy implementation in Africa, conditionality will exist in one form or another and that the reason that donors provide funds is not altruism but is related to specific interests. It is such interests that have run counter to the shared assumption of welfare maximisation for the Africans. The insistence on the use of one's own country's suppliers is to ensure that all the aid trickles back to the country of origin. This practice also appears to be a way of boosting 'business for own countries' which also leads to the creating of a demand for their services in African markets. This process has led to projects that, once complete, are left to run down – 'white elephants' (Tangri, 1999, Killick, 1978, Nkurunziza and Ngaruko, 2002).

An analysis of NEPAD and other policies from Africa at international level reveals that most of these policies seem to be similar and of service to foreign interests. How does this happen, one may ask? This is because the major providers of funds for the policies are multilateral institutions whose main source of funding happens to be the USA and Europe. These financiers are of the opinion that free market economics provide the best rules for the running of economies. It is correct that free market economics have proven to be the best way to encourage performance and efficiency within the economy, but one only needs a course in basic economics to know that this performance and efficiency does not extend to the provision of public goods, or those that are provided through a monopoly infrastructure. The privatisation of these goods has been used as conditionality for aid, hence undermining the very assumption on which policy development is based – the maximisation of welfare for the African populous. The question is: How can Africans claim ownership to policies that undermine their very existence? Foreign interests even engage in underhand dealings such as targeting these sectors but hiding this fact. This has been exposed by the publicising of a 'Hit List' in *The Guardian* in 2002 (Ainger, 2002). International partners also pressurised African governments to sign documents that undermine their own policies, for example, during world trade negotiations on trade and agriculture in 2007 (Niyiragira, 2010).

Policy formulation is usually guided by ideologies, experience and frameworks. An analysis of NEPAD shows that as much as it has tried to advance the African position, caution has had to be exercised lest the policy upset international partners. It is not what this chapter is arguing – that caution should not be exercised when preparing policy; it is merely to shed light on the limitations placed on the African policymaker by the undefined framework that has been set by external parties. In as much as Africa would like to own her policies, the existence of the third parties who fund the development of policy means that certain

propositions cannot be considered for they are deemed to fall outside this undefined framework. This framework comes from international partners who release or withhold funding depending on whether policies meet their expectations. The IMF retains the right to veto any policy that it has to fund; such a right means policy always has to be according to the partners' own way of understanding how to solve the problems facing Africa lest the policy receive no funding.

In several instances, sharing the ownership of African policy with some partners has led to situations of unfairness whereby some international institutions, by virtue of having assisted in the development of Africa, now openly undermine the African effort. The existence of proxy wars in Africa is testimony to this effect. Multilateral institutions have also been criticised for their role in the unbalanced trade between Africa and the rest of the world. The Bretton Woods Institutions advocate market reforms in African countries as a condition to allow access to financial assistance. Such reforms advocate for the opening up of African markets to products from the developed world, but the same treatment is not afforded to African products in the developed world since most of the developed countries are not recipients of aid from the Bretton Woods Institutions. Hence, they are not required by the Bretton Woods Institutions to open up their markets. Such practices have led to Africa receiving the raw end of the trade deal. The irony is that when the Bretton Woods Institutions were first established with European states as the intended aid recipients, it was widely understood that these institutions were not to impinge on the sovereignty of those offered assistance; however, this changed once they started offering aid to the Third World, for the Third World is viewed as incapable of managing its own affairs. Such is the paternalistic attitude that they have held towards Africans ever since the day they came into contact with them. Paternalism, which Kant described as the 'greatest despotism imaginable', is to treat men as if they are not free, 'but human material for me, the benevolent reformer, to mould in accordance with my own, not their freely adopted purpose' (Berlin, as cited in Whitfield, 2009). This paternalistic attitude is further strengthened by the ability of donors to sanction African countries should they deviate from set and agreed upon policies; as such it would be naïve to assume that Africans and their partners are equal in their partnership.

The word 'partnership' is mentioned in NEPAD and is also repeated in African policies but, as Mold (2009) puts it, 'the unspoken, unpalatable truth is that donors often have little confidence in recipient governments: they have a tendency to regard aid recipients as under their tutelage' hence the idea of a 'partnership is not a reality'. Only by understanding such realities can the African policymakers unmask the illusion of ownership of shared policies and have a clear understanding of the limitations of such shared policies.

As acknowledgement of the fact that conditionality reduces ownership, donors have come up with what is now known as the Paris Declaration. In this declaration, donors pledged not to dictate terms to the recipient, but to come in and assist with funding in terms of the policies of the recipient to ensure the success of such policies. The situation on the ground tells a different story between the pledge and the action. Fraser (2010) concludes that all it is 'is a shift in rhetoric', as there are still substantial conditions attached to aid by most donors. Fraser (2010) identifies a situation in today's aid system where donors dominate the decision making over what aid is spent on and what conditions are attached to its release, whilst at the same time denying their desire and capacity to do so. Fraser (2010) goes on to point out that such behaviour is meant to induce 'a false sense of ownership' of one's own policies within the recipient communities. Fraser (2010) argues that for ownership of an own policy agenda to occur there are certain conditions which have to be met, one of which is that there is a need for the owners of the policy agenda to lead and develop their own policy agendas. A second is that whenever such policies have been set, third parties should trust the owners of the policy agendas and as such support them unconditionally.

The international community has also been increasing the number of institutions through which it delivers aid so as to ensure that most African governments are not in a position to manage and coordinate that aid. These activities run counter to the objectives of the Paris Declaration which advocates a reduction in the fragmentation of aid. However, such fragmentation is still on the increase (OECD, 2008). Some of the institutions which have been created have blurred the distinction between donor and recipient. Donors have created organisations which they say are comprised of what they call expert advisors or consultants to assist Africans in decision making. This assistance, one could argue, is just another way of ensuring that all the decisions and policies agreed on reflect the wishes of the donor and not the ordinary African. This expanded donor participation has increased the entanglement of donor institutions and recipient governments. Whitfield notes that these expert advisors and consultants funded by donor institutions are now so intimately enmeshed in the public administration that it is now difficult to identify donor and recipient (Whitfield, 2009). This increase in the number of institutes has also resulted in an increase in administrative costs in recipient communities at the expense of real investment in the productive and social sectors (Mold, 2009). If Africa is to truly own its policy then a similar consolidation approach as was adopted in the formulation of NEPAD would be essential. Such unconsolidated implementation of policy results in conflicting and competing policies as well as duplication.

An analysis of Africa's record with regard to policies is also essential if we are to understand the ownership scenario that Africa finds itself in today. When confronted by the evils of colonialism, minority rule and apartheid, African leaders rose to the challenge and instituted policies that resulted in the establishment of institutes that eliminated these evils. However the celebrations of victory were short-lived, for some countries were soon plunged into civil wars, came face to face with poverty, hunger, diseases, underdevelopment and many other ills which afflicted their communities. The leaders had to institute policies and some peace has been achieved, but poverty, wars and underdevelopment still remain the major challenges facing Africa today. Reasons for such failures range from lack of capacity, inadequate political will, greed and self-interest and a lack of technical and financial resources. It is during such times of policy failure that external parties are invited to come in to assist. Since external parties intend to assist where Africa has failed, these parties tend to direct efforts. Hence the current ownership structure involves external parties that take the role of directors because of fears of a repeat of Africa's failures.

NEPAD was born after many of the policies directed by external parties had failed. NEPAD is meant to be a coordinated policy of Africa on a number of issues. Although a few years have passed since its adoption and a number of strides have been made, it would be an insult to the African to celebrate these successes for not only has the number of those living in dire poverty increased, but hunger has become more common and wars are raging with no end in sight. As it stands today, NEPAD runs the risk of following its predecessors as a failure unless there is a revamp of its objectives and strategies for implementation, whilst incorporating the lessons of years gone by and new knowledge from those nations that look to be on the path to reducing poverty. Asian countries come to mind as examples of nations on the road to sustainable development.

What is lacking in African policies? In spite of the increase in advice from the expert advisors to governments in Africa, development is still elusive. Chang (2005) notes that the reason for such failure might be the quality or depth of advice in relation to the contexts of African governments. This should not be surprising since most of these experts have experience in managing their fully developed economies or have been trained in modern schools which have an emphasis on economic theory and not economic history. It is also a known fact that even the so-called experts do not have all the answers regarding the design and application of policy (Mold, 2009). Chang (2005) points to the absence of information on the role of the state in the development process in the expert advice received. Such information, he argues, might be essential if development is to occur. Chang (2005) uses the term 'developmental state' to refer to this role

and notes that the state plays an important role in trade and industrial policy in particular.

What has not been acknowledged is the fact that in most of these developmental states, governments act as major points of capital accumulation, and this capital is invested in capital intensive industries or in research and development through which new firms may be spun-off for private individuals to develop (White, Wade and Gerschenkron in Evans, 1989). The funding of major research and research institutes such as universities in Europe and America comes to mind. Some of the accumulated capital is invested in chosen industries which are state run using the principles of a capitalist free-market for the development of the country. The military industry would be one such industry that comes to mind in which the military institutes develop weapons and these weapons are exported, earning large amounts of revenue for their states. (This does not imply that exporting weapons which have been used in wars to kill innocent people is something to be admired or justified.)

The major problem that Africa is facing is hunger. It would be in Africa's interest if governments were to become the producers of basic foodstuffs for their populations so as to combat hunger which is a major problem on the continent. Such projects would ensure food security, as well as surpluses that could be exported to other regions of the world with unfavourable climatic conditions. An analysis of total agricultural output from Africa between 1970 and 2004 shows that the 1970 total was better than the totals for the subsequent years, yet most African policies never allude to this fact (FAO, 2005). It would be much better if Africa were to shift her policies and focus on those that encourage production; such policy shifts are better than the perennial complaints African countries make to the countries of the developed world, asking them to remove subsidies from their agricultural sectors. It is a known fact that, apart from the African nations, no country is willing to risk its food security by placing it in the hands of foreign interests. The current state where most of agricultural produce in Africa is obtained from subsistence production is unsustainable, for subsistence production has not been able to keep pace with the current rates of population growth and is highly susceptible to weather patterns which are becoming more unpredictable as a result of a number of factors including global warming. In addition, when faced with competition from mass-produced products from the developed world this sector is unlikely to be able to compete. By instituting government-run agricultural facilities, Africa would be able to save the more than thirty billion US dollars it spends on food imports annually (Janneh, as cited by Farnell, 2010).

In many policies from Africa, one infers the request that the developed world should transfer technology to the continent. The irony is that the production

of technology in most states has not been a leap from have not to have, but has been a process of redesigning and upgrading technology, incorporating the advances developed at the particular time in history. In spite of the availability of knowledge on how to design and make such machinery, the African continent is still waiting for the developed world to bring these technologies to it, and to create competition for itself from the developing world. Another factor that has to be addressed through education is the financial literacy of African leaders. It would be a waste of resources if education institutions were to increase but merely maintain the current system where students finish their education without financial literacy. A look at the spending habits of today's African leaders and the nations they lead would leave us in no doubt as to the financial illiteracy of many of them. The continuous languishing in debt of most African nations is testimony to this financial illiteracy. Even with debt cancellation the African continent will soon be caught up in a spiralling debt cycle unless financial literacy is taught to its leaders.

The absence of a discussion on population in NEPAD is a major drawback. Economic growth rates which do not take into account the growth in populations and the targeted rates of reduction of poverty are highly questionable. The increase in the number of people living in poverty in spite of economic growth should have served as a reminder to policy formulators that it is not enough for the economy to grow. Increasing populations are also resulting in increasing conflict between human needs and the need to maintain our natural environment. A policy that does not address population concerns runs the risk of finding itself being overwhelmed by a population it cannot sustain. Human population issues are sensitive, but they still have to be addressed and the question on population is 'can you think of any problem in any human endeavour on any scale, from microscopic to global whose long-term solution is in any demonstrable way aided, assisted, or advanced by further increases in population, locally, nationally, or globally?' (Bartlett, 1996).

Africa's developmental policies should also refrain from using ideologies as determinants of what is acceptable and what is not. Ideologies are an excuse not to think; indeed, ideologies are used as doctrines for guiding behaviour whose authority should not be questioned. A look at China's development reminds one of a developmental leader who once said 'it does not matter whether a cat is black or white as long as it catches mice' (Deng Xiao Ping in Spence, 2006). Here the leader was calling for a careful analysis of whatever policies the state would adopt and to refrain from using ideologies as guiding truths, but to encourage careful analysis of data and the adoption of policies that ensure a better life for the citizen. In this way he launched China on its road to economic growth. It is

essential to note that the above recommendations are not meant to be blanket recommendations; they are meant to be applied taking cognisance of the individual circumstances in particular regions of the African continent. Such adaptation is meant to ensure success and flexibility in policy formulation.

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CHAPTER 14

Globalisation and Public Ethics: An African Perspective

Edwin Chikata Ijeoma

Introduction: The Basis of Analysis

To solve the myriad problems emanating from the universal ethical issues emerging from globalisation, African governments and society may begin to consider almost the very opposite path. Instead of seeking to create a single global economy controlled by vast and ever less controllable transnational corporations, it should instead seek to create a diversity of loosely linked, community-based economies managed by much smaller companies and catering above all (though not exclusively) to local or regional markets. It is not economic globalisation that society should aim for but the reverse; economic localisation to counter-balance today's unfettered globalisation which has substantially influenced the direction of the emerging global ethics.

Background to Ethics

Since the end of the Second World War, trillions of dollars have been poured into development schemes by multinational development banks, bilateral aid agencies and private enterprises. New technologies have transformed the agricultural industry and service sectors alike. Tariffs have been drastically reduced and vast transnational corporations have systematically replaced the national corporations that catered for the domestic economy. Similarly, nation-states have largely replaced the small companies that catered for the domestic economy and governments seem to have been ignored. If conventional wisdom held true, then the world should have been transformed into a veritable paradise. Poverty, unemployment, malnutrition, homelessness, disease and environmental disruption should be but vague memories of an underdeveloped past. However, by contrast, these problems have become more serious and more widespread; hence the traditional nation-states' service delivery and social welfare efforts seem to be far from being realised.

Davidson and Rees-Mogg (1997) have argued that

in a time when the world is seen as a global village, with neoliberal capitalism as the only acceptable economic system, ethics has to be situated within *relatedness* and *interrelatedness*. Exploring the ethics of relationships reveals what kinds of relationships are being fostered in the world today. In neoliberal capitalism, relationships are motivated by self-interest and profit. The free market is seen as an appropriate mechanism guaranteeing the wellbeing of society. At the same time, with the globalisation of capital, the traditional concept of the state as a sovereign entity is being eroded, largely due to transnational corporations becoming dominant influences in the market to the extent that they are able to evade political and social accountability. Some economists see the present global market as an historical epoch that will bring about freedom for the individual from institutional relationships.

This explains why some neoliberal policy analysts are advocating for market ideology as the only source of economic growth for African states. What needs to be considered is that Africa and other poor countries could well be victimised by this relationship, which is characterised by fierce competition. The success of powerful countries is often based on their ability to prey on the economic and political weaknesses of poor countries. It is their own prosperity that they are mostly concerned with rather than that of the poor countries. To ensure their own progress, for instance, European countries have mobilised their capital to form a Union. Accordingly, the USA responded by initiating selective trade agreements with other Third World countries. These initiatives point to the evolution of a survivalist imperative in public governance. Politically, the ideal in neoliberal theory is that the primary function of government is to remove whatever shields protect weak and ill-adapted industries. However, global politics has been caught up with the fatalistic *laissez-faire* philosophy. The philosophy of fatalism inherent in *laissez-faire* advocates that any interference in the market will have harmful effects (Gaddis, 1992: 79). One could argue that the world must let the markets work according to their principles and all will come right in the end.

This philosophy encourages one to think only in the short term. However, as Keynes notes (in Singer 1995) ‘in the long run we are all dead’. Karl Marx (Singer, 1995) in turn notes the element of Greek tragedy embedded in the *laissez-faire* market economy. ‘Modern bourgeois society with its relations of production, of exchange and of property, a society that has conjured up such gigantic means of production and of exchange, is like the sorcerer, who is no longer able to control the powers of the nether world which he has called up with his spells’ (Singer, 1995: 33).

The assumption is that the market is a given tragedy of human kind's existence. *Ethics can be seen in the globalisation process as a tool to cushion the ugly effects of selfishness among people, businesses and governments.* The implication is that the market system is an inevitable tragedy of existence. The conviction that has emerged among neoliberal public policy analysts is that since the market is a phenomenon of tragedy, it also follows that the welfare of society can only be achieved through self-interest.

Consequently, it may be necessary to hold the needs of self-interest and altruism in balance, with self-interest being the dominant value. This implies that if altruism is given too prominent a role, the likelihood is a political backlash that endangers the very operation of altruism within public welfare. However, the tragedy is that self-interest is incompatible with altruism. This contradiction becomes an unresolved moral conflict in the sense that one who sacrifices his or her interests for the good of others will end up being seen as acting primarily for his or her own self-interest. To caricature this kind of reasoning, one can argue that people should be grateful to the selfish and greedy individuals in society; it is their selfishness that sustains altruism. This clearly makes mockery of moral sentiment and reveals that the doctrine of self-interest is actually built on seriously fallacious grounds. For good governance to be secured, the interests of the people should be given the first priority in a democratic state in the globalisation process. Graham (1997: 26–30) argues that the economic policies of a particular country are not concerned with the wellbeing of another country but with its own economic self-interest. This implies that a politician who goes about promoting the interests of another country will be abusing power in the sense that he/she is not compelled to promote these interests. In other words, national interest in economic relations is morally neutral – it has nothing to do with ethical considerations.

In this form of argument, it becomes difficult to argue for common interest at the global level. The present reality of globalisation seems to go against an ethical theory that espouses the idea that national interest is neutral. Africa and other Third World countries have experienced the negative impact on global relationships due to the pursuit of national self-interest by the economically advanced countries. If one sees globalisation as implying that all humankind is 'related and interrelated' ethically, it becomes difficult to talk about national interest separate from the global implications of this interest. Taking into consideration the fact that the world has become a giant market, responsible governments have to realise that their national interests are intertwined. Instead of talking about national interest, one should perhaps refer to global interest so that global ethics could be developed.

Africa's Experience on Common Ethics

The nationalist quest for identity has inadvertently been transformed into a quest for uniformity. It has also produced a rather schizophrenic political culture in which leaders are considered nationalists by day but tribalists by night. The nationalists can be excused for their conflation of tribalism and identity in many ways, forces ranging against them tended to abuse identity. For an example, the shock of Katanga, in which Africa's worst enemies – imperialism and racism – championed tribalism against the central government, was to profoundly affect African nationalists' perceptions of ethnicity. Then followed regional claims that *Tshombes* and *Katangas* were behind every movement challenging the authority of the central government in the Congo (Mkandawire, 2004: 3). Part of the paranoia about ethnicity stemmed from a one-sided understanding of how colonialism affected African identities. The usual view was that colonial rule fragmented African society. However, as Nnoli (1998: 16) persuasively argues, also supported by Mkandawire (2004: 3), despite the Machiavellian machinations of the colonial establishment in segmenting and fragmenting the colonised, the reality was that the socioeconomic upheavals unleashed by colonialism questioned people's erstwhile identities, and therefore led to the continuation of identity formation and boundary redefinition. This process of identity formation continued unabated. The point, therefore, needs to be made that throughout the colonial period, to the immediate postcolonial period, and now into the contemporary post-independence period. The processes of identity formation and boundary redefinition have continued.

An understanding of this process is just as important as comprehending the vicious *divide-and-rule* machinations of British colonialism or the political opportunism of the various factions of the ruling classes of the postcolonial state (Wilson, 1923: 87–88). It is the totality of these pre-colonial, colonial, and post-colonial experiences and identities, which form the substance of the *national question* that has been frustrating every effort that could make pan-Africanism a true reflection of African unity and identity.

Global versus National Ethics

Global ethics has to arise from a conscious realisation of the fact that human existence depends on the wellbeing of the whole. In such a global consciousness there is an ethical attempt to transcend national self-interest and patriotism. Most ethicists tend to see patriotism as the same as altruism but perhaps the two are best distinguished. Patriotism tends to identify with a group and sees its fortunes to some degree as fortunes. Socially, patriotism becomes an expression

of the group's self-interest against the interest(s) of those who are classified as not belonging. Patriotism thus implies seeing one's country or race as possessing some superiority over any other race (Singer, 1987: 51). The ethical implication is that one feels less obliged to help people of other countries than one's own fellow citizens. The ethical bias in ethics, in respect of loyalty to one's group as a whole, shows itself in the high praise accorded to patriotism. Selfish behaviour disappears; group selfishness is encouraged and it is called patriotism.

In contrast, ancient thinkers such as the Stoic philosophers saw their loyalty as belonging to the world community instead of the states they were born into. To foster a global ethics on the paradigm of relatedness and interrelatedness, there is a need to go beyond patriotism. One needs to see oneself as belonging to a larger reality beyond that which is contextual. One needs to learn to think of those people who live in lands far away as relatives regardless of language, colour and culture. This can only be possible when globalisation is essentially 'action at a distance' (Beck, Giddens and Lash, 1997: 96). This notion of 'action at a distance' is contradicted by scholars who postulate the survival of one's culture as the goal of all living. In this form of reasoning one's culture is being seen as in a state of competition with other cultures. Its survival is premised on its ability to outsmart other cultures. This is the impression one gets from Skinner's (1988: 181) argument that culture has produced the science and technology it needs in order to save itself. The salient feature of Skinner's argument is that of cultural competitiveness as being important for national survival. Instead of seeing globalisation in terms of cultural competitiveness, attempts should be made to see globalisation in terms of multiculturalism based on the ethos of dialogic engagement.

In this dialogic engagement, an outlook should be cultivated based on the idea that no culture has the monopoly on truth but that each culture is nourished and invigorated by constant dialogue with other cultures.

Morality versus Self-interest

Various postmodernists,, argue that those countries that are economically successful have a strong moral basis and operate within a strong moral public administrative framework. Their notion of a strong morality is actually based on the Darwinian concept of survival of the fittest. Neoliberalists see self-interest as a mechanism of natural selection. What this means is that, as those individuals who control the rules of the global economy, its language and logic, its resource allocation, its markets, they will survive in the long run. It logically follows that poor countries are an endangered species. Indeed it is their perishing which

gives progress to the rich countries. Darwin insinuated the undesirability of the existence of the poor when he said that: 'With savages, the weak in body may soon be eliminated; and those that survive commonly exhibited a vigorous state of health' (Lux, 1990: 12). According to Darwin, as cited in Lux (1990: 12), the humanitarian efforts to build a compassionate and sympathetic society are the very causes for the propagation of endless misery. The ideal would be that poor people should be left for nature to take its course.

When bodies such as the International Monetary Fund (IMF) and the World Bank advise governments to cut spending on social welfare they may be motivated by a lack of morality or motivated by the Darwinian theory of natural selection, or by a morality of a common belonging. If reality is related and inter-related to everything else, it would follow that the present dualistic economic and political system should be substituted by another, more holistic model. From denying relationships among people, neoliberal theory, modelled on the Darwinian paradigm, denies relatedness between people and the environment. The present global socioeconomic and political structure encourages the 'externalisation' and objectification of human beings and the environment; it accentuates the competitive element and equates self-interest with the common good. This juxtaposition also distorts the capacity of objective thinking so that even much of what passes for science is tainted by ideology.

Self-interest gave rise to parliamentary politics. The political participation of citizens in policy formulation is motivated by the need to safeguard and advance one's own self-interest. The role of government becomes that of protecting the individual's self-interest. Those who consider government as existing only to promulgate laws of its own are misguided in the sense that they simply do not understand this basic feature of human nature. Moreover, any attempt by government to come up with rules to organise society is actually illusory. Smith (1969: 381) also seems to be arguing that the wealth of nations is not based on governmental planning but on the freedom of individuals to exchange, specialise and extend their markets. While engaging in the pursuit of their own self-interests, individuals or nations end up promoting the common good. This moral paradigm is that of participants in a system that moralised self-interest within a free market system without government intervention.

In view of the foregoing, it may be deduced that the global market is an expression of relationships in which individuals make political and economic decisions that produce economic and political consequences. For example, when the USA was considering the African Growth Opportunity Act (AGOA), aimed at creating investment funds and developing a free trade agreement with Africa, President Clinton expressed the spirit of the legislation as paying more attention

to those who are making the right political and economic reforms. Thus, the USA wants to help the magnets of change. Sub-Saharan Africa is still a largely untapped market of about 800 million people. This example shows that economically powerful countries do give shape to the political and economic design of poor countries – be it for good or bad. Therefore, developing countries should begin to initiate positive local economic initiatives for good governance in the face of this globalisation process.

Furthermore, it is important to point out that there are two mechanisms that are used by economically powerful countries to bring about effective change, namely, aid and investment. With these two mechanisms, powerful countries pronounce damnation or blessings on poor countries. However, their intention may not be to promote the wellbeing of poor countries, but to persuade them to embrace the liberal market system. The market, being driven by self-interest, cannot accommodate the interests of the majority of people who have no access to a basic livelihood. In fact the market depends on a society's readiness to sacrifice its citizens. This has been a crucial issue in IMF and World Bank lending policies. At the microeconomic level, these financial institutions insist that African governments should cut welfare spending and not interfere with the market. At the macroeconomic level, governments should allow the mobility of capital. It is only upon the fulfilment of these policies that loans are given, depending on the economic performance of the country in question. The aim of lending policies is to advance the liberalisation of the economy and the mobility of capital – the lending policies are basically modelled on the needs of the liberal economies of the North. The economic dominance of the developed countries thus did not come about as a result of a spontaneous order but through an extensive exploitation of natural resources, guided by the assumption that these resources would never diminish. However, resources are finite which implies that the scarcity of resources will eventually lead to the collapse of the global free market system. An economic system based on self-interest, for this reason, cannot bring about the global common good. Such an economic system will in the long run ultimately militate against itself.

An alternative ethical paradigm that is able to address the concerns of globalisation has to emerge from a worldview based on relatedness and interrelatedness. Africa's economic and political wellbeing in its quest for effective public leadership and governance does not lie in subscribing to the neoliberal economic system in the name of globalisation; rather African governments need to encourage local economic initiatives as an approach to safeguard the general economic interests of all citizens.

Ethnicity has always been considered the most ubiquitous and most dreaded identity. Both nation building and development presupposed a strong state running a coherent nation. Ethnicity was seen as inimical to both. It weakened the state by the conflicts it engendered and the multiplicity of its claims simply denied the new countries a national image (Murobe, 2000: 63). The nationalist movement saw recognition of this pluralism as succumbing to the *divide-and-rule* tactics of the colonialists and neocolonialist forces that were bent on denying African independence, or whenever they accepted it, they emptied it of any meaning by nursing the fissiparous potential that social pluralism always harboured, and so nationalism saw itself as up in arms against imperialism and the retrograde forces of tribalism. In the process something else happened: in combating tribalism, nationalism denied ethnic identity and considered any political, or worse, economic claims based on these identities as diabolic as imperialism, if not worse. Radicalisation of the nationalists through armed struggles was to banish ethnicity even further from any serious political consideration. In those states where Marxism became the leading ideology, class analysis simply rode roughshod over any other social cleavages. Ethnic identities were regarded as something *invented* by the colonialists or the petty bourgeoisie locked in combat among themselves. This was on a par with a *false consciousness* that was bound to disappear through ideological struggle or as the development of capitalism made class consciousness more salient. This may eventually come to pass as *false consciousness*; while subjective in its origin it assumes an objective historical presence that can only be dismissed at one's peril.

Globalisation versus Public Ethics: An Appraisal

What makes globalisation worthy of discussion, despite the vagueness of the term, is its cultural magic. After a long history of extraordinary destruction, societies could become one single society. This contribution raises an important question: From where does the discourse of globalisation derive its objectives? The world will quickly discover the close link between the modernisation project and the globalisation project. The underlining perception so far has shown that the expected dividends from the globalisation process may be more beneficial to developed economies than their developing counterparts. The main conclusion is that globalisation may neither produce useful results nor help to advance the cause of humankind unless human beings begin to look inwards for local self-sustainable empowerment. However, as custodians of people culture and policies that drive every societal change, governments may need to have a re-think in their policy conceptions and formulations aimed at protecting their

citizens. The role of governments at all levels in this era of global change cannot be undermined.

Robertson (1992) argues that the modernisation project has failed to westernise the culture of the world. The discourse of modernisation – laden with ideological distortions, instrumental policies and strange concepts – has been powerless to assist. In addition, development has been a minefield of corruption embracing those who do not mind losing their intellectual probity. The discourse of globalisation takes its inspiration from such ruins and some professionals believe that the end of history has arrived with the inception of the globalisation process.

The globalisation process may be conceived as the fruit of modernity. However, there must be something after modernity. Therefore, globalisation cannot be comprehensively considered simply as an aspect of the outcome of the Western project of modernity. It may also be argued that globalisation is intimately related to modernity as well as postmodernity and postmodernisation. Globalisation concepts have had so many critics in wider perspectives just as the previous world's concepts such as modernity, anti-modernity and postmodernity and its impact on the world. The public sector may be seen as agents of the globalisation process; hence leaders and governments create all legal and environmental friendly conditions in which big businesses thrive. Therefore, further world integration within the globalisation process either for profit or for social change, cannot succeed without government inputs. Globalisation may represent the final stage of the world's societal integration. However, in order to simplify complex arguments Westernisation may present a minimal model of globalisation. Therefore, countries should endeavour to assume a moderate stand towards globalisation by thinking in the direction of self-reliance, local economic initiatives or else Westernisation, imperialism and capitalism will be repeated in the globalisation process.

Globalisation involves the possible integration of the economy, polity and culture. If this is so, the human endeavour to influence or dominate has been evidenced throughout the ages. Therefore, the globalisation process should be embraced with a holistic approach in which there is more concern to create a sociocultural system in which culture, polity and economy play dominant roles in the world system. Economy and polity are not excluded from the world system, but help to energise it negatively or positively.

Global Ethics: Lessons for Africa

This chapter has so far articulated globalisation from both a political and ethical point of view. Each view tends towards cultural ‘cloning’ of the entire world in the name of global ethics and culture. For example, if Islamic ideas and values should press Muslims to attack the world system, more than a single set of policy alternatives is needed to prevent the world system from being victimised; an alternative which would please major actors may go a long way to solving the world’s security challenges. That is so because it is difficult to agree that Islamic ideas and values are the best for all or vice versa. Therefore, societies must go further in determining a societal order in relation to a global order, which means that political-ideological and religious movements arise in deference to the issue of defining societies in relation to the rest of the world and global circumstances as a whole.

To be in the business of globalisation is to be in the business of culture and vice versa. For example, in terms of culture the process implies that Arabs and Jews must discuss their differences and adopt some policy alternatives that bring them closer to a single global order. Islam, Confucianism and Western liberal democracy contest with one another for dominance on the contemporary world sociopolitical scene. At the level of politics and economy, the process also involves international organisations and transnational movements whose aim is to have the upper hand rather than the advancement of humankind. Consequently, under the Western umbrella where organisations and multinationals play a dominant role, globalisation will be no more than the disorganisation of non-Western cultures and structures.

The new version of change is also about competition, in which the rich alone will be rewarded and esteemed, provided it is done with openness and clear developmental intentions. Therefore, if globalisation is not a form of cultural dominance by the West then every nation in the developing world should be left to dictate the pace and limits of their involvement. However, globalisation is not a self-operating machine but requires a great deal of cooperation from those involved, especially when the problem relates to cultural identity. Therefore, the world of today demands a hegemonic organisation capable of diffusing, enforcing and protecting the harmonious interaction of economic, political and cultural processes. The problem is that good hegemonic power (whose goal is cooperation and liberation rather than colonisation and domination) is hard to define in the modern world, given that international cooperation efforts can be easily abused and subverted for national interests.

Similarly, as national governments and their leaders have the traditional role of serving the interests of their people, it will not be out of place for them to

protect the same interests in matters of global concern and at the same time have good global relations with other sovereign states. However, the existing international public policy prescriptions are not universal in application and even if they were, leadership and governance scenarios are not the same all over the world and this poses a serious administrative threat in the present globalisation era. Thus, the concept of powerful global actors must be organisational; for example, the body of the United Nations (UN) and its agencies is in a position to make sure that every global decision must be in the interests of the people and not of a few economically privileged countries or/and individuals. It is important to note that the policies and programmes of developing nations need to be focused on public service delivery in issues that pose serious threats to society such as primary health-care to deal with deadly diseases such as acquired immune deficiency syndrome (AIDS), tuberculosis (TB), malaria and education, which gives a boost to people's empowerment, training and development, as well as poverty alleviation programmes. These challenges and many others may not be priorities for developed countries at this stage, but they are serious realities that impede several developmental efforts in developing countries. Unless these issues are viewed in their proper perspectives, the survival chances of developing countries may be slim in the present globalisation era.

Conclusion

In this chapter, evidence was produced to show that globalisation originated from Western thought in the same way as the discourse on modernisation, and this may be termed 'global cultural cloning'. Western intellectuals may still see themselves as the best in the field, despite the West's diminished capacity for spinning intellectual debate around the non-Western spaces. Indeed, evidence shows that the North is more conscious of the globe than the South. However, this raises the question: '*Whose influence will continue to shape the present and future welfare of the earth's inhabitants?*' In the final analysis, freedom and equal justice need to be considered as overriding factors that drive global ethics and culture.

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CHAPTER 15

The Global Governance of Trade and Economic Development in Africa: Assessing the Impacts of Neoliberalism

Ojo Samuel Oloruntoba

Introduction

The General Agreement on Tariff and Trade (GATT) which became operational in 1947 was part of the overall international arrangement designed, along with the Bretton Woods Institutions, to facilitate international cooperation and development at the end of the Second World War. The current global trade governance architecture has its foundation in the GATT and the various agreements that resulted from the Uruguay Round of Negotiations and the World Trade Organization (WTO) which succeeded the GATT in 1995. According to Archarya Daly:

The Uruguay Round (UR) of negotiations completed in 1994 resulted in a tripod of rules under the auspices of the World Trade Organization, which was established in 1995. The tripod consists of the GATT 1994, the General Agreement on Trade in Services (GATS) and the Agreement on Trade Related Aspects of Intellectual Property Rights (TRIPS) (Daly, 2004).

The various laws that govern international trade among nations are enshrined in the preamble to the GATT, which commits members of the WTO to 'reciprocal and mutually advantageous arrangements directed to the substantial reduction of tariffs and other barriers to trade and to the elimination of discriminatory treatment in international commerce' (WTO, 2003). Even though this is clearly spelt out by the WTO, the experiences of the developing countries within the context of the current global trade governance are of mixed results compared to those countries, especially in South East Asia, that have adopted a gradual and cautious integration into the global economy. The latter have benefited from the system, while those that are unprepared, like sub-Saharan African countries, have been increasingly marginalised. As Khor (n.d.) notes, developing countries have generally become more integrated in the world economy and, thus, their

development prospects and performances are more dependent on global structures and trends. In this regard, the position of Africa has remained dangerously precarious, as the membership of various countries in the continent in the WTO has rendered them vulnerable to the manipulations of the advanced capitalist countries like the United States of America, Britain, France, Germany, Canada and Japan in the areas of trade, investment and competition issues. Dani Rodrik states rather poignantly that:

The rules for admission into the world economy not only reflect little awareness of development priorities, they are often completely unrelated to sensible economic principles. WTO rules on anti-dumping, subsidies and countervailing measures, agriculture, textiles, TRIMS and TRIPS are utterly devoid of any economic rationale beyond the mercantilist interests of a narrow set of powerful groups in the advanced industrial countries. The developmental payoff of most of these requirements is hard to see (Rodrik, 2001).

In spite of this obvious contradiction, the world is today under a single economic orthodoxy which presents trade liberalisation as the only way to economic growth and development. The debt crisis of the 1980s and its attendant problems, which necessitated the intervention of the multilateral financial agencies like the International Monetary Fund and the World Bank in the management of the economies of sub-Saharan African countries, brought about a wholesale adoption of neoliberal economic doctrines, which was encapsulated under the Structural Adjustment Programme and the Washington Consensus. The core components of these policy packages are the privatisation of public enterprises, deregulation, the devaluation of currencies, and the liberalisation of trade and finance.

With particular reference to trade liberalisation, these reform programmes consist of many do's and don'ts such as the demonopolisation of trade, the streamlining of import regime, the reduction of red tape, and the implementation of transparent customs procedures. Also included are the replacement of quantitative restrictions with tariffs, avoidance of extreme variation in tariff rates and excessively high rates of effective protection, allowing exporters duty-free access to imported inputs, refraining from large doses of anti-export bias, and an effort not to tax export crops too highly (Rodrik, 1998). African countries that followed these prescriptions, such as Ghana, Uganda, Mali and Nigeria, did not record commensurate growth in their various economies. Rather, government officials

latched onto the loopholes inherent in them to enrich themselves at the expense of the citizens.

According to Jimi Adesina, the fundamental adjustment of economies from the 1980s has meant severe social dislocation for the populace in many African countries. This resulted from massive rural-urban migration as opportunities for survival in the rural areas have shrunk to near zero level, the loss of jobs as many industries have been closed down owing to the harsh operating environment, and the influx of substandard products from abroad due to WTO commitments, among others (Adesina, 1994).

This chapter interrogates the current complexities and credibility deficits in the global governance of trade that have engendered these problems, the corresponding erosion of state capacity and the loss of policy autonomy which hamper appropriate domestic responses to the prevailing international economic order and the implications of these for African development. In other words, what are the provisions and practices under the WTO which impede the effective use of trade to facilitate development within the context of economic globalisation in Africa? How has trade liberalisation contributed to the economic development or stagnation of African countries? Also, what led to a loss of policy autonomy and the erosion of state capacity under a neoliberal economic paradigm, and what can be done to ensure that Africa does not remain at the margin of the world economy? This constitutes the first part of the chapter. The second part examines the theoretical trajectory of global trade governance, while the third section contains an analysis of the WTO and the inherent contradictions that underpin the various agreements for regulating international trade. The fourth section examines the impact of neoliberal economic doctrine on African economies especially in relation to state capacity and loss of policy autonomy. The final section concludes with recommendations.

Theoretical Basis of Global Trade Governance

The current global economic system, which emerged after the Second World War, has its roots in the neoclassical theory propagated and expanded by seventeenth and eighteenth century economists like Adam Smith and David Ricardo. In their respective submissions, these authors advocated free trade and the principle of comparative advantage as ineluctable standards for the operations of international trade. Neoclassical economic doctrine holds that the hidden hand of the market is the best device for mobilising even the basest of human instincts, such as gluttony, greed and the desire for wealth and power for the benefit of all (Smith, 1776; Ricardo, 1971; Harvey, 2007). Consequently, in order to ensure

the unfettered control of economic activities by the market, neoclassical economic doctrine advocates a very minimal role for the state in the management of economic affairs. According to Julius Nyang'oro (1989), a neoclassical theory of development through the concept of comparative advantage advocates international trade as a principle of specialisation according to relative efficiency in production. This theory is also based on the assumption that a nation will tend to export those commodities which use the nation's abundant factors intensively, and will tend to import those commodities which use the nation's scarce factors intensively (Nyang'oro, 1989).

Implicit in the principle of comparative advantage is free trade among nations. The proponents of this theory argue that free trade promotes economic development and enhances macroeconomic stability. In this regard, Ricardo's submission is apt. He states that:

Under a system of perfectly free commerce, this pursuit of individual advantage is admirably connected with the universal good of the whole. By stimulating industry, by rewarding ingenuity, and by using most efficaciously the peculiar powers bestowed by nature, it distributes labour most effectively and most economically: while by increasing the general mass of production it diffuses general benefit, and binds together, by one common tie of interest and intercourse, the universal society of nations throughout the civilised World. It is this principle which determines that wine shall be made in France and Portugal and that hardware and other goods shall be manufactured in England (Ricardo, 1971).

Neoclassical economists believe that

... free markets provide individuals with signals necessary for rational consumption decisions and the freedom to choose what, and from whom, they will secure the necessities of life. Free markets also allow producers to commit their productive resources to the most fruitful areas of production and then sell their products, with no let or hindrance, on the most favourable terms. When free markets are reinforced by the sanctity of property rights, then individuals are truly free to enjoy freedom and assert their liberties publicly (Jones, 1995).

An offshoot of neoclassical economic doctrine is neoliberalism, which assumed a global dimension from the 1980s after the influence of Keynesianism and post-Keynesianism began to dwindle owing to the failure of state enterprises in

various parts of the world. David Harvey (2007), in his book, *A brief history of neoliberalism*, brilliantly traces the origin of the activities of the various business and intellectual networks of apologists like the Mount Pelerin group and the Chicago School in the United States to the establishment of the neoliberal economic doctrine. The combination of these powerful groups in strong alliance with the policymakers, especially in the Reagan administration, made neoliberalism a new economic orthodoxy from 1979. This was also true of Britain under Margaret Thatcher who, after ascending to power in May 1979, committed herself to the dismantling of or rolling back the commitment to the welfare state; the privatisation of public enterprises, reducing taxes, encouraging entrepreneurial initiatives and creating a favourable business climate to induce a strong inflow of foreign investment, particularly from Japan (Harvey, 2007: 23).

According to Rodrik (2006), the standard recommendations emanating from this neoliberal-conventional rhetoric of international trade is that once an economy eliminates government distortions, prices should automatically reflect the correct cost of production and resources should be allocated optimally in resource-abundant countries. This also implies that the dismantling of quantitative restrictions on imports, reducing import tariffs (and their dispersions), making the currency convertible for current account transactions, eliminating bureaucratic red tape and other impediments to foreign direct investment and improving customs procedures. The result of such wholesale commitment to free trade will thus increase the specialisation, capital accumulation and technological progress brought about by increased competition. Given these prospects, the economy should exhibit an income and wage convergence with trade partners and bring about improvement in the standard of living at least in the short term (Cruz, 2008). The importance of the neoliberal economic theory of trade then is that the quicker trade distortions are removed, the sooner will the economy enjoy gains from trade which will leave the market in the driver's seat in terms of facilitating growth and promoting industrialisation.

Even though this is the submission of advocates of free trade, Cruz notes that such unbridled optimism of trade liberalisation fails to take into consideration the inevitable costs that are associated with free trade. For instance, shifting of resources from one sector to another on the basis of comparative advantage may not necessarily have a positive impact on industrialisation (Cruz, 2008: 3). Historical evidence has also shown that when it comes to issues of trade as an instrument for facilitating economic development, it has not always been as simple as the neoliberal economic doctrine would have us believe.

In various studies, scholars have shown that, at the initial stages of economic development, the state has always been involved in applying policies that protect

infant industries. Tariffs were also used selectively while whole export subsidies were generously employed to facilitate the export of manufactured and primary products (Chang, 2002; 2003; 2004; Chang and Grabel, 2005; Stiglitz, 2002; Rodrik, 2001, Chang, 2007). In these works, Ha-Joon Chang and others argue with almost empirical precision that the developed countries of today, including the United States of America, Britain, France, Germany and Japan, have at various times used and still use tariffs to protect their domestic industrial, agricultural and commercial sectors. Even the newly industrialising countries of South-East Asia have involved the state in using tariff and non-tariff barriers selectively to promote export-led industrialisation, which the World Bank acknowledges in its 1993 Report as a 'miracle' (World Bank, 1993; Amsden, 2001).

The world system theory posits a counter-argument to neoliberal orthodoxy. Immanuel Wallenstein (1974) submits that the world economic system operates on the basis of the international division of labour, with three major configurations which include the core, the semi-periphery and the periphery. The core is made up of the advanced capitalist economies where advanced technology is predominant, the semi-periphery comprises the newly industrialising countries of South-East Asia, and the periphery consists of essentially the Third World countries that specialise in the export of commodities and raw materials (Wallenstein, 1974). The core argument of this theory, as well as the dependency theory that preceded it, is that the global economy is characterised by power asymmetries, which are tilted in favour of the advanced capitalist economies of the North (Cardoso and Faletto, 1969; 1979; Evans, 1979).

Dependency theorists like Raul Prebisch and Andre Gunder Frank associated underdevelopment in developing countries with the worsening terms of international trade. The theory employed 'the concept of underdevelopment to express a particular kind of asymmetrical relationship between developed and underdeveloped countries, largely to the former's advantage' (Nyang'oro, 1989). One of the leading proponents of this theory was Theotonio Dos Santos, who provides a general explanation of the dependency theoretical framework thus:

By dependence we mean a situation in which the economy of certain countries is conditioned by the development and expansion of another economy to which the former is subjected. The relation ... of interdependence between two or more economies, and between these and world trade, assumes the form of dependence when some countries (the dominant ones) can expand and be self-sustaining, while other countries (the dependent ones) can do this only as a reflection of that expansion, which can have either a positive or negative effect on their immediate development (Dos Santos, 1970: 231).

Although the theory has been criticised for its overemphasis on terms of trade rather than external and internal production structure, it provides a historical analysis of the asymmetrical relationship and the pattern of international division of labour between the advanced capitalist economies and the developing countries (Blomstrom and Hettne, 1984).

Global Trade Governance and African Development: A Critique

As stated earlier, current global trade governance is premised on the provisions of the GATT and the WTO. According to Effe (2008), although the laws that govern inter-state trade relations are notoriously complicated, detailed and multifaceted, it is possible to reduce them to a number of basic principles which are enshrined in the Preamble to GATT, which commits members to ‘reciprocal and mutually advantageous arrangements directed to the substantial reduction of tariffs and other barriers to trade and to the elimination of discriminatory treatment in international commerce’. The first substantive paragraph of the Agreement Establishing the World Trade Organization lists the following aspirations:

Raising standards of living, ensuring full employment and a large and steadily growing volume of real income and effective demand, and expanding the production of and trade in goods and services, while allowing for the optimal use of the world’s resources in accordance with the objective of sustainable development, seeking both to protect and preserve the environment and to enhance the means for doing so in a manner consistent with their respective needs and concerns at different levels of economic development (www.wto.org).

Another paragraph cites ‘mutually advantageous arrangements directed to the substantial reduction of tariffs and other barriers to trade and to the elimination of discriminatory treatment in international trade relations, as a means of contributing to these objectives’.

To enhance the realisation of these objectives, the WTO has also made provision for several exceptions. For example, Article XVIII titled ‘Governmental Assistance to Economic Development’ allows WTO members whose economics ‘can only support a low standard of living and are in the early stages of development’ to adopt certain measures outlined under section A–C for purposes relating to economic development. Under section A, such a concession may be granted under the GATT/WTO framework to another member if the aim is to promote a particular industry and to raise its people’s living standard. In section B, it may

impose quotas for balance of payments reasons. Section C permits the granting of governmental assistance for the purpose of supporting an infant industry, with a view to raising living standards, while part IV – Article XXXVI–XXXVIII calls upon developed countries to grant access to products originating from the least developing countries (LDCs) on the basis of non-reciprocity (Effeh, 2008: 83). Various Generalized Systems of Preferences (GSP) are also available to take care of the special conditions and inabilities of the LDCs to operate on a par with the developed countries in a multilateral trading system.

Ostensibly, the objectives of the WTO, and the various exceptions which take cognisance of the peculiar conditions of the LDCs, would provide a level playing field and ensure development for all its members. However, as Rodrik (2001: 2) poignantly argues, the WTO has focused essentially on reciprocal market access rather than development-friendly rules. It is this fixation on market access that has cast a pall of credibility deficit on global trade governance. The controversies over fairness and the justness of the application of the rules have also stalled the conclusion of the Doha Development Round since it was launched in 2001.

In examining the operations of global trade governance, we agree with Das (1998) that there is now widespread acceptance that the rules and processes at the WTO are unbalanced and that much needs to be done to improve the situation. Some of the issues that concern developing countries include the non-realisation of the expected benefits of the Uruguay Round, problems faced by developing countries in implementing their WTO obligations and concerns over the proposals by developed countries to expand the WTO's mandate to 'new issues' (Khor. n.d.). Firstly, the much-expected benefits from the Uruguay Round in areas of market access for agriculture and textiles have remained elusive. For instance, tariffs on agriculture, which is one of the main items of trade for developing countries, have remained high with some as high as 200 to 300 per cent. The developed countries have continued to subsidise agriculture to the extent that this rose from US\$275 billion in 1986–88 to US\$326 billion in 1999 (OECD, 2000). According to Dambisa Moyo (2008), these subsidies are far more than the overall official aid to Third World countries.

On textiles, the International Textiles and Clothing Bureau report shows that only a few quota restrictions (13 out of 750 by the US; 14 out of 219 by the EU; 29 out of 295 by Canada) had been eliminated (WTO, 2000). The contradictions inherent in the global trade governance also stem from the increasing pressure by the developed countries on the developing countries to continually liberalise their economies with an assurance that such liberalisation is beneficial to them. However, more than fifteen years after the commencement of the WTO, anti-dumping measures, as well as countervailing duties and standard issues

such as health and standard measures, have combined to exclude the products of Third World countries from the markets of the developed countries.

Secondly, developing countries also face increasing difficulties in implementing their obligations. For instance, the prohibition of investment measures such as local-content policy and many types of subsidy under the trade-related investment measures agreements and the subsidies agreement has made it harder for developing countries to adopt measures to encourage domestic industry (Khor, n.d.). Import competition with food from advanced countries has also put domestic farmers in Third World countries at risk. A report by the Food and Agriculture Organisation reveals that the rice and sugar sectors in Senegal were facing difficulties in coping with import competition despite the substantive devaluation in 1994 (FAO 2000). In Nigeria, rice importation still constitutes over 75 per cent of annual consumption. This stifles local production and increases prices without any assurance of better quality.

The WTO Agreement on Trade Related Aspects of Intellectual Property Rights (TRIPS) is also not in favour of the developing countries as the Agreement provides leeway for the holders of intellectual property rights based in developed countries to assume monopolistic positions. The Intellectual Property Rights (IPR) regime has also led to high and exorbitant prices for medicines, such as HIV drugs, thereby reducing consumer access to affordable medicines. Prices of computer software and industrial technology are also very high. Worse still is the patenting by companies in the developed countries of biological materials originating in the developing countries. Another problematic aspect of the WTO Agreement is the one on General Agreement in Trade and Services; it is obvious that services-based companies in developed countries have more capacity to export and invest abroad, while developing countries lack the wherewithal in terms of capital and skills to operate in the developed countries.

In spite of these differences in capacities, the developed countries have been putting pressure on the developing countries to liberalise. Although the movement of capital and labour both fall under the General Agreement on Trade and Services, the developed countries have been more concerned about movement of capital on which they have comparative advantage than movement of labour on which the developing countries have a comparative advantage. Equally, more attention is paid to the movement of capital (with its inherent dangers such as the sudden massive withdrawal of funds witnessed during the Asian Crisis of 1997–1998) than movement of labour where, on account of population, the developing countries have more advantages (Soros, 1998; Stiglitz, 2002).

The decision-making processes of the WTO, where decisions taken at the informal discussions such as the Green Room and late night meetings become

binding on all members also call into question the credibility of such decisions. The conclusion of the Doha Development Round has been stalled, essentially due to the fact that the developed countries have not only refused to shift ground on issues of interest to developing countries, such as market access for textiles and agriculture, but have also gone ahead to introduce non-trade issues such as investment, competition and transparency in government procurement to WTO negotiations. As we shall see in the next section, these new demands, if granted, would completely remove the room to manoeuvre for governments of developing countries to apply measures that are necessary to promote economic growth and development.

Neoliberalism and Trade Policy in Africa

Implicit in the current philosophy which underpins the global capitalist economy is the assumption that the market is better positioned to foster economic growth and poverty reduction. This is based on the notion that the market can do better than the state in allocating resources to different segments of society. This notion, which has its roots in neoliberal economic doctrine, has been widely promoted by international financial institutions such as the IMF and the World Bank in concert with the governments of the advanced capitalist economies, particularly the US treasury (Stiglitz, 2002). According to Joan Spero and Jeffery Hart, liberal theories of economic development argue that the existing international market structure provides a framework for development in the global South (Spero and Hart, 2010). From the perspective of the neoliberals, the major causes of the problems of development in developing countries are the domestic economic policies of these countries that create or accentuate market imperfections; reduce the productivity of land, labour and capital; and intensify social and political rigidities. To them a way out of these problems is through the adoption of market-oriented domestic reforms. Also, given appropriate internal policies, the international system – through increased levels of trade, investment and foreign aid flows – can provide a basis for more rapid growth and economic development (Spero and Hart, 2010).

African Export Performance

Tables 1 to 3 show Africa's exports to the rest of the world in absolute, share and growth terms between 1980 and 2006. Though Africa's exports are high in absolute terms, Africa's share of world exports is relatively low. In 1980, African countries exported about US\$119 billion worth of commodities, representing

about six per cent of world exports. However, in 1990, the value of exports dropped to about US\$107 billion, or three per cent of the world exports. The continent's exports regained an upward trend in 1995; it recorded up to over US\$112 billion but this represented two per cent of world exports. The value of Africa's exports increased to US\$231 billion in 2004 and later rose to US\$332,8 billion in 2006, which is 2,5 per cent and 2,8 per cent respectively of global exports. In terms of growth, Africa's exports have only grown haphazardly over time; it can be observed that Africa recorded negative growth in 1990 (– 8,47%). In 2000, Africa recorded a positive growth of about 31 per cent in terms of the preceding years; however, the continent recorded a negative growth rate of over 5 per cent in 2001. Nevertheless, the periods after 2001 recorded a positive growth rate, but these rates have been oscillating. This means that, in absolute terms, Africa's export values have been increasing at a decreasing rate (Kareem, 2009).

Many factors are responsible for the decline in the export profile of African countries. These include the development of substitute products in advanced countries which make demand for commodities from African countries haphazard. Prices of commodities in the international markets are also unpredictable and this affects long-term planning in terms of exports from Africa. Although export promotion was stated as one of the objectives of the structural adjustment programmes, it is very clear that this objective has not been achieved, as Africa is lagging behind other continents in the quantity of exports (Nyang'oro, 1989).

Table 1: Africa's exports in comparison to the rest of the world

Region	1980	1990	1995	2000	2001
World	2031,1	3478,6	5168,9	6444,1	6177,4
Developed countries	1327,6	2506,4	3606,6	4229,8	4095,2
Developing countries	597,6	842,9	1427,0	2044,6	1910,6
Developed America*	293,5	521,8	777,0	1058,9	989,0
Developed Asia**	136,0	299,2	462,2	510,7	432,5
EU	870,7	1636,3	2300,7	2583,1	2596,6
Africa	119,0	107,0	112,5	147,2	138,6
Developing America	111,2	143,8	225,2	361,1	341,9
Developing Asia	365,0	589,3	1084,8	1532,3	1426,8
Oceania	233,5	280,3	454,5	405,7	335,4

Region	2002	2003	2004	2005	2006
World	6472,6	7526,9	9167,1	10440,8	11982,9
Developed countries	4237,9	4884,5	5761,2	6291,9	7085,0
Developing countries	2052,4	2410,6	3090,7	3780,5	4409,0
Developed America*	945,8	998,0	1123,5	1267,0	1442,6
Developed Asia**	446,1	503,6	604,3	639,7	691,0
EU	2766,6	3294,9	3926,6	4259,7	4805,4
Africa	146,4	178,4	231,3	298,0	332,8
Developing America	346,65	380,6	470,5	566,8	680,0
Developing Asia	1556,0	1847,0	2383,8	28779,7	3389,5
Oceania	339,7	450,9	508,7	591,1	668,8

Source: Kareem (2009) Computed from UNCTAD Handbook of Statistics (2007)

* This includes Bermuda, Canada, Greenland, Saint Pierre and Miquelon and US

** It includes Israel and Japan

Table 2: Share of exports by region %

Region	1980	1985	1990	1995	2000
100,0	100,0	100,0	100,0	100,0	100,0
Developed countries	65,3	66,4	72,1	69,8	65,6
Developing countries	29,4	25,4	24,2	27,6	31,7
Developed America	14,5	15,7	15,0	15,0	16,4
Developed Asia	6,7	9,3	8,6	8,9	7,9
EU	42,9	41,9	47,0	44,5	40,1
Africa	5,9	4,2	3,1	2,1	2,3
Developing America	5,5	5,5	4,1	4,4	5,6
Developing Asia	18,0	15,6	16,9	21,0	23,8
Oceania	0,12	0,10	0,08	0,09	0,06

Region	2001	2002	2003	2004	2005	2006
100,0	100,0	100,0	100,0	100,0	100,0	100,0
Developed countries	66,2	65,5	64,9	62,8	60,3	59,1
Developing countries	31,0	31,7	32,0	33,7	35,9	36,8
Developed America	16,0	14,6	13,3	12,3	12,1	12,0
Developed Asia	7,0	6,9	6,7	6,6	6,1	5,8
EU	42,0	42,7	43,8	42,8	40,8	40,1
Africa	2,2	2,3	2,4	2,5	2,9	2,8
Developing America	5,6	5,4	5,1	5,1	5,4	5,7
Developing Asia	23,1	24,0	24,5	26,0	27,6	28,3
Oceania	0,06	0,05	0,06	0,055	0,057	0,056

Source: Kareem (2009) Computed from UNCTAD Handbook of Statistics (2007)

Table 3: Export performance growth by region %

Region	1980	1995	2000	2001	2002	2003	2004	2005	2006
World	71,2	48,6	24,7	-4,1	4,8	16,3	21,8	13,9	14,8
Developed countries	88,8	43,9	17,3	-3,2	3,5	15,3	18,0	9,2	12,6
Developing countries	41,1	69,3	43,3	-6,6	7,4	17,5	28,2	21,4	17,6
EU	87,9	40,6	12,3	5,2	4,4	19,1	19,2	8,5	12,8
Africa	-8,5	5,1	30,8	-5,8	5,7	21,8	29,7	28,8	11,7
Americana	29,3	56,6	60,4	-5,3	1,4	9,8	23,6	20,5	20,0
Asia	61,44	-81,59	41,24	-6,88	9,06	18,70	29,06	20,81	17,70
Oceania	20,0	62,2	-10,7	-17,3	1,3	32,7	12,8	16,2	13,1

Source: Kareem (2009) Computed from UNCTAD Handbook of Statistics (2007)

The glut in the commodity market of the 1970s and 1980s had serious implications for the economies of sub-Saharan African countries that depended essentially on the export of commodities. As Martin Khor notes, according to UN data, the terms of trade of non-fuel commodities vis-à-vis manufactures fell by 52 per cent between 1980 and 1991 with catastrophic effects. A paper by the Secretariat of the United Nations Conference on Environment and Development (UNCED) in 1991 showed that for sub-Saharan Africa, a 28 per cent fall in terms of trade

between 1980 and 1989 led to an income loss of \$16 billion in 1989 alone. In the four years 1986–1989, sub-Saharan Africa suffered a \$56 billion income loss or 15–16 per cent of GDP in 1987–1989 (Khor, n.d.).

The UNCED study also showed that for 15 middle income highly indebted countries, there was a combined terms-of-trade decline of 28 per cent between 1980 and 1989, causing an average of \$45 billion loss per year in the 1986–89 period, which is about 5 to 6 per cent of GDP (Khor, 1993). The macroeconomic and balance of payment difficulties that resulted from the above scenario and the corresponding (if paradoxical) availability of surplus funds in the centres of the world capitalist system in New York, Tokyo, Paris and London, necessitated the request for loans by sub-Saharan African countries. The IMF became the first point of call for funding to restructure the economies. However, in granting the loans, this organisation stipulated some conditionality, which the borrower had to meet under a comprehensive reform package known as the Structural Adjustment Programme. According to Bieyang (2009), some of the conditions attached to granting the loan under the Structural Adjustment Programme include cutting social expenditures, focusing economic output on direct export and resource extraction, devaluation of currencies, trade liberalisation or lifting import and export restrictions, balancing budgets and not overspending, removing price controls and state subsidies, privatisation or divestiture of all or part of state-owned enterprises, enhancing the rights of foreign direct investors, as well as improving performance and fighting corruption.

The overall effects of the Structural Adjustment Programme have been increased social and economic dislocations, poverty, horizontal and vertical inequalities, loss of jobs arising from closure of industries and, importantly, the weakening of state institutions. The capacity of the state to achieve economic transformation (transformative capacity), the capacity of the state to redistribute income and wealth (redistributive capacity) and the capacity of the state to address injustice and inequities (redress capacity) were lost to the vagaries of the market, acting on behalf of the indigenous comprador bourgeoisie, the multinational corporations and the international financial institutions (Edigheji, 2006; Weiss, 1998; Evans, 1995).

Almost three decades after the introduction of the Structural Adjustment Programme and its variants such as Poverty Reduction Strategy Papers (PRSP) and the Heavily Indebted Poor Countries Initiative (HIPC), reports have shown that developing countries implementing the programmes have experienced lower economic growth than those that have been outside the programme. African countries that implemented the adjustment programmes have fared even worse than other countries as the per capita income of an average adjusting African

country has declined. Nor has adjustment led to substantial debt relief. Total external debt as a share of GNP for Enhanced Structural Adjustment Facility countries increased from 71,1 to 87 per cent between 1985 and 1995. In sub-Saharan Africa, debt rose as a share of GDP from 58 per cent in 1988 to 70 per cent in 1996 (CEPR, 1999).

At the domestic level, the neoliberal economic order also led to the loss of policy autonomy, as the World Bank and the IMF made it a point of duty and as part of their oversight functions and conditionality to have their staff or ex-staff as consultants to either work as ministers or technical advisers to the various governments in the sub-region. Most of these consultants ended up collecting almost a quarter of official development assistance in the form of salaries and allowances. Additionally, membership of international organisations such as the WTO and the binding commitments to various treaties and agreements resulted in loss of policy autonomy by African governments. For example, on the issue of trade, the three proposed new agreements on investment, competition and transparency in government procurement and even on existing agreements like the removal of trade barriers and lowering of tariffs have reduced the regulatory function of the state thereby creating leeway for the multinational companies to do as they wish as long as they can maximise their profit. Concerns over cautious integration through the protection of infant industries and checkmating the excesses of the market, among other functions of the state, have been jeopardised.

Exploring Trade for Development: What should Africa do?

Charity, they say, begins at home. To be relevant in this age of globalisation, Africa must look inward and restructure its social, political and economic institutions. Governance must be made more accountable with emphasis on participatory democracy. Against the backdrop of the penchant for primitive and private accumulation by African political and business elites, there should be strong institutions to enforce the extant laws to punish erring officials who abuse offices. Economically, infrastructure should be put in place to enhance diversification of the economies, especially away from the export of commodities to the export of value-added products.

Contrary to the neoliberal economic mantra, it is time that Africa followed the path of ingenuity successfully taken by the newly industrialising countries of the South-East Asia such as Singapore, South Korea, Taiwan and, especially, China. Before it assumes the current position of the fastest growing economy in the world, China embarked on a 'two-track strategy' of gradual integration which involved state and market tracks, which coexisted side by side (Rodrik, 2001).

At the multilateral level, African countries should not only be concerned with negotiating for market access but should also insist on a multilateral trading system that prioritises development. In doing so, there will be more cooperation in the South. The unity of purpose which was demonstrated in Cancun in 2003 should continue such that the leading voices – China, India, Brazil and South Africa (the CIBS) – would continue to insist on fair trade and not just free trade. There is also the need for more trade relations among the South–South countries. The evolving interests of China in Africa should be well coordinated to avoid a repeat of the experience with the West where Africa was seen as a base for raw materials and a destination for finished products, regardless of the quality. Policies should be put in place at the country, regional and continental level to ensure that the investment of China and, henceforth, Western countries is not limited to mineral extractions.

In view of the increasing choice of bilateral trade agreements, such as the ongoing ACP-EU Economic Partnership Agreements, caution should be the word for African leaders. The promises of market access and so-called aid by the developed countries should not be taken at face value. The timing and spacing of concluding the negotiations should not be dictated, as the EU has been trying to do over the past three years. Africa must insist on a fair deal, which should also be conversant with the multilateral trading system, where a more functional dispute settlement mechanism exists.

Lastly, Africa must build capacity for trade negotiation. A consolidated fund from the national budgets of countries in the continent should be set aside to train for and coordinate trade negotiations at regional and continental levels such that well-trained representatives can represent the interests of the continent both at Geneva and at various venues of the ministerial meetings. African countries should also insist on the democratisation of the decision-making processes at the WTO level. The current practice of limiting participation to government officials should be reformed to accommodate other segments of civil and political society; after all the impact of decisions reached at those forums affects everybody.

Conclusion

This chapter has attempted to situate the development trajectory of African countries within the context of global trade governance anchored on a neoliberal economic doctrine. The chapter argues that the sudden liberalisation of the African economies, which in the main was due to the macroeconomic imbalances suffered by these countries in the 1980s, coupled with the pressures from the international financial institutions such as the IMF and the World Bank, has

not really worked in the interests of economic growth and development in the continent. Rather than leading to growth, trade openness has actually led to further complications in the economies, as African countries did not respond appropriately to economic globalisation. Debts have increased, many jobs have been lost owing to the closure of industries; the global commodity markets have been increasingly disarticulated owing to the fluctuations in the international market and the few manufacturers have not been able to compete with manufactured products from advanced capitalist economies which now find their way onto African markets as a result of commitments to the WTO Agreements. In the same way, the WTO has not provided a level playing field for the developed and developing countries, as the various agreements seem to have been skewed in favour of the advanced capitalist economies. Issues of textiles and agriculture on which African countries have a sort of comparative advantage have not been fairly handled, as high tariff and non-tariff barriers still pervade the international trading space dominated by the advanced capitalist economies.

In this chapter we have also argued that neoliberalism has led to a loss of policy autonomy and state capacity as the multilateral institutions continue to mount pressure on the governments of African countries to keep to the various commitments made at multilateral institutions like the IMF, World Bank and WTO. Beyond this, however, is the proclivity of so-called reformers in Africa like the former President Olusegun Obasanjo of Nigeria, Jerry Rawlings of Ghana, Eyadema of Togo and many others to pander to the accolades of the developed countries, especially the United States of America, when in actual fact the so-called growth is at the best jobless because it has no positive effect whatsoever on the lives of the ordinary citizens of the countries. For instance, despite the celebrations that greeted the economic reforms under President Olusegun Obasanjo of Nigeria with various commendations from international rating agencies like Fitch and Rating and Standard and Poors, the 7 per cent growth in GDP merely succeeded in leaving about 70 per cent of the population in poverty at the time of leaving his office in 2007!

The problems of Africa then cannot be said to be only externally induced, as there are so many domestic constraints in terms of infrastructure, supply chains, corruption and ill-formed policies that are not in tune with the local specificities of the continent. Trade openness alone is not a guarantee for economic growth and poverty reduction. There is a need for investment in infrastructure and human capital and the establishment of credible institutions of macroeconomic management. Like their counterparts in South East Asia, Mauritius and Botswana are two of only a few countries in Africa that have combined elements of an open economy with more unorthodox economic policies with outstanding

results in terms of per capita income, favourable terms of trade and an increased standard of living. Other African countries would do well to learn from their gradual approach to integration into the global economy.

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CHAPTER 16

The World Trade Organization: For Which World? Whose trade? And Whose Organisation?

Serges Djoyou Kamga¹

Introduction

Set up during the Uruguay Round Agreements (URAs) of its predecessor, the General Agreement on Tariffs and Trade (GATT), the World Trade Organization (WTO) is the 'only truly global international organisation dealing with the rules of trade between nations. At the core are the WTO agreements, negotiated and signed by world trading nations and ratified in their parliaments'.² It has a membership of 159 countries as of 2 March 2013. The WTO aims to ease and liberalise international trade and works for the economic development of the world at large. The GATT in its Preamble highlighted the need to use trade to better human conditions by providing employment and enough resources for all. At the centre of these provisions of the WTO, states should contribute to the development of international trade of goods, especially by means of arrangements and by the conclusion of long-term multilateral commodity agreements, which improve life in every part of the world. According to its mission statement, the 'WTO is the international organisation whose primary purpose is to open trade for the benefit of all'.³

Yet, since the establishment of the GATT in 1947 and its development into the WTO in 1995, it is obvious that while the global North's trade grows, developing countries in general and African ones in particular are struggling and not developing. This raises questions on the nature of WTO. Which world? Whose trade? And whose organisation does the WTO serve? Isn't the WTO an instrument of coloniality?

Coloniality is a term used to describe how the colonial masters keep colonialism going in the postcolonial era. It operates as a 'structuring process within global imperial designs, sustaining the superiority of the Global North and ensuring the perpetual subalternity of the Global South using colonial matrices of power' (Ndlovu-Gatsheni, 2012: 1). Instruments used for this process include humanitarian intervention, development, modernity, civilisation, globalisation, international law and internal institutions such as the World Bank, the International Monetary Fund and the WTO (Chimni, 2006: 1; Anghie, 2004).

This chapter argues that indeed the WTO through its various rules and agreements is nothing but a tool for ensuring and perpetuating the hegemony of the Global North.

In making its case, the chapter is divided into five parts including this introduction. The second part plunges into the history of the birth of the GATT to show that originally the agreement was meant for Western countries only. It proceeds to show that when it developed and opened its doors to other countries, the GATT permanently ensured the supremacy of the Global North in terms of trade. The third part examines how the advent of the WTO kept Western domination in trade alive as originally established by GATT. In other words, it shows that the arrangement serves Western trade interests through a primarily Western organisation, and that the move from GATT to WTO did not benefit African countries. The fourth part proposes mechanisms to ensure the decoloniality of power through trade by suggesting approaches to turn the WTO into a ‘real’ global organisation characterised by justice and fair trade for the benefit of all humankind. The final part offers concluding remarks.

The GATT: A Western Tool at Birth and in its Development

Towards the end of the Second World War, the world’s most powerful country, the USA, was of the view that liberal trade or free trade was the solution to rebuilding the post-war economy and the idea of setting up an international trade organisation (ITO) came into being (Foncesca, 2012: 198). Therefore, in 1944, with the support of the United Kingdom, it designed a plan to establish the World Bank, the IMF and an ITO *‘in order to promote its own economic development, the reconstruction of Western Europe and the general expansion of world trade’* (Foncesca, 2012: 198, my emphasis). Although the discussions on the ITO were not completed, they resurfaced in 1945 after the establishment of the United Nations (UN) through the UN’s Economic and Social Council (ECOSOC) in the form of multilateral trade talks and were finally tabled in New York and Geneva in 1947 at a conference aiming ‘to draft an ITO Charter, to prepare schedules for tariff reductions and to prepare a multilateral treaty containing the general principle of trade named the General Agreement on Tariff and Trade (GATT)’⁴ (Foncesca, 2012: 199). It is important to note that during the debates, Brazil also proposed an ITO charter, but as will be discussed later, the American version of the charter was finally agreed in Havana in March 1948.

The aim of GATT was to ensure non-discrimination in trade between contracting parties (Art 1 of GATT). Accordingly, state parties agreed to trade concessions and preferential treatment among themselves. It is worthy of note that

even though a few developing countries (China, Brazil, Burma, Ceylon, Chile, India, Pakistan, Syria and Lebanon) were parties to the agreement, none of them was from Africa (Hudec, 1987; Matsushita, Schoenman and Mavroidis, 2003: 374–375). African countries were yet to be independent and the GATT did not capture their aspirations as well as those of the developing countries involved, but those of the Western powers for whom the agreement was designed in the first place. In fact, this is not surprising because the ancestor of GATT, that is, the ITO negotiations documents (from the USA) did not make ‘provision on economic development, nor were there any special rules or exception for developing countries’ (Ismael, 2009: 15). It is worth noting that the ITO Charter tabled by Brazil included such provisions but was set aside by the ‘mighty’ USA.

It could be argued that, originally, GATT was for sovereign states in the Northern hemisphere. It is important to note that the concept of sovereign states in this context applies only to states of the Global North. The historian Anthony Pagden correctly points out that: ‘[s]overeignty beyond Europe, unlike sovereignty within Europe, was ... very much a divisible notion and was to remain so within all subsequent conceptions’ of relationship with the non-Western world (Pagden, 2006: 36, 41). This was further clarified by Anghie who argues that Third World sovereignty is simply different from that of the west (Anghie, 2004). Consequently, the GATT was established in the Western sovereign states. Ismail (2009:14) writes: ‘the developed countries or the colonial countries, were to regard the GATT as their “property” and believed that they did not have to accommodate the interests of the rest of the world’ (Also see Hudec, 1990).

In ensuring that the GATT remained the property of ‘Western sovereign states’, amongst others, the agenda and the proceedings were held ‘on the basis of major traders in commodities negotiating together and then, presenting an agreement to the rest’ for adoption (Foncesca, 2012: 204). Draper (2006: 84) explains as follows:

In the Uruguay round the so-called squad (the USA, EU, Canada and Japan) largely directed proceedings, cut the deals and – through various power relations – ensured that those deals were adopted by the wider membership. Developing countries (including Africa) were noticeable largely by their absence.

As a result of such practice, developing countries were kept at the margin of the Agreement, hence China, Syria and Lebanon left the GATT in 1949.

However, at the end of colonisation consecrated by the independence of various developing countries, numerous former colonies accessed the GATT and

this caused some transformation of the agreement. In this vein, an exception to the non-discrimination principle was inserted in the Agreement to accommodate weak and newly independent states. For instance a clause related to the protection of infant industries in the Third World (art XVIII) and the addition of a chapter dealing with trade and development (part IV) were inserted in the GATT. Part IV called on developed countries to reduce tariffs on developing countries' exports without expecting any reciprocity. Subsequently, numerous ministerial conference resolutions dealt with issues of concern to developing countries such as low export growth, instability of commodity prices (GATT Ministerial Conference, 1957), and high tariffs imposed on Third World goods at the door of Western markets.

In pushing for a better international trade arrangement, developing countries called for the limitation of reciprocity in trade and advocated for a preferential treatment in the form of 'differential and more favourable treatment' which unfortunately did not yield positive results. In fact, in the mid-sixties, under the regime of differential treatment, developing countries' share of world trade dropped extensively and the gap between developed and developing countries widened (Wilkinson, 2006). This led to the comment that 'GATT did very little that was positive for the majority of poor countries, but locked them politically into a relationship of dependence' (Foncesca, 2012: 202). In fact, the accommodation of newly independent countries in the GATT was designed so as to avoid the awkward balance of power between member states. In this vein, Third World delegates had to deal with '28 000 pages of treaty text drafted in exclusive ("green room") consultation among the most powerful countries and trading blocs' (Pogge, 2008: 233). In such a context, the imposition of the rules of the game by rich countries and the lack of know-how by Third World delegates hindered the ability of these delegates to grapple with trade arrangements, hence they signed for the hegemony of First World, hoping to be offered an opportunity on Western markets (Pogge, 2008: 233).

In the process of accommodating the newly independent countries through article XVIII of GATT, the divide between rich and poor was highlighted, the conception of 'them versus us' became apparent with the notion of developing countries clearly defined to mean 'the economy of which can only support low standards of living and is in the early stage of development' (Matsushita et al, 2003: 380). This belief was maintained and sustained and became part of world trade discourse. One approach used was to limit the participation of developing countries 'in initiating proposal and in securing results' during the GATT proceedings (Foncesca, 2012: 206).

Even the United Nations Conferences on Development characterised by the strong solidarity of developing countries did very little besides the adoption of special measures to allow favourable conditions for exports of primary goods from developing countries, without reciprocity (part IV GATT; also Dam, 1970: 238). Nevertheless, the requirement to offer exceptional special treatment to developing countries was not legally binding, and as correctly observed by Foncesca (2012: 208) ‘the implementation was based on the “best endeavour” effort’. In other words, developed states were not compelled to provide differentiated treatment for Third World countries that finally benefited from these treatments only when Western interests were at stake. In fact, the non-binding character of provision on differential treatment enabled Northern countries to choose and dictate when to give favourable treatment or not. Hence the European Economic Community (EEC) for instance strengthened its alliance and gave preferential treatment to their former colonies when it was in their interests. For instance, Britain used such an approach through the Commonwealth Preferential Area and the EEC under the leadership of France through the Yaoundé Convention which developed into the Cotonou or ACP agreement (Francesca, 2012: 209). In summary, special and differential treatment offered to developing countries enabled them to protect their infant industries and access Western countries in the form of the Generalised System of Preference without reciprocity (Tussie, 1987: 138; McCulloch et al, 2001: 167).

Notwithstanding these measures, the trade gap between the Global North and the South did not reduce. This shows that the solution was not located in preferential treatments, but in multilateral trade discussions. It could be argued that preferential treatment was informed by geopolitical interests grounded in the cold war and consequently could not be sustainable for the Global South after the end of the cold war. It is submitted that preferential treatment, though apparently useful for developing countries, had kept colonialism going as it enabled Northern countries to impose conditionalities on Third World countries and African countries in particular. Foncesca (2012: 211) summarises as follow:

Preferences had not proven to be very effective as an instrument of development. They often came laden with restrictions, product exclusion and administrative rules that prevented beneficiaries from using them fully. Even when effective, they diverted trade away from equally poor but excluded developing countries

The hegemonic objectives of the Global North were clearly exposed in 1982 when the USA and its allies attempted to withdraw the preferential treatment which

was granted to the developing countries. They called on these countries 'to open their markets, conform to international regulatory standards and to liberalise their economies' (Foncesca, 2012: 215). Notwithstanding the resistance of developing countries, the Northern powers imposed their views which among others set up a platform for their domination through various trade arrangements. Pogge (2008: 233) writes:

Poor countries lacked the bargaining power needed to resist the imposition [of rich countries]. All the Western free-trade rhetoric notwithstanding, the poor countries are compelled to pay dearly for access to [Western] markets. Any poor country is required to open its own markets widely to the corporations and banks of the affluent countries and required to commit itself to the costly enforcement of their intellectual property rights ..., but get nothing like full access to the market of the rich countries which continues to be heavily protected through quotas, tariffs, anti-dumping duties, export credits and huge subsidies to domestic producers.

However, some proponents of GATT are of the view that the passivity and defensive attitude of developing countries, their non-participation in debates and negotiation (Finger, 2007; Das, 2003; Jawara and Kwa, 2003) and their focus on special and differential treatment (Martin and Messerlin, 2007) hindered their ability to benefit from the Agreement. In other words, the argument in support of hegemony of the global North is a false one.

First of all developing countries had not been inactive or passive. Right from the ITO debates, Brazil (a developing country at the time) presented a counter ITO Charter which recorded developing countries' interests. The US representative almost agreed to insert these interests in its own document. Nevertheless, the US Congress stopped proceedings from adopting the ITO Charter which did not ensure their global dominance (Ismail, 2009). Furthermore, developing countries took action when necessary. For example in 1961, Uruguay instituted legal action against all 15 developed country parties to the GATT that had set up 576 hindrances to its exports as well those of other developing countries (Hudec, 1987).

Secondly, blaming developing countries for their non-participation in debates and negotiations would be a failure to acknowledge GATT processes which basically excluded developing countries from the negotiations. In this vein, in implementing exclusionary policies, the USA and the European Economic Community used tools such as the 'principal supplier' rule, the exclusion of internal taxes and quotas that practically kept tropical products (mostly from developing countries)

out of the negotiation agenda and also used the principle of reciprocity. These rules ensured the exclusion of developing countries from the debates. Ismail (2009: 13) correctly notes: ‘Developing countries were willing to participate in the negotiations, but were rendered unable to do so’ (also see Wilkinson and Scott, 2008).

Finally, claiming that the developing countries’ impotence in GATT was linked to their focus on special and differentiated treatment is a flawed argument because from the ITO discussions, developing countries opposed the concept of Most Favoured Nations and reciprocity which enabled ‘equal’ countries to trade amongst themselves. These concepts were problematic because of the uneven level of development between countries, hence the need to set up an affirmative policy in the form of special and differentiated treatment (Ismael, 2009: 14).

Overall, the GATT was born in the Northern hemisphere from parents from the same area, hence its development was tailored to ensure the domination of the global North in the field of trade. The GATT was a tool to ensure that trade is dominated by Western countries in order to assert their power on the global South. Stiglitz, a former adviser to former president Clinton writes that in completing the Uruguay Round ‘the US pushed other countries to open up their markets to areas of our [the US] strength, but resisted efforts to reciprocate’ (Stiglitz, 2003; also see Ismail, 2009: 118).

The WTO: A Western-based Organisation to Ensure Western Hegemony through Trade

Being part of an organisation goes beyond signature as a member, but includes the extent to which one is involved in decision making, the extent to which one is consulted and is able to suggest policies and reap results (Storti, 2013). Considering these determinants of involvement in an organisation, this section demonstrates that in spite of the large number of state parties to the WTO, the latter really belongs to the First World. After the conclusion of the URA in 1994, the WTO Agreement was opened for signature in Marrakech and came into force on 1 January 1995. Guided by the same principles of non-discrimination between countries and liberalisation of trade, the novelty is that the WTO specifically addresses trade in goods, services and intellectual property. Another specificity of the WTO agreement is that in contrast to the GATT (Tokyo Round), where countries could opt out of some agreements, it applies to all state parties, even though some ‘plurilateral agreements are not compulsory’ (Annex 4 of WTO Agreements). The WTO agreement covers various issues including those in GATT, 1994: the Agreement on Agriculture, the Agreement on Textile and Clothing,

on Trade Related Investment Measures, (Annex 1B), the TRIPs Agreement (Annex 1c), on Trade and Services (Annex 1 B), on the Understanding on Rules and Procedures Governing Settlement of Dispute (Annex 2) and on the Trade Policy Review Commission (Annex 3).

Most importantly, the Preamble to the Marrakesh agreement establishing the WTO expresses the objective of 'sustainable development' and clearly underlines the need for 'positive efforts to ensure that developing countries secure a growth of international trade commensurate with the needs of their economic development'. In the same vein, the Doha Declaration, initiating the Doha Round in November 2001 (para 2) reads: 'The majority of WTO Members are developing countries. We seek to place their needs and interests at the heart of the Work Programme adopted in this Declaration.' These provisions clearly portray the WTO as a cosmopolitan organisation for the interests of all.

However, the WTO *modus operandi* testifies to the contrary. Indeed, similar to the GATT, the advent of the WTO did not ameliorate Africa's stringent trade conditions. On the contrary, a few years after the WTO came into force, governments throughout the Third World realised that their interests were not at the centre of the agreement which emphasises the interests and priorities of developed countries. Unfair trade rules such as agriculture subsidies by rich countries, complex and strict rules for food imports, and other protectionist policies imposed on the Third World are legitimised through the WTO agreements. The most powerful industrialised countries freely hamper the implementation of those URA terms that are contrary to their interests. For example, the USA is committed to obstructing the implementation of its URA commitments to eliminate its tariff and quota constraints on textile and clothing exports from the developing world.

The asymmetric relationship between developed and developing countries also demonstrates the domination of the Global North. In this perspective, the WTO is the theatre of manifest expression of power characterised by domination of the Global North that uses all means available for the alienation of poor countries. Dot Keet writes that the WTO is a very complicated negotiation ground where:

Ruthless hard bargaining is driven by powerful corporate and national vested interests, not the polite diplomatic positioning or posturing of Heads of State. And, with the WTO Secretariat clearly biased towards the interests and demands of the most powerful member states, and the expansion of the liberalised global trade regime, the WTO is not a neutral open forum or assembly of nations where world leaders gather to debate and 'influence' each other's positions (DjoyouKamga, 2011: 373–374).

To legitimise their domination, Northern countries through the WTO set up global rules in the form of international economic law which assists them to conquer and rule through trade. These rules, significantly complex as they are, are legitimised through various training provided by their authors who make sure that the balance of power does not change. In line with the goal of legitimising their hegemony, designers of the current world system often offer the so-called 'technical assistance and support to enhance the institutional capacity of African states to use the WTO and to engage in multilateral trade negotiations' (NEPAD, 2001: para 167). For instance, the WTO has publicised its supports for NEPAD in the field of trade, especially through its technical assistance activities for African countries.⁵ In 2004, out of 501 Trade-Related Technical Assistance, 178 or 36 per cent benefited African countries⁶. Furthermore, African countries take part in the 12-week Geneva-based training courses for government officials; the regional three-month trade policy courses, the Doha Development Agenda Advanced Training courses etc⁷. The integrated framework for trade-related technical assistance is another initiative established to assist poor countries to harmonise their poverty reduction strategy with the rules of international trade. There are also various programmes under the Joint Integrated Technical Assistance Programme as well as the Trade Policy Review Mechanism, all aiming to enhance poor countries' ability to have a say in international trade.

In a similar vein, the Aid-For-Trade (AFT) initiative was initiated at the WTO 6th Ministerial Conference in Hong Kong in 2005. Its purpose was to assist Third World countries, including African countries, to make use of trade for their development (Bedourama, 2008). To implement the AFT, the African Development Bank (ADC) in collaboration with the WTO, the United Nations Economic Commission for Africa and the Tanzanian Government co-organised an Aid-For-Trade Conference in Dar-Es-Salaam, Tanzania from 1 to 2 October 2007. Economic ministers from African governments, donors, NGOs, government organisations, regional economic communities (RECs), the private sector, the media and other stakeholders were present at the forum which looked for means to improve Africa's role in world trade. A succeeding AFT meeting was held from 19 to 21 November 2007 in Geneva and an AFT Advisory Group gathered on 21 January 2008 at the WTO to assess and discuss the initiative further (Bedourama, 2008). These initiatives seem to suggest that the WTO designers are making sure that the world at large benefits from trade.

However, the training programmes and assistance mentioned above do not yield results because of the uneven bargaining power at the negotiation table. In this regard, African delegates to the WTO are submitted to extreme pressure and are influenced by their Northern aid and trade counterparts, who frequently

force them publicly, or privately to oppose and disregard African views (Djoyou Kanga, 2011: 375). Most importantly, as a result of the asymmetry of power, resolutions are sometimes presented to Third World delegates as a *fait accompli* (Wilkinson and Scott, 2008; Capling, 2001). In fact to use the words of Ismail (2009: 57), the WTO uses the “‘medieval’ system of decision making that was not transparent and excluded the majority of members’. Therefore, training provided afterwards does not contain the view of the trainees and can only serve to legitimise the domination of the trainers. Consequently, such training cannot make a difference in the trainees’ communities. Put differently, foreign trade and economic policies are simply imposed on Africans who have no understanding of their application as they are not appropriate for their context. One example that comes to mind is the havoc created by the international financial institutions’ Structural Adjustment Programmes imposed on Africa in the eighties.

It could be argued that technical assistance from the Global North or WTO engineers will simply reproduce the views of the pro-WTO institutions and agencies offering capacity building in Africa. As a result, the Global North will keep the supremacy in world trade as is currently the case. It is submitted that African problems in the world trade system are not the lack of training, but the inequitable rules that are applied at the WTO. It does not help to have training programmes based on ‘wrong’ or inequitable rules. For instance Africa’s agricultural trade will not improve if the First World continues to subsidise its farmers who end up dumping the surplus of their products on African markets to unsettle world prices and frustrate local producers.

What are needed for the Third World and Africa in particular are equitable rules or fair trade mechanisms before referring to technical assistance. In a similar vein, the ADB was of the view that training was mostly awareness raising on the WTO rules, and that it was time to ‘shift from awareness to implementation’ of AFT (Bedourama, 2008). It is contended that the implementation of rules and policies that are not context responsive will not work, hence the need to ensure equal participation in initiating policies and sharing of results if the WTO is to become an effective global trade organisation for the benefit of all human beings. Unfortunately, so far, it had been a tool for the coloniality of power. Foncesca (2012: 241) correctly observes:

The overall picture of international economy is one of imbalance: While the North preaches that governments in the developing world should not subsidise their industries, the farmers of the developed world are subsidised to over produce. While the North preaches the need for the South to grant market access to industrial goods in the service sector, it denies market

access to products from the South like agriculture. While the least developed countries lack the capacity to seriously influence the agenda of trade talks, multinational corporations are powerful players often richer than governments and often write their own rules.

Besides using the so-called ‘training and assistance’, another tool for the coloniality of power can be located in the WTO’s rule that hinder regional trade arrangements (RTAs). In this regard, WTO rules forbid RTAs to ‘raise barriers that discriminate against third parties in the world economy’. Countries in regional economic communities (RECs), such as those in Africa, are asked to lower their individual and collective tariff provisions, and remove other external ‘barriers’ in order to integrate with the globalised world ‘for their own good’. In other words, the type of preferential trade terms and common external tariffs that categories of countries might exploit for their mutual benefit and ease heavy pressures from external third parties are severely limited by the WTO’s article 24. This provision requests that regional agreement covers ‘substantially all trades’ and does not take into consideration individual trade arrangements. In short, it assumes that all countries are equal and that rules should be applied without exception or rather universally. This justifies the call by Djyouou Kamga to amend this contentious article in terms of the development needs and objectives of African RECs and on the basis of the ‘special and differential terms’ that the WTO supposedly allows for the special needs of developing countries (Djyouou Kamga, 2011: 378).

Though the WTO brings discussion on poverty on the table, these matters are not adequately addressed. On the contrary, the debate on poverty in the Third World appears to be the bridge to ensure that the Global North remains the sole beneficiary of trade and consequently the sole rich part of the world. However, although the WTO is the theatre of interstate relations dominated by the Global North, it has adopted some cosmopolitan ideologies (Sanchez, 2006; Archibugi and Held, 1995) characterised by the involvement of non-state actors such as NGOs that can play a vital role in ensuring fairness and justice for all stakeholders. Following this logic, the WTO’s arrangements protect poor countries by enabling NGOs to participate in its processes and the establishment of a dispute settlement mechanism to enable unhappy countries to air their complaints. As far as NGOs’ participation is concerned, the Marrakesh Agreement provides that the ‘WTO General Council may make appropriate arrangements for consultations and cooperation with NGOs concerned on matters related to those of WTO’ (Marrakesh Agreement, art V.2; Sanchez, 2006). According to this provision, NGOs are entitled to consultation and cooperation. In ensuring consultation of NGOs, the General Council Decision WT/L162 (1996; also WT/GC/M/29 OF

1998; WT/INF/30 OF 2001) assists with guidelines that call for the openness of the WTO Secretariat to NGOs and 'increase dialogue' with NGOs.

Nevertheless, the effectiveness of consultation is limited by the fact that the WTO remains 'an intergovernmental forum and actual deliberation (i.e. the right to vote) is restricted to member states' (Sanchez, 2006: 106). In addition, the Secretariat defines the forms of consultation, scope and the nature of topics on which to consult NGOs. The approaches used include ad hoc discussions in the forms of colloquia or courses on the WTO, submission of position papers (which shall comply with specific requirements for their publications [Sanchez, 2006: 108]) that have no real impact on the WTO processes. In fact, the consultation arrangements are not likely to hinder the ability of the Global North to influence the Secretariat on the types of consultation to be used. This arrangement simply shows that article V.2 of the Marrakesh Agreement is powerless in protecting poor countries.

As far as cooperation between the WTO and NGOs is concerned, similar to consultation, it is more rhetoric which had not been enforced as expected. The platforms for consultation are the Advisory Bodies created by WTO Directors. In fact these bodies had been controversial and criticised for not being representative enough of civil society.⁸ Even the 2003 Consultative Board made up of experts in multilateral trade did not make any difference. Consequently, cooperation between NGOs and the WTO is yet to happen to protect poor countries that remain dominated by the Global North.

Besides the consultation and cooperation crafted in the Marrakesh agreement, Sanchez (2006: 106, 107) correctly notes that information is another tool to enhance participation. This tool is prescribed by the 1998 decision (WT/GC/W/29) which urged the Secretariat to ensure that NGOs access information and reports that are regularly submitted to the media. This approach is problematic because NGOs received conclusions on issues as *fait accompli* without any power to modify or influence anything. Overall, it could be argued that the constant pressure put on the WTO by NGOs claiming their right to participation is yet to yield positive result because so far NGOs have no voice in rule setting which remains the domain of inter-state affairs characterised by the domination of the Global North.

As mentioned earlier, apart from providing a framework for NGOs' participation, the WTO established a Dispute Settlement Body (DSB) in which unhappy parties can bring complaints. Crafted within the ambit of the Understanding on Rules and Procedure Governing Settlement of Disputes in Annex 2 of the WTO Agreement, the DSB receives complains when parties fail to sort out their disagreements bilaterally. According to the WTO Dispute Settlement Understanding

(DSU), the DSB is 'a central element in providing security and predictability to the multilateral trading system' and is 'essential to the effective functioning of the WTO and the maintenance of a proper balance between the rights and obligations of Members states' (DSU, art 3.1.2). This led to the characterisation of the DSB as the most 'judicialised' body at the WTO (Ehlermann, 2002). In terms of process, it is worthy noting that in the case of disagreement between parties, the DSB constitutes a panel of experts and provides recommendations which can be appealed by any party to the Appellate Body. When a decision is taken, the respondent state must take corrective measures and, if not, the applicant is allowed to take retaliatory action.

Unfortunately, an effective judicial body does not rely on the will of a party to provide remedies. This arrangement can only enhance the power of the First World countries that have resources to crash the developing countries. Foncesco (2012: 220) correctly argues that 'the operation of the DSU still generally favours the richer countries'. In addition, echoing William Tabb, he also points out that the WTO 'Dispute Settlement Mechanism [is similar] to the American legal system, where all individuals are supposed to be "equal" before the law, yet seldom are. The rich and powerful are able to afford better lawyers, can negotiate out-of-court settlements, can postpone the process through countless appeals and counter-appeals, and exert disproportionate influence on the decision-making process' (Foncesca, 2012: 220). In other words, at the WTO the wealth and power of First World states enable them to control proceedings, even before the DSB.

Indeed, so far the DSB has been powerless as far as the protection of poor countries is concerned. Although this body had rendered several decisions to the benefit of developing countries, most of these decisions are not given effect. Furthermore, a verdict against wealthy countries 'sees more traditional barriers replaced by another, less obvious non tariff barrier' (Foncesca, 2012: 220). It could be argued therefore that the judicial structure of the WTO makes no difference in ensuring global justice in the field of trade.

In the final analysis it appears that, in order to ensure their hegemony, the designers of the world system have presented the WTO as a forum in which 'equal states' discuss trade. The organisation is portrayed in the form of agreements secured within the ambit of international economic law which legitimises any form of domination. This legitimisation of hegemony is also secured through various training and technical assistance to the poor countries, whereas the solution resides in establishing fair trade rules informed by the idea of global justice. In fact, as correctly observed by Ismail (2009: 12) '[t]he WTO and the

GATT before it [have been] unfair, unbalanced and prejudicial to the interests of developing countries' (Ismail, 2006).

Proposal to Transform the WTO into a Platform for Fair Trade and Global Justice

This section reflects on solutions to address the coloniality of power through the WTO. Addressing the coloniality of power is not an easy task, hence the need to engage all stakeholders in seeking solutions. In this endeavour, intellectuals, developing countries representatives and the global social movement have a role to play.

The role of intellectuals

Intellectuals should declare the injustices anchored in the WTO and encourage a critical review of the aims and functioning of the organisation. In this perspective, it is imperative to decolonise knowledge by explaining how the conventional accepted knowledge on trade is a discourse of domination by the Global North. In this vein, it is vital to ensure that an activist narrative becomes part and parcel of the international economic law discourse characterised by suggestions for tangible changes in the WTO. Furthermore, proponents of decoloniality should reach out to and unite with all those groups that are alienated by the current world system. In this perspective, Afro-centrist, Asio-centrist and Latino American advocates should collaborate with feminists and other subdued groups to develop a harmonious and viable alternative to the Northern academic discourse (Chimni, 2006: 22) which promotes the domination of the Global North.

Embarking on scholarship for justice or scholarship activism in the Global South is essential as it will inform the masses on the need to seek justice at the WTO. Such education would lead to the creation of social movements in the Global South and prepare civil society to mobilise everywhere to stand for the weak and disenfranchised nations. In addition, this could reach social movements in the First World and develop into political mobilisation for global justice. In this context, First World civil society organisations seeking global justice would mobilise citizens to change governments (through elections) that do not stand for global justice or perpetuate global injustice through trade. One approach to bring First World social movements on board could be to craft the discourse around the First World's responsibility and complicity in poverty in the Global South (Pogge, 2005).

The role of Third World states

Third World representatives should stand firm and unite in defending their interests at the WTO. In this vein they should make coalitions among each other, but ensure that their partnership is not informed by the ‘defection hypothesis’ in which states join an alliance for their self-interest (Narlikar and Vickers, 2009). Third World representative coalitions at the WTO should be informed by the ‘collective gains hypothesis’ in which all the parties seek collective benefit or interest through their cooperation. (Narlikar, 2009). In this perspective states should come together for a collective victory without individual calculation. This may entail that wealthy countries in the partnership assisting the small ones and the drawing of an inclusive agenda in which all partners are equal, where the proceedings rest on the principle of togetherness (Narlikar, 2009).

A good example of collective gains theory that comes to mind is from the 1999 Seattle Ministerial conference where developing country delegates stood firm against inserting new issues (government procurement, competition policy environment and labour standard) without addressing questions related to agriculture liberalisation which alienated their countries. They also claimed the right to participate fully in the proceedings and not be presented resolutions by the powerful countries for adoption. Indeed their resilience was behind the collapse of the Seattle conference. (More, 2003). Delegates from the Global South should always stand together, as in Cancun where representatives from the African Caribes and Pacific Countries, LDCs and the AU stood united against negotiating issues related to investments, competition, transparency in government and trade facilitation previously mentioned in Singapore. Ismail (2009: 25) writes:

The fact that the Uruguay Round was only launched in 1986, at Punta del Este in Uruguay, about five years later than the US wanted, was the result of the opposition that developing countries had waged and their insistence that the issues of interest to them should be adequately addressed. Thus developing countries played an active role in the launching of the Uruguay Round and in shaping the agenda of the Round.

The role of social movements

According to the *Britannica Encyclopedia*, social movements are ‘loosely organised but sustained campaigns in support of a social goal, typically either the implementation or the prevention of a change in society’s structure or values’. Social movements differ from mere crowd movements. They are persistent, possess mechanisms to keep going, including means and channels of communication and synchronisation of activities over broad geographical areas. Hence

they are also defined as ‘interactive networks of people who have shared beliefs, a sense of solidarity, and who come together to take part in collective action to challenge the status quo’ (Stackpool-Moore, 2006: 1). In this perspective, the human rights impact of social movements is more profound because they challenge deep-rooted power dynamics, values, meanings and identities. Although one or more organisations usually lead the movement, the boundaries of the movement are never limited to any of these organisations. In that sense, social movements are also a mixture of organisations and spontaneity (Foncesca, 2012). The mixture of organisations leading social movements are made of various civil society organisations that provide ‘a space for collective action’ (OSISA, 2011: 11, 12). Therefore the role of civil society cannot be overemphasised.

Third World and African social movements must work hard to challenge hegemonic politics as the African Social Forum did to address Africa’s debt question, to revisit the Structural Adjustment Programmes and injustices crafted in international trade (Murithi, 2011: 349). In addition, African social movements must liaise with others in the world to seek global justice (Murithi, 2011: 349). In this perspective, the example set by the African Social Forum that extended a hand of collaboration to the World Social Forum to address global injustices should be emulated by other social movements (Murithi, 2011: 349). Moreover, international civil society as a whole must unite and keep asking questions on the beneficiaries of the internal institutions at large and the WTO in particular. NGOs’ success stories should inspire civil society in their claim for global justice. For instance in 1992 at the UN Earth Summit in Rio de Janeiro, protests by civil society compelled states to reach agreement on controlling greenhouse emission (Foncesca, 2012: 227). Similarly, in 1994 during the World Bank 50th anniversary, civil society protest under the label of ‘50 years is enough’ was instrumental in forcing the Bank to revisit its methods (Foncesca, 2012: 227) and more importantly the anti-globalisation protest that turned the WTO Seattle Ministerial conference of November 1999 into the ‘battle of Seattle’ characterised by the blockade of roads to the venue, physical fights with the police and other security forces. The protest of Seattle was replicated in various First World capitals and the call for global justice resonated over the globe. United and relentless, global civil society will certainly be helpful in pushing for global justice through trade.

Overall, intellectuals, Third World representatives and the global social movement should push relentlessly for global justice and the establishment of a cosmopolitan world in which all people and countries are equal. The action for global justice should, among other things, focus on tackling the hegemony plans (of the Global North) secured in the WTO arrangements.

Conclusion

The aim of this chapter was to examine the WTO in terms of its role in the world. Which world and whose trade does it serve? The chapter found that after more than 500 years of Western colonial expansion, the designers of the world system established the WTO to keep their hegemony through trade. The WTO happens to be a tool for postcoloniality. This finding is informed by the fact that the GATT was born from Western parents for Western trade. Subsequently, after its growth and development into the WTO, it kept its roots in serving the Global North's hegemonic interests by making sure the Global South remains poor as result of trade arrangements under the label of international economic law.

The chapter however did not perceive this state of affairs fatalistically. It is shown that a development of different narratives or the decolonisation of knowledge by intellectuals, the unity of Third World representatives at the WTO and other fora, as well as the sustained actions of social movements will enhance the prospects of changing the current WTO into a new one characterised by fair trade and informed by ideal of global justice.

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CHAPTER 17

The Peace and Security Council of the African Union at Work: The Case of the Democratic Republic of Congo and Sudan

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It is customary to begin by citing a catalogue of Africa's failures, and, if one is well disposed to Africa, one is then put on the defensive, seeking to justify and explain the unique and exceptional nature of Africa and her ills. That is Afro-pessimism. The approach used in this chapter acknowledges that war and conflict have been a feature of Africa's development since independence. This does not require defence or justification as has been explained by many scholars in a variety of ways. This chapter focuses, instead, on analysing the variety of instruments available to advance peace and development in Africa. The chapter takes country case studies, and then focuses on the African Union as an agency for reconstruction and development in Africa.

I

In May 1997 Mr Joseph Kabila was declared President of the Democratic Republic of the Congo. On 5 December 2011, Mr Kabila was officially inaugurated once again as President of the DRC. The DRC has been mired in conflict since its independence in 1960. The assassination of Patrice Lumumba in 1961 was followed by decades of the Mobutu Seseseko kleptocracy. Since 1998, the DRC has been a theatre of war that has involved almost all the neighbouring states, and others like Zimbabwe that are further afield: Angola, Namibia, Zimbabwe, Chad and Sudan in support of the Kabila regime, and Rwanda, Burundi and Uganda backing the rebellion against Kabila. The current President Joseph Kabila's father, then President Laurent-Desire Kabila, was assassinated by one of his own Presidential Guard at the presidential residence in Kinshasa in 2001, plunging an already unstable Great Lakes region into further chaos. At the height of the war some 1 000 people, according to UN estimates, were dying daily. It is now estimated that about three million people died during this protracted conflict, about 3,2 million people were internally displaced and 500 000 refugees were

dispersed across the continent and abroad. There has been a massive destruction of infrastructure, and a breakdown in structures of central government, leading to rule by warlords in different regions of the country.

The young President Joseph Kabila made it his mission to bring an end to hostilities in the DRC and establish peace among the various belligerents. He found a ready and positive response from his father's erstwhile enemies who sensed that there could be no winner in war, and that the people of the Congo yearned for lasting peace and development. Patriotism played a part too, because having one's country being the stamping ground of foreign armies was unpalatable to Congolese of all political persuasions. The causes of conflict in the Congo were varied and complex, affected no less by the aftermath of the genocide in Rwanda and the conflict in Burundi, than by the contestation for power and resources in an ethnically diverse country.

The final solutions and the rapid moves towards peace are no less complex. A Global and All Inclusive Agreement facilitated by President Thabo Mbeki was signed at Sun City in South Africa in 2003, under the aegis of the African Union. Accordingly, the UN Mission in the Congo (MONUC) was established, and all foreign armies were repatriated. By late 2003, a transitional government was established and a comprehensive process for the drafting of a new Constitution put in place. This Constitution received popular approval in a referendum held in December 2005, which saw 84 per cent of registered voters cast their votes. Subsequently, the Constitution became the basis for the elections held in July 2006. These elections were hailed as a great success and, after some initial resistance, the losing candidate Jean-Pierre Bemba accepted the final results of the Presidential Poll as declared by the Supreme Court.

Although, by all accounts, democracy and constitutional and democratic institutions are in place in the DRC, major challenges remain. These include the challenge of charting a course towards unity and national reconciliation, building democratic institutions, establishing control over the sovereign territory of the DRC, and exploiting all economic resources and institutions for the benefit of the Congolese people in this vast and divided territory. Besides political systems, the DRC also needs to consolidate law and order, and the police, army and security services that are united under one command.

The DRC is Africa's third largest country, with a population of about 60 million people. The country has in fact never been ruled effectively as a unitary state since independence in 1960. The first challenge now is to re-establish the sovereign and territorial integrity of the DRC, address the history of ethnic strife and promote social cohesion. The second challenge is to address the scourge of years of militarisation with regard to Congolese society. It is necessary to demobilise;

redeploy a large fighting force; address the culture of military rebellion by militias largely politicised and loyal to their warlords; complete the repatriation of foreign combatants (among whom are the *interahamwe* genocidaires) especially from Rwanda, Burundi and Uganda; and disarm armed groups, especially in the eastern regions of Ituri, Bukavu, North Kivu, and Katanga.

It is perhaps too early to declare the DRC a post-conflict society. There can be no doubt that peace is fragile and much depends on developments in neighbouring states like Burundi, Rwanda and Angola, and on the ongoing support and involvement of the AU, UN, Zambia and South Africa (who brokered the final peace deal). It seems important to focus on the integration of the armed forces so as to create a professional army, establish credible law enforcement agencies, and control effectively all aspects of the economy. As part of the strategy for reconstruction and development, the Kabila government must draw on the resources of society as a whole, as well as civil society (including the churches), NGOs and higher education institutions, to address the causes of instability, which include ethnicity, poverty, corruption and the large-scale looting of the wealth of the Congo by foreign interests. It would seem logical to say that any reconstruction project for the DRC would be best developed as part of a regional strategy for the development of the Great Lakes states, that is, the DRC, Rwanda, Burundi, Uganda and Tanzania. Moves towards the re-establishment of the Great Lakes Economic Community (CEPGL) should be encouraged. Finally, it would be unwise for MONUC and the AU to beat a hasty retreat from the Congo, as their presence could serve as the guarantors of peace, reconciliation, reconstruction and development.

II

The Sudan is a very different story. Here there has been, consistently, a strong central government, a confident – even arrogant – army with a history of intervention in political affairs through coups d'état; and there has not been any direct military involvement by her neighbouring states in recent years of internal conflicts. That is as far as the differences go.

The Sudan is Africa's largest country whose population of over 100 million people is second only to Nigeria's. The Sudan has, however, been involved in internal conflicts since independence, seeking as it does to govern a country with different histories and political cultures from Khartoum, and with the South, West and North-east all expressing dissent from time to time. As far as the South is concerned at least, the Islamisation and some would say, Arabisation, of the country was a denial of the traditions, culture and religion of the southern peoples,

who are Bantu in culture and anthropology, rather than Arabic – Christian and animist in religion rather than Islamic. In addition, at the heart of the conflicts in the Sudan has been the inequitable, maldistribution of resources between the regions, and the resultant concentration of power in Khartoum. With the declaration of *Sharia* law as the basic law of the Sudan, the alienation and exclusion of the non-Islamic peoples of the Sudan was complete.

After 50 years of conflict, the Comprehensive Peace Agreement (CPA) was signed at Naivasha, Kenya in January 2005, between the Government of the Sudan and the Sudan Peoples' Liberation Army/Movement. The CPA agrees that the 'unity of the Sudan, based on the free will of its people and good democratic governance, is and shall always be the priority for the parties'. It therefore seeks a comprehensive solution to conflict and to the economic and social deterioration of the Sudan. It further seeks to agree on a reconstruction and development strategy for all areas affected by war in the Sudan. Subsequently, the Machakos Protocol secured the right to self-determination for the people of the Southern Sudan to be determined by a referendum six years after the establishment of the CPA structures in the Sudan. It was also agreed that the *Sharia* law should no longer apply to non-Islamic people against their expressed will across the Sudan. The CPA also provides for protocols on power-sharing in the Government of National Unity, and on wealth-sharing. Interestingly, disputed matters such as the Abyei Conflict and Southern Kordofan and Blue Nile have separate arrangements.

The CPA was hailed as a major breakthrough by the international community, sponsored as it was not just by IGAD, but also by Britain, Norway and Italy. Undoubtedly, much of it was secured through the agency of, and the personalities (as often happens in these matters) of Vice President Taha (the main negotiator on behalf of the National Congress Party Government of the Sudan) and the late Dr John Garang, the legendary leader of the SPLA. Sadly, within three months of the inauguration of the Government of National Unity, and before the Government of the Southern Sudan was established, Dr Garang died in a freak aviation accident in Uganda in July 2005. General Salva Kiir succeeded Garang as leader of the SPLA, as First Vice President in the GNU, and as President of the Government of Southern Sudan.

The CPA, however, is running into difficulties. In part this has to do with the untimely death of one of its main protagonists, John Garang, but it is also because the Government of the Sudan has been so embroiled in the Darfur and other unresolved internal conflicts that it has sought to short-change attention and resources to the CPA. John Garang was a historical figure in the politics of the Sudan having been a major player since independence. In many respects, he

held the historical link between the Sudan at independence and throughout the period of conflict. Somehow he was able to hold a genuinely national vision for the Sudan which few others could emulate. The governing National Congress Party continued to seek influence and power in the GNU through the distribution of ministries, the reassignment of responsibilities in the Ministries, departmental leadership in the civil service, and general control of the resources. However, some of the critical institutions of the CPA took far too long to establish (such as the crucial Petroleum Commission), and the Government of Southern Sudan operated without a budget for almost a year. As a result, the demobilisation and integration of the Army were delayed, the Government of Southern Sudan was there in name only, and the Southern civil service was slow in establishment.

It would seem that although Salva Kiir is in his own right a formidable army general, the Khartoum-based NCP may not find him an interlocutor that they revere in the same way as they might have done Garang. Some have argued that part of the strategy was to delay and allow divisions within SPLA/M to surface, thus delaying the ultimate implementation of the CPA, or to allow time for the other conflicts in which the Khartoum Government is embroiled to be resolved, and as such bring the whole country into one comprehensive peace deal. The SPLA/M has now found that the Ugandan rebel group LRA is ensconced in its territory; armed, equipped and supported by Khartoum, and with the potential (and some may believe, the intention) to destabilise the GoSS. The likely result of Khartoum's gerrymandering will be to undermine the integrity of the CPA, and confidence in their partner SPLA/M. The SPLA/M is not without its own internal problems either. Clearly, some of its nominees for government positions are no longer operating under a SPLA/M mandate, and divisions regarding strategy have surfaced. Whereas in discussions with the leaders of SPLA/M, one gets the impression that they hold the hope that the CPA could become a model for the reunification of the Sudan, and the means by which all other conflicts could be resolved. Nobody wishes to have the CPA held to ransom by the intractable difficulties caused by the politics of the Khartoum regime, and to be sucked into those conflicts which are not of its own making. The National Congress Party seems to hold a different view.

Darfur, sadly, has overshadowed the bright promise of the South. In Darfur in the West, the Sudan Liberation Army and the Justice and Equality Movement are waging an armed rebellion against the central government in Khartoum. It is thought that elements of these rebel movements have the support of Chad or are associated with some of the Chadian rebel movements. Over half a million people, mostly civilians, have died and about three million (mostly women and children) have been displaced during this conflict. The United Nations has declared

Darfur an exercise in ethnic cleansing and guardedly (but with a crescendo) as 'genocide'. There is no longer any denying that the Janjaweed, the armed militia engaged in scorched earth, root and branch hostilities in the area, do so as a surrogate force of the Khartoum government, armed and supported by the state to fight alongside the SFA as a counter-insurgency force.

Negotiations to bring lasting peace are continuing in Abuja, Nigeria. The Inter-Sudanese Peace Talks are sponsored by the AU and chaired by former OAU Secretary General Salim Ahmed Salim. The Abuja Conference adopted the Protocol to Improve the Humanitarian Situation in Darfur (November 2004) and the signatories include the Government of the Sudan, Minni Arkou Minawi, then Secretary General of SLA/M, who has since joined the Government of National Unity with his faction of the SLA/M (who signed a separate Agreement with the GoS), and Ahmed Mohamed Tugod Lissan on behalf of JEM. The Agreement was served by Nigeria, Chad and the AU Commission. Remarkably, the Protocol allowed free movement and access for the purpose of providing humanitarian relief, enabling cross-border movement to do so, and to protect civilians against attack, protect the IDP camps as civilian zones, and protect IDPs and refugees. One could say remarkably because nobody really intended to do what the Protocol provided. It is evident that the Protocol was merely an exercise in buying time. Before the ink was dry on the document, the IDP and refugees were being attacked and scattered, atrocities were being committed, and impunity was in place both by Chad (which has a perverse interest in the escalation of the conflict for its own domestic difficulties) and Khartoum, which sponsors the Janjaweed and seeks to divide the rebel forces.

That was in November 2004, but since then hostilities have escalated. The movement of refugees and the IDP continues, and relief operations are hampered. The AU Peacekeeping Force and the AU Mission in Sudan (AMIS) are not coping with the scale of the tragedy despite several agreements between the parties. The Abuja Talks continue, although the draft Enhanced Ceasefire Agreement for Darfur has not yet been signed by all the parties.

Meanwhile, under the AMIS, the AU has deployed about 7 000 personnel in Darfur, consisting of some 700 military observers, 1 400 civilian police, 28 international civilian staff and a protection force of 5 000 troops. Given the inadequate and underresourced AMIS force in Darfur, and in the light of the imminent termination of their mandate, the Security Council, with the agreement of the AU, resolved that the UN should replace the AU force. This has been fiercely resisted by the GoS who fear that this could be the thin end of the wedge to becoming, as President al Bashir has bluntly put it, 'like another Iraq'. One can perhaps understand the perceptions of negative effects of the US and British military and

foreign policy manoeuvres from an Islamic government that stands accused of supporting or harbouring al Qaeda, and in recent statements, the threat of a No Fly Zone in the Darfur Region. At the AU Peace and Security Council meeting in Abuja, Nigeria recently agreed that the AMIS force would be extended by six months as of the end of December, and a new UN Peacekeeping Force would be deployed with troops drawn mainly from the member states of the AU, under the command of an African general. This is the UN force of 20 000 troops promised by retiring UN Secretary General Kofi Anan under the resolution of the Security Council. There were no indications, at the time of writing this chapter as to whether the Sudan will now accept the UN Peacekeeping Force under the arrangements approved by the AU Peace and Security Council.

Darfur is part of the sovereign territory of the Sudan. It appears, however, that the Government of the Sudan has no control over the territory and is unable to maintain legitimate law and order. There appears to be a case of the government using militia and intervention forces to seek to enforce its will. In the process, the Darfur Conflict has become a war against the civilian citizens, and no safety and security is guaranteed by government. Authority appears to be in the hands of the various rebel forces, and humanitarian aid is provided by international organisations in areas controlled by the various rebel movements. The Government of Sudan does not have a strategy for the resolution of the crisis, except an ineffectual military campaign. Evidently, the unleashing of the Janjaweed on the civilian population has been counter-productive. And yet one would have thought that the CPA holds pointers to a possible solution. Mutual restraint with Chad should limit interference in each other's affairs. It would seem fair to say that the Comprehensive Peace Agreement on Southern Sudan will never realise its ambitions in an environment of unresolved conflicts in other parts of the Sudan. All that will happen is that the Southern Sudanese will be drawn, on the side of the GNU, into a conflict that is not of their own making.

III

The Constitutive Act of the African Union was adopted by the Assembly of Heads of State and Government of the Member States of the OAU at Lome, Togo, in July 2000. The Constitutive Act 2000 marks a qualitative departure from its predecessor Organisation of African Unity, in that it seeks definitively to dispose of the baggage occasioned both by the neocolonial era, and the responses thereto by Africa. In some respects the Constitutive Act builds on the achievements and principles developed by the OAU during its almost four decades of existence. The Constitutive Act retains the principles of infallibility of national boundaries

acquired at independence, and in accordance with evolving international law, refines the principle of non-interference in the domestic affairs of states. The Act gives the African Union Commission stronger leverage to respond to the demands of the continent as a self-regulating mechanism, including sanctions, and in terms of its comprehensive vision as an economic community as per the Treaty of Lagos.

The Preamble states that the Constitutive Act is guided by a common commitment to seek a common vision for the problems besetting the Continent, and to act in partnership with states and civil society, and with the international community, to find African solutions to African problems. It also states that conflicts in the African Continent are an impediment to socioeconomic development, and it thus commits to promote peace, security and stability ‘as a prerequisite for the implementation of our development and integration agenda’. The Constitutive Act then sets out a range of objectives and principles for the establishment of the African Union (AU), namely to

- promote peace, security and stability ... democratic principles and institutions of popular participation and good governance;
- promote and protect human and peoples’ rights in accordance with the African Charter on Human and Peoples’ Rights.

Among its principles, the AU will seek to establish a common defence policy towards a peaceful resolution of conflicts; respect democratic principles, human rights, the rule of law and good governance; and promote respect for the sanctity of human life, condemnation and rejection of impunity, political assassinations, acts of terrorism and subversive activities. These are very important principles because they mark the difference between the AU and the OAU where often member states fermented dissension and revolts against fellow member states, and harboured rebel groups that sought to overthrow legitimate governments in neighbouring countries.

However, the Constitutive Act does not end there; it goes on to attack the historic principle of non-interference in the domestic affairs of other states, by providing that non-constitutional changes of government will not be tolerated and, in certain circumstances, the AU states may intervene ‘pursuant to a decision of the Assembly in respect of grave circumstances, namely, war crimes, genocide or crimes against humanity’; or where member states request such intervention ‘in order to restore peace and security’.

In July 2002, the Protocol relating to the Establishment of the Peace and Security Council was adopted in Durban, South Africa. The Protocol provides

for, among other things, the provision of a humanitarian action and disaster management function in the AU, as well as an African Stability Force. The PSC will seek to 'promote peace, security and stability in Africa in order to guarantee the protection and preservation of life, property, the wellbeing of the African people, and the environment, as well as the creation of conditions conducive to sustainable development'. The PSC will thereby undertake the responsibility to advise the Assembly, to anticipate and prevent conflicts, and to embark on peace-making and peace building and postconflict reconstruction. The Constitutive Act was amended in 2003 to insert these provisions on the PSC into the Act, and to establish the PSC as one of the organs of the AU to become a 'standing decision-making organ for the prevention, management and resolution of conflicts'.

The PSC should most probably be addressed alongside the recently established African Court on Human and Peoples Rights (the African Court). The Court conflates two instruments originally found in the Constitutive Act and, separately, in the protocol to the African Charter on Human and Peoples' Rights. The Court, to be based in Arusha, Tanzania, now has a President, and officials are now in place. The judges were elected at the Khartoum Session in January and sworn in, in Banjul in July. A third session of the Court was held recently in Addis Ababa, Ethiopia. The Court will interpret the Constitutive Act and resolve all conflicts arising from it and, additionally, it will interpret the provisions of the African Charter, as well as at the request of member states, 'provide an opinion on any legal matter relating to the Charter or any other human rights instruments ...'. It would seem therefore that Africa now has a judicial instrument for resolving interstate disputes and for enforcing the provisions of the Constitutive Act and the treaties attendant on it. Besides, the African Union now has an instrument of enforcement in the African Stability Force, and the means through the provisions for intervention in other states or the application of sanctions.

It is evident from the Protocol Relating to the Establishment of the Peace and Security Council that the AU recognises its role in postconflict countries in ensuring timely and effective intervention and resource mobilisation, and humanitarian action. This is necessary to prevent a relapse into violence, or the ascendancy of counter-democratic forces. In keeping with this objective, the AU in Maputo (2003) established a Ministerial Committee for Post Conflict Reconstruction and Development in Sudan chaired by South Africa; the first such AU mechanism for postconflict reconstruction and development. The Policy Framework for Post Conflict Reconstruction and Development was adopted by the PSC. Its elements include peace and security, monitoring, early warning and advising on the maintenance of peace, and ensuring security that is viable and sustainable. This should ensure that there is a security plan for the demobilisation, deployment

and resettlement of previously fighting forces, for the training of civil society peace activists, for security around excessive small arms proliferation, for the retraining of ex-combatants, and for ensuring a stable economic and political system. On political governance and transition, this will include testing the viability of the political systems, their inclusivity, marginalisation and ethnic discrimination, appropriate distribution of power, wealth sharing, civic education, and support for political parties. On Human Rights Justice and Reconciliation, the organ will promote the establishment of institutions to promote and protect human rights and democracy, and enhance popular participation, good governance and effective parliamentary systems.

Somehow the emergent society has to find means to deal with its past, with forms of justice-making in transition and with promoting reconciliation. Humanitarian/emergency assistance to respond to emergency situations, meet the needs of the most vulnerable, attend swiftly to those internally displaced and the return of refugees, together with their relocation and other forms of humanitarian assistance, including healthcare, land and water, housing and education must also be attended to. Reconstruction and socioeconomic development are crucial. This is what gives confidence and obtains popular buy-in and commitment to the democratic dispensation; the democratic and peace dividend – engaging civil society in its own development programmes.

The problem, of course, is that much of this is well beyond the capacity of the AU, and of any one African country to achieve. For one thing the resources required are enormous, and even if available, the capacity and skills required to spend such large amounts of money may not be available. In circumstances of a collapsed state, or where state power has not yet been established, development must go hand-in-hand with security. The dream is beautiful but one wonders whether it is viable. However, in order to bring coherence and effectiveness to this objective, NEPAD has now undertaken to be the mechanism for Post Conflict Reconstruction and Development. Implementing agencies can be sourced from elsewhere in the continent and internationally, and in partnership with local NGOs and churches. It is critical though that the government must own or be a partner in this programme and champion it nationally. In 2003, the African Humanitarian Action, Africa's only pan-African humanitarian and disaster management agency, based in Addis Ababa, deplored the fact that most humanitarian programmes in Africa were undertaken without African participation that would allow for local conditions to be learnt and understood, ensure knowledge transfer and capacity building, and thereby create sustainable and credible local institutions for reconstruction and development projects. To achieve that, the programmes have to be knowledge-based, flexible and responsive to local

conditions and needs, participatory in that local resources must be involved, and be renewable and sustainable, and subject to regular review.

IV

In its capacity as the Chair of the Ministerial Committee on Post Conflict Reconstruction in Southern Sudan, the South African government, at the request of the SPLA/M Government of Southern Sudan, and with funding provided by South Africa's Department of Foreign Affairs, requested that the University of South Africa embark on a comprehensive programme for developing, training and capacity building for the people of Southern Sudan. A delegation of ministers from member states went on a fact-finding mission to Southern Sudan in March 2005. The Comprehensive Strategy for Post Conflict Reconstruction in the Sudan was then developed by the Ministerial Committee. The programme was designed by a committee made up of Unisa, the Department of Foreign Affairs of South Africa as advisors, and the SPLA/M focal point at ministerial level. The SPLA/M delegates then had the programme approved by SPLA/M, and they identified the training needs and the candidates for such training. Unisa, for its part, developed the training programme and certificated those who achieved the agreed standards.

The programme commenced in February 2005, with a high-level visit to Southern Sudan and consultations with the leadership of SPLA/M. Afterwards, a delegation of the leadership visited Unisa to explore facilities. The first group came for a period of six weeks in March/April to attend a specially designed course on diplomatic training. Other courses on civil service and public administration followed. On this occasion, candidates were paired with various government departments under a supervisor, to observe and to learn all aspects of public administration. There was another session on the justice system, the judiciary and the magistracy; and another on law enforcement agencies like military, policing, corrections service and security. The programme is continuing but my information is that nearly 500 Southern Sudanese have attended one or more of these courses since 2005. The purpose of these initiatives is to enable the people of Southern Sudan to take charge of their government with speed and efficiency, and to be knowledgeable participants in the Government of National Unity. The programme is coordinated by the Centre for African Renaissance Studies, is interdisciplinary and practical by nature, but has built on theory and case studies. This programme has been welcomed and appreciated by SPLA/M, and for some of them, it may provide a bridge to further academic studies.

With the CPA at such a perilous point, it is necessary that further international pressure be applied to Sudan to honour the letter and spirit of the CPA, and to stop playing a strategy of brinkmanship. Among the guarantors of the CPA are not only IGAD countries in East Africa, but also the AU and the UN. It is critical that the countries that made the pledges in Oslo should make good their pledges in order to give capacity to the Southern Sudan government to undertake much-needed infrastructure and socioeconomic development. Among the sponsors of the CPA are the US and the EU (Britain, Norway and Italy). The UN also undertook to deploy a 10 000-strong UN Mission to support and monitor implementation of the Agreement. In fact, so the ICG charges, activities in Darfur are financed from the resources pledged to Southern Sudan by Western governments. Most worrying, says the International Crisis Group in a recent Report, is that the international community is not engaged in the implementation of the CPA.

V

This chapter uses the Democratic Republic of Congo (DRC) and the Sudan as case studies to compare and contrast different ways in which postconflict societies in Africa emerge. The chapter suggests that there is hardly a 'post'-conflict society in the immediate aftermath of intractable intrastate conflicts. One could just as well have examined the postconflict situations in the Meno River Basin: Liberia, Sierra Leone, Cote d'Ivoire, and Guinea Conakry. Ethiopia/Eritrea after the overthrow of Mengistu, provides other lessons as well. Rwanda, Burundi and Somalia also provide some lessons. The causes of conflicts and their resolution depend on a variety of factors, the resolution of which will take years of ups and downs and stumbling. In other words, conflict in postconflict societies is always lurking beneath the surface. It is also true that sustaining peace requires resources and management beyond those often available to the emerging state itself, and is often dependent on developments it hardly has any control over. For example, the demobilisation of ex-combatants has a lot to do with both the power of the state to enforce compliance, and the incentives available to such ex-combatants. What has been demonstrated, though, is that states must guard against the development of some Taliban-type 'ungoverned spaces', as Patrick Mazimhaka and Iqbal Jhazbhay express the phenomenon. There must be no 'no-go areas' beyond the reach of the central authority. The problem with Darfur, for instance, was related to the legitimacy question of the Khartoum government, and as such, it was not able to assert its authority in the area. That is a dangerous development.

These developments raise questions about the nature of the state in Africa today. For one thing, a state can no longer be defined simply on the basis of its capacity to exercise power and coercion over its territory. There are many non-state actors who confront the power of the state, and there are also other 'business' interests that exploit the resources of states in some remote regions without accountability to any central authority and for their own benefit; maybe this is evidenced in the phenomenon of 'blood diamonds', or oil-for-arms. The state in Africa needs more than its own resources to exercise state power effectively; it needs legitimisation both by its own citizens and by multilateral bodies like the AU and the UN. It also needs the support and goodwill of its neighbours and it must be compliant with the African Union as its security shield under the new provisions of the Peace and Security Protocol to provide common defence to member states, and the amended Constitutive Act that allows the possibility of seeking the assistance of other states to maintain peace and security. In the DRC, although far from actual achievement, one can foresee that the Kinshasa government will grow its internal and external legitimacy, and will then be able to exercise control over its sovereign territory. That, after all, is how the Rwanda Patriotic Front legitimised itself. The Government of the Sudan in Khartoum has to understand the force of this legitimisation principle.

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CHAPTER 18

A Perspective on Paradigms for Africa and the African Diaspora's Involvement in a Globalising World

Kwesi Dzapon Lwazi Prah

... modern history has set up either heroes possessed of extraordinary, superhuman abilities, or simply men of the most diverse sort, from monarchs to journalists, who lead the masses. Instead of the former divinely appointed aims of the Jewish, Greek or Roman peoples, which to the ancients represented the aims of mankind, modern history has postulated its own aims – the welfare of the French, German, or English nation, or, in its highest abstraction, the welfare and civilisation of all humanity, by which is generally meant those peoples that occupy the small north-western corner of a large continent (Tolstoy, 2007: 1413).

Introduction: Globalising Consciousness and Conscience

The historical legacy of human consciousness and conscience, as both individual and collective experiences, attests to the metaphysical and physical conditions in which human beings find themselves today. Whether one is an African, Asian, European or North/South American-born citizen, our past has ensured that it is no longer a question of intellectual or practical validity; human beings have sought to justify *development* and *progress* in terms of how relevant it is to the functions and purposes of conscience.¹ Any documented attempt at establishing a world order or system in human history (typically determined by imperial concerns in varying forms) since the nascent beginnings of consciousness has inadvertently succumbed to the pangs of conscience. Concurrently, in any etymological and ontological critique of the term 'globalisation', the prevailing themes are of conflictual or complementary interests, at localised or transcontinental levels, under space-time conceptions. In totality, when observing variables of change, development and progress, in relation to understanding human conscience and consciousness in its societal variety, no impulse has been more influential in determining the direction of human development and progress than the *apparent* inevitability of conflict.²

Will Durant, in his tribute to Western³ philosophy and understanding of Platonic political thought, corroborates the *apparent* inevitability of conflict and its consequential relation to human conscience by stating that

... life in society requires the concession of some part of the individual's sovereignty to the common order; and ultimately the norm of conduct becomes the welfare of the group. Nature will have it so, and her judgment is always final; a group survives, in competition or conflict with another group, according to its unity and power, according to the ability of its members to cooperate for common ends (*Durant, 2006: 52*).

At the same time, the social mechanisms governing these processes of cohesion have varying impulses and impacts. John Ayotunde Isola Bewaji aptly states that 'divergences of moral norms as between Western and non-Western Societies are largely due to variations in cultural traditions and to ecological, sociological, and other existential differences' (Wiredu, 2006: 396). It is therefore not surprising to note that most narratives and meta-narratives on contemporary change, that attempt to 'globalise history' or, better yet, 'historicise globalisation', do so under the auspices of community, empire, business or evangelical mission (Gills and Thompson, 2006). Indeed, the dialectic of conscience leads one and all in hot pursuit of the greater or greatest 'good'. What is often forgotten at a popular level is that this pursuit has a correlating antithesis; that it always needs to posit and reify its being in the reality of 'the Other', in order to understand its worth or use. In particular, Franz Fanon's and Valentin Yves Mudimbe's rigorous intellectual critiques regarding interactions with, and conceptions of, Africa and its realities serve as startling reminders of the extent to which various persons and the Western world have justified and reified their varied interests (Mudimbe, 1998; 1994; Fanon, 1963).

However, it was a couple of Durant's philosophical forefathers who did most of the legwork in exposing the nature and impact of Western development and progress in what was, in their time, a rapidly industrialising, capitalist world; as well as involuntarily reacting to the pervading reality of what was later understood to be Gramscian hegemony. Karl Marx and Frederick Engels prophetically understood these preponderances for cataclysmic activity among human beings to be primarily as a result of revolutionary sentiments brought about by political and economic subjugation, or conflict of interests. Jacques Derrida had this to say about Marx and his seminal work:

Upon rereading the *Manifesto* and a few other great works of Marx, I said to myself that I know of few texts in the philosophical tradition, perhaps none, whose lesson seemed more urgent *today*, provided that one take into account what Marx and Engels themselves say (for example, in Engels' 'Preface' to the 1888 re-edition) about their own possible 'aging' and their intrinsically irreducible historicity. What other thinker has ever issued a similar warning in such an explicit fashion? Who has ever called for the *transformation* to come of his own theses? Not only in view of some progressive enrichment of knowledge, which would change nothing in the order of a system, but so as to take into account there, another account, the effects of rupture and restructuration? And so as to incorporate in advance, beyond any possible programming, the unpredictability of new knowledge, new techniques, and new political givens? No text in the tradition seems as lucid concerning the irreducibility of the technical and the media in the current of the most thinking thought – and this goes beyond the railroad and the newspapers of the time whose powers were analysed in such an incomparable way in the *Manifesto*. And few texts have shed so much light on law, international law, and nationalism (Derrida, 2006: 13–14).

Relevant sentiments they are, for it was the resulting political (world wars, Asian and African independence movements, and the cold war) crises of the twentieth century that irrevocably outlined the socioeconomic landscape we live in today. According to Engels, 'men make their own history, whatever its outcome may be, in that each person follows his own consciously desired end, and it is precisely the resultant of these many wills operating in different directions and of their manifold effects upon the outer world that constitutes history' (Marx and Engels, 1970: 366). Further on, Engels concludes that 'in modern history at least it is, therefore, proved that political struggles are class struggles, and all class struggles for emancipation, despite their necessarily political form – for every class struggle is a political struggle – turn ultimately on the question of *economic* emancipation' (Marx and Engels, 1970: 369). Marx then cogently takes this dialectic to a contentious end by stating that

... in the domain of political economy, free scientific inquiry meets not merely the same enemy in all other domains. The peculiar nature of the material it deals with, summons as foes into the field of battle the most violent, mean and malignant passions of the human breast, the Furies of private interest (Marx, 2007: 5).

In essence, political, economic and social realities motivated by intellectual and material aims, have in the last two hundred years intensified the need to view the global human population as an organic whole. Accordingly, jargon explaining these interrelated characteristics and processes concerning socioeconomic change and reorganisation often tend to conceptually metamorphosise and influence policy, while the existential realities of the individual and collective society endure the consequences.

Paulin Hountondji brings this otherwise predominantly Western discourse into an Africanist perspective and asserts that

... the present focus of African reflection, as dictated by the realities of the post- colonial era, has been the immediate and practical issues of ‘development’, understood as a process of the accommodation of African lives to the demands of modernity. It is especially in this connection that the observed divergence between traditional values in Africa and the Western paradigm that governs the very idea of modernity has come to assume a practical importance and to represent something of a dilemma (Hountondji, 1979: 9).

This assertion is poignant because it indicates the duality of conscience and consciousness, yet acknowledges the need for both to concurrently aid in the constructive re-emergence of ‘self ’ (Linklater, 2007: 45–59).⁴ Moreover, it is within the *practicality* of this dilemma that Hountondji speaks of what calls for human consciousness as a global collective, in its multiple social/political/economic/ spiritual dimensions, to critically assess and understand its developmental and progressive aims. Thus, in light of the multifarious nature of perspective concerning issues of hegemony and equity/equality; spirituality and science; or ultimately the conscientious harmony of consciousness, it is safe to rest on a notion of globalisation as ‘being processes and practices that result in globalised outcomes’ (Edwards and Usher, 2000: 10).

The Role of Perspective in the Discourse: Global and Local Spaces

The role of perspective in the discourse of globalisation is thus a fundamental requisite. Furthermore, to creatively contribute to progress and dynamic development means to allow and heed conscientious self-criticism and self-evaluation. For Africa and the African Diaspora, Afro-centric or Africanist sentiments, opinions and perspectives have always been, and will always be, necessary and important factors in influencing dialogue and research on globalisation. This has not necessarily been as a result of conscientiousness on the part of Western or

Eastern intellectual and material interests, but rather the inevitability of seeing the African social, political and economic reality as ‘part of humanity in its historical process of human emancipation and development’ (Prah, 2008: 83). The political and economic hegemonies of the Western world, today in heated competition with their historically linked antecedents in the East, further expose the pressing need for Africans and Africans in the Diaspora to address present-day crises that impede their development and progress, and constructive involvement in the ethos of humanity.

At a political and economic level, the masses of the African world are housed and represented by the various ‘nation-states’ scattered across the planet. In particular, the ghettos of Chicago, the slums of Kingston, the favelas of Rio de Janeiro, the banlieues of Paris and the townships of Cape Town all highlight the septic reality of the statist, neocolonial enterprise. Nevertheless, these nation-states primarily in the Caribbean and Africa simply were and are ‘states created for purposes of maintaining imperialist domination through the rule of small-holders and military-bureaucratic elites’ (Prah, 1998: 109; 2006: 24). This sobering reality does not fully express the range and depth of the problem; that while operating under euphemisms such as ‘they’ve got what we want, and we’ve got what they need’, the slaving nation-states with their perspective ‘elites’ slavishly mimicking and espousing to impress their imperial masters fall deeper and deeper into intellectual, social and material debt (Moyo, 2009: 111).⁵

Notwithstanding the exclusivity and corraling of knowledge production and reproduction, the African world also cannot ignore the fact that while the economics of capitalism have catapulted society at large into a state of technological bliss and merry moral relativity, it has also brought them and the rest of the world to its knees, as capitalist-driven debt exercises its theoretical aims with merciless precision. Furthermore, the increased might and sophistication of the armies assembled to support the enforcement of the varying imperial aims ensure that the prostrated masses are kept subdued, living in fear and fighting for jobs that continue to elude them. Both overt and covert measures are taken to maintain the economic and political stranglehold. Concurrently, criminality (or for others, open defiance of state or international law) thrives, as criminal elements continue to maintain pseudo-fraternal ideals in various ways, but principally employing the following mantra: to survive requires the manipulation and coercion of others to gain material profits and political freedoms, and the enforcement and protection of these ventures comes at a heavy price. The peculiarity of the civil and economic crises that beget Africans and Africans in the Diaspora is that it is indisputably a social and economic strife ‘largely entangled with the general impact of the colonial experience’ (Prah, 2008: 100). Furthermore, ‘while the

West introduced modern techniques into pre-colonial and pre-industrial Africa, putting Africa on the road to (capitalist-driven) modernity, it also distorted the autonomous nature of the processes of African development' (Prah, 2008: 100).

In other words, these forms of control to inculcate the masses into a forced state of submission while pursuing a 'conscientious' world order have a distinct historical chronology when observed through African eyes. As an explanatory reference point, the African Diaspora is a good precedent because it definitively highlights the historical trajectory and establishment of what some Africans and Africans in the Diaspora understand today as a world system; colonial and neocolonial interests in the African/'old' world. The Diaspora also presents historical testaments of the successes and possibilities regarding Africa and African Diasporic, emancipatory aspirations.

Globalising Africans

According to contemporary historiography, the institution of slavery as a mode of production was not a novel experience, but an ancient dynamic in the genesis of humanity. Furthermore, the intensity and sources of its existence varied as it reached its apex in the previous millennium. However, the 'forced migration' of Africans from Africa, primarily as a result of externally motivated economic interests either as a result of 711 AD invasions by Arabs, the Indian Ocean slave trade or the Atlantic slave trade, all exhibit the varied extensions of slavery and its wretched association with the African world (Harris, 1998: 95–102). Certainly, the Atlantic slave trade appears to have been the decisive factor in sparking what was to be the ravaging firestorm of capitalist entrepreneurship. Thus, on the one hand, one writer placidly states that 'the rhythms of European exploration, conquest, colonisation and economic development determined where and when Africans would be forced into the transatlantic slave trade and, if they survived the rigours of the middle passage, enslaved in the Americas' (Bergad, 2007: 33); and, on the other hand, the trans-Atlantic slave trade served a particular sector of the West African population, the economically or socially privileged classes that managed to exploit what seemed to be upwardly orientated economic socialisation, and who 'had social and economic institutions in place to provide slaves in exchange for commodities they preferred' (Wright, 1990: 16). Concomitantly, Vasco da Gama's navigational feat of sailing around the tip of southern Africa 'set in motion a series of events that assured centuries of economic and political unrest as three forces sought dominance. These three forces were the Africans, Arabs and Europeans' (Harris, 1998: 157).

From about 1440 AD, Portuguese explorers and merchants kick-started the importation of slaves from and to the Americas in an effort to buttress their efforts in establishing their colonies and creating plantations that would sustain, attain and accrue material wealth for their country of origin. The dispersal and need for slaves across the Americas and the Caribbean was initially a modest exercise. However, as other imperial powers became involved in what was proving to be a financially lucrative trade, and as colonies grew in size, as well as 'the introduction of cattle, pigs, horses, goats, and other European animals and crops', this 'led to a demand for labor skills that were lacking among the indigenous populations' (Bergad, 2007: 36). Furthermore, the demand for minerals such as the gold and silver found in the Spanish and Portuguese Americas stimulated the necessity for mining companies which in turn spawned 'ancillary industries, from food production to the small-scale manufacture of a wide variety of tools and consumer goods, developed to serve the mining economies' (Bergad, 2007: 37; Gills and Thompson, 2006: 232–245). Industries of this nature were scattered all over the Caribbean peninsula. Portuguese and Spanish trading hegemonies were later eclipsed by British and French competitors (Freund, 2007: 38).

In summary, these mercantilist practices (primarily maritime-based trade in which merchants were the principal benefactors in a 'state-sanctioned' enterprise) spawned a global economic network serving multiple sources, on which primarily African human labour served as the means to the end; and it is within this flurry of economic activity over two centuries (1440–1880) that the Western world saw fit to justify and reify its financial pursuits through civilising missions and discriminatory ideologies. However, the historical record of the African world also shows that the imperial interests of a few, which were disconnected from the cultural, political and economic exigencies of indigenous society, became inappropriate and were ultimately met with hostile reaction as the subjugated masses collectivise their socioeconomic and political interests for emancipatory purposes.

The island of Saint-Domingue in the Caribbean was, by 1789, the most profitable colonial enterprise outside mainland North/South America. The consequence of this infamous wealth was a brewing discontent and disquiet among the slaving masses and their immediate authorities. This was a worrying spectre for the French, for they were also in the nascent throes of a fully fledged revolution; the culmination of which saw the quintessential representation of revolution and emancipatory aspirations, as well as exposing ensuing colonial strictures in the pre/industrial, African and Western world (Dubois, 2005: 1–7; James, 1989). By 1791, civil war had struck the island. Charismatically led by Toussaint L'Ouverture, Saint-Domingue marched into the annals of history

as having staged the largest successful slave revolt, as well as being the first slave colony to gain its independence in the Caribbean. By 1804, Jean-Jacques Dessalines (elected leader) gathered with a few generals to pen down the creation of a new nation: Haiti (Dubois, 2005).

Spearheaded by the French revolution and its intellectual aftermath, the parody of what was to follow over the next two centuries was the reconceptualisation of the 'Rights of Man and his Freedoms/Liberties' by the Western world, associated with the material and metaphysical dispositions of what was being understood to be the un/civilised world. Under Hegelian-Darwinian tutelage, the West carved out the world into appendages of their imperial ideals.⁶ Not a single part of the planet was spared in this extraordinary feat of 'private interest'. Africans, seen as mere objects of manipulation or spectators in the construction of enlightened 'civilisation', unwittingly perpetuated the myth that to develop/progress was simply to reconfigure the material and intellectual foundations of the colonial enterprise.

Olufemi Taiwo justifiably points out, in his criticism of Western philosophical traditions, that it is only insofar as Western philosophy has passed itself off as universal philosophy that we may talk of the peculiar absence. It is only insofar as we confront, or have to deal with, or inhabit a world constructed by Western philosophy that we are forced to think of an absence and of how to make sense of it. And we must confront our absence from the history of this tradition because, no thanks to colonialism and Christianisation, we are inheritors and perpetrators of this heritage. Additionally, given that the 'West' presents itself as the embodiment and inventor of the 'universal', we must protest even more loudly that its universal is so peculiar and that its global is so local. That is, the West, in constructing the universal, instead of truly embracing all that there is, or at least what of it can be so embraced, has merely puffed itself up and invited the rest of humanity, or the educated segment of it, to be complicit in this historical swindle.⁷

Nevertheless, the beginning of the twentieth century was cathartic as it ushered in an epoch of revolution all over the world, as the culture of national, democratic sovereignty came into vogue. Africa and its Diaspora was an inevitable contributor to this ethos of revolution because a vast majority of its populace found themselves entrapped in the intricacies of colonialism. At the beginning of the twentieth century, the loudest and rather radical articulation of these revolutionary sentiments was Jamaican in origin. Marcus Garvey, who regarded the protagonists of chattel slavery, colonial theory and practice as 'barbarous, savage, and in many ways inhuman and unjust', spearheaded a dialogue that would continue to galvanise Africans worldwide from within a pan-African context

(Garvey, 1990: 3). WEB Du Bois, CLR James, George Padmore, Paul Robeson and Ras Makonnen all fervently represented the diasporic articulation of African emancipatory ideals. This was not accidental, as history once again showed the interrelated nature of human conscience. The French philosopher, Jean-Paul Sartre, self-critically observes the troubling existentialities of the post-slaving, colonial world by quoting Franz Fanon in the preface he wrote for *The Wretched of the Earth* (*Les Damnés de la Terre*):

Let us not waste time on sterile litanies or nauseating mimicry. Let us quit this Europe which talks incessantly about Man while massacring him wherever it meets him, on every corner of its own streets, in every corner of the world. For centuries ... in the name of a supposed 'spiritual adventure', it has been suffocating almost the whole of humanity. This tone is new. Who dares adopt it? An African, a man of the Third World, a former colonial subject, he adds: 'Europe has reached such a mad and uncontrollable speed ... that it is heading towards an abyss from which it would be better to move away.' In other words: it has had it. This is a difficult truth to admit, but one of which we are all – are we not, my dear fellow continentals? – convinced deep down (Haddour, et al 2006: 155).

K Nkrumah, J Kenyatta, J Nyerere, P Lumumba, O Tambo, A Cabral and H Selassie collectively aided in dismantling the old vices of colonial oppression and attempted to set up the foundations for what they hoped to be a prosperous future for the African world. Their efforts were echoed by African-American writers and activists such as Toni Morrison, Maya Angelou, Alice Walker, James Baldwin, Martin Luther King, and Malcolm X, as the Civil Rights and Black Panther movements continued the legacy and desire for independence and equal opportunity/ rights. Yet despite the successes of these prodigious few, their efforts and Sartre's call to 'fellow continentals' seem to have fallen on deaf ears, as the economic, intellectual and cultural vices of colonialism in retreat took root in the psyche of the African and the diasporic African socioeconomic realities, which in turn solidified Western capitalist interests in a new world order it had masterfully created. This was typified by the extraordinary durability of the apartheid regime in South Africa, which had supporters such as Reagan and Thatcher in the West. Steve Biko hit the nail on the head when he stated that 'the racism we meet does not only exist on an individual basis; it is also institutionalised to make it look like the South African way of life' (Biko, 1987: 88). The paradox is that, in 2010, almost fifty years since his analysis, this is *still* a South African reality (Malegaparu and Mbeki, 1999).

Today, although postmodern theory and its progenitors have exposed the fallacies of the coloniser, and although the metaphysical and physical exigencies of the African have been shown to be in constant flux as humanity continues to explore the depths of its consciousness and conscience, postmodernists at large and their ‘texts need to be acknowledged as speaking through the ventriloquism of Western epistemologies linked to imperialist and capitalist social relations’ (McLaren and Farahmandpur, 2005: 19). Partly in reference to the peculiarity of this phenomena at an institutional level, Ngugi w’a Thiongo poignantly stated, in an address to the United Nations General assembly, that:

The devil, however, lies in the context of implementation in terms of definition, history and the contemporary global situation. Terms like the International Community have often been too narrowly evoked to make it sound as if the West is the gatekeeper who determines who is to be allowed into that community and who is to be outlawed. The emphasis on the United Nations is the right one; but it should be noted that the United Nations cover, the security council blessings in particular, has sometimes been used to legitimate invasions and overthrow regimes the West deems intolerable. In Africa, Patrick Lumumba of the Congo was killed with the eyes of the United Nations forces he had invited looking the other way. Europe is disproportionately represented in the Security Council; and one continent, Africa, has no veto. A degree of humility is called for in all nations, big and small, and a holier than thou attitudes will not do, for history of the modern tells of a more complicated story. The worst instances of genocide and wanton massacres of other people have come from Europe. Hitlerism was not an exception in the European history of relationships with other peoples. Every colonising nation in the past has been involved in crimes against humanity. Slave trade and plantation slavery are obvious. Africa, America, and Australia have got stories of indigenous populations depleted, displaced, by Europe.⁸

Furthermore, ‘[c]apitalism and democracy share a forced intimacy; their marriage has been arranged so that the families of the global ruling class can consolidate their power and set limits on how and what questions concerning equality and emancipation can be raised and in what contexts’ (McLaren and Farahmandpur, 2005: 19). Anthony Giddens, in his theoretical analyses of Marx’s, Durkheim’s and Weber’s work, was succinct about the inherent paradoxes of capitalist theory. He states that

... the basic ‘contradictions’ inherent in the capitalist economy derive directly from its character as a system based upon production for exchange-value. The need to maintain, or to expand, the rate of profit, is in opposition to the tendential law of declining profits; the separation of the producer and the consumer (i.e., the necessity of capitalism to maximise exchange-value rather than to produce for known needs) is the main factor lying behind the crises to which capitalism is recurrently subject (Giddens, 2006: 240).

The manifestation of these paradoxes are the cash-crop economies littered across Africa. The *manifestation* of these paradoxical crises in the present socio-economic world system means that ‘the original communicative base of modernity was reduced to a rationality based in consciousness that limited the possibility to act upon social structures’ (Zadja, 2008: 62). Whatever else that is materially ‘necessary’ to the labouring masses of the African world was and still is negated by ‘the fact that exports are increasingly concentrated in primary commodities while imports tend to be manufactures (technology, textiles, and agriculture), thereby reinforcing commodity dependence and replicating the existing pattern of trade with developed countries’.⁹

Constructive Policies and Knowledge Production

Yet what is recommended in the form of constructive policy alternatives is the continuation of dependence on ‘credit lines’ to build infrastructure so as to encourage the growth of the metropolis and its varying industrial/technological tributaries, the enlargement of the existing cash-crop/oil/raw or processed mineral-exporting economies, the adherence to a ‘sovereignty’ within the inherited colonial state borders, and the control and manipulation (intellectual property law) of knowledge production concerning technology and material that could be of substantial benefit. In addition, according to the 2010–2012 strategic plan formulated by South Africa’s Foreign Ministry, part of their strategic focus would be to protect and promote South African national interests and values through bilateral and multilateral interactions, protect South Africa’s sovereignty and territorial integrity, yet at the same time promote regional economic and political integration as well as contributing to the creation of an enabling international environment for SA business.¹⁰ The glaring inconsistencies and the logic of these processes find their conclusion in a present-day crisis in which ‘new knowledge’ that attempts to reconfigure/deconstruct/change this dilemma among Africans and the Diaspora fails dismally; not because of its lack of rationality, but because this new knowledge is not applicable/practical given the current world system it

aspires to operate under, and the conflicting interests of the ‘developed’ and ‘underdeveloped’ world/geopolitical world. How is one to implement development initiatives that are to operate under sovereignties, economies and state borders that historical records clearly show served and *still* serve imperial interests?

Thus, the lesson here is not whether there is ‘new knowledge’ regarding innovating and stimulating African and African diasporic modalities, but rather whether the African world can heed and act on/against the self-critical analyses and exigencies of the current world system as it knows it. It is also clear that what has been understood as ‘development’ or being developed, underdeveloped or backward with regard to socioeconomic theorisations has been discourse conceptualisation operating within euphemisms (in relation to the metaphysical and physical realities and interests of Africans and the Diaspora) that inadvertently hegemonises localised modes of production and their connection with globalised demands from the military superpowers of the West and East. What is understood to be a world system is, in essence, a politicised economic hegemony piggy-backing off the rhetoric of human rights championed by the United Nations.

The late Odera Oruka left no room for doubt when critiquing this particular malaise, and wisely summarised this dilemma. He states:

Backwardness (or underdevelopment in this case) is a relative term. A community is backward in relation to another which is seen to be ahead of it in matters desirable; for example, the United States and Colombia are ahead in drug use and trafficking, but Kenya is not backward to them in this respect. But the United States is ahead of Kenya in the accumulation of capital and expansion of technology. And since these two are considered desirable, it therefore means that Kenya is backward to the United States in this respect (Oruka, 1997: 256).

If constructive participation in a world system is what the African world seeks, the moral relativism of neoliberal theory and its capitalist affiliations, such as free market capitalism (within which the current world system operates or aspires to operate), need to be critically understood, and rationalisations based on African and African diasporic cultural realities and values need to serve as steering wheels in directing the course of its emancipatory/participatory aspirations (Oruka, 1990). In other words, what is the African’s world *need* for active participation and contribution to a world system in which the distribution and use of wealth stimulates poverty, crime, environmental destruction, moral apathy and general, societal disorder amongst its peoples?

Conclusion

In a recent publication, Ren Xiao, an International Relations scholar, in an articulation of his concerns that Chinese foreign policy/international relations need constant evaluation, states that

China's calls for 'harmony' in international relations, together with the revival of classical studies in the domestic academic community, will hopefully stimulate and push Chinese IR scholars to further explore and study China's own thought, philosophy, and culture, in a way conducive to the emergence of a 'Chinese school of International Relations' (Gungwu and Yongnian, 2008: 306).

In its concise expression, this statement concurrently defines the *nature* of Africa's present-day tasks. The perceptions of African technological 'backwardness' need to be usurped, as the combined expertise within Africa and its Diaspora can innovate and stimulate its realities. Dependencies on banking institutions to spur on infrastructural and technological development need to be quashed, and allow for policy creating and accentuating the value of the environment and its connection to the African world's indigenous customs and traditions. The production and reproduction of knowledge needs to be exercised in linguistic mediums rooted in African indigenous histories and realities, for this is the logical precondition for a move from the current discourse of development.

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CHAPTER 19

The Impact of Colonised African Historiography among Diaspora Populations: The Case of Kongo Kingdom Historical Narratives

Paola Vargas Arana

Introduction

This chapter discusses learning African history as an empowering tool for people of African descent in America, and how the potential that this offers has been diminished by mainstream interpretations that omit the analysis of important political decisions made by African societies during the past five centuries. The chapter offers criticisms of mainstream historiography, since it has been a political instrument to persuade people of African descent that their African ancestors were, for instance, responsible for the commencement of the Atlantic slave trade during the sixteenth century, and to de-emphasise the role played by Europeans in initiating human trafficking in Africa. As an example, the chapter analyses Kongo Kingdom historiography. Finally, it proposes a methodology for teaching African history based on the re-examination of primary sources. This will hopefully empower African Diaspora populations to reclaim their past, and stimulate them to formulate new questions, and engage in new reasoning and interpretations that will extend beyond ‘colonised’ African sociopolitical memory.

The Issue

Having obtained a master’s degree in African Studies in Mexico, I began teaching African history. During this period I came to realise the existence of a historiographic paradigm, promoted through teaching materials and scientific publications, relating to the existence of a slave trade throughout the African continent that predated the arrival of the Portuguese. I consider that in the light of primary sources this paradigm should be revised, since it fails to acknowledge the role of leaders and ordinary people of various African societies who, during the slave trade period, dedicated their lives to combating or opposing slavery and the slave trade within their territories.

It is vital for Africans and populations of African descent to learn the true response of African societies to the slave trade, as this influences their view of

their past and of their ancestors. For instance, one would notice Afro-Brazilian students reluctance to study slavery in any detail, both because of the cruelty involved and also because they had been taught at school that their own kings or forebears had willingly handed their people over to the slave traders for profit. Afro-descendant populations thus avoid gaining a true understanding of several centuries of African history, which compounds their lack of knowledge of both their long-term past and important links with their current cultural, religious and political expressions in America.

It is impossible to deny the antiquity of slavery in African history, yet it is also unreasonable to claim that slavery was common throughout the enormous and diverse continent of Africa by the beginning of the 16th century. It has been demonstrated that human trafficking took place among a number of North or East African societies as a result of established trade relations with the Arabs and Europeans; however, this may not have been true for the West-Central African societies, who rarely had contact with those populations or routes. This leads us to ask whether the first contact with the Portuguese heralded the beginning of the slave trade in the West-Central African region.

This question makes it necessary not only to investigate past events, but also to analyse what has shaped Central African memory over the long term. This requires identifying the politics that support and mould perceptions of African history throughout the world, as well as asking whether those historical narratives do in fact represent the history of West-Central Africans in America, which is where many people were brought as slaves, as this population constitutes an important Diaspora by reason of their cultural heritage.

The Example of the Kongo Kingdom

My studies of the mainstream West-Central African historiographic tradition, in particular as pertaining to the Kongo Kingdom, revealed both gaps and contradictions in the primary sources regarding the beginnings of the slave trade during the 16th century. Nonetheless, many scholars filled those gaps taking for granted that prior to the European contact, human beings' commerce pre-existed in Kongo, and consequently that kingdom assumed its immediate involvement in the transatlantic slave trade. For instance, one of the foremost specialists in the field, John Thornton, asserts,

slavery was widespread and indigenous in African society, as was, naturally enough commerce in slaves. Europeans simply tapped this existing

market, and Africans responded to the increased demand over the centuries by providing more slaves (Thornton, 1999: 73).

In a subsequent article entitled 'African political ethics and the slave trade: Central African dimensions', Thornton states:

This examination reveals that all the African rulers led societies that recognised an institution of slavery, and they accepted the legal possibility that an individual could have a bundle of rights over another person that surpassed those of any other community or the state. These rights moreover could be alienated to any other person by sale. [...] This institutional framework made the slave trade possible, and smoothed its way along. Recognising these features of African social structure *certainly can explain why African leaders did not actively resist the sale of people as slaves, and it must be invoked in their defence when they are accused of being European dupes for doing so* (Thornton, 2001, my emphasis).

The title of the article is significant in this case, as Thornton criticises the ethics of the African kings in relation to the introduction of the slave trade. However, my study of primary sources revealed that contact between Europeans and Africans, Christianisation and the further involvement of the Kongo Kingdom in the slave trade were all elements in a complex process that included political deceit, weapons, assassinations and sieges, indicating that the European slave trade schemes were not merely passively accepted. Nevertheless, many of the events and declarations that prove political hesitation or opposition on the part of the Kongo elites have been neglected in the historical interpretations.

This chapter suggests another interpretation of the sources, based on the correspondence between the manikongos and the pope and kings of Portugal. Through those sources this chapter reveals the doubts and unwillingness of the manikongos with regard to the introduction of the slave trade, their opposition to the Christianisation process, their denial of the existence of a slave trade in the kingdom, their willingness to enter into other commercial agreements, and petitions to install ecclesiastical power. At the same time, the responses of the Portuguese suggest that their early penetration into Central Africa was deeper than has been reported in historiographic accounts. In the words of the Guyanese intellectual Walter Rodney (Rodney, 1982: 80):

In the Kongo, the slave trade did not get under way without grave doubts and opposition from the king of the state of Kongo at the beginning of the

16th century. He asked for masons, priests, clerks, physicians, etc.; but instead he was overwhelmed by slave ships sent from Portugal, and a vicious trade was opened up by playing off one part of the Kongo Kingdom against another. The king of the Kongo had conceived possibilities of mutually beneficial interchange between his people and the European state, but the latter forced him to specialise in the export of human cargo.

To understand this quotation, let us begin by examining the complex relationship between the Kongo Kingdom and the Portuguese, which began in 1483, when a Portuguese expedition arrived at the Kongo mouth. Some years subsequently, European clerics and merchants settled in the Kongo capital of MbanzaKongo, and in 1491 the king, Mani João I Nzinga a Nkuwu, who reigned from c 1470 to 1509, decided to be baptised. Many of the documents dating from Mani João's reign have been lost, but a letter dated 1512, three years after his death, mentions that before 1500 he had rejected the Christian faith and banished his son, Affonso, from the kingdom (Manso, 2006: 7).

Mani João was therefore a Christian for less than nine years. This fact is important, since historiography has generally upheld the stability of the Christian mission in the Kongo Kingdom, avoiding any investigation into why the first converted king openly rejected Christianity. This decision can be related to the political context of his reign following the arrival of the Portuguese and to the European intentions with regard to the Kongo Kingdom and the Atlantic island of São Tomé.

Significant in this context are the papal bulls of 1452 (Brasio, 1956: 269), and 1455 (Santos, 1993: 60–73), in which the Pope openly authorised the invasion of African kingdoms, the capture of Africans and their subjection to perpetual slavery. On this basis, the Portuguese crown encouraged the colonisation of São Tomé, officially occupied in 1485 (Brasio, 1956) through edicts in which the settlers were exempted from taxes, the establishment of sugar cane plantations was encouraged, and a structure was built on the island to receive and sell captured slaves. In 1493, the Portuguese crown explicitly expressed approval of the capture by the settlers in São Tomé of people from Kongo and neighbouring kingdoms, who were to be sent to the island (Albuquerque and Santos, 1995: 135–136). These documents provide clear evidence of Portuguese interest in enslaving Central Africans by the time they were just arriving at the Congo mouth.

Mani João was the last king to be elected according to Kongo custom and tradition. Afterwards João exiled his son, Mvemba a Nzinga (later crowned Affonso I), and the latter secretly requested Portuguese military support, looking

to seize the kingdom after his father's death. Until then, Kongo kingship had not been hereditary, but was the result of a selection process by a council of local leaders following the death of the king. Therefore, it is possible that Affonso's decision to side with the Portuguese could have been influenced by his desire to inherit the kingdom according to Christian European custom. This event should be viewed as the first political division in Kongo after the arrival of the Europeans. Affonso thus departed from the traditional political election system and affirmed the acceptance of the Christian doctrine, even though part of the elite was against it.

Despite Affonso's having seized power by manipulating Christian principles and European weaponry, another historiographic myth that must be re-evaluated is the one that states that Affonso's reign maintained stable relations with Portugal or the Vatican, as he voluntarily accepted the capture and sale of slaves, and the establishment of the slave trade in the kingdom.

His long rule, from c 1509 to 1542, was indeed characterised by hesitation and contradictions. Nonetheless, many of his ambiguities can be connected to the enormous pressure exerted on him by the Portuguese to pay with human cargo for so-called Portuguese favours. Among the favours an insignificant Christian mission was established in the kingdom, and some children from Kongo sent to Portugal to be educated; however just one of them received significant education in Europe. The Portuguese also loaned weapons, troops and ships which Affonso used to seize power, as well as 'gifts' such as clothes, jewellery, Christian cult objects and books. It is not the intention of this chapter to defend or attack him, yet cognisance must be taken of the small-scale of the favours, in particular the Christian mission, and how it was possible for the Portuguese to ask for human cargo to pay for it. Hence, it is necessary to evaluate the Portuguese strategies in a larger context, which will reveal the extent to which all this was orchestrated.

Let us start with the second fact. In an interesting chapter of the book *A social history of black slaves and freedmen in Portugal (1441–1555)*, the historian AC de CM Saunders studies the establishment of the Portuguese fiscal and administrative framework devoted to the trafficking in African slaves. Based on primary sources, he ascertained that, by 1486, just three years after the Portuguese arrival at the Congo River mouth, the institutional framework for that means had already been established in Portugal. This included a structured bureaucracy with specific titles for office bearers, such as 'steward of slavery finances', 'receiver of Moors', 'Guiné warehouse keeper', 'overseer', 'treasurer', and 'Guiné judge', each one with its own scrivener and subordinates, as well as a complex of buildings under the name 'Casa da Mina e Tratos da Guiné' (Saunders, 1994: 27–31).

Moreover, the Portuguese crown arranged ships, created taxes and instituted stiff penalties to punish any free person who hid a fugitive or expressed their opposition to slavery. However, when it came to Europeans, the penalty for those ‘crimes’ was never slavery, probably, as Saunders (1994: 186) states, because of the crown’s reluctance to punish whites with slavery. These policies, together with the numerous licences and tax exemptions granted to Portuguese settlers on São Tomé, reveal the intentions of Portugal to make the African slave trade virtually its exclusive vocation.

In the meanwhile, as declared in various letters, Kongo kings João and Affonso were looking to engage in trade relations with the Europeans involving particularly copper, ivory and textiles. In addition, they hoped for the establishment of a Christian seat or diocese in the kingdom’s capital.

The Christian mission established at the kingdom of Kongo seems to have been more of an endeavour at embezzlement than saving souls. Whereas in America the colonisers began by constructing churches and genuine missionaries were sent out, the sources contain numerous complaints by the Kongo king that there was no architectural or educational investment either in the Kongo children who returned from Portugal, and that the missionaries were interested only in trade, especially in human cargo (Paiva Manso, 2006: 17) and in territorial exploration beyond the borders of the kingdom. While at first some clergy were retained within the Kongo limits, subsequently, as a petition on the part of the Portugal king, the limits of Kongo kingdom were being spied upon and, half a century later, Luanda was founded on the southern Kongo border.

While many of the documents concerning the education of Kongo children in Portugal were lost in the earthquake of 1755, the surviving sources tell of Affonso’s son Enrique, who studied in Portugal and later in Rome, and who reached one of the highest positions in the Catholic church, being made Auxiliary Bishop in 1518 (Paiva Manso, 2006: 46). He was practically the only Kongoese who received a significant education in Europe during that period. Following his election to this position, his father Affonso wrote more than four letters asking the Vatican to send him to Kongo to perform his duties there, yet, for a number of years these requests were turned down, and Enrique was placed in the Utica Diocese, far away from Kongo. As a result, the creation of a native clergy in Kongo proved impossible, since there was no bishop, the clergy was corrupt, no diocese was established, just one little chapel was built, and it was therefore impossible to ordain priests. These events called into question the intentions behind the so-called favours given by the Portuguese to the Kongo kingdom.

One of the most critical documents referring to the strategies employed by the Portuguese is the *Regimento*, dated 1512. In it, the king of Portugal reveals that

he would lend Mani Affonso the vessels that he had so long been requesting. However, he states that it would be an insult if those vessels were to return empty, owing to the enormous expense of sending them. Therefore, the Portuguese king said, as it was the will of God, the only possible compensation would be to return them filled with slaves, copper and ivory. But the most important thing of all, he repeated, was that they return as soon as possible full of slaves, since the expenses relating to educating Affonso's children in Portugal were enormous. However, Affonso must remember that Portugal's intentions were not related to any economic benefit, but to the growth of the Christian faith in the kingdom of Kongo (Brasio, 1953: 227).

In three postscripts, the king of Portugal issued instructions to the Portuguese ambassadors accompanying the vessels. First, they were to ascertain the type of merchandise in which the people of Kongo traded, whether there was ivory, copper, or slaves to 'rescue', and the quantities of each the manikongo was able to send to Portugal annually. Second, they were to provide a description of the Kongo Kingdom in terms of its size and borders, whether it had vessels, whether the Kongo king had influence among the common people, and the kinds of weapons they used. Finally, they were to describe the belief system in the kingdom, and provide an account of any civil wars being fought (Brasio, 1953: 228–246).

Thus, although the king of Portugal publicly expressed his intentions to advance Christianity in the kingdom of Kongo, the source above provides evidence of other plans. In my view, sending emissaries to discover the size of a kingdom, describe its relations with its neighbours, and ascertain its trade routes and products, constitutes spying and these actions proved to have consequences for years afterwards. We should remember that the Portuguese invaded the southern corner of Kongo to found Luanda, officially landing there in 1530 (Brasio, 1953: 199–200) and that Luanda was in fact the source of the currency used in the kingdom of Kongo: a shell known as *nzimbu*. It is important to notice this event caused sudden inflation in Kongo, destabilising the internal economy (Hilton, 1985: 41).

Mani Affonso wrote many letters in which he complained about the corrupt clergy, theft by merchants in São Tomé (Paiva Manso, 2006: 37–43), defaulting on promises with regard to the construction of more churches (Paiva Manso, 2006: 31–33), and the boarding of vessels for the purpose of capturing and kidnapping people (Paiva Manso, 2006: 36–37). Furthermore, Affonso claimed that his Kongolese relatives received little benefit in terms of their education in Portugal (Paiva Manso, 2006: 43). He asked for vessels, and insisted on the need to establish a diocese in Kongo.

Perhaps the most significant correspondence was a lengthy letter sent by Affonso in 1526 to the Portugal king, in which he stated:

And there is no more harm than the one caused by merchants who draw out the offspring of this land, of our vassals, and of our relatives; since thieves or men of bad conscience rob them with the desire of obtaining the things and merchandise coming from your kingdom, so they kidnap people and bring them here to be sold in such a way, Sir, and their corruption and debauchery is so much, that the land is all depopulating, which should not be considered good or in your favour. That is why we must avoid this, because here we do not need more than priests, wine, and some people to teach at the school, and no other merchandise unless wine and wheat to celebrate Mass. So we ask your majesty to help us in this sense, *in telling your foremen not to send merchants or merchandise since our will is that in these realms there is neither a slave trade nor demand for them* (Paiva Manso, 2006: 54, my translation).

The above document has been quoted by various historians as a statement in which Affonso declared his dissatisfaction with the enslavement of his vassals, but not as a rejection of the establishment of the slave trade in Central Africa. Nevertheless, we should note his use of the plural when declaring the realm's negative opinion of the slave trade, and the fact that he styles himself lord of the Umbundo and neighbouring realms. Therefore, one could interpret Affonso's declaration as a statement uttered by a spokesperson representing a number of other neighbouring kingdoms.

Similar statements opposing the introduction of the slave trade were subsequently made by other Central African societies. The Ovimbundo, for instance, a society located near Benguela, expressly denied the existence of the slave trade within their dominions at least twice in the first quarter of the 17th century. In 1618 they declared: 'In our realm slaves are not rescued, since we are not accustomed to sell one another' (Brasio, 1 series, vol 4, 1953: 340). Later, some Portuguese merchants stated: 'They never wanted to pay baculamentos [taxes], nor rescue slaves, because they are not accustomed. They only deal with harvest production, which is not of your majesty's interest' (Brasio, 1 series, vol. 8, 231).

The continuous rise in slave trafficking during the 17th century, as demonstrated by the vast numbers of Central Africans arriving in the Caribbean, North America, Brazil and South America (Curtin, 1969), shows that the opposition expressed by the African kings was ignored by the Portuguese crown and its vassals, who stepped up the slave trade throughout Central Africa.

Towards a New African History Teaching Methodology

The case of Kongo presented above leads one to question the mainstream historiography that presents the Central African kings as collaborators in the slave trade. It also leads one to ask whether that historiography, disseminated through teaching materials and scientific texts, truly reflects the complexity of the history of those kingdoms during the Atlantic slave trafficking period.

This chapter argues that historians have presented an image of a peaceful, stable and collaborative interaction between the Central African and Portuguese populations as a way of legitimising European political history during the Renaissance period. In that sense, it should be considered a ‘colonised’ historiography, since it does not accurately represent the African or Afro-descendant population who, until now, have not evaluated the complexity of that period in African history, and are unaware of how many of their predecessors in fact opposed the slave trade.

To correct this, in my African history courses I place a great deal of emphasis on primary sources. Instead of using the enormous corpus of materials that sustain ‘colonised’ arguments, I encourage students to read the primary sources directly. I usually use a workshop methodology, with students working in groups to analyse one or two documents per lesson. As a result, by the end of the semester, they have gained an understanding of the complex social processes occurring in a number of African societies during a specific period, and a position toward mainstream historical accounts on the matter. In addition, in my lessons I consider the broader global context that was being created at the beginning of the so-called ‘modern’ period, such as the Catholic and Protestant churches’ history, the tight relations those churches maintained with European crowns and American colonisers, and with the slave trade merchants.

The workshops have had very gratifying outcomes, sometimes eliciting strong emotional responses on the part of Afro-Brazilians, who have said that they had never explored such complex reasoning about the African past. Others have expressed surprise at the biases contained in the history they learnt at school. Most important, however, is that the workshops triggered their interest in research, allowing them to reclaim their own cultural expressions as a true African inheritance. This had lain dormant in most of them, owing to the ‘colonised’ historiography that had led them to believe that anything coming from Africa could not be worth anything.

The re-examination of primary sources should be encouraged by teachers of African history, not only in America, but also in Africa. This strategy will result in a generation of people with analytical skills capable of creating new reasoning and innovative historiographic trends with which to approach African

history. Therefore, I believe that a considerable effort should be made to translate primary sources so that, not only Portuguese or Spanish speakers, but students from all countries, will have access to this literature.

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CHAPTER 20

Invention and Innovation for the Development of Africa

Valentine Jingura

Introduction

‘The sustained prosperity of a nation depends upon the level and quality of its education system.’ After more than 50 years of postcolonial independence, Africa is still struggling in the arena of scientific development. Various challenges have hounded the ‘Cradle of Mankind’ and a concerted effort is required to strengthen science and technology changes in Africa. Marginalisation, war, lack of resources, the brain drain and other culture-related issues have all played a major role in ensuring that the progress of Africa on the scientific front is stifled. Among the challenges is the lack of visionary and consistent intellectual leadership. Science aims at understanding the natural world while technology aims at solving or fixing the concrete problems of the natural world. To date Africa cannot fully utilise its vast wealth of natural resources owing to the fact that she does not have the financial resources or, most importantly, the knowledge to ensure that the value addition process is applied to the raw material extracts from Africa’s natural resources. As a result, African countries continue to be largely underdeveloped, poor and dependant on aid from the developed countries which process Africa’s raw materials and sell them back to African countries at a handsome profit.

The major question is, how can we turn around this situation? How can Africa advance in the arena of Science and Technology? It is commonly stated that the further we look back into the past, the clearer is our path for the future. Looking back at Africa’s history we realise that education or formal education systems have played a very important role. Besides, Africans are to some extent ‘new-comers’ in the capitalist system – for a long time they survived on subsistence farming. Being new in Western education, capitalism and modern technology, Africa constantly finds herself in a rushed developmental quagmire. Trade in Africa was done differently and that is perhaps the reason why our colonial masters took advantage of the communal orientation of Africans. However, the world we live in has always been dynamic; dynamism requires change and the change process in Africa has been painful. The effects of an inherited capitalism,

questions of access to education, especially science and technology education, leadership greed in Africa, all add up.

Scientific and technological knowledge and understanding are at the centre of development. In order for Africa to rise, the children of Africa must equip themselves with quality knowledge because, in the Information Age, the pen is mightier than the sword. Those who have superior knowledge need ethical commitment not to exploit the less knowledgeable. It is no secret that the colonial rulers ensured that our forefathers were less educated than their colonial masters; they undermined indigenous knowledge systems and privileged western education. However, we cannot cry over the mistakes of the past forever. The colonial age is long gone, the opportunities that existed then have vanished; it is the present and the future that now matters. Lest we miss the opportunities that lie in the future, Africa must now act in such a way as to position herself so as to take full advantage of the new opportunities that will arise in the future.

Science Education pre-1980

The era of colonial science saw, among other things, the ‘conquest’ of Africa and the acceleration of scientific research on the vast natural resources that Africa could offer the world, as well as on the cultures and behavioural characteristics of the ‘natives’ in order to control them. The few Africans who were afforded the opportunity to study abroad became puppets of the institutions that sponsored their education. Colonial education was such that it was scarce and not accessible and the number of African students who benefited from it was small. In the Gold Coast, the first Director of Education was appointed in 1890, but by 1902 the number of children in primary and middle schools was only 15 000, rising to 35 000 in 1920 (Mazonde) This represents an average growth rate of 1 000 pupils per year. These students faced many challenges, among them being

- acclimatisation to the European or American way of life
- detachment from family and friends during the period of study, which had a major effect on the emotional stability of the education ‘exiles’
- the research topics studied abroad were vastly different from the problems that were faced back home in Africa.

Essentially, the few students who managed to make it abroad were being used to advance the prerogatives of the imperial states and did little to improve the wellbeing of Africa. On returning to the home countries these educated Africans

faced a number of challenges which eventually would drive some of them back overseas:

- A lack of resources to implement the scientific knowledge that they had acquired at the foreign institutions of learning
- The inability to contextualise the knowledge received abroad to tackle the problems Africa was facing
- A change in the standard of living and the lure of a better life abroad with easy access to essential services such as healthcare, education and communications.

The end result was a growing number of educated Africans who could not in any way contribute to the wellbeing of the continent because of relations with the former colonisers abroad. The few Africans who worked on the continent were overwhelmed with work. Clearly there is a huge knowledge and capacity gap that has to be filled before Africans can advance in the Information Age. This is a challenge even now with many African scientists who have studied abroad – sometimes they have to go overseas because of political reasons, seeking economic refuge, avoiding crime and war in the home countries. It is difficult to stay in one country and have the interests of another country at heart; it is difficult for an African living abroad to comprehend the challenges that are facing the continent. Without comprehension of the problems it would be folly to stand up and propose any solution.

The lack of patriotism has therefore also played its part in the snail's pace of scientific development of Africa.

The Current State of Science in Africa

Great strides have been made in the last 25 years with respect to science education in Africa. However, this is only the beginning and a more concerted effort is required in order to increase scientific literacy on the continent. There are wide disparities between science education in Africa and that of the developed nations. The table below paints a heart-rending picture of how far behind Africa is in the contribution to scientific knowledge globally.

Table 1: Production of science and technology publications (% of world production)

Region	Medical	Biology	Physics	Chemistry	Maths	Engineering Sciences	All disciplines
North America	39,1	42,9	27,3	25,1	34,5	37,7	36,6
Europe	41,5	37,2	36,2	38,1	38,1	31,2	37,5
Sub-Saharan Africa	0,9	0,4	0,2	0,4	0,8	0,4	0,7

Source: Unesco Institute for Statistics

The numbers speak for themselves. Sub-Saharan Africa is years away from catching up with North America and Europe in terms of research and development (R&D) in science and technology. Without a concerted effort to increase the R&D undertaken there is little hope of Africa advancing in these fields. With exploration comes discovery and, hence, innovation. Currently, South Africa, Africa's leading economy, accounts for 29 per cent of the world's share of scientific publications from Africa.

The amounts spent on R&D on the African continent are shown in the following table. In 1991, South Africa had the highest R&D total spend and was the third highest spender per scientist/engineer in the SADC after Seychelles and Rwanda respectively.

Table 2: Research and Development spending in Africa (US\$)

Country	Year	Total Research and Development	R&D as % of GNP	R&D per capita	Average per scientist and engineer
Benin	1989	11 132 613	0,7	2,3	13 217
Burundi	1989	3 379 323	0,3	0,6	19 878
Central African Republic	1984	1 558 017	0,2	0,6	7 949
Gabon	1986	1 097 283	0,0	1,1	5 201
Madagascar	1988	10 213 498	0,5	0,9	44 796
Mauritius	1992	11 373 129	0,4	10,5	29 237
Nigeria	1987	21 481 574	0,1	0,3	16 055

Rwanda	1985	9 071 122	0,5	1,5	127 762
Seychelles	1983	1 899 232	1,3	29,7	105 513
South Africa	1991	1 009 085 838,00	1,0	26,4	83 382

Source: UNESCO, Statistical Yearbook 1996

With an improved R&D spend Africa would gradually gain ground and improve on the current levels of scientific literacy and innovation. Table 3 below shows that Australia and Africa (compared to the rest of the world) have the lowest R&D expenditure. It is no secret that a large chunk of the US\$2 741 billion was contributed by Australia. This figure is nearly 15 per cent of the expenditure by the highest spending region (the Americas) and a paltry five per cent of the total global expenditure. This means that Africa is still a far cry from competing with the US and Europe in technological terms, given the wide disparities in research funding gaps. When funding issues have been addressed and research expenditure starts to build up to decent levels, then can we start talking about improved Science education and development in Africa.

Table 3: Global Research and Development spending (billions of US\$ at purchasing power parity)

	2007 GDP (Billions US\$)	2007 R&D as % of GDP
Americas	18 826	2,19
US	13 844	2,62
Asia	17 267	1,94
Japan	4 290	3,33
China	6 991	1,43
India	2 989	0,69
Europe	15 851	1,73
Rest of the world	2 741	1,28
Total	82 799	1,90

The Challenges in Africa

The problem of limited development in science and technology for the continent is largely a result of a lack of funding. African governments have in the past struggled financially and have had to relegate expenditure on education to the back of the queue whilst concentrating on so-called 'bread and butter issues'. Very few African governments provide funding for graduate students and there are also few African governments that have set up national science foundations that drive research on the African continent. The issue of poor salaries in the public sector (education) relative to the private sector has resulted in a significant skills migration from the public sector, which in turn has resulted in a lack of teaching staff in university faculties. Without adequate instructors it is impossible to expand, let alone admit students for graduate programmes that require intensive research. As a result, the numbers of PhD students continue to dwindle with few that are making it through the ranks of advanced research. Some are being absorbed in corporate research institutions where they are offered better pay. Sadly, many of the big corporate entities are foreign owned and the intellectual property developed on African soil by African minds is sometimes shipped abroad, developed and sold back to African consumers at huge prices. This is a vicious cycle which governments in Africa should seek to curb by investing more in education and the development of science in Africa.

Schools and other institutions of learning are also facing enormous challenges which to date have not been addressed and will also take some time to tackle given the pace of change on the continent. The brain drain has also played its part in robbing Africa of the required human resources to drive the continent forward in terms of science education. This brain drain has often been present as part of development. In 1990, for instance, 62 per cent of engineering doctorates in the US were given to foreign students and the proportion was almost as high in a number of other fields such as mathematics, computer science and the physical sciences (Owen, 1993). In the UK there are 134 500 Africans; of these 14 500 have first degrees and 4600 have advanced degrees. It is estimated that between 1960 and 1975, about '27 000 high-level Africans left the continent for Europe. Between 1975 and 1984, this number increased to about 40 000 and then almost doubled by 1987, representing 30 per cent of the highly skilled manpower stock' (*ACP-EU-Courier*; No. 159; Sept/Oct 1996; p. 59). Africa lost 60 000 professionals (doctors, university lecturers, engineers, etc.) between 1985 and 1990 and has been losing an average of 20 000 annually ever since. The departure of doctors from Africa to other parts of the world is shocking. According to the UNDP Human Development Report (1990), there were more than 21 000 Nigerian doctors practising in the US alone, whilst Nigeria's health

system suffers from a critical lack of medical practitioners; 60 per cent of all Ghanaian doctors trained in Ghana in the 1980s had left the country, while in Sudan, 17 per cent of doctors and dentists, 20 per cent of university lecturers, 30 per cent of engineers and 45 per cent of surveyors in 1978 alone had gone to work abroad. As Africa bleeds because of the brain drain, the effort that African governments put into educating the few that remain has come to nought, as those who have acquired skills and knowledge quickly leave for greener pastures leaving the continent worse off than before.

The other challenges to be faced with regards to science education in Africa are as follows according to the report of the International Mathematical Union (2009):

- Low numbers of mathematics and science teachers at masters and PhD levels. With few professors to mentor the students, the continent continues to struggle to expand the number of adequately qualified science professionals.
- Graduate students suffer from professional and geographic isolation. This means that there is little knowledge sharing and consequently limited professional development.
- Low salaries in the education sector dissuade students from viewing academia as a profession.
- Lack of capacity to accommodate students because of various resource constraints chief among them being teaching staff. For example, in Zimbabwe the Actuarial Science class is limited to a maximum of 12 students per intake and there is only one university in the country offering the programme. This has had a serious impact on the amount of skills available to the market.
- There is also a lack of instrumentation to conduct science classes. It is no use having a large science laboratory that cannot perform the necessary scientific tests. Equipment is often expensive to purchase and the teachers and lab technicians are often inexperienced in maintaining the equipment. In addition, some of the equipment purchased abroad could be affected by the change in climate and hence have a shorter life span. Educational institutions thus will have to fork out much more with regard to scientific equipment, yet this equipment is an essential part of the learning process.

In a nutshell, Africa is faced with a multitude of problems in its bid to develop science on the continent. The challenges are, however, not insurmountable. A solution can be found and continual probing by those involved will open channels for achieving the intended goals.

A Response to the Challenge

It is recognised that science and technology development is a necessary condition for peaceful social development of the continent. This necessity is obvious, but its sustainability requires that adequate human and financial resources be available in this sector. At a very high level, the governments in Africa should develop initiatives to enforce policies that will help nurture the growth and development of science and technology in Africa.

Government Policy

The policy objectives that need to be addressed are as follows:

- The channelling of funds towards R&D. It has been proven that there is a strong correlation between the amount of R&D expenditure and the scientific and technological advancement of any country. Therefore, governments should take the initiative in funding local research projects in order to boost the science and technology space.
- Policies should be put in place to curb the brain drain. In a free market economy the best way to attract or retain high quality staff is to offer competitive rewards. It would be difficult to match salaries in Third World economies with those of First World countries, but if the local people are offered decent salaries and working conditions they are more likely to stay in their home countries than relocate for a marginal increase in pay. Patriotism should be taught from an early age and Africans should realise that it is up to them to leave a good legacy for future generations and to build a platform which will propel future generations to pursue the dreams of their fathers, 'a better and more technological African society'. Forcing people to remain in the country using draconian laws might work but the challenge is to make people productive. It is difficult for demotivated people to be productive because innovation and invention are largely self-driven.
- Private sector institutions should be encouraged to invest more in local research and development. Government could offer tax breaks for funds used in research. It could also enforce policies to ensure that locally conducted research is used locally and not exported abroad.
- The government could also assist by providing loans and funding for students who intend to pursue studies in the area of science, mathematics and technology. A good number of students who wish to pursue higher qualifications are students from disadvantaged and poor backgrounds who view education as a

potential tool for economic emancipation. These are the students who are in dire need of financial assistance.

Education

Access to basic education is the right of every child. A nation cannot advance if its people are not empowered with the right knowledge. It is therefore an obligation of governments to ensure that they educate the youth in order to encourage and empower them. There has been an outcry over the fact that the current science curriculum is not beneficial for African education because it is largely based on the colonial education system. Whilst this position is correct, throwing away the ‘baby with the bath water’ is not the solution. In addition to that, there are constructive initiatives which we as Africans should pilot and we also need to build on the good things colonial education bequeathed. To this end African nations should do the following in order to advance the development of science in Africa:

- Establish strong links among our institutions to ensure that both curriculum and context empower students and challenge them to be innovative in a local context.
- Drive towards an inquiry-based, hands-on science teaching approach that is established as a fundamental component of education at primary school level. Students must embrace science education as a tool for development instead of an abstract subject that is feared by learners. The awareness with regards to science subjects must be raised to levels where the students begin to embrace the usefulness of science education.
- Funding should be provided in order for universities to engage in robust innovation and provide quality education. Research projects undertaken should be of high quality and should be related to sustainable development on the continent.
- Exchange programmes at local, national and international level should be fostered in order to enable knowledge sharing, skills transfer and professional development.
- Educational institutions should form strong links with the relevant industry practitioners, as education without application is a waste. Students should be put in a position where they are able to apply theoretical knowledge to practical situations in their respective fields of work. These industry links should be in the form of internships, joint research initiatives and ‘sandwich’ degree programmes.

Conclusion

The struggle to develop science in Africa has not been a futile one. Many African students are contributing to science and technology worldwide. There are also various African scientific research initiatives that have yielded impressive results, such as:

- The African Centre for Technological Studies (ACTS) in Nairobi, Kenya, which was created in 1988 to conduct in-depth policy research and contribute to the creation of knowledge necessary for Africa's development. The ACTS has emerged as one of Africa's most prominent 'think tanks' in the interrelated field of science, technology and development.
- The African Mathematics Millennium Science Initiative (AMMSI) was established in 2003 and its goal is to nurture the next generation of African mathematicians and mathematical leadership.
- The African Regional Postgraduate Program in Insect Science (ARPPIS) was established in 1983 and was initially in partnership with seven universities. To date there are 35 universities participating in the network. Currently, the programme boasts an output of 202 doctoral and 165 masters' degree level graduates, most of them holding responsible positions in various governmental and private institutions in Africa.

These are just a few of the many achievements, but there is a lot more that has to be done in order to spread the science and technology awareness message to every part of the African continent.

There are still a number of challenges that Africa has to overcome in order to develop science and technology on the continent to respectable levels. To achieve this there needs to be a development from the basics; the most important of which is to educate and retain educated people within the continent. Once that is done the next challenge would be to encourage scientific innovation. This can be achieved only if there are enough resources to undertake research and if there is a direct benefit to the researchers. At all levels of development, funding is required in one form or another. This is another challenge because historically there has never been enough funding for scientific and educational initiatives.

If Africa is to benefit fully from the vast wealth of resources in agriculture, nuclear power and minerals that she is endowed with, home-grown initiatives will have to be developed to harness them. There is great potential for wealth but that wealth has to be unlocked by the use of science and technology. Science and technology knowledge is not something that is inherited but is instead acquired.

By developing our institutions of learning great strides will be made in equipping Africans with the power to fully exploit their wealth.

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CHAPTER 21

The Use of Technology and Leadership in Enhancing Strategic Cooperative Policing within the SADC Region

Ingrid Sinclair and Mpho Matlala

Introduction

Although most SADC countries have become democratic states, the region is plagued by rising levels of crime as a result of socioeconomic inequalities, globalisation processes and transnational organised crime which impact negatively on the peace, security and development of the region. Besides the rise in crime rates, some SADC states have been beset by civil wars and political instability for decades, resulting in underdeveloped police institutions and the underdevelopment of the region. Accordingly, law enforcement agencies are compelled to seek innovative ways of and regional responses to dealing with high crime rates. Finding African solutions to African problems is a saying that was coined by the former President of South Africa, Thabo Mbeki. Finding African solutions to policing problems, particularly in SADC, demands that we explore effective ways of responding to the regional policing needs in democratic environments. This chapter argues that the integration of state-of-the-art information communication technology (ICT) in an overall safety strategy plan of the regional policing and the tactical leadership, which was demonstrated during the 2010 FIFA-Soccer World Cup tournament in South Africa, enhanced peace and security efforts in the region. In this chapter, 'leadership' refers to the effective and efficient use of human, financial, physical and informational resources to achieve the organisation's objectives, which in this case concerned the security of the 2010 FIFA-SWC.

Regional cooperation during the FIFA-SWC was facilitated by SARPPCO (a regional network of police chiefs), whose task it is to facilitate collaboration among law enforcement agencies by planning and executing joint operations, exchanging crime intelligence, providing technical assistance and expertise, logistical support and support or assistance in training. The FIFA-SWC demonstrated how SARPPCO supported the regional police strategically during the event to deal with crime jointly by providing crime intelligence using sophisticated technology (Van der Spuy, 2008: 244). Msutu (2001) claims that in order to meet operational goals SARPPCO, through the technological sharing of crime intelligence,

'has made it possible to conduct police operations that are intelligence-driven'. ICTs used during the FIFA-SWC have allowed SARPCCO to communicate and coordinate police operations beyond South African borders.

Some of the ICTs used by law enforcement agencies that facilitated effective policing during the FIFA-SWC included the following: satellite tracking devices; mobile command centres; mobile cameras with high-tech monitoring equipment which were able to receive live footage from airplanes; e-border systems that constantly scanned international databases to keep track of potentially dangerous people as they travelled; hand-held passport processing devices used at international airports to service new arrivals while they were standing in queues; bomb disposal robots; and biometric fingerprint detection technology. Besides the ICTs, the FIFA-SWC also provided a motivation for the acquisition of technologically advanced equipment such as helicopters, water cannons and retractable fencing (Van der Spuy, 2008: 253). The question raised by social justice activists about whether the finances used to set up the technological infrastructure for the FIFA-SWC could have been used in the reduction of poverty should be weighed up against the long-term goals of employing such technology in intelligence-driven police operations. Lieutenant-General Andre Pruis is of the opinion that the South African Police Service (SAPS) can use the technology inherited from the 2010 FIFA-SWC for future crime prevention (Pruis, 2010).

We recognise that not all countries in SADC have the necessary technological resources or infrastructure to enhance policing in their states. We argue that, notwithstanding the resource constraints in some of the SADC states which impact negatively on professional policing, the knowledge, skills and experiences acquired through collaboration during the FIFA-SWC have contributed to regional ownership of common and individual national security and safety. The chapter suggests that the skills acquired during the event can be transferred by regional police to regional policing operations. Van der Spuy (1997) agrees by stating that:

... police cooperation can be considered a source of dynamism for new ideas and new methods to become institutionalised. In the Southern African region, amidst institutional underdevelopment of police institutions, a mobilisation of policing resources across states may be one way of bolstering the organisational capacity of policing agencies in the face of some formidable challenges.

The SAPS attributed the success of the 2010 FIFA-SWC to good planning, cooperation, and effective policing *using state of the art technology* (authors'

emphasis), and the effective implementation of the security plan (Pruis, 2010). It is contended that all of the success factors identified by the SAPS are functions of good leadership. There is need to extract the best practices from the regional coordination initiatives that took place during the FIFA-SWC and replicate them in daily policing operations with a view to enhancing the quality of safety and security in the SADC region. In order to do so, there is need to examine critically the sociopolitical landscape of Africa within which policing is undertaken. To do this the chapter begins by contextualising the challenges of policing in the SADC region. It then proceeds to discuss the way in which cooperative policing, leadership and technology intersect to create effective policing. The FIFA-SWC is used as an example to illustrate this collaboration. The chapter concludes by underlining the lessons learnt from this 2010 world soccer event.

Methodology

The research that produced the knowledge presented and analysed in the chapter consisted of an extensive literature review on the state of policing in Southern Africa, police cooperation and the use of technology in policing and a conference presentation by Lieutenant-General Pruis who was in charge of policing operations during the FIFA-SWC. A content analysis of media, government and other reports about the FIFA-SWC was also conducted. While the findings reported in this chapter are limited to a focus on research reports and a conference presentation, they speak to the broader literature on policing in Southern Africa, the challenges of police cooperation and the use of technology in policing environments that are underresourced.

The State of Policing in Southern Africa

Most countries in the global South have over the last 20 years made successful transitions from autocratic to democratic states. These democratic changes have been accompanied by, and are complicated by, a concomitant rise in gender violence, other violent crimes, corruption and organised (transnational) crime (including the trafficking in illegal goods, women and children), which result in public insecurity within these emerging democracies, some of them also emerging from conflicts. It is generally agreed that peace, security and adherence to the rule of law are basic requirements for stability, development and economic growth. A study of five African countries conducted by Van der Spuy and Röntsch (2008: 78) illustrates the complex relation between governance, security and development. The study found that despite economic growth in four of the five

countries (Nigeria, South Africa, Tanzania, Kenya, and Uganda) ‘capital cities and other major conglomerations have increasingly become crime prone’. The authors point out that in these countries development was not necessarily the answer to dealing with high crime rates, but that it led to more serious crimes. This highlights the paradox between crime and development. For example, the most developed country in Africa (South Africa) has the highest levels of serious crimes.

The research results show that there are multiple and complex reasons for the rise in crime rates in developing democracies in Africa. Some of the reasons are, amongst others, the colonial and apartheid history of countries such as South Africa and Namibia; civil wars (Mozambique, Angola and the Democratic Republic of the Congo); urbanisation; and the underdevelopment of the region as a whole. Barolsky and Pillay (2009: 15) add reasons for the rise in violent crimes within the SADC region as the deepening of economic inequalities that resulted from the democratisation and globalisation processes. The authors also argue that violent crime has a ‘fracturing effect on society and impedes the state’s ability to deepen and consolidate its democratisation processes’. They are aware that the perceived inability of certain individual African states to respond to violent crimes ultimately undermines the very legitimacy of those states.

The police are tasked with dealing with the high crime rates while securing the safety and security of citizens. They frequently revert to punitive and militarised responses in dealing with the high crime rates. Rauch and Van der Spuy (2006: 16) argue that ‘the rise in crime, together with the emergence of new forms of organised crime and the increase in public insecurity to which they give rise complicate democratic reform efforts. In such contexts ..., more punitive and militarised responses to criminality are evoked’.

Besides having to deal with unacceptable crime levels, the police in Southern Africa in particular are faced with further challenges such as poor investigative competence, which often results in the lack of credible evidence, and limited forensic analysis capacities that lead to low prosecution rates (Chikwanha, 2010). Research by Rauch and Van der Spuy (2006), Van der Spuy and Röntsch (2008), Geyer (2008) and Chikwanha (2010) also highlight the following challenges faced by the police in Southern Africa: poor public perceptions of the police because of the latter’s inability to administer law and order; high levels of police brutality and allegations of human rights violations; lack of police accountability owing to weak oversight mechanisms; poor or no response to crime calls and late arrival of police at crime scenes; lack of professionalism in handling offences; use of unnecessary levels of violence in apprehending suspects; violation of the rights of persons in police custody; underfunded and inaccessible police stations;

perceived corruption in the police service; political interference in policing; and unequal access to technology and resources.

The issues outlined above do not provide an exhaustive list of the challenges that confront the police in Southern Africa, but they serve to illustrate the difficulties that the police are faced with on a daily basis. In order to effect change in the state of policing, a multi-layered approach to change should be embarked on in the political and societal spheres. Such an approach entails pursuing developmental goals whilst institutionalising human rights practices in the police. These challenges underscore the need for the police in SADC to share resources, ideas and skills in a cooperative manner in order to secure regional security. The 2010 FIFA-SWC serves as an example where strategic leadership and international cooperation using sophisticated technology can, despite the above-mentioned shortcomings in policing, still enhance effective policing.

The Use of Technology in Policing

Owing to the increasing levels of sophisticated crime, every police agency in the SADC, regardless of size, must have the capacity to understand the implications of using technology for effective policing. Effective policing demands that police have adequate resources and crime information to deal with crime. The power of technology in improving policing operations, their safety and overall performance is indisputable. Pruis (2010) is of the opinion that the police can use technology to complement their core functionalities, such as crime intelligence analysis. The police use technology to analyse the crime data that is gathered for the purposes of understanding crime patterns and planning operational strategies. Thus, it is fundamental that the police should institute organised technological mechanisms to receive, manage, report and share critical information relating to crime. During the FIFA-SWC, the police used the crime information gathered to follow a geographic approach to dealing with crime incidents (Pruis, 2010).

Currently, the Geographic Information Systems (GIS), Global Positioning Systems (GPS) and Automated Vehicle Locator (AVL) are used in more developed countries, such as in the United States of America, England and Canada, in crime control and prevention. The same were used in South Africa during the FIFA-SWC to enhance policing operations. These technologies are used collectively to triangulate crime information and geographic coordinates based on time, to locate the movement and position of police vehicles in real time, to visualise and manipulate the geographic data used for statistical analysis, and to display the output from the analysis.

Despite the strategic support provided by organisations such as the African Union (AU), most police agencies in Africa are still unable to optimise or even employ technology in their fight against crime, owing to a variety of challenges (SAPS, 2009: 35). Such challenges relate to rural/urban inequalities, a lack of or limited technological infrastructure and the lack of human capabilities (technical competence). SADC recognises the challenges that accompany the use of technologies within its law enforcement agencies. For this reason, the SADC Parliamentary Forum stated in Maputo in July 1998 that there was a dire need to develop and strengthen institutional capacities (United Nations, 2008: 27). Given the infrastructural limitations and the under-resourcing of SADC police agencies, strengthening institutional capacities is a challenging project. This is compounded by the other challenges associated with the socioeconomic development priorities that the countries have to deal with.

Besides the infrastructural limitations that impede the use of technology in policing, there are a number of issues regarding technology that impact on the effective use of ICTs to combat crime. Police agencies in Africa are not always sufficiently equipped and trained to use technology to deal with the high levels of crime. In order to address such challenges, SADC has developed the Strategic Indicative Plan for the Organ on Politics, Defence and Security Cooperation (SIPO), which outlines the objectives of the regional integration agenda (United Nations, 2008: 1). These include the development of human capital and technology and other resources, including the state of policing for the overall development of the region (SADC, 2010). However, there is a gap between the policy document and its translation into realistic programmes of action. This makes it difficult for police chiefs at SARPPCO level to provide strategic support for law enforcement operations within the region. It thus makes sense for the police in the region to collaborate by pooling resources, skills and knowledge where possible in order to address shortcomings among the SADC police.

The SAPS, in particular, is guided and supported by the Information Technology Resource Strategy (ITRS) and its Strategic Plan for 2005–2010. These documents provide a framework that can support the police in implementing information-driven policies and practices aimed at achieving their organisational strategic objectives (South Africa, 2002; SAPS, 2005; Strategic Plan, 2005–2010). The existence and effective implementation of policies laid a solid foundation for the strategic involvement of Interpol and SARPPCO during the 2010 SWC.

Notwithstanding the structural difficulties and resource constraints within policing agencies in the region, there is no doubt that when common goals are

pursued through collaborative efforts and the use of sophisticated technology, the end results are effective policing operations.

The Use of Technology in Regional Policing

The transnational nature of crime, which is influenced by the global information economy, has highlighted the need for the cooperation of regional police agencies and the use of sophisticated technology to assist in combating crime. From the preceding discussion it is clear that, in order for policing agencies to deal with the rising crime rates, there is a need for coherent and coordinated regional approaches to addressing the crime rates. The effective use of technology can assist in facilitating such cooperation. Various scholars (West, 2004; Sorensen and Pica, 2005; Zhao, Bi, Chen, Zeng, Lin and Chau, 2006; Van der Spuy, 2008) argue that technology equips the police with new operational tactics that also support intra-police agency collaborations aimed at moderating crime and anarchy. The advantages of technology in facilitating such regional cooperation in SADC have been demonstrated in cross-border police operations led by SARPCO which led to several arrests and convictions of criminals during the FIFA-SWC.

Although the success of technology largely depends on its widespread application, we cannot assume that technologies are value-neutral, since they have both beneficial and damaging effects (Muller, 2000 in Moodley, 2005: 5). The benefits of technology relate to the advancements in technology that have created a digital revolution, which has turned the world into a global village where the flow of information is easier and communication is less costly (Laudon and Laudon, 2004; Shih, 2004: 719; Kotler and Keller, 2006: 13; Nissan, 2008: 46). The inverse of this is also true – the globalisation of criminality and increased threats to the safety and security of individuals have been ascribed to advancements in technology (Lebeya, 2007).

The success and effectiveness of policing in the SADC region depend on whether managers can jointly facilitate strategic management in both the national and the regional spheres of policing. During the FIFA-SWC, exceptional leadership and interagency cooperation between different law enforcement agencies such as Interpol, SARPCCO, other international agencies and the SAPS illustrate how technology, intelligence and cooperation combined with an excellent security plan can result in effective law enforcement. This increased cooperation among police agencies has resulted in enhancing peace and stability (Zhao et al, 2006: 616; Interpol, 2008: 67), as was witnessed during the FIFA-SWC event. Cooperative networks also require strategic support from international and continental bodies and the training of police personnel to ensure that officers are suitably skilled

to use technologies, to carry out successful crime-combating operations and to improve on service delivery (Pillay, 2004: 599; SAPS, 2009: 35).

Given the sociopolitical realities of the SADC region, this chapter does not suggest that security operations during the 2010 FIFA-SWC can be used as a model for all policing problems, but there are lessons to be learnt about strategic support and leadership provided at international, regional and national levels. These actions contributed to the safe hosting of the entire FIFA-SWC event and can be regarded as the ‘epitome of success in collaborative policing’. In a media briefing, the FIFA president, Sepp Blatter, awarded South Africa an excellent rating of 9 out of 10 for hosting the most successful tournament in the history of the FIFA World Cup. The use of ICT featured prominently in that success story (South Africa the Good News 2010).

Strategic and Technological Support during the 2010 FIFA World Cup

The successes of policing during the FIFA-SWC depended on timely detailed planning and efficient operational strategies that were linked to budgets. Intensive planning for the tournament began in 2004, when a comprehensive and adequately resourced integrated security strategy was compiled. This strategy included identifying the training needs of security personnel, vetting of fans and instituting security processes (Van der Spuy, 2008: 253). This security strategy was facilitated through the promulgation of the 2010 Soccer World Cup special events’ measures in 2006 (as per FIFA regulations) and the finalisation of the SADC security plan in 2008.

Most of the human and material resources used in security operations during the 2010 FIFA-SWC came from the SAPS, with additional resources deployed by the Department of Justice (dedicated special courts), the metro police departments, the South African National Defence Force and the intelligence community (Burger and Omar, 2009: 15). These different role players contributed an array of knowledge and skills that were used for crime intelligence. Two months before the event, Interpol, the chiefs of police, heads of security and police liaison officers from all 32 participating nations convened and coordinated their security plans (Interpol, 2010). During a press briefing on 29 June 2010, General Bheki Cele, the National Commissioner of the SAPS, ascribed the success of the World Cup to intelligence-driven policing.

During the 2010 FIFA-SWC, there was an unprecedented operational coherence between international, continental, regional and national police bodies. To coordinate the proceedings strategically, the SAPS set up a National Joint Operational and Intelligence Structure (NATJOCS), in terms of which a team of

high-level government officials met daily as the Joint Operational Committee (JOCOM) under the leadership of Lieutenant-General Andre Pruis. The role of this team was to analyse daily media reports to assess the previous day's situation and respond immediately to crime threats. This team reported to the National Commissioner and used intelligence-gathered information to plan for the next 24 hours (SAPS, 2010). The NATJOCS followed a geographical approach by making police more visible in and around the stadia, using technologies such as CCTVs, GPS, GIS and AVL to collect, analyse and identify crime problems in their geographic locations, and to respond to them appropriately. The exceptional leadership that was provided during the FIFA-SWC, supported by the use of sophisticated technology, contributed to building a shared vision among policing agencies and citizens alike. It also served to inspire and motivate members of the police to share a common goal and work for extended hours.

State-of-the-art technology and about 40 000 police officers were deployed to increase security during the event. Besides the local policing arrangements, international police involvement was also crucial. Two hundred and twenty-five foreign police officials were deployed and twenty-eight of these officials were from foreign countries whose teams participated in the tournament. These officers were deployed in an advisory capacity to assist the SAPS in understanding the behaviour of fans from the participating countries, and identifying those who may have threatened security during the event. The international police delegation formed part of the Interpol Major Events Support Team (IMEST), which was stationed at the International Police Cooperation Centre (IPCC) in Pretoria. International cooperation created opportunities for the police to share information and ideas on policing. The IMEST was placed in South Africa well ahead of the 2010 FIFA-SWC to help secure the event. Its task was to make critical data accessible through access to Interpol's databases in order to detect possible threats of terrorism, hooliganism and serious crimes. This team was also responsible for making information available to the event's key security personnel to assist in informing operational and strategic decisions. The IMEST was posted strategically at ports of entry, team-based hotels and stadia, both during and after the tournament. This team provided technological passport control mobile units that assisted with the checking and profiling of suspects (SAPS, 2010). As already pointed out, the strategy to ensure safety included close working relations between the SAPS, Interpol and SARPCCO, whose strategic support proved to be invaluable.

In addition to the structures set up for security during the event, representatives from SARPCCO established a joint operation centre at the IPCC. The SARPCCO joint operational centre (SARCO JOC) was linked to the NATJOC and to

information centres in SARPCCO countries. The SARPCCO JOC was responsible for monitoring the movement of organised crime syndicates and other transnational crimes between South Africa and its neighbours (Pruis, 2010). To achieve this goal, SARPCCO deployed police officers along the borders of countries that neighbour South Africa. ICTs were instrumental in helping SARPCCO coordinate the security of foreign VIPs and spectators in transit to the tournament. The SARPCCO activities during the event led to the criminal conviction of suspects who were arrested for, amongst other things, suspicion of terrorism, selling unauthorised tickets and merchandise, theft, and armed robbery. The 2010 SWC demonstrated how police cooperation, information sharing and communication can help in safety and security. The easy flow of information, in which technology serves as a catalyst, is critical in securing international events. Before June 2010, critics argued that the high crime rates in South Africa cast doubt over the nation's ability to host a problem free tournament (Symonds, 2010). What these critics overlooked was the country's commitment to minimising potential problems through an effective and integrated security plan, a goal that was realised. Media reports have shown that there was a reduction in violent crime during the SWC (Smith, 2010).

One needs to be mindful that replicating the lessons from the 2010 SWC is not easy. The event had a massive security budget of R1,6 billion (Symonds 2009). Most sub-Saharan African countries cannot afford to spend such amounts given the socioeconomic challenges in the country. However, the existence of various platforms, such as the Renaissance Fund and others, could go a long way to resourcing and capacitating the police's technological infrastructure. Over and above sourcing the finances for technology, the principles embedded within the security plan for the 2010 SWC could still be replicated in other police operational plans.

Lessons Learnt from the 2010 FIFA World Cup

The principles that underlie the success of the 2010 FIFA-SWC are lessons that we could replicate in certain aspects of operational policing. The various security activities that unfolded prior to and during the tournament have in many ways proven to the international community that Africa has the capacity to host major mega events. The South African government spent an estimated R665 million on resources, which included the security technology used during the event (South Africa 2010).

The following are the lessons that can be extracted:

- The 2010 FIFA-SWC has provided the SAPS with the opportunity to exchange ideas, data and operational knowledge with regional and international security personnel.
- Opportunities for cooperative police networking and intelligence sharing within the region were made possible through joint strategic planning.
- Planning by and coordination of various government departments brought together the joint operational and intelligence structures (JOINTS) which worked well during the Confederations Cup and once again proved to be a strategy that should be adopted for all major international events (Burger and Omar, 2009).
- The detailed planning for the tournament proceeded well in advance due to dedicated financial resources.
- The constant monitoring and evaluation facilitated real-time problem identification and problem-solving police interventions during the tournament – an example of this was the arrest of a suspect who went into one of the team's dressing rooms during a match in Cape Town and the suspect was spotted on CCTV cameras.
- The existence of sound regulatory tools, such as the promulgation of the 2010 Soccer World Cup special events measures and the SADC security plan, backed by a strong political will, facilitated the effective involvement of international role players in policing.
- Contingency plans such as the immediate dispatching of police personnel to four different venues (Soccer City and Ellis Park in Johannesburg, Green Point stadium in Cape Town and Moses Mabhida stadium in Durban) during the security personnel industrial action, showed strategic leadership.
- A well-planned and coordinated media campaign not only kept the public informed but also rallied the people's identity of nationhood; regular media briefings by the police about crime incidents and police actions in dealing with these incidents worked well in terms of allaying the fears of the public.
- The immediate investigation by dedicated teams of investigators and the immediate prosecution of criminals sent a message to the public that the police were organised and able to deal with criminality.
- The heavy police visibility in and around stadia, as well as in fan parks, created the feeling of an omnipresent police force and this served as a deterrent to criminals and would-be criminals.
- Apart from the state-of-the-art technology used during the event, the re-skilling of police officers through event-specific training and in the use of technology, enhanced the approach to policing.

- The presence of international police agencies left a legacy of global sharing best practices in the policing environment.
- The security preparations proved to be premised on an undertaking by the SAPS that human life should be placed far above any monetary investment, equipment or politics.
- The police should always plan well, so that their spending is not only accountable in terms of legislation, but is also aligned to achieving clear goals, in terms of their plan.

Conclusion

Technology can be an effective tool in combating crime if it is used innovatively to enhance the effectiveness of the police and to improve cooperative networks. Some of the challenges that the police face in using technology relate not only to knowing the type of skills required for the use of technology, but also to realising the legal and ethical issues linked to the use of technology in policing.

In the SADC region, however, one of the major challenges is the unstable political climate in some of the countries and a lack of infrastructure. These challenges can be overcome through skills transfer that takes place when the police engage in joint operations in various regions of Africa. Thus, it is critical that the police should use technology not only to report, receive and share information relating to crime, but also to share best practices such as the success story of the 2010 FIFA-SWC. In all the events, the government assured the millions of visiting fans and its citizens that they would be safe. As regards the FIFA-SWC, the fact that the tournament occurred in a secure environment where everyone rallied around a common goal showed that the well-resourced comprehensive security plans contributed to the safe and secure environment. Not only did South Africa have the best technological support in World Cup soccer history, but it also provided satisfactory strategic leadership. Various role-players from all of South African society, and the regional and international communities, also contributed to an overall safety environment that is conducive to effective policing.

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CHAPTER 22

The Significance of Infrastructure Development in the Realisation of Sustainable Development in Africa: The Case of Research and Development

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Introduction

Infrastructure development occupies a central position in the realisation of sustainable development in Africa. This means that for Africa to turn around the scourge of underdevelopment and to achieve sustainable development, viable infrastructure should be in place. In a nutshell, infrastructure development and management are crucial to efficient development in Africa; it is the cornerstone of socioeconomic progress. Infrastructure plays a pointed, often decisive, role in determining the overall productivity and development of a country's economy, as well as the quality of life of its citizens (Afeikhena, 1999: 1). Accordingly, the importance of research and development cannot be overemphasised, as it is through research that knowledge about the intended development within a state could be realised. Hence, in the absence of research and development for gaining innovative knowledge, it is inevitable that Africa will not achieve viable infrastructure or sustainable development. In addition, the scourge of underdevelopment and the large number of landlocked countries justify the need for viable infrastructure development in Africa.

This chapter sets out to explore the significance of infrastructure development and management in achieving economic development in Africa by looking at the development of transportation systems, water and sanitation, telecommunications and the internet, and electricity supply, as well as the importance of infrastructure development in landlocked countries. The chapter argues that, unless viable infrastructure is developed, Africa will remain underdeveloped.

Research and Development

Research and development refer to the creative work undertaken on a systematic basis to increase the stock of knowledge, including knowledge about human beings, culture and society, and the use of this stock of knowledge to devise new

applications (OECD, 2008). It also intends investigating activities aimed at making discoveries that can lead to the development of new products or procedures, and the improvement of existing ones.

Research and development is a term covering three activities: basic research, applied research, and experimental development. Basic research is experimental or theoretical work undertaken primarily to acquire new knowledge of the underlying foundation of phenomena and observable facts, without any particular application or use in view (OECD, 2008). Applied research is also original investigation undertaken in order to acquire new knowledge. It is, however, directed primarily towards a specific practical aim or objective (OECD, 2008). Experimental development is systematic work, drawing on existing knowledge gained from research and/or practical experience, which is directed at producing new materials, products or devices, to installing new processes, systems and services, or to improving substantially those already produced or installed (OECD, 2008). Research refers to the knowledge acquired after investigation, while development concerns the most economically feasible method for applying the facts or principles identified by research before a product goes into full-scale production (Anon, 2008: 1).

Research is another way of attaining new knowledge and information about the intended changes. Accordingly, research seeks to make basic discoveries and uncover new principles or facts so far unknown or unrecognised. Access to adequate information is critical in the decision-making processes because decisions are reached only after careful consideration of diverse perspectives. However, it is through research that adequate information can be attained. It is, therefore, unavoidable that research and development are essential for the recognition of feasible infrastructure development that will advance the prospects for achieving sustainable development in Africa. Most impressively, research and development involve looking at the existing knowledge and new knowledge that come into the picture after research and then drawing conclusions based on both. This should help governments and policymakers to identify deficiencies impeding the realisation of effective infrastructure development in the continent and to improve the policy response. It is also clear that without research and development efforts, the desired and desperately needed sustainable development in Africa will remain unattainable. This is informed by the understanding that research and development seek to bring in new knowledge which will, in the context of this study, improve the existing infrastructure and give direction that will lead to the development of the intended infrastructure. Hence, African governments should give research and development special attention.

Defining Infrastructure

According to Afeikhena (1999: 1), infrastructure refers to all basic inputs into and requirements for the proper functioning of an economy. Mody (1999) defines infrastructure as the facilities that provide society with the services necessary to accomplish daily life and to engage in productive activities; whilst Jahan and McCleery (2005: 7) define infrastructure as investment in various physical assets and services, which include roads, telecommunications, bridges, highways, transport, ports, power, piped water supply and sanitation. Drawing from these definitions, infrastructure can be seen as the basic systems and services that are necessary for efficient development and the enhancement of people's living conditions. Infrastructure is also the means by which efficient development is brought about within a society that relies heavily on it, that is, the backbone of a nation's success in socioeconomic spheres. In other words, infrastructure is a cornerstone for sustainable development because upon it rests all the qualities necessary for sustainable economic development. It is therefore apparent that the availability of sufficient infrastructure in Africa would ensure societal wellbeing by enabling human and social development in a society, which is important for a country's development.

The Significance of Infrastructure Development

An adequate supply of infrastructure services has long been viewed as a key ingredient for economic development, both in the academic literature as well as in the policy debate (Calderon and Serven, 2008). This is also reflected by Africa's own blueprint, the New Partnership for Africa's Development (NEPAD), which argues that infrastructure is a pressing priority because it provides the vital underpinnings of any prosperous economy (Madamombe, 2005). In other words, infrastructure constitutes a core aspect of economic development and as such we cannot talk of sustainable development without infrastructure development. It is therefore clear that the lack of basic infrastructure is a defining characteristic of poverty (Madamombe, 2005).

The development of infrastructure and services is critical for promoting and sustaining continental economic development, trade and investment (African Development Bank, African Union, and New Partnership for Africa's Development, 2006). However, a lack of infrastructure leads to increased production and transaction costs, which lessens the competitiveness of businesses, and therefore the possibility of implementing economic and social development policies. Furthermore, the business environment will be less conducive for attracting foreign direct investment (African Development Bank, African Union,

and New Partnership for Africa's Development, 2006). It is apparent that access to improved infrastructure could empower people to contribute to sustainable development. This observation is informed by the understanding that sustainable development demands a significant contribution by the citizens. However, it is only when people are enjoying civil rights or an improved quality of life that they can contribute to sustainable development and such prospects rely heavily on their access to the resources necessary to meet basic needs.

What is crucial about infrastructure is that it is key to the achievement of sustainable development. In other words, infrastructure plays a central and meaningful role in shaping the sound development of a country's socioeconomic spheres, which in turn improves the quality of life of nationals. Inadequate infrastructure results in reduced service options and lack of quality being available to the population, particularly the most vulnerable segments (ADB African Development Bank, African Union, and New Partnership for Africa's Development, 2006). Without doubt, the provision of infrastructure addresses people's most critical needs. Hence, it is crucial that the supply of infrastructure indeed takes place in order to advance the quality of life of society and the prospects for achieving sustainable development in Africa. Doing so would mean there could be a great improvement in the socioeconomic conditions of many people. Infrastructure supply should focus initially, as indicated above, on transportation systems, water supply and sanitation, telecommunications and the internet, and electricity.

Transportation Systems

Transport infrastructure is a prerequisite for the viable economic development of a country. An efficient transport infrastructure is necessary in order for any country to compete effectively in today's economy (Mbwana, 1997), particularly bearing in mind the critical role transportation systems play in trade connections between countries; that is, transportation systems are the key to trade connections and economic development. In other words, the link between transportation infrastructure and economic development occupies a significant place in the development plans for Africa (Njon, 2000). In addition, transportation systems constitute an important sector for the enhancement of economic growth and the socioeconomic integration of the African region, particularly the promotion of intra- and extra-African trade (Afeikhena, 1999: 1). For Africa to realise sustainable transport infrastructure all available modes of transportation should be given attention. This may have pleasant effects on the part of investors because such infrastructure will increase accessibility and improve mobility. However, the realisation of sustainable transportation systems should be given priority because

these will guarantee economic development on the continent. Concurring with the above statement, Africa cannot attract private investment if there is no basic transport infrastructure to access potential areas of investment (Mbwana, 1997).

In Africa, road transport is the most widely used means of transportation (Mbwana, 1997). However, it is not without its challenges. The development of efficient regional transport has remained elusive in most parts of Africa (Torero and Chowdhury, 2005: 4) as road conditions are appalling, especially in Central Africa (Anon, 2007: 2). The condition of the transport systems, especially roads, is likely to push up vehicle maintenance costs, an outcome that is likely to discourage investment and undermine economic development regionally and continentally.

Reportedly, in the Central African Republic lies the corridor known to be one of Africa's worst for shippers struggling to get their goods to and from the international markets and this has hampered trade for thousands and takes a substantial toll on the price of doing business regionally (Anon, 2007: 2). It is apparent that if regional business ceases as a result of poor transportation systems, the prospects for achieving sustainable development are likely to falter. This is particularly so because the realisation of sustainable development is a continental objective and an indisputable fact in this regard is that the realisation of such objectives has to begin within the regions and then spread out continentally. It is therefore critical that this issue be given considerable attention to prevent failure to achieve the envisaged development in Africa.

Furthermore, transportation costs in Central Africa are among the highest on the continent, according to research done in preparation for the Transport and Transit Facilitation Project (Anon, 2003: 2). The most nagging transportation problems in the continent are associated more with poorly maintained and sometimes completely neglected transportation facilities than with the complete absence of such facilities (Njon, 2000). The understanding is that the development and maintenance of transportation systems in Africa has been undermined by the violent conflicts fought in the continent. In support of the preceding statement, Faye, McArthur and Snow (2004) assert that most African countries have experienced violent conflicts in the past decades often making transport routes unusable.

Poor economic status has also prevented Africans from developing viable transportation systems that are efficient in bringing about sound economic growth and development. This has mostly been the result of the underdevelopment that has haunted the continent since the early days of decolonisation. It is of crucial importance for Africa to construct adequate transportation systems in order to attract the foreign direct investment so desperately needed in

the continent and to boost economic growth and development. Globalisation and regional integration require effective regional transportation systems and communication infrastructure in order to integrate markets, achieve economies of scale, encourage the participation of the private sector, and attract foreign direct investment and technology (Anon, 2008). The realisation of these aspects constitutes major essential components for sustainable development. However, with its current poor transportation systems Africa is unlikely to experience opportunities offered by foreign countries such as foreign direct investment, as investors generally do not want to risk their investments in a condition that does not guarantee more profits than losses.

Owing to the fact that Africa has a considerable number of landlocked countries, the development of transportation facilities has become even more essential. The economic survival of these countries, especially in terms of trade, depends on neighbouring countries, especially for imports and exports. Moreover, landlocked countries and small island developing states do not have access to the viable means of transport needed to seize the opportunities offered by the rule-based international trading system (Anon, 2008). The transportation infrastructure provision in these countries is demonstrably poor relative to other African countries, thus constituting an impediment to the growth potential of these economies (Afeikhena, 1999: 1). This is underlined by the high cost of fuel when delivering goods to and from harbours, as well as the cost of access to pass through neighbouring territories. To substantiate this it has been argued that one of the most striking features of landlocked countries is their dual vulnerability; that is, they are vulnerable on their own account and on account of being dependent on one or more transit countries (Anon, 2003: 1). It is apparent that, for most landlocked countries, high transport costs remain the single most detrimental obstacle to their equitable access to global markets and competition with other countries. Furthermore, their transport costs can be three times more than the tariffs imposed by the developed countries on goods from landlocked countries (Anon, 2003: 5). As a result, landlocked developing countries are among the poorest in the world (Anon, 2003: 5). It is thus obvious that lack of territorial access to the sea, isolation, remoteness from world markets, and high transport and transit costs experienced by landlocked developing countries (LLDCs) impose serious constraints on their overall socioeconomic development, including their trade competitiveness (Anon, 2003: 5). Therefore, unless the structural problems facing LLDCs are adequately addressed, there is a real risk of a relative lack of integration in the African economy, especially for those LLDCs whose neighbouring export and transit markets are similarly poor (Anon, 2003: 5).

However, this situation is not likely to affect only the LLDC, but also the continent as a whole, presenting great setbacks to the efforts made thus far in realising the most desired sustainable development. Since Africa consists of fifteen landlocked countries out of fifty-three and that connecting infrastructure across borders is even more difficult for one country, these are issues of concern. Besides, given that the transport system forms a core economic apparatus, without this being up to standard sustainable economic growth and development is unlikely to be attainable. There is a need for transport systems to be given top priority from a regional and a continental perspective in Africa for the sake of attaining sustainable development.

Water Supply and Sanitation

The need for good water supply and sanitation infrastructure has to be widely recognised as an essential component of social development. This is because water supply and sanitation meet some of the most important basic needs in the development and maintenance of societal wellbeing. Safe drinking water and basic sanitation are of crucial importance to the preservation of human health, (WWC, 2010: 1) as water-related diseases are the most common cause of illness and death among the poor of developing countries (WWC, 2010: 1).

It has also been argued that safe water and good sanitation infrastructure are essential for the protection of community health in that they limit the transmission of infectious diseases and assist in the maintenance of a sanitary home environment (Warner and Abate, 2005). Moreover, good sanitation infrastructure supports good health by putting in place barriers to the disease-causing organisms that spread through poor waste management (*City Press*, 2008). Water is a basic need and the provision of a safe water supply and sanitation addresses the most critical needs of the people. It is therefore crucial that the supply remains consistent in order to maintain societal health standards, as doing so would mean there could be a great improvement in the health conditions of many people and would also contribute greatly to the enhancement of the standard of living and human dignity by freeing people, mainly women and youth, from the drudgery of water carrying and providing them with more time to engage in other activities (Warner and Abate, 2005). If society is in good health, governments will need to spend less on medication, which is likely to boost economic development and reduce poverty; the reason being that there would be more healthy people with the ability to work and contribute to their country's development efforts. This is essential for enhancing the prospects for attaining sustainable development.

Based on the above information, it is clear that poor water supply and sanitation have harmful effects on society and are likely to hamper efforts for sustainable development. It has been argued that the water and sanitation sector in Africa is facing common challenges, with 30 per cent of the population in 36 countries lacking access to safe water and 50 per cent lacking adequate sanitation (DeVillier and Nieuwoudt, 2003). This is likely to lead to poor economic development because of health problems and a lack of manpower to contribute to economic activities. As a direct consequence of an inadequate water supply and sanitation, Africa's development is hampered by poor health, leading to lost productivity (Owari, 2008: 1). Hence, poor water supply and sanitation infrastructure are likely to exacerbate the already existing problems, which make the prospects of enhancing the human living conditions even more difficult.

DeVillier and Nieuwoudt (2003) point out that more than three million people are without a water supply or sanitation in Africa. According to these authors, this may lead to diseases such as cholera and river blindness. Given the recent cholera outbreak in Zimbabwe, one would understand that the effects of poor water supply and a lack of sanitation are intolerable and detrimental to social development. This is supported by the fact that five hundred people died from cholera within six months of the outbreak of cholera in August 2008. Its spread was aided by the collapse of Zimbabwe's health and sanitation systems amid a prolonged economic and political crisis (BBC, 2008). In addition, the absence of sufficient safe sources of drinking water exacerbated the situation, creating in the country an incredible breeding ground for cholera (BBC, 2008). This challenge demands closer attention, since water supply and sanitation infrastructure are key instruments for social wellbeing and because their absence has an immense impact on human security and development, including food security and health security. It is apparent that unless this issue is addressed, Africa will continue to suffer from water-related diseases, placing constraints on the achievement of sustainable development in the continent. Given the magnitude of the problem, regional and continental integration is relevant to the tackling of this problem; hence, the formulation of sound policies is necessary. Formulated policy should reflect the importance of all kinds of transportation systems (rail, road, air, water).

Telecommunications and the Internet

Telecommunications and the internet is one of the communication systems used to transmit information electronically over a distance (UNESCO, 2007: 2). In other words, it is a process that makes communication between two or more people

at a distance possible. It is also understood here to be a means for disseminating knowledge, particularly because people are able to search for specific information via the internet. Afeikhen (1999: 6) maintains that telecommunications infrastructure lies at the heart of the information economy. According to him, countries lacking modern telecommunications cannot compete effectively in the global economy. Since communication and knowledge are the principal factors in the production of goods and services, the development of telecommunications in Africa is of significant importance in order to change and improve the quality of lives and societies.

Given Africa's poor socioeconomic status, the development of telecommunications is essential. It is clear that for sustainable development to be achievable there should be great technological advancement so as to distribute knowledge. The understanding is that this development will also present an opportunity for Africans to create better connections among themselves and with the world at large through information flow. Telecommunications in Africa has the potential to leapfrog the continent past older technology by introducing the use of innovative new technologies that offer many benefits to Africa (Wright, 2004). The development of telecommunications in Africa is essential in order to promote cooperation and communication among its countries (Hegener, 1996). Telecommunications and the internet are also important for social development, especially in education. For education in Africa, telecommunications and the internet are needed because they provide all the information one can possibly desire (Hegener, 1996). They have the potential to boost research and assist in acquiring new knowledge. These justify the need for the development of telecommunications and the internet in Africa for the realisation of sustainable development.

There are, however, difficulties facing the development of telecommunications in Africa. One of the major development challenges confronting Africa is to develop the capacities, strategies and mechanisms necessary to take full advantage of the opportunities offered by information communication technologies (ICTs) for development (Thioune, 2003). In view of the situation in Africa, underdevelopment has presented a great setback to technological development in the continent. This deprived Africa of access to resources, including the skills and training necessary to introduce or enhance technology. Training and capacity building have been identified as the challenges Africa is facing in developing ICTs, as the continent does not have the technical skills required for the efficient development of ICTs, particularly because technologies are imported and are fast-changing (Thioune, 2003). For Africa to attain sustainable development it is obligatory that ICTs be of a good standard in order to simplify the communication

process continentally and even beyond. The understanding is that the problem of telecommunications and internet development in the continent is also a result of socioeconomic challenges. Many nations continue to suffer from poorly performing economies, high foreign debt, declining resources and social infrastructure, alarming population growth, increased dependency, degradation of the environment and other debilitating ailments (Anon, 2008: 2). The lack of adequate basic infrastructure, such as power supply, has been identified as an impediment to the development of telecommunications in Africa (Thioune, 2003). It is clear that, with the existence of such obstacles, the construction or coordination of networking projects is not possible and sustainable development will remain elusive. Therefore, sound public policies are necessary to address the need for viable infrastructure.

Electricity Supply

Electricity is another key infrastructure essential for sustainable development. Given that electricity is used in the production process of every sector of an economy, it is of crucial importance that its supply and quality remain consistent. Madamombe (2005) argues that energy is crucial for a viable economy. However, although the availability of electricity by itself is not a panacea for the economic and social problems facing Africa, the supply of electricity is believed to be a necessary requirement for Africa's economic and social development (Rufael, 2006). Accordingly, its availability would be likely to bring about the changes necessary for Africa to realise sustainable development.

Gnansounou (2007) maintains that to improve people's living conditions in West African countries, national governments have to considerably reinforce the electricity supply infrastructure. Given the strong correlation between electricity access and human progress, Africa will remain Third World for another two hundred years if access to electricity does not become widespread (Silwamba, 2008). This is an indication that a electricity supply is indispensable in creating better living conditions. It is through electricity that people are able to carry out most domestic duties, such as using electrical appliances like stoves to cook and kettles and geysers to boil water. This upgrades the standard of living and makes it possible for people to enjoy an improved quality of life. Ini Urua, the principal industrial engineer in the NEPAD Unit of the Africa Development Bank, as quoted by Madamombe (2005), concurs with this, saying 'infrastructure development is not merely erecting giant structures, but providing vital services, such as power to increase commerce, business productivity and enhance the lives of the poor families by giving them affordable energy for cooking, heating

and lighting'. However, it is estimated that no more than 20 per cent, and in some countries as little as five per cent, of the population of Africa has direct access to electricity (Madamombe, 2005). This poses a threat to the realisation of sustainable development in Africa.

In view of the situation described above, electricity is one of the cornerstones in the realisation of socioeconomic development. Bearing in mind that many of the tasks or duties in the corporate world are rendered by electronic machines, it is clear that the provision of electricity is an instrumental component of economic development in Africa. Research shows that, in this era of the digital economy, it is really difficult to envisage development without the use of electricity (Rufael, 2006). In addition, electricity and other modern energy sources are necessary requirements for economic and social development as well as technological progress (Rufael, 2006). The experience of developed countries also shows that the electricity supply sector played a crucial role in their economic development, not only as a key input in their industrial development but also as a key factor in improving the quality of life of their people (Rufael, 2006). It is therefore apparent that the achievement of sustainable development will remain unattainable if a solid foundation for electricity supply is not laid.

Rehabilitation of the existing installations and construction of new power generation facilities and transmission lines require substantial resources and these are tremendously difficult to raise, owing to the region's specific economic and political conditions (Gnansounou and Bayern, 2007). The understanding is that poor economic status and political instability in Africa have contributed heavily to the poor development of electricity supply sources. Factors that hinder the robust development of energy sources are not limited to those already mentioned, but also include the poor management of nations' resources in Africa, as a result of corruption. Economic development is stunted because direct investment from outside the continent is discouraged and small businesses on the continent often find it impossible to meet the start-up costs required because of corruption. During the early years of independence corruption was high in Africa and as such maladministration also became a challenging issue for the development programmes of individual states. Owing to corruption and maladministration in government institutions the governments did not invest much in infrastructure, which is one of the underlying reasons for the current condition of infrastructure in Africa. It is high time that Africa lays a solid foundation that will lead to a prosperous future for Africans through the development of an effective electricity supply and other major infrastructure.

Conclusion

The lack of infrastructure development in Africa is widely recognised. Research and development should remain the core in the strategic planning of infrastructure development in Africa, because research and development is likely to provide direction for envisaged, adequate infrastructure development. This chapter shows very clearly the significance of infrastructure development in the realisation of sustainable development in Africa, and the challenges hindering the achievement of this objective remain. The most worrying factor about this situation is that the realisation of sustainable development in Africa will remain elusive if these challenges are not effectively addressed, particularly because they directly affect sustainable economic growth and development in Africa. Again, these challenges are constantly exacerbating underdevelopment and heightening the level of Africa's dependency on developed countries.

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CHAPTER 23

Prosperous African Women Traders in the last decades of slavery in Brazil

Christianne Silva Vasconcellos

Throughout the 19th century, Africans and women of African descent played the role of *ganhadeiras* (a Brazilian term meaning ‘income earning women’ or ‘day labourers’) in the main cities of Brazil. This earning system was a strategy of the slavery regime, which came about as a result of the crisis in sugar production. During this period, owning a large number of slaves was no longer profitable at the sugar mills. As a result, the colonisers started selling their slaves’ day labour or renting the services that these slaves could provide in the cities. The slaves that were sent to work in the cities were identified by means of a licence as *ganhadeiras* (female) or *ganhadores* (male). These slaves had to earn the amount previously stipulated by their owners as well as the amount required for their food and lodging in the city. This system was also known as urban slavery (*escravidão urbana*) or earning slavery (*escravidão de ganho*; Soares, 1996, Reis, 2003).

Under the *ganho* system, enslaved Africans and their descendents (known as *Creole* – children of Africans born in Brazil), fulfilled various services such as selling household products, transporting people, objects or merchandise. From the point of view of the enslaved, urban slavery provided relative freedom and the possibility of accumulating capital which was invested in buying their freedom and later carrying on their own businesses, which enabled the emergence of an African elite within Brazil. As the Afro-Brazilian intellectual Manoel Querino proposed at the beginning of the 20th century (Querino, 1917), the entrepreneurship created autonomously by that segment of the population constituted a contribution to the construction of Brazilian society, although few historians had recognised its value.

This chapter deals specifically with the case of African women and other women of Afro descent who did craft work, sold raw and cooked food, made lace, clothing, or were involved in trade activities. The itinerant or street-selling type of trade that was done by the women was characterised by a whole network of solidarity and sales strategies in areas with a vast circulation of people, and involved preparing and selling foodstuffs, vegetables, meat, fish, textiles and

household products. In addition to selling in the streets and squares, they sold, from house to house, products which were placed in wooden and glass boxes, which they carried on their heads (Soares, 1996, Wetherell, 2000, Verger, 1999, Reis, 2003). Those women traders and the kind of commerce they practised have been recorded by 19th century photography.

Photography was introduced in Brazil in the decade of 1840. This resulted in a whole series of photos of black people (called ‘urban types’), who walked or worked in the streets. Today, these photos represent a valuable historical source due to their visual specificity, which provides cultural information as no other source can provide. Women who traded in the streets or the squares of the city of Salvador were photographed both in their work places and in studios, and these photographs, together with documents such as testimonials, newspapers, almanacs, reference documents, criminal and civil records and laws, constitute the basis for the arguments discussed here.

This chapter presents a photographic series analysed during my research for a masters’ degree, when I had the opportunity to gather 183 photos of Africans and Afro-descendants who were photographed between 1860 and 1916 in the city of Salvador, Bahia, Brazil (Vasconcellos, 2006). This collection of photos was divided into thematic groups in order to provide a historical ethnography of the population that constituted Bahia society in the last years of slavery in Brazil. The photos of the *ganhadeiras* enables one to look at labour and economic strategies established by the African women traders and allows one to appreciate their symbolic practices, functions and values. Within the economic scope, the chapter concludes that the creation of a special type of jewellery, specifically made for that elite group of African and Afro-descendant women which served as a currency within that internal economy of an African nature.

Lastly, the chapter shows that today the successors of those thriving women traders did not succeed in achieving the same economic prosperity, although they followed the same procedures that had been followed by the previous generation. Since the Republican Brazilian system after abolition of slavery did not create inclusion mechanisms for the black population, the women traders who managed to overturn the slavery system through their trading strategies were not followed in prestige and social status by their successors. Therefore, little by little, the state policies moved the trader’s inheritors toward an advanced state of impoverishment and loss of prestige, which characterises this sector up to the present.

Thriving African Women Traders in the Last Decades of the Slavery Regime in Brazil, Salvador City, Bahia State, 1850–1888

To determine the structure of the African population in Salvador City during the last decades of the slavery regime in Brazil, I investigated the dynamics of the transatlantic slaved trade to Bahia. At the beginning of the Portuguese colonisation of Brazil, between the 16th and 17th centuries, Africans were captured in the Congo and Angola regions. During the 18th century and the first half of the 19th century, the enslaved population in Bahia came from the Gulf of Benin, called the 'East Coast of the São Jorge de Mina Castle'. During this period, the enslaved trade exchanged the African population for tobacco produced in the Bahia plantations (Verger, 2002). Notwithstanding the fact that British laws prohibited trafficking north of the Equator (1815) and in the whole Atlantic area (1830), trafficking of people between Uida and Brazil was intense up to 1851 (Verger, 2002). Thus it is suggested that the trade culture developed by African women in Salvador city was a recreation of their own trading strategies from western regions of the African continent.

In the City of Bahia, the African women traders occupied the squares that were used for free open markets, where they sold various products. During the 1830s, these women occupied various strategic points in the urban area of Salvador, not only the legally allocated areas known as 'Praça do Comércio' and 'Caes Dourado' (Andrade, 1988). All sales areas were characterised by a high movement of people. Instead of promoting these women's initiatives, the Legislative Assembly of Bahia Province gradually stipulated laws which limited where itinerant trade could take place, as well as imposing a licence fee that was to be paid to the province in order to carry out trade activity in a public space (Fundação Cultural do Estado da Bahia, 1996).



Figure 1: Gaensly and Lindemann, Bahia, Campo Grande, c. 1890

Archive of Gilberto Ferrez.



Figure 2: Marc Ferrez, Bahia, Castro Alves Square, 1885

Archive of Instituto Moreira Sales.

Nonetheless, with regard to the 1890s, the photos reveal the existence of other points of sale in the squares of Campo Grande and Castro Alves (fig. 1 and 2). These photos illustrate how the traders set themselves up in these areas, with people around who were possibly linked to their trade network. In addition they show the way they carried out the trade: in small groups spread out in the same square. According to travellers' reports, each group sold a different product, so these trade squares were characterised by a diversity of products offered (Wetherell, 2000, Verger, 1999 Vilhena, 1969).

Other cultural information provided by the photo is the presence of infants, possibly children of the traders. This indicates a specific way of educating their children in selling and other cultural strategies. In a study carried out on an enslaved family in Bahia, Isabel Reis confirmed the strong presence of the mother in the lives of her children. In fact, until 1871, the legal status of the mother determined the status of the child, and even after the Free Womb Law, it was up to the mother to look after her children until they were free, which was fifteen years after having worked as slaves (Reis, 2001: 63–83). Accordingly, women and children often participated together in street trade activities.

Control in the distribution of each kind of product on the part of the sellers prevented competition, which favoured a wide diversity in the goods offered. As far as foodstuffs were concerned, some only sold fish, others sold vegetables or meat (Vilhena, 1969). The same occurred with those who sold prepared African food, for example *Acarajé*, a traditional Yoruba dish made from fried mashed black-eyed white beans. Only women devotees of Orixá Iansã prepared and sold *acarajé*, a food usually placed on Orixá's altar, while others sold *pamonhas de milho* (green maize cakes). This happened since each dish was associated with the Candomblé religion ceremonies practised by these women.¹ Thereby,

economical strategies and religion were related in the African women traders' strategies, and this made possible the introduction of African gastronomy into the colonial city culture.

An example of the specificity of the products sold from house to house is shown in the photos below (fig. 3 and 4); see that each trader used a box or a basket to carry a specific product: crockery, textiles, or fruit.



Figure 3: Non-identified photographer, Bahia, no date, REGO, 1978, p. 38



Figure 4: Photo by R. Lindemann, Bahia 'Caixinheiras', c. 1900, Postcard, Renato

Berbert de Castro Collection, Archive AMS

The organisation in which black women traders worked was so strongly constituted that it came to the point of determining the prices of products within Salvador city. Since the 18th century, reports made by travellers inform that these women dominated the access, price and distribution of food products sold in the city (Vilhena, 1969: 93,127–130, Hapsburg, 1860: 81–88). In order for us to understand why they monopolised the sale and distribution of products, we point out that, throughout 19th century, economic activities undertaken by colonialists focused exclusively on the traffic of the African population and export of single crops such as sugar and tobacco. In addition, for their own survival in the colonies, the Portuguese imported from Europe all foodstuffs and household products. For this reason, the colonialists despised cultivating and selling food and household products in Salvador. Nonetheless, the European imported products did not supply all needs in Brazilian cities. The women traders became aware of that gap and established direct links with small producers, craftsmen and fishermen who lived in Bahian countryside areas. They established a direct countryside to city network, developing a market system without intermediaries through which they agreed on prices, quantities and types of crop.

Gradually during the 19th century the African women traders monopolised the distribution and sale of food products. Since they determined the prices, they achieved high revenues (Soares, 1996). Additionally, the extent of the social network established by the African and Afro-descendant women traders was also linked to political movements. This is evident when in 1835 some of these women took part in the Malês Rebellion, the largest urban rebellion led by Africans in Brazil during the 19th century against the colonial enslaved regime (Reis, 2003).

Economic and Religious Functions of Creole Aesthetics from the *Ganhadeiras*

In addition to the trading strategies, African women in Bahia created their own aesthetics in their way of dressing. All the elements of their dress attire had a working function and a symbolic meaning. That type of dressing was called *creole aesthetics*.² Their dress attire comprised a blouse, with various types of sophisticated embroidery on the top part, together with a wide skirt, embroidered at the bottom. The suit was elegant as well as comfortable, and differentiated them from other African women in other Brazilian cities. Traveller Jean-Baptiste Debret reported that in Rio de Janeiro it was easy to distinguish the women that came from Bahia due to the way they dressed, and the proud manner in which they walked (Debret, 1978). At the Clothes and Textiles Museum of the Henriqueta Catharino Female Institute in Salvador city, one can find a permanent exhibition of these embroidered clothes, which illustrate the diversity of embroidery that was used in their blouses (fig. 5).³ The similarity of these embroideries with those in Africa during that same period must be pointed out, especially in the Western African cultures: white lace work with delicate designs, jewellery with stones and necklaces with beads which have religious connotations.



Figure 5: Vitrine 'Ala das escravas' (Wing of the Women Slaves), Bahia, 2006, Museu do Traje e do Têxtil, Archive IFHC

Another item that was part of the Creole dress attire was the *pano-de-costa* (cloth from the coast of Nigeria), one of the most expensive pieces of material that could be bought at that time in Bahia. This accessory was versatile in the attire of the thriving women traders, and was used over the shoulder, as a turban or to carry children (fig. 6). Based on advertisements in newspapers of the 19th century, it is known that there were three types of *pano-de-costa*: the one imported from Africa, the English imitation, and the one from Bahia (APEBa, *Jornal da Bahia*, 25 September 1867). About this last type, the Customs House (Alfandega) documents indicate that between 1862 and 1871, Fructuoso Gomes Moncorvo, the most well-known importer of products from Lagos, used to import ‘loads with eighty stylish ‘panos-de-costa’ each of which cost forty pounds, and 37 “panos da costa” made as imitation of Bahé, at 57 pounds a load, pepper, African stones, black soap from the coast, and straw baskets’ (APEBa, Alfândega, *Notas de despacho*, 1862, no. 932). These documents indicate the existence of a market system that imported African products to be sold to this elite group of women traders.

On the other hand, Querino, the Afro-Brazilian intellectual contemporary to these women, described the process of arrival, handling and sale of these wraps. According to this author, when these materials arrived, they were rough and hard. Then they first had to be treated by African men, who also had their working units in the streets. They softened the material, giving it a shine and trimming it before it was made available for sale. To treat these materials, the Africans used two cylindrical logs of wood. They also provided the additional service of dyeing these materials (Querino, 1917).



Figure 6: Rodolpho Lindemann, Bahia, c. 1900, collection für Landeskunde



Figure 7: Alberto Henschel, Bahia, c. 1870, Ganhadeira carte-de-visite, archive Leibniz Institut Renato Berbert de Castro, archive AMS



Figure 8: coleção Museu Carlos Costa Pinto, Salvador, Bahia

source: www.museucostapinto.com.br/

In addition to the economic functions, the creole dressing comprised specific jewellery which, besides having a particular design, was used widely. The jewellery was made in gold and silver, and was decorated with designs, stones or corals. Researcher Simone Silva, who studied the collection at the Museum Carlos Costa Pinto in Salvador, Bahia (fig. 8), stated that the peculiarity of that jewellery was the fact that it was designed and manufactured by jewellers from Bahia, exclusively for African and Afro-descendant women. According to this researcher, there are various examples in the Museum which are engraved with the signature of the jewellers who were African and Afro-descendants too, and the date on which they were created (between the 18th and 19th centuries) (Silva, 2005: 63).



Figure 9: Fotografia não identificado, Bahia, c.1890



Figure 10: Penca de Balangandãs. Acervo IFHC Coleção Museu Carlos Costa Pinto. Salva-dor, Bahia

source: www.museucostapinto.com.br/

According to oral sources, in the Candomblé *Terreiros* (African and African descent territories where ceremonies took place), this type of jewellery had a religious function (Cicinha, 2005). Each necklace, dress or *pano da costa*, as well as the colours and materials used, identified the Orixá worshippers and indicated the hierarchical place they occupied within the ritual community. The wide use of jewellery also served as a musical instrument at the time of dancing and incorporation of the Orixá. On the other hand, the number of rings used was associated with the position these people held within that community. A significant item of the jewellery used by the black women was the *Penca de Balangandas*, a set of gold, silver, and coral objects attached to a silver link and worn around the hips (fig. 9 and 10). This worked as a sound accessory to attract customers and bring them luck in their sales.



Figure 11: Fulô e Chiquinha, postcard, c.1900. Read, Richard

It is hypothesised that the accumulation of jewellery was used also as a means to accumulate wealth. The regional legislation of 1835 denied Africans the right to own property in the province of Bahia. This was stipulated by Law 09 of 13 May 1835, specifically by Article 17 of this law which specified that freed Africans were deprived of the right to own real state property (Fundação Cultural do Estado da Bahia, 1996–18). In this context, African women traders would

have used the accumulation of jewellery to save property, initially to enable them to buy their freedom, the freedom of their children and later to establish their own businesses.

As discussed in this chapter, during the last decades of slavery in Brazil, there were specific well-known production units all over the city of Salvador that were established by African women and men, which demonstrated that an autonomous trade network was developed by black people. As a preliminary conclusion, one can say that, in Salvador, Africans created their own economy which functioned parallel to the colonial economy. Just as Europeans and their descendants imported household products, jewellery, crockery and clothes from Europe, Africans and their descendants used African products, cooked dishes inspired by African cuisine, and produced jewellery and designs from Africa. But the interesting issue to notice is that the parallel economy created by Africans and their descendants was developed in the context of slavery, therefore overcoming the lack of freedom imposed by the colonisers.

Thus, an exclusively African economy of production and sales was formed, with social hierarchies, including an economically powerful elite, working strategies and labour relations specifically geared to this demographic group. This enabled the acquisition of material wealth by Africans and Afro-descendants in a fast and autonomous manner during the 19th century in Brazil.

Why did this Sector not Thrive after Slavery was Abolished?

The production and markets established by Africans during the end of the colonial slavery period were maintained throughout the capitalist post-abolition system and continued to exist until today. In particular, the production and selling of cooked food can still be found in the main cities of Brazil, especially in Salvador, Rio de Janeiro and Recife. These practices are so fundamental to Brazilian identity that recently, the preparation of *acarajé* and its selling in Salvador streets was declared part of the intangible heritage of the country, though many of the women who prepare and sell the *acarajé* are in a state of impoverishment.

To understand why this happened we need to know that with the abolition of slavery in Brazil (1888), people who had been slaves were left to their own fate. In fact, the letter that acknowledged freedom did not include any compensation for their years of forced labour, nor was there any policy that favoured their inclusion as free workers, such as rights over the land they possessed or educational policies. This constitutes proof that legal freedom did not grant them rights of citizenship which would enable them to be socially included. On the contrary, this population found a racist juridical system which granted rights and

benefits, such as land and education, only to the Euro-descendant population of Brazilian society. To justify the legal favour to Euro-descendants, *racialist theories*, a pseudo-science created in Europe to assert the intellectual inferiority of Africans and Afro-descendants, was introduced in Brazil during the second half of the 19th century. This gave rise to a scenario of racial hostility during the period after the abolition of slavery.

The above-mentioned intellectual, Querino, wrote various articles on this issue criticising the total denial, on the part of the government and the academy, of the African input towards the building of the nation (Querino, 1918). Furthermore, he criticised the growing ideology of *branqueamento* (becoming white), which was a result of the concepts brought about by the scientific racialists who attempted to deny that there was in Brazil a differentiated treatment and opportunities according to the colour of one's skin (Querino, 1923). The economic and academic elites designed major legislation programmes of 'whitening' by promoting European migration to replace the enslaved workers. Within the urban environment, these new immigrants took ownership of the streets and the trade strategies that had been created by the African women traders.

At the same time, a legislation system was created that favoured the inclusion of European immigrants by means of naturalisation as Brazilian citizens (Law of 1901) or by means of concessions and land ownership, which, nowadays, we could consider as affirmative action for Europeans and their descendants. In view of this, one could argue that in the countries that were colonised by Europeans, it is necessary and urgent to implement affirmative action policies for Afro-descendants and native populations aimed at overcoming the largest legacy of colonialism in those countries: the differentiation in opportunities, rights and treatment according to one's skin colour.

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CHAPTER 24

The State, Politics and the Democratic Consolidation of Africa

Sehlaire Makgetlaneng

Introduction: The Theoretical and Practical View of the Role of the State and Politics in the Democratic Consolidation of Africa

African countries have existing structural relations with imperialism, advanced capitalist countries and neocolonial social formations. It is important to bear in mind this starting point as one proceeds to examine the state, politics and democratic consolidation in Africa. Central to the relationship between African countries and advanced capitalist countries are issues of how African countries are governed. The view argued in this chapter is that Africa has to look inward first – the primacy of internal factors over external factors is of strategic importance if Africa is to progress on her own terms.

To what extent is the exercise of state political power linked to the strategic and tactical issues of advancing the process of sociopolitical and economic democracy or sociopolitical and economic transformation in African countries? This is the strategic question which should be answered when analysing the state, politics and the democratic consolidation of Africa. This is so because central to the democratic consolidation in African countries has been the form and content of the sociopolitical, economic and ideological relationship between the state and the masses of the people, and the ability of the state to satisfy the needs and demands of the masses of the people. The manner in which state political power is exercised has been central either in the realisation or the failure to realise the objectives of the democratic consolidation of Africa. The point is that the state is the material condensation of power relations in the society. However, a key issue underlying the process of advancing or achieving Africa's democratic consolidation or transformation is the question about the exercise of state political power: which social class or class alliance is exercising state political power in African countries, by what tactical means and to what strategic end? How is the exercise of state political power supported and contested by other social forces in African countries? How is it supported and challenged by external sociopolitical and economic forces, by what means and for what strategic and tactical ends? What is the programme of action of the state against the programme of action

of external forces opposed to national and continental transformation? These questions underline the centrality of the satisfaction of the needs, demands and exigencies of the masses of African people by African leaders through their exercise of state political power. Underlined also is the credibility and legitimacy of the political governance or political administration of African countries.

Jonathan Moyo (1998) provides a critical analysis of the political administration of African countries. In his critical assessment of the African Renaissance, he points out that there are six defining characteristics of political governance in African countries in the postcolonial era. They are that:

- African political independence has now been achieved.
- The majority of African governments are now democratic.
- African governments are now running liberalised market-driven economies.
- Many African governments now enjoy considerable autonomy in the formulation of their foreign policy.
- There is now a new breed of African leaders in countries like the Democratic Republic of the Congo, Eritrea, Ghana, South Africa and Uganda.
- The end of the Cold War has made globalisation possible bringing with it new trade and investment opportunities (Moyo, 1998: 11).

These characteristic features pose challenges and present opportunities to African political governance. However, the challenges they pose are more important than the opportunities they present. In appearance, they point to ‘significant defining moments in the politics of Africa’s postcolonial history’ (Moyo, 1998: 11). In substance, they do not constitute a fundamental development in African political governance.

Moyo (1998: 11) argues that the ‘achievement of political independence in Africa is significant only to the extent that colonial occupation is no more’. Unless neocolonialism is addressed, this position ‘obfuscates internal struggles for political independence in countries such as Sudan and Morocco’. The position that ‘the majority of African governments are democratic’ is not true. It is based on ‘contentious notions of democracy with external notions’. In addition, it ‘has no empirical basis’ (Moyo, 1998: 11). Multiparty elections are cited as evidence that the majority of African countries are now democratic. Moyo (1998) maintains that multiparty elections, which are now common in Africa, have not led to new power relations. They do not constitute a fundamental sociopolitical and economic development. This reality is supported, among others, by the case of Zambia since the fall of Kenneth Kaunda and Malawi since the demise of

Kamuzu Banda. Moyo (1998) concludes that Zimbabwe is following suit ‘with reckless abandon’.

Moyo’s critical analysis of the state of the political governance of African countries and the structural failure of African leaders to achieve popular democratic dispensation is of theoretical importance in providing the organic link between the political governance and the struggle to achieve and consolidate democracy.

Organic Link between Political Governance and the Struggle to Achieve or Consolidate Democracy in African Countries

There is a direct organic link between the form and content of political governance and the struggle to achieve and consolidate democracy in African countries. Democracy, even when viewed by social forces of different and antagonistic political, economic and ideological positions, is in essence ‘a material question’ which ‘concerns the lives of people in their daily struggles for material existence’ (Tandon, 1979: 1). The daily struggle of the masses of the people of Africa for a better material existence can best be understood if we come to grips with the reality of the paradox of Africa’s socioeconomic development. Central to this paradox is the plight of the masses of the people of the continent who are mired in poverty. At issue is the question why Africa is ranked the poorest continent in the world by all available socioeconomic indicators while it is so richly endowed with natural resources and arable land. Given the fact that Africa has the highest proportion of poor people in the world and that it is home to more than thirty per cent of the world’s poor, the key political task is to solve what Fantu Cheru (2008: 8) calls the continent’s ‘widespread poverty and human deprivation’. Cheru (2008) lists some of Africa’s socioeconomic problems, including poverty. He maintains that vulnerability to hunger remains pervasive. Although declining, infant and maternal mortality rates still remain very high. Fifty per cent of people in sub-Saharan Africa do not have access to adequate healthcare. The state of health is negatively affected by lack of access to clean drinking water and adequate sanitation services. The coverage for sanitation on the continent is the lowest in the world. This development has decisive consequences for public health, particularly in the over-crowded slums of cities. In addition to this health problem, the HIV/AIDS pandemic is a colossal threat to economic development. It is already eroding economic development, educational achievement and child survival in the majority of African countries. Demand for education at primary, high school and tertiary levels is enormously more than the supply of

educational facilities and resources. Public spending on education remains low (Cheru, 2008: 8).

What is to be done to solve Africa's socioeconomic problems? It must be recognised, as Agostinho Neto maintained, that the 'most important thing is to solve the people's problems' as Lucio Lara (in Campbell 2000: 163), one of the leaders of the Popular Movement for the Liberation of Angola (MPLA), also said in criticising what Jean-Francois Bayart referred to as 'the shameless exploitation' of Angola's 'resources' by some leaders of the MPLA (Bayart, 2000: 232).

The achievement of political independence in Africa has been accompanied by the rise to state political power of individuals for whom the personal accumulation of wealth is more important than serving the socioeconomic needs of the masses of the people. Some African countries, such as the Democratic Republic of Congo, are (in their internal relations) characterised by a profound contradiction between the brutal reality of poverty and socioeconomic hardships confronted by the masses of the people, on the one hand, and the enormous natural resources and the lifestyle enjoyed by their national rulers and internal allies on the other. They are characterised also by the unique preoccupation of their rulers with the accumulation of wealth by monopolising their countries' natural resources and the reluctance of these rulers to commit socioeconomic and financial resources derived from their countries' natural resources to the provision of basic social services. These are key challenges that these countries face in their internal relations.

African countries are also facing key challenges externally or in their external relations. The point is that the relationship between their dominant and leading internal actors and their dominant and leading external actors, especially transnational corporations actively involved in the extraction and exploitation of their enormous natural resources, takes the form of an international structural interlocking network of class interests, commonality of interests and patterns of cooperation. This sociopolitical and economic network or union involves strategic and tactical sociopolitical, economic, military and cultural interests, interlinkages and ties characterised by a commonality of interests between those who control the state and economy in these African countries, on the one hand, and in the advanced capitalist countries and some developing countries on the other. The operation of this network or union is antagonistic to the interests of the masses of the people of African countries. It is on this basis that we get to understand the reality that the ruling class of these African countries is an integral part of the general alliance of the capitalists' world, which forms the basis of the economic alliance of capitalism. This process is, as Lenin (1965: 34) maintains:

[A]n alliance whose natural and inevitable aim is to defend capital, which recognises no fatherland, and which has proved in the course of many major and important episodes in history that capital places the safeguarding of the alliance of the capitalists of all countries against the working people.

Working within this framework allows us to provide an analysis of the class structure of these African countries and of advanced capitalist countries. Their class structure is primarily determined by their dominant (capitalist) mode of production. This reality helps us in understanding the nature of the socioeconomic order of the countries in question. Given this, we can determine, on one level, whose class interests are being served in the process and, on another level, whether the interests of those who control the state and the economy in these African countries and advanced capitalist countries are in line with the interests of the masses of the people of these countries. Given the uneven positions occupied by these African countries and advanced capitalist countries within international capitalism, the interests of African countries are not always in line with the interests of advanced capitalist countries within international capitalism. Despite this reality, the fact remains that the class interests of their ruling class and its national allies are not the same as those of the masses of African countries.

What are the implications of the issues discussed above for the consolidation of democracy in Africa? The presence of a commonality of interests between national rulers in Africa and their external allies, particularly transnational corporations actively involved in the extraction and exploitation of enormous natural resources in the African continent, and the absence of a commonality of interests between their national rulers and the masses of the people, is one of the major challenges to the achievement of democracy in African countries. Central to this problem is the nature of political governance and its implications for the achievement of substantial improvements in the material conditions of the masses of African people and the achievement of socioeconomic democracy.

The struggle to consolidate democracy in African countries is part of a process that is dependent on the progressive or rational utilisation of their enormous natural resources to meet the sociopolitical and economic interests of the masses of the people. This is the prerequisite for the consolidation of democracy. The position that success is dependent on the active participation of transnational corporations in the extraction and exploitation of resources in the African continent is a secondary issue. The primary issue is that the contribution of transnational corporations to the achievement and success of socioeconomic democracy in Africa will primarily depend on the nature of the political administrations in the continent. In other words, it will primarily depend on the commitment of those

controlling the state in African countries to using public resources to satisfy, in a sustainable manner, the sociopolitical and economic interests of the people in these countries.

The organic link between the form and content of the political governance and the struggle to satisfy or consolidate the socioeconomic needs and demands of the masses of the people in the majority of African countries is affirmed even by the organisations opposed to the realisation of the strategic interests of the masses of the people of Africa. The National Intelligence Council, in its *Global Trends 2015* report, published in 2000, points out that the ‘interplay of demographics and disease – as well as poor governance – will be the major determinants of Africa’s increasing international marginalisation in 2015’ (National Intelligence Council, 2000: 71). The report points out further: ‘Most African states will miss out on the economic growth engendered elsewhere by globalisation and by scientific and technological advances.’ It concludes that ‘only a few countries will do better, while a handful of states will have hardly any relevance to the lives of their citizens’. It refers in this instance to sub-Saharan Africa. It provides an analysis of the developments in North Africa together with those of the Middle East under the heading ‘The Middle East and North Africa’ (National Intelligence Council, 2000: 70).

Poverty and poor governance will further deplete natural resources and drive rapid urbanisation. As impoverished people flee unproductive rural areas, many cities will double in population by 2015, but resources will be inadequate to provide the needed expansion of water systems, sewers and health facilities. Cities will be sources of crime and instability as ethnic and religious differences exacerbate the competition for scarcer jobs and resources (National Intelligence Council, 2000: 72).

Thus the quality of political governance, rather than Africa’s enormous natural resources and how they are managed and used, will continue to be the key determinant of the consolidation of democratic sociopolitical and economic development.

The World Bank has been maintaining this position since it first articulated the concept of ‘good governance’ in its 1989 report on sub-Saharan Africa. Its view of government is that its role is primarily to manage national sociopolitical and economic affairs (World Bank, 1989: 60–61). The Bank’s view of governance, in its 1989 report, is that it is an exercise or task mainly focused on the creation, maintenance and expansion of the governance environment conducive to the operations of private capital. It maintains that the economy of Africa was enmeshed in crises because of the lack of good political governance.

The World Bank links aid not only to economic reforms, but also to the political governance or good governance in some African countries. African leaders are pushed to accept the certificate of good behaviour issued to them once they have met the Bank's demands. If they refuse to have the certificate of good behaviour or to be compliant, they are told not only that they will not be given aid, but that their countries and their people will, moreover, suffer economically. While those who comply are rewarded, those who do not are punished. The dominance of advanced capitalist countries in the political economy of African countries is reflected in the struggle by a considerable number of their leaders to obtain political and ideological legitimacy and appeal in the eyes of the leaders of advanced capitalist countries. Zbigniew Brzezinski, National Security Advisor to President Jimmy Carter from 1977 to 1981, a Centre for Strategic and International Studies counsellor and trustee and co-chairperson of its advisory board and one of the leading geo-strategic organic intellectuals of multilateral imperialism, brutally and honestly explains the multilateral imperialist system under the leadership of the United States of America as follows:

Unlike earlier empires, this vast complex global system is not a hierarchical pyramid. Rather, America stands at the centre of an interlocking universe, one in which power is exercised through continuous bargaining, dialogue, diffusion, and quest for formal consensus, even though that power originates ultimately from a single source, namely, Washington, D.C. And that is where the power game has to be played, and played according to America's domestic rules. Perhaps the highest compliment that the world pays to the centrality of the democratic processes in American global hegemony is the degree to which foreign countries are themselves drawn into the domestic American political bargaining (Brzezinski, 1997: 28).

The State, Politics and the Forward Movement towards Popular Democracy

In most African countries, the state is based on the separation of the masses of the people from the means to acquire political and economic power. This separation is based on the existing relations of political power and economic power. The control of politics is characterised by the exercise of state political power by a few elites. This means that the state is used to defend the interests of the few who have economic power. The masses of the people do not enjoy privileges based on the ownership and control of the leading sectors of the economy. Unlike those who have political and economic power, they have no influence on the professional

and higher levels of skills, access to and control of the civil service, or access to the best educational and health facilities. They are structurally excluded from the power dynamics of the army and the police force. This means that they have no control over the decisive organs of the state. Political leaders in power frustrate any efforts to tamper with the essence of the neocolonial power. Economic structures exclude the masses of the people from political power. African countries, as social formations based on socioeconomic inequalities, deny the masses of the people access to the educational, ideological and economic means to participate directly in the daily political operations of the state.

Popular transformation is sociopolitical and economic development which involves shared equality, emancipation and liberation. On the political front it is the emancipation of the immediate producers of wealth from unequal, oppressive and exploitative sociopolitical and economic institutions; it involves a fundamental restructuring of power and authority relations. On the economic front it is the equalisation of access to and use of productive forces in order to be distributed equitably among individuals and to serve the collective needs and demands of the masses of the people, particularly the working class and peasants. On the social front it is the liberation of the immediate producers of wealth from inhumane personal and social practices by restructuring sociocultural relations. Central to this transformation on these fronts is for countries to control their productive forces. It is not the development of state ownership and party control of the means of production, distribution and exchange. According to Amílcar Cabral (Davidson, 1969: 128), the national control of the economy as the strategic objective is achieved by the tactical means of popular collective control by

... a group of persons constituted as a group, and not by a single person or some persons of that group. Collectively to control, in a given group, means to study problems together so as to find the best solutions; it means taking decisions together; it means to profit from the experience and intelligence of each member, and thus of all members.

The Role of Political Parties in the Struggle for the Achievement or Consolidation of Democracy

Central to the fundamental and structural needs for political parties of African countries is how to transform into modern organisational parties for the politics of revolutionary and progressive change. They must also have programmes of action to respond to sociopolitical and economic challenges in their respective countries. Also needed is a concrete understanding of sociopolitical and economic

developments and debates in other countries, particularly in the African continent and in advanced capitalist countries. These should be viewed progressively within the context of revolutionary agendas to resolve Africa's problems. In other words, political parties in Africa should understand that:

[T]o effectively mobilise the people, to generate a viable alternative agenda, and develop a capacity to establish a responsible, democratic, and accountable government on coming to power, they must have certain qualities: effective and flexible organisation; ability to generate resources for its operations; a viable alternative program for overall reconstruction and rehabilitation; an effective foreign policy; legitimate and visionary leadership; a strong internal and public education program to challenge the established world view; a transparently democratic and accountable structure; and in-depth knowledge of existing political (even theoretical) debates, blueprints, developments in other nations, and of the local political economy. Such a movement must cultivate and retain the support of alternative constituencies; its politics must be seen to be different from the discredited past; and the leadership must be principled, consistent in its philosophy, and be above board morally. Finally, the leadership and movement must be capable of distinguishing between rhetoric and practical politics, and must consistently strive to stay and operate above primordial and opportunistic considerations (Ihonvbere, 1997: 127).

Most of Africa's opposition political parties which strive to contribute towards the achievement or consolidation of popular or substantive democracy in their countries should no longer limit themselves to parliamentary tactics or electoral, legalistic strategy. In concentrating their efforts on these in their struggle for power, African opposition parties have been overestimating the importance of elections. While elections are important in the achievement or the consolidation of substantive democracy, democracy is not simply the electoral victory of one political party over another or about holding periodic credible, transparent, free and fair elections. Substantive democracy as a people's project involves the struggle to either achieve or consolidate socioeconomic development in the interests of the masses of the people.

Eghosa E Osaghae (2004: 1–2) cogently articulates the organic relationship between substantive democracy and socioeconomic development in the interests of the masses of the people in Africa. The democratic project is not simply about the electoral victory over 'unpopular or discredited incumbents' or about holding periodic elections. It is 'about and for citizens who have stakes in and expect

dividends from it'. The masses of the people 'who queue for long hours' to vote or take part in 'riots and demonstrations' to defeat oppressive governments, and those who lead and join progressive social movements and political parties, expect 'immediate and long-term dividends'. Osaghae further argues that:

Democracy is not simply about satisfying theoretical expectations. For example, it is not about the electoral defeat of unpopular or discredited incumbents (the euphoria of 'regime change' does not last long!) or, for that matter, about holding periodic elections. Rather, the democratic project is about and for citizens who have stakes in the project and expect dividends from it. Ordinary citizens who queue for long hours to cast their votes, or take part in riots and demonstrations to oust authoritarian governments, and those who lead and join reform-seeking social movements and political parties, as of legitimate right, expect immediate and long-term dividends (Osaghae, 2004: 1–2).

Conclusion and Recommendations

The political governance of African societies should be used to satisfy the socioeconomic interests of the majority of their members and to achieve development and progress. The achievement of Africa's development and satisfying the interests of the masses lies in the struggle to defeat nationally, regionally and continentally those Africans who are 'thieves and their accomplices, the givers of the bribes and the recipients,' who are 'the corrupter and harlot who act together to demean our Continent and Ourselves' (Mbeki, 1998).

Their measure of success is the amount of wealth they accumulate and the ostentation they can achieve, which will convince all that they are a success, because, in a visible way, they are people of means.

Thus, they seek access to power or access to those who have access to power so that they can corrupt the political order for personal gain at all costs.

In this equation, the poverty of the masses of the people becomes a necessary condition for the enrichment of the few and the corruption of political power, the only possible condition for its exercise.

It is out of this pungent mixture of greed, dehumanising poverty, obscene wealth and endemic public and private corrupt practice, that many of Africa's coups d'état, civil wars and situations of instability are born and entrenched.

The time has come that we call a halt to the seemingly socially approved deification of the acquisition of material wealth and the abuse of state power

to impoverish the people and deny our Continent the possibility to achieve sustainable economic development.

Africa cannot renew herself where its upper echelons are a mere parasite on the rest of society, enjoying a self-endowed mandate to use their political power and define the uses of such power such that its exercise ensures that our Continent reproduces itself as the periphery of the world economy, poor, underdeveloped and incapable of development.

The African Renaissance demands that we purge ourselves of the parasites and maintain a permanent vigilance against the danger of the entrenchment in African society of this rapacious stratum with its social morality according to which everything in society must be organised materially to the benefit of the few (Mbeki, 1998).

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Pan-Africanism and the African Renaissance

CHAPTER 25

A Strategy for the Promotion of Swahili in Africa and its Relevance for Linguistic Decolonisation and African Cultural Renaissance Projects

Samba Buri MBOUP

The African Renaissance can be viewed as an alternative global project of society and civilisation that is aimed at creating objective and subjective conditions for the rebirth of Africa. The Renaissance intends to make Africa an independent pole of initiatives and a decision-making centre in the scientific, technological, economic and political spheres of the world of today and tomorrow. As such, African Renaissance seeks to address three major interconnected and interdependent issues or challenges as identified by José do Nascimento (1987: 286, 287):

- The creation of objective conditions for the material development of African societies and the spiritual uplift and moral regeneration of African peoples and people of African descent, in an international political context where issues of military security determine the possibility of the success or failure of national strategies for economic development
- The renewal of African intellectual and cultural inventiveness and creativity in a context where harnessing scientific knowledge and information and technology play a key role in the wealth of nations and in the balance of powers worldwide
- The autonomy of African political conscience and the renewal of political intelligence, in the framework of a world civilisation that is still dominated by conflicting national interests – as is testified to by certain dimensions of the current identity crisis of multilateralism and by difficulties in establishing a more transparent and equitable world trading system in the WTO, notably because the dominant philosophies and practices often tend to ‘instrumentalise’ human beings’ promethean intelligence in the service of selfish nationalist interests and Faustian goals.

The African Renaissance basically involves two realities and processes, that is, the ultimate, strategic, long-term goal for Africa and the African people in the

21st century (rebirth), second, the long, protracted and complex process of transformation and self-transformation which leads to the Renaissance.

Pan-Africanism as the Doctrine of the African Renaissance

If we agree on the content and significance of the concept of African Renaissance as stated above, pan-Africanism can be viewed as the political and economic doctrine of the African Renaissance. Pan-Africanism can be defined as the expression of the political (and historical) conscience and the position of the African masses and peoples of African descent worldwide. As such, it is rooted in the historical experience that is common to these peoples (i.e. their common origin, which is Africa as the cradle of humankind and of human civilisation); their common history and affinities beyond and in spite of cultural diversity; their commonly shared material conditions of existence; their common historical aspirations; and their common material and spiritual interests and common destiny.

As a guide for action (doctrine), pan-Africanism has various dimensions:

- **Continental and Diaspora dimensions.** Pan-Africanism seeks to articulate the fundamental aspirations and interests and to address the needs of all African peoples, 'those at home and those abroad', because their aspirations, interests and needs are basically the same. Obviously, there are undeniable specificities and differences that have to be taken into consideration. However, there is a certain level of interrelatedness and solidarity between the struggles of African peoples and people of African descent who are living in Sudan, Senegal, Brazil, the USA or Jamaica as a result of the combined incidence of history, sociology and political economy (and particularly because of the historical role and political impact of oppressive nationalism and racism/racialism in the mechanisms and processes of social differentiation and classification).
- **Political doctrine.** As a political doctrine, the ultimate goal of pan-Africanism is the establishment of the United States of Africa and a common African nationality and passport. This can be achieved through consistent empowerment and operationalisation of common federal frameworks such as NEPAD and the African Union (AU) together with their respective institutions such as the Pan-African Parliament (PAP); the Peace and Security Council (PSC); the African Peer Review Mechanism (APRM); the Economic, Social and Cultural Council (ECOSOCC); the Council for Safety, Security, Development

and Cooperation in Africa (CSSDCA); the African Court of Justice (ACJ); and the African Court on Human and People's Rights (ACHPR).

- **Economic doctrine.** As an economic doctrine, pan-Africanism ultimately seeks to create a continental integrated economy with a common market and currency and regional integration through the reorganisation, rationalisation and operationalisation of the Regional Economic Communities (RECs) – such as ECOWAS, SADC, IGAD, COMESA and ECCA – as a critical precondition for the materialisation of an African Economic Community.
- **Cultural dimension.** From a cultural point of view, pan-Africanism addresses the need for the mental and cultural de-alienation, spiritual upliftment and moral regeneration of African peoples and people of African descent. This entails a critical reassessment, re-codification and valorisation of African cultures and languages; the decolonisation of African history and historiography; a qualitative reform of African information and educational systems; as well as a clear option for the advent of 'intentional sciences' that must include research policies at the service of the interests and aspirations of the African people and, therefore, the purpose and objectives of the African Renaissance.

Stakes and Challenges to the African Cultural Renaissance

Nationhood and national conscience: Beyond the different types of nations that are identified in human history, there is now growing consensus about the core element of a nation: the existence of a 'common will to live together' and to together build a better future for all. In this regard, two factors are of great significance to the national project:

Commonality (or convergence) of interests and aspirations beyond differences that are based on social identity and stature, gender, race, ethnicity, creed, culture or language; and loyalty to the same State, country and community as the embodiment of the same (or convergent) aspirations and interests.

However, as demonstrated by Diop (1991: 211–219), commonality of history together with cultural and linguistic affinities also perform a key role in cementing the 'psychological factor' that is anchored in and nurtured by the conscience of belonging to the same community despite discontinuities in history and geography, as is the case between Africa and its Diaspora(s). According to Diop (1991: 211–219), history and language represent two of the three key components of cultural identity, the third one being the psychological (subjective)

factor. Historical conscience is crucial for the consolidation of national conscience and nation building, particularly in the case of a pluri-cultural and multilingual nation in the making.

Historical conscience refers to the feeling of belonging to the same community from and, above all, to the consciousness of commonly shared aspirations, interests and value systems: in Diop's (1991: 212) words, it is about that which distinguishes a cohesive *people* from the heterogeneous, inorganic *population* of a market. The psychological factor is anchored in and substantiated by a set of principles, value systems and worldview shared as a common reference among all members of the same community. For Diop (1991: 218), it is about 'the *psychological and cultural invariants* that political and social revolutions, even the most radical ones, leave intact, not only among the people, but among the very leaders of the revolution'.

In the perspective of JFA Ajayi (1986), emphasis must be put on both history and historiography. The role of historiography (the way in which history is told and taught) is not only to enable the explanation and comprehension of all events and facts which make up history; it also has to deal with the way in which the totality of the same events and facts are perceived individually and collectively within a given society. In other words, particularly for a people subjected to foreign subjugation, it is of critical importance to understand how their current situation came to be what it is.

Hence, the function fulfilled by historical collective memory as the womb for an alternative identity and image of self as a people, and, therefore, as a potentially subversive space for political initiative and self re-assertiveness (Mboup, 2011: 70). Hence the necessity for a concerted effort in order to correct the falsified versions of history as told or written by others, in order to achieve a greater and more effective autonomy for African historical and political consciousness, the main objective being not a rehabilitation of Africa's history as such, but rather to enable African people to 'know and understand exactly what happened, how and why it did happen'. More importantly still, is the capacity for African people and leadership, *to identify in both their common history and current situation, the major tendencies as well as alternative models and references for the future* (Ajayi, 1986: 11).

Identity Crisis and Challenges to Viable Statehood and Nation Building

(a) 'Mis-educating' African people and threats to citizenship

African educational systems are expected to produce conscious African citizens, qualified professionals for an increasingly demanding labour market

and quality leadership to carry forward the African Renaissance as a project of society. Instead, the educational system played a critical role in the mental alienation and subversion of African people and leaders – as is demonstrated by Carter Woodson in his seminal work *Mis-education of the Negro* (1933). The ‘mis-education’ of African people and people of African descent manifests itself by among other things, the habit of forging negative stereotypes about each other and calling each other names. As a result, any other African beyond the borders of the less than 200 000 square kilometres of Senegal who does not speak Wolof is a ‘*Nyak Bao*’; all Senegalese – irrespective of their mother/father tongues, creed or birthplace – are ‘*Gorgi*’ in the Ivory Coast; any non-Tsonga Mozambican – inasmuch as s(he) does not speak Ronga, shiTswa or Shangaan and comes from beyond the Limpopo River or the Zambezi River – belongs to a social category that is generically known as ‘*Xijondo*’; and in South Africa the term ‘*Kwerekwere*’ refers to any non-South African from the ‘north’ of the continent, especially West Africa.

Tolerable and ‘sociable’ to some extent, as mild expressions of the acknowledgement of non-fundamental specificities and differences, stereotypes and ethnotypes (and the generic visions and value systems underlying them) can sometimes lead to extreme forms of indiscriminate and blind violence that is unleashed by certain Africans against other Africans.

(b) Spirituality and Religion and Issues of Viable Statehood

Religion refers to specific doctrines, beliefs and ritualised practices of worship, meditation and prayer. While religion and the systems of beliefs and ritualised practices that go with it can be viewed as a structured sphere of power, spirituality refers to the more genuine, less formalist, intimate relationship that one establishes with God as a principle of a transcendental nature. It is also a relationship with the outside world, with nature and society and with other human beings as well as a relationship with the self in the quest for inner harmony, balance and peace. In terms of this perspective, the line of demarcation between spirituality and ethics is a very thin one in the African context. Spirituality plays a central role in African people’s history, life, cultural ethos and personality. Nevertheless, from a historical and sociocultural point of view, foreign religions (notably Christianity and Islam) were superimposed over African spirituality during the *Maafa* or Black African Holocaust (De Gruy Leary, 2005).

Malcolm X once expressed his ‘surprise’ at his own people’s ‘covetousness for copper whilst sitting on gold’. Ironically, from a historical point of view, African spirituality precedes by far other ‘revealed religions’. Many Bible passages and Islamic precepts and teachings have striking similarities and parallels with the

Egyptian book of the divine light (improperly called the *Book of the dead*) and with the more ancient African texts of the pyramids and sarcophages. According to Diop (1991: 149), Osiris (Asare, by his original African name) ‘was the first god in the history of religions to sit on a throne on Judgment Day, to judge the souls of men’. This also brings in the critical issue of the principle of secularism of the state. In this regard, one can agree that the worst act of political trickery and fraud occurs where and when religious faith storms into intellectual and political debates and tends to dominate or regulate them. In addition, the imposition of a project of society and governance that is based on religious faith will deal a deadly blow to the African traditions and ethos of pluralism and tolerance.

Furthermore, notwithstanding some history of progressiveness (particularly in the case of Islam [Diop, 1991: 148, 149]), religious discourse has contributed – in the most insidious ways – to inculcating in African people an inferiority complex together with a spirit of passivity and acceptance of Arabo-Semitic and Indo-European supremacy as both a burden and as an order of things stamped by God’s will; for example, the derogatory Islamist notion of ‘*kaafir*’ which means unfaithful, pagan or heathen; and the Biblical myth of the divine curse on Ham and his descendants that has been used as an ideological justification for the enslavement of African people on behalf of Christianity and Islam (see Segal, 2001; Williams, 1968; Ki-Zerbo, 1972).

Beyond confessional pluralism and tolerance, certain protagonists in this debate willingly advocate for the advent of an order of things that is characterised by **genuine ecumenism**, taking into consideration the outcomes of numerous scholarly works by Africans and other academics (Assiouty, 1989; Ben Jochannan, 1974; Diop, 1991; James, 1976; Soulié, 1979; 1984). These works have, among other things, extensively documented aspects of Islamic and Christian cosmogonies and eschatology that are more akin to ancient African conceptions. They include the myth of the creation of the universe; the idea of a hereafter that is associated with Judgement Day; the 42 principles of the Declaration of Innocence, which have to be recited by the deceased on Judgement Day presided over by Asare (Osiris) and has in all probability, inspired the Judaeo-Christian 10 Commandments; the image of the Madonna; Psalm 104 in the Bible, which has striking similarities and parallels with Akhenaton’s Hymn to the Sun; and, finally, the notions of Paradise and Hell which were part of the ancient Nile Valley belief systems 1700 years before the birth of the Prophet Muhammad (Diop, 1991: 332).

Healing from Past Injuries and Reconnecting with the Diaspora

Sacy Pereire is a central character in Afro-Brazilian narratives and folktales. Of African origin, one-legged Sacy is an unsettled, lonely and tormented character who roams the wilderness of the Amazonian forest, wandering and wailing as (s) he yearns for one of her/his legs but can never find it in South America because it remained in Africa. Sacy knows that (s)he will have to return to the motherland to find her/his other leg so that s(he) can regain her/his physical and spiritual balance and plenitude. Sacy Pereire is an archetype that is of great significance for the historical and symbolic relationship between Africa and its Diaspora(s). Among African slaves who had been forcibly removed from the continent and transplanted in the 'New World', death was perceived as the ultimate liberation and redemption since it was believed that the spirit of the deceased would return to its home in the motherland after death.

Is Africa not a Sacy Pereire that is Unaware of its Crippled Condition?

This question comes to mind with great acuteness at a moment when there is a strong impetus among Africans in the Diaspora(s) to return home. This yearning is manifested in many ways: culturally, politically, in academia and economic entrepreneurship among other things. There is a wide range of opportunities which Africa should seize in order to face the major challenges that lie ahead. African leaders who have critically understood the stakes of this unprecedented process and are cognisant of the considerable contribution that the Diaspora(s) can make towards the African Renaissance agenda have embarked on a historical initiative to reconnect Africa with its Diaspora(s) as the AU's sixth region. This applies to both the historical Diaspora and the more recent diapora(s) that are scattered throughout the world.

Many initiatives and frameworks are being developed that testify to the will of Africans on the continent and in the Diaspora(s) to reconnect with each other with a view to fostering the AU–NEPAD goals and the African Renaissance agenda. One of these initiatives is the Bicentennial Global Dialogue that took place in Barbados. In this framework, a number of major projects have been identified. They include the establishment of a direct sea link between Africa, the Caribbean and the Americas and also a direct airline link between Africa and the Caribbean, with Barbados as the regional hub; the development of the African Diasporic Census Initiative on Doing Business with Africa; and facilitating people who want to settle on the continent to do so. When implemented, these projects will translate into significant brain gain and a massive injection of investment for Africa.

The reconnection with the Diaspora will also bring in the issue of African reparations ...

Languages of Governance

Cabral (1973: 42 sq.) emphasises the importance of the culture of a given people as the quintessence of the historical process of that people. Hence the need and relevance of the *return to the sources* as basis for the African Renaissance project. According to Cabral (1973), the essence of imperialist domination lies in the violent usurpation of the freedom of the historical process and the negation of the historical and cultural personality of the oppressed (in this case African peoples). Conversely, if the essence of the project of national liberation for an oppressed people appears as the '**negation of negation**', this is because the project is aimed at reappropriating the historical initiative and regaining the historical – cultural personality of the people – both of which were usurped by forces of foreign domination. Negation of the negation therefore represents '**the most significant cultural act**' as far as the oppressed people are concerned inasmuch as it is about '**going back into history**' through the ascending paths of their national culture.

Language is the most important and dynamic element of every culture. As such, it is at the core of the process of contestation of foreign domination, as an irreplaceable means of expression and social communication, in all political and economic activities and sociocultural manifestations in the project of resistance to foreign domination. Better still: in the context of domination, multiform national resistance always includes a strong linguistic (and cultural) component. As the '**quintessence of quintessence**' of the experience and the journey in time and space of the African people, African languages serve as shelters of an alternative historic and cultural identity and, therefore, as both spaces and factors of historical-political subversion and initiative. Nonetheless, it is in European and not in African languages that these African intellectual and political elites took power (or inherited it from former colonial powers), exercised it and continue to hold it up to the present time. This situation is symptomatic of the ambiguities and shortcomings of the process of decolonisation and of the African Liberation Movement as a whole, particularly with regard to some of its leaders.

Linguistic Decolonisation: Language, Culture, Identity and Social Citizenship

Language, the most essential and dynamic element of culture, can be viewed as the 'keystone of human achievement and the essence of humanness' (Hertzler,

1965: 20). Undoubtedly, as a means of expression and social communication, language is a **resource** and not a problem in itself in so far as the acquisition of a new language competence opens up for the learner windows onto other cultures and other worlds and therefore represents opportunities for cultural growth, self-enrichment and self-expansion, and greater social citizenship. In contrast, what can be problematic are the patterns of unequal relationships that are established between certain languages or language groups by virtue of the cultural and linguistic **policies** that govern such relationships. In certain multicultural and multilingual contexts though, the pursuit of policies of **vertical or ordained multilingualism** instead of **equitable or coordinated multilingualism** can lead to the creation, perpetuation and even the exacerbation of sometimes huge gaps between categories of citizens.

Colonial and Postcolonial Legacies and the Marginalisation of African Languages

As a consequence of past policies and practices, reinforced by speakers' negative attitudes and the perpetuation of misconceptions and misrepresentations about the capacity and intrinsic value of African indigenous languages as mediums of communication and tuition, there is a limited use of these languages in critical areas such as teaching, research, information and communication, and governance. Lack of **political will** is perhaps a major challenge when the implementation of national language policies has been hampered by the fact that they were never ratified by African parliaments nor were legal frameworks and regulatory tools for their implementation put in place.

Linguistic problems in present-day Africa are numerous and often complex. Reflecting on these problems in terms of the African Renaissance will lead us to examine two questions whose aspects are addressed unevenly and differently by scholars:

- (i) Theoretical issues, particularly those that relate to the scarcity of systematic work or to the development of historical and comparative linguistics.
- (ii) The operational and practical aspects of linguistic problems, towards which the scholars of the first decade of the postcolonial era seem to have adopted a generally timid or 'neutral' attitude since they only dealt with the description of mechanisms and the inventory of problems without suggesting solutions.

Theoretical Issues

This chapter focuses primarily on operational and practical aspects in the search for solutions to the linguistic problems of Africa that pose serious challenges for viable statehood and nation building. The following feature prominently among the issues: the role of comparative and historical linguistics in African historiography; the role of onomastics in the study of migrations; and the debate around the need for a theoretical model for the study of African languages (descriptive linguistics).

Issues of Classification: Revisiting Greenberg's Paradigm

Issues of classification concerning African languages have been at the centre of many authors' concerns. Among other contributions, Greenberg's book entitled *Languages of Africa* was published in 1963, and it has become a basic reference work on the classification of African languages – and this despite its limitations. Greenberg distinguishes four major language families in Africa: (1) Niger-Kordofan, (2) Afro-Asiatic, (3) Nilo-Sahara and (4) KhoiSan (three entities: Southern African KhoiSan, Sandawe and Hattsa).

The Nilo-Sahara family, which was the focus of much of Greenberg's attention and interest, consists of six major branches: (1) Songhai; (2) Saharian; (3) Maban; (4) Fur; (5) Koman and (6) Chari Nile. The Niger-Kordofan family (or Congo-Kordofan) consists of two major branches or sub-families: the Niger-Congo sub-family (whose area of geographic extension corresponds roughly to the Senegal–Kenya–South Africa triangle) and the Kordofan family (which covers a more restricted area that corresponds roughly to Eastern Sudan and includes the entities of Koalib, Tegali, Talodi, Tumtum and Katla). The Niger-Congo branch is subdivided into six language groups: (1) West-Atlantic (Wolof, Pulaar, etc); (2) Mande; (3) Gur or Voltaic (Senufo, More, Dogon, etc); (4) Kwa (Yoruba, Igbo, Akan, etc); (5) Benue-Kongo; and (6) Adamawa (Mbum, Lakka, Banda, etc).

Bantu Languages are One of the Subdivisions of the Benue-Congo Complex.

For a long time, the Greenberg's classification model has served as a reference model for a great number of specialists in African linguistics. And yet, as the Hungarian linguist Istvan Fodor (1966) has noted, Greenberg failed to observe a basic methodological rule: establishing phonetic correspondences in order to show genetic relatedness between two or several languages.

Diop (1977) was the first to fill the methodological gaps in Greenberg's classification. Since in previous works he showed the basic historical and cultural unity of all Africans, he resorted to the rule of phonological, morphological and semantic correspondences (in this Diop followed in the footsteps of linguist F Bopp who had shown the unity between Sanskrit, Germanic and Roman languages in the large Indo-European family) to show the structural unity and genetic relatedness between Pharaonic Egyptian and African languages.

Theophile Obenga (1973; 1974; 1993; 2004) supported and strengthened Diop's thesis by adding more arguments to his scientific demonstration, notably in a paper delivered at the Cairo Colloquium that was organised by Unesco in January/ February 1974 on the topic 'The population of ancient Egypt and the deciphering of Meroitic writing'. In this paper, Obenga questions Greenberg's classification, particularly regarding the Afro-Asiatic family (or Hamito-Semitic), by showing that there is no genetic relationship between Berber, Pharaonic Egyptian and Semitic – which are all languages Greenberg classified under the same 'Afro-Asiatic family'. After rejecting the notion of **mixed language** and challenging the arguments of Greenberg in support of his classificatory patterns, Diop and Obenga set out to establish – both in terms of phonology and morphology – the structural features of the genetic relatedness between Egyptian (Pharaonic and Coptic) and the other African languages. They found the following:

- Formation of the plural by suffixes to the morpheme *w* (variants: *u*, *on*) in Egyptian and other African languages: Kanuri, Ewe, Julia and Dogon
- Negative morphemes (*n*, *nn*)
- Expression of emphatic future by one of the morphemes *na*, *n*, *ka* or by derived forms: in Egyptian (Ancient and Middle Egyptian, Coptic) and in Negro-African
- Complete forms: e.g. expression of the imperative 'Take! Hold!' by the morphemes *m*, *mi* (Ancient Egyptian), *ma* (in the Sahidic variant of Coptic), *ma* (in Mboshi of Kongo), *am* (Wolof)

Further evidence of genetic relatedness is the origin of the system of nominal classes in the interrogative and relative forms in Egyptian. On this basis, in lieu of Greenberg's model on which their work relies, Diop and Obenga propose a classification model that mainly identifies

- two non-African entities: Semitic (including, Arabic in North Africa) and Malagasy (Madagascar)
- two minority groups: Berber and KhoiSan

- five large language families: (i) Egyptian (Pharaonic and Coptic); (ii) Kushitic (Somali; Galla; Saho; Danakil and Bishari); (iii) Chadic (Hausa; Giziga and Matakam; Mandari; MusGu; Masa; Tuburi); (iv) Niger-Kordofan; and (v) Nilo-Saharan.

The main contribution of Diop and Obenga in this area lies in a convincing critique of Greenberg's model, which resulted in a classification that is more reflective of the linguistic reality of the African continent (even though these two authors' contribution relies, to a large extent, on the taxonomic model of the American linguist).

Studies in Linguistics and Social Sciences, and the Issue of Cultural Unity

The demonstration of the genetic relatedness between Egyptian and the modern African languages has strongly contributed to reinforcing the notion of a profound linguistic and cultural, but also historical and anthropological, unity between different African populations. The case of the Bantu entity is one of the many examples that illustrate the reality of the fundamental unity of the African peoples. Even more than Bleek sensed, the linguistic unity of the Bantu world has finally been scientifically established by Meinhof and Guthrie with the publication of *The classification of the Bantu languages* (1948) and *Comparative Bantu*, a monumental work that was reprinted in 1967 and 1970. Greenberg (1966), Diop (1977; 1988) and Obenga (1985) have also made seminal contributions in this area.

Operational and Practical Aspects of the Linguistic Decolonisation Project

In the area of language policy, opposition to change, together with a lack of rigour and self-confidence, has contributed to Africa missing another appointment with history insofar as the Decade of Cultural Development (1988/97) under the auspices of UNESCO offered, at international level, an enabling framework for developing new linguistic policies in accordance with the aspirations of African peoples for a stronger African cultural identity and full citizenship and nationhood.

Primacy of Function over Form: Need to 'Grab the Bull by its Horns'

With regard to the South African context, Finlayson and Madiba (2002) and others stress that the social use of languages has always been the yardstick to

measure their actual development. Therefore, the function(s) that are fulfilled by a particular language or language group are key factors that will determine the forms in which the language development process will occur. Indeed, 'the form always follows the function' (Cooper, 1989, in Finlayson and Madiba, 2002: 45). According to Finlayson and Madiba (2002: 46), the use of a language as a medium of instruction 'creates the demand for new terms and further provides the opportunity to use them. The new terms can be used in text books, in teaching, scientific experiments and so forth'.

A study by the African Academy of Languages (ACALAN) of proposals and resolutions about language policies on the continent shows that 'there is nothing new about them': 'What is really significant is how much they have remained on paper and not seriously been addressed.' Hence, there was a need for a new approach at continental level, which culminated in the founding of ACALAN. In other words, it will be necessary to 'grab the bull by its horns' and address the apparent lack of political will on the continent regarding the development of African indigenous languages. This will require building new synergies and institutional networks as well as the (re)mobilisation of all stakeholders and the coordination of interventions.

Looking beyond Functional Multilingualism

The main objectives of the Decade of Cultural Development have remained relevant in Africa as far as linguistics is concerned. Three main objectives have to be adopted to implement this new policy: (i) promoting the social usage of national languages; (ii) introducing them as languages of education; and (iii) creating and/or reinforcing the operational capacities of language study centres. In this regard, it is necessary to look beyond the narrow scope of an option for **functional multilingualism** because such an option will result in some sort of **structural linguistic and sociolinguistic dualism** that will confine African languages to peripheral and less prestigious functions while former colonial languages will continue to dominate and even monopolise critical functions in areas such as education, governance, administration and science.

In Yai's opinion, a stable and durable situation of linguistic balance and equity cannot be attained without a 'generalisation of the practice of scientific and political discourse in African languages'. Yai (1983: 10) agrees that such a choice calls for 'a clear vision of the objectives to be attained, extensive and accurate knowledge of the problems to be solved, a precise assessment of the methods and means to be implemented, and the creation of an institutional framework that is efficient but not cumbersome'. In all cases, this option will require **special attention and support** not only for the development and promotion of African

languages as languages of science, technology, education and research, but also as mediums of information, governance and diplomacy. This will imply allocating adequate financial, institutional, material and human resources for the development and promotion of African indigenous languages.

Criteria of Choice

Which languages should be chosen? ‘All of them!’ one is tempted to say, because all languages are important (Mboup, 2008: 109). The stake lies in excluding a language in favour of those that are considered more ‘important’ than it does in the fairness, the pertinence of the policy choices that have to be made and the criteria on the basis of which these choices have to be made. From this point of view, it is undeniable that all African languages are not in the same situation. The requirements of efficiency and rigour, which are inspired by experience and the lessons that have been learnt from the past (including the experience of non-African countries), indicate that the perspective that should be adopted should be realistic in order to prevent both the possible risks of a policy that can threaten some languages with extinction while preventing a situation of linguistic hyper-fragmentation that will make the policy inefficient. The criteria that have to be adopted should therefore take into consideration the following:

- The geographic distribution of languages and the representativeness by area, in view of their nature as a lingua franca and the importance of the other social functions of the languages
- The number of speakers
- Broadcasting and integration in the geographic space
- How easy it is for speakers of other languages to learn the language that was chosen
- How one can use the language
- The existence of educational materials (particularly written ones) or the possibility of developing them
- The role of the language as a factor of African consciousness, national unity or cultural solidarity (sociolinguistic criterion).

Filling the Gaps in the Legal and Regulatory Framework: Institutionalisation and Promotion of the Social Use of African Languages

The perpetuation of the generic situation of structural dualism as a result of an option for functional multilingualism is made possible and encouraged through the perpetuation and, in some instances, widening of certain gaps in the legal

and regulatory framework. There is therefore, an urgent need to fill these gaps by formulating – including African indigenous languages and having them ratified by African parliaments and implemented by competent government authorities in partnership with all stakeholders and role players in a linguistic renaissance process – pieces of legislation for the development and promotion of African indigenous languages as languages of teaching, learning, research, science, public administration and governance. Bold reforms should be initiated so that written and oral mastery of African languages becomes a criterion for election to some administrative functions and promotion in professional and social life. No African will be interested in learning Xhosa, Swahili or Wolof as long as the mastery of Portuguese, Afrikaans, French or English remains the sole criterion for finding a well-paid job in the public service or elsewhere, for acquiring information or benefitting from training opportunities in Africa.

Languages of Education

African languages that are chosen for education should be a reflection of large linguistic groups and areas that are identified at the level of the continent. It is true that some African languages such as Hausa, Swahili, KiNyarwanda-KiRundi, Yoruba, Somali, SeSotho, LiNgala and CiLuba have already become, in various degrees and terms, languages of education.

For various reasons, none of the African languages have managed to acquire the status of equality with the European languages of colonisation as languages for the acquisition and transmission of modern knowledge and know-how and for social promotion. Thus, it can be stated that everywhere in Africa problems of linguistic decolonisation, which are of a cultural and political nature, remain on the agenda. Besides, with a few exceptions and in most cases, some of these languages are studied in various systems of formal education merely as a discipline – the aim being the linguistic competence of tertiary level students and secondary school learners. Or else their use as languages of education is limited to the pre-school level or the first years of primary school, with no plans for continuation at the secondary and tertiary education levels. This is apart from the insufficiency and poor standard of teaching materials, staff training and teaching methods (Mboup, 2008b: 114, 115).

Pilot literacy experiments in these languages should also be encouraged. Once they are integrated into educational systems from primary to tertiary level, these languages can become compulsory subjects alongside the European languages of colonisation. At the same time, the principle of linguistic and cultural opening up to 'the outside world' should be taken into consideration. In this way, the West

African student or learner will be able to choose another West African or East African idiom, preferably a cross-border language.

Creation and/or Consolidation of Study Centres

The systematisation of the study of African national languages raises the issue of the creation of institutions that can be responsible for the coordination of such study and for following up on the application of the results that are obtained in collaboration with existing institutions, for example universities, Departments of Education and Training, of Information and Culture, and national directorates of literacy, according to the following division of responsibilities:

African universities and tertiary institutions: research and language codification; teacher training (training of trainers); participation in the teaching of African languages and in teaching in these languages; and the development of teaching materials.

Departments of Education: literacy and language teaching, development of school manuals and various teaching materials; training teachers in literacy in African languages; using trained trainers at universities as lecturers; defining and applying new language policies.

Departments of Information and Communication: promoting the social use of national languages in the media (radio, print and TV); training information professionals (speakers, presenters, writers, translators, etc) to achieve perfect command of national languages, which are their primary work tool.

Departments of Culture: research on and disclosure of cultural contents that are conveyed through national languages: ethno-linguistics, anthropology, oral literature, including forms and modes of linguistic expression (issues in semiology and semantics, intrinsic features of some language or discursive practices: structures, order and instances of discourse, etc). Departments of Culture can also promote minority languages, for example the Khoi and San languages.

Broadcasting, Information Technology and Integration in the Geopolitical Space

Currently, all the major African languages are languages of information and broadcasting (including on internet sites in the case of some languages). All

African countries have their own national transmitter(s) and some have transmitters with a capacity for supra-national, regional or sub-regional diffusion. This factor should be taken into consideration when defining new language policies. It is also desirable that each language zone adopts as much as possible the principle of opening up to the 'outside world' particularly neighbouring countries. Furthermore, the fascinating development of new communication technologies provides African societies and people with undreamed of opportunities to access modern information and knowledge on scientific and technological development in the national languages, depending on a good command of information technology and the internet. Regulatory bodies should be established to guarantee that the open competition occasioned by the increasing globalisation of exchanges is not harmful to the vital interests of Africa and Africans. From being mere consumers, Africans have to become **producers of content and knowledge** in these fields.

The Dakar–Cape fibre optics network (one of the best in the field of application) can be extended to the development of communication systems, including those in African languages. What is more, 'wireless' technology (cordless telephones) allows considerable expansion of and improvement in connectivity. It is also possible to make it easier for rural populations to have access to the telephone and the internet by setting up multifunctional telecentres in each village or group of villages. There are other opportunities, particularly for Africans who do not have a command of the European languages, like interactive TV and touch-sensitive screen computers. These can play a big part in bridging the digital divide between Africa and Northern countries, while increasing opportunities for the development of the African continent.

The Promotion of Swahili

What is KiSwahili?

(a) The origin of the language and its history

According to Whiteley (1969) and Khalid (1977), the origin of Swahili can be attributed to certain historical factors which, in the first centuries of the Christian Era and even earlier, led certain groups of African people speaking broadly similar languages to be dispersed over a wide geographical area along the Indian Ocean that was called '*Shungwaya*' in local traditions. This basic linguistic affinity added to the trading relationships they developed over time accounted, to a great extent, for the emergence of a common language as a means of social communication. It is therefore important to bear in mind that the WaSwahili were but one of a number of original *Zanj* or black/African peoples and that, despite

the Arab origin of the toponym '*sawahil*' (from which the linguonym '*Swahili*' is derived), Arab influence on the language (essentially on the phonetism and lexicon) came later (not earlier than the 9th and 10th centuries CE).

As demonstrated by Nurse and Spears (1985), the history of the development of Swahili as both a language and a cultural identity was marked by a multiplicity of factors and processes that occurred between 800 and 1500 CE (being the African component that was of paramount importance in shaping identity). However, as a result of the combined effects of factors such as people's migration to the coast, their involvement in long-distance trade across the Indian Ocean and the urbanisation of Swahili societies, the WaSwahili (Swahili people) developed, through space and time, certain cultural traits that differentiated them from their African neighbours. On the whole, Swahili can be seen as the result and expression of some sort of cultural syncretism; with the process of 'swahilisation' having affected both African indigenous populations and the Arabs that had been trading along the coast for a long time, many of whom having remained and settled there over time. In return, Arabs influenced the development of the coastal culture.

Overall, the Swahili people are in many ways undoubtedly an African people.

(b) A 'Bantu' language

The term '*Bantu*', the generic name by which some of the people happened to be called as a result of the infamous 'right to call' that was often usurped as an exclusive privilege by colonists on our continent, is the plural of '*mu-ntu*' (which means human being). From this perspective, 'Bantu' people are human beings who have the same ontological status and share the same humanity or '*u-ntu*' ('*utu*' in Kiswahili) of other human beings. Therefore, Europeans, Asian Japanese and Chinese are also Bantu – so also are the Ketchua-Aymara, Guarani and Mapuche peoples of Abya-Yala (the indigenous name for the continent of South America).

In Central, Eastern and Southern Africa, '*mu-ntu*' (in languages such as KiKongo, LiNgala, IsiZulu, IsiXhosa and SeTswana) occurs in phonetically varying forms: '*mtu*' (Swahili), '*mutthu*' (EMakhuwa), '*munhu*' (in Ronga and Shangaan, a Tsonga sub-group of southern Mozambique and northern South Africa), etc. '*Muntu*' is equivalent to and carries the same meaning as the '*nit*' of the Walaf, the '*móot*' of the Dwala, the '*mëtë*' of the Bamileke, the '*neddo*' of the Hal-Pulaaren and the '*r-mt*' in Ancient (pharaonic) Egyptian. In all these contexts, the human being represents, from both a philosophical and spiritual as well as an ethical point of view, a central notion and a superior ontological category. In such contexts, muntu is as central as other notions such as that of

'maat', which carries an idea of justice, equity, harmony, balance and righteousness. If the Walaf have it that *'Nit nitay garabam'*, 'Bantu' people such as the AmaZulu and AmaXhosa of the Nguni entity or those who belong to the Sotho-Tswana-Pedi cluster express the same worldview and basic principles and value systems through the saying *'umuntu ngu muntu nga banye bantu'* (a human being is a human being through other human beings).

The term *'Bantu'* is therefore used in this chapter for the sake of convenience and not because its etymology is accepted unquestioningly as legitimate.

In the above context, *'Bantu'* refers to a very large group of about 300 million people (about 1/3 of the total African population) who live in an extensive area of land on our continent that has the shape of a triangle whose three angles are located in Western Cameroon, Northern Kenya and South Africa, with the exception of a few parts that are occupied by some Nilotes (Masaay, Jie and Samburu) and by the Khoi-San, Sandawe and Hata (the three latter ones are considered as the first inhabitants or indigenous peoples of Southern Africa).

As acknowledged by Obenga (1985), conclusive results of archaeology, palaeontology and palaeo-botanics, which have been reinforced by cultural anthropology and historical and comparative linguistics, indicate that Bantu peoples migrated from the mountainous regions of Western Cameroon into their current habitats in Central, Eastern and Southern Africa over a period of two millennium (between 1000 BC and 1000/1100 CE) in two migratory waves or trends: a Western wave alongside or parallel to the Atlantic coastline and another wave which followed the fringes of the tropical rain forest. The two waves converged in the Congo basin, from which they later dispersed in secondary and tertiary waves of migration. Despite undeniable specificities and differences in their respective habitats, living conditions and lifestyles, Bantu people display a profound unity (from a historical, linguistic, cultural and anthropological point of view, being metallurgy, pottery and cereal agriculture, some of the most commonly shared traits among them).

As for the Swahili language itself, it is an African language. As proof of this assertion, Nurse and Spears (1985: 15) point to the fact that 'some of the major sound changes that took place during the historical development of Swahili had already occurred by the beginning of the second millennium after Christ, and most were complete by AD 1500'. Additional evidence for the late adoption of Arabic loan words can be found by looking at some morphological traits of the rural dialects of Swahili on Zanzibar and the mainland such as the levels of retention of many pre-Arab Bantu words. Indeed, 'if Arabic loans had been present for centuries, they would have spread beyond urban centres to replace these earlier forms'. In fact, despite the attested influences of Arabic on Swahili

vocabulary in the 12th century AD and even earlier (as previously stated), evidence nevertheless suggests that Arab influence was not very intense prior to the 18th century (Nurse and Spears, 1985; Khalid, 1977: 75). European influence seems to have been registered even later.

Overall, research in historical linguistics has demonstrated that Swahili, together with idioms such as CiBemba (Zambia and the southern Democratic Republic of the Congo), KiKongo and CiLuba display the greater per centage of retention (44%) of the common pre-dialectal Bantu linguistic legacy (see the works of Meinhof, Guthrie and, later, Obenga and Diop). Yet, as a result of contact with foreign colonists and traders, both the Swahili language and culture display a number of influences from Arabic (most markedly); Hindi (only a couple of words such as '*pesa*' = money; '*gari*' = car and '*bangi*' = Indian hemp); European languages such as English; and (to a much lesser extent) German and Portuguese (only a couple of words such as *mesa* = table and *karata* = playing cards).

Obviously, Kiswahili has also borrowed part of its vocabulary from neighbouring African languages. Some of the borrowings include *Bunge* (Parliament) from the Haya language that is spoken on the south-western shores of Lake Victoria) and *Ikulu* (presidential residence or palace) from the gogo/nyamwezi cluster.

(c) Literary tradition: Kiswahili as the 'perfect tool for poetry'

Part of the Swahili legacy is a very rich literary and poetic tradition that can be linked to a large extent to the Islamic religion and tradition. It was first written in a graphic system that was derived from Arabic. Similarly to the *ajami* writing system that is widely used in West Africa (the Hausa, Mandinka, Pulaar, Walaf languages), this writing system was enriched with a number of diacritic signs for the adequate transcription, spelling and pronunciation of certain words whose phonic structure include a number of sounds that do not exist in the phonetics of the Arabic language. This written tradition, which was well documented from the 18th/19th centuries and even earlier, includes a corpus of very sophisticated verse literature that flourished in and around the island of Faza (off the northern Kenyan coastline) before moving southwards at a later stage to Mombasa and (even later) to Pemba, where it flourished during the latter part of the nineteenth century and into the first decade of the 19th century.

Over centuries, the Swahili people have greatly enjoyed and taken great pride in a very old and rich tradition of '*mashairi matamu*' (sweet verse) that was written in a language whose vocabulary is at least twice as extensive as that in the *Oxford standard Swahili dictionary*. Some of the most outstanding authors

of this literary tradition are Aidarusi, Bwana Mengo, Muyaka Ghasani, Mathias Mnyampala, Amri Abedi, Ahmad Nabahani, Bwana Mataka and Shaaban Robert. Most of these authors were real '*waalimu*' (masters) in their own right who established their own schools of thought and/or of metric like their West-African counterparts (such as Majaxate Kala, Musaa Ka, Samba Jaara Mbay and Usmane Dan Fodio).

In their Islamic and non-Islamic and in their narrative or non-narrative literary productions and/or performances, these authors – generally writing for aesthetical and, above all, didactic purposes – were regarded by many as men of great knowledge ('*elimu*') and wisdom ('*hikima*'), particularly due to their willingness and capacity to articulate and give expression to their people's feelings, aspirations and ideals.

The Linguistic Panorama and Status of the Language

(a) Sociolinguistic context(s)

At present, the sociolinguistic context of Swahili comprises a total of three main groups of speakers: (i) those who speak the language as a mother/father tongue; (ii) speakers who use it as a second or third language; and (iii) speakers who find themselves in sociolinguistic contexts within which Swahili is occasionally used as a medium for self-expression and social communication. Although the total number of Swahili speakers has yet to be thoroughly assessed and confirmed through a sociolinguistic survey, the available data suggests the figure to be 35 to 40 million and even 50 million speakers (Marten, 2005). These speakers are found in an area that is 1 500 kilometres long between southern Somalia and northern Mozambique in Tanzania and Kenya (10–15 million), in Uganda, and in other parts of Eastern, Southern and Central Africa.

In Tanzania, where it was promoted to the rank of an official language in 1967, Swahili is spoken as a mother tongue and as a second or third language. In this country, it is used in education, in administration, in politics (in the drafting of the Constitution of the United Republic of Tanzania and in parliamentary proceedings), as a means of social communication (in the press, radio and TV), on public signs and in the rules of the road in conjunction with English. The original versions of Nyerere's political texts, such as *Azimio la Arusha* (the Arusha Declaration) and *Ujamaa Vijijini* (Ujamaa Villages), were also written in Swahili.

In Kenya, Swahili was one of the national languages that received official recognition in 1974, together with other languages such as Luo and kiKuyu, despite the fact that its area of extension as a lingua franca remains essentially restricted to the coastal area (Lamu and Mombasa). As a mother (and/or father) tongue,

Swahili is spoken alongside the Indian Ocean littoral, on some offshore islands (such as Unguja [Zanzibar], Pemba and Mafia) and in a number of inland cities and towns (such as Tabora, Ujiji and Bujumbura, which in the past played a crucial role as major trading centres alongside isolated trading settlements in Zambia), and along the banks of the Congo River. In general, the users of the language as a second or third language include 'Bantu'-speaking groups who use Swahili for self-expression and social communication purposes in most of their daily lives and another group of people who regularly use the language in a limited manner (e.g. speakers in the Democratic Republic of the Congo, Nilotic-speaking groups such as the Masaay or in Uganda where Swahili became an official language in 2005).

There are also sociolinguistic contexts in which KiSwahili is occasionally used by speakers with a rather limited command of the language and/or who use it in a sporadic way. They are mainly found at the periphery of the mainly Swahili-speaking areas, in southern Somalia (including some off-shore islands between Mogadishu and Kisimayu), in northern Mozambique, in parts of Rwanda and Burundi, in the Democratic Republic of the Congo, on the Comores (Ugazija and Nzwani) and in northern Madagascar as far as Majunga. In Rwanda and Burundi, Swahili is spoken in some districts of Kigali and Bujumbura, particularly in the Muslim community and among traders. In the Democratic Republic of the Congo, it fulfils various vehicular functions in the mining area of Shaba (where there is a large concentration of immigrant labour), in the Maniema, in the western parts of the country and around the capital city of Kinshasa.

In Mozambique, Swahili is not the mother tongue of any ethno-linguistic community as such. However, its use as a cultural tool in the recent history of the country was real and during the struggle for national liberation, many military and political cadres of FRELIMO were trained in Tanzania in the Nashingwea and Tunduru camps. Therefore, this language should deserve the attention of Mozambican authorities in the design and implementation of a language policy that is aimed at breaking away from the colonial status quo, especially since the language is spoken by many government and FRELIMO officials. Its use is also widespread in the Nampula, Cabo Delgado and Zambezia provinces.

(b) The status of the language

Swahili is taught as a subject at many universities in Africa and other parts of the world, especially at the universities of Ile-ife (Nigeria) and Makerere (Uganda). It is also taught as a subject in East African tertiary institutions and, more recently, in Tripoli (Libya). It forms part of curricula in Europe, for example at London's SOAS (School of African Studies) and Paris's INALCO (National Institute of

Oriental Languages and Civilisations), and at Nordic countries' universities. In the USA, it is taught in various universities (such as Columbia, Pennsylvania, UCLA and Texas) in addition to being considered for staff training in the foreign service.

In Tanzania, the *Swahili Journal* (which is published twice a year by the Institute of Swahili Research of the University of Dar-Es-Salaam and is entirely devoted to fostering Swahili studies) includes articles in the areas of history, linguistics and literature in addition to lexicology (coinage of lists of new words) and book reviews. As a consequence of this and other initiatives, Swahili has the advantage of having a particularly thriving and high quality written scientific and literary corpus (dating from the 18th century and even earlier) and excellent educational materials that will likely make learning easier. Finally, it is important to stress that although it is without any defined status in the framework of the UN despite some laudable individual initiatives particularly in the area of media and broadcasting, Swahili was adopted as an official language by the AU following a resolution that was introduced by Senegal at the Durban (2002) and Maputo (July 2003) summits.

For all the above-mentioned reasons, in addition to the fact that it is the most widely spoken African language on the African continent, Swahili has the potential to become a language of unity and integration at sub-regional and continental level since it is a language of science and education, diplomacy and politics. In the medium term, it might also become a language of communication with the African Diaspora.

Strategy for the Promotion of Swahili

(a) In education systems

An aggressive and systematic policy of promotion should be undertaken in schools and entire education systems on the continent and throughout the African Diaspora under the auspices of the AU's Commission for Education and Science. Frameworks such as the 'Home of the Little Ones' initiative (*La Case des Tout-Petits*) – sponsored by President Abdoulaye Wade and thereafter adopted by UNESCO as a universal initiative to be replicated worldwide, including in Africa – should be used to promote Swahili as a compulsory subject for all African children, together with the children's primary languages as languages for teaching and learning for the first years of formal school, as was recommended during the Association for the Development of Education in Africa (ADEA)'s conference in Libreville (Gabon) in March 2006. The AU's Commission for Education and Science should be fully empowered and resourced in order

to take responsibility for this task in addition to its other responsibilities and mandates. The African Academy of Languages (ACALAN) can make a valuable contribution in reinforcing the capacity of African tertiary institutions in the area of curriculum development.

Target institutions should also include

- the NEPAD e-School initiative, implemented in more than 20 African countries, which is one of the most promising flagship programmes of NEPAD and has the potential to fast track the implementation process and ownership by African people and can therefore guarantee NEPAD's credibility, viability and sustainability in Africa and on the world stage
- leadership academies to promote and consolidate a new generation of African leaders
- educational initiatives such as the Afrika Heritage School project in South Africa.

(b) The promotion of the language's social use

As a follow up to the adoption of a pan-African protocol on the promotion of Swahili that has to be ratified and implemented by all AU members, all African heads of state and government and all ministers and senior officials (including MPs) should do a compulsory initiation course in Swahili, and the PAP can act as the host for a pilot project. At the same time, the use of Swahili in NEPAD, the AU, PAP, the PSC, the ARPM and other pan-African institutions and initiatives should be promoted, at least at a symbolic level at the beginning (e.g. in the AU's anthem and motto). Later, some level of proficiency in Swahili should be a prerequisite for eligibility to functions in any pan-African institution.

The preceding should be coupled with another battery of measures that are aimed at the more effective institutionalisation of the use of Swahili in shifting its current status as an official NEPAD and AU language to that of a working language. This will necessitate (1) greater political, institutional and financial empowerment of the AU's Commission for Education and Science in order to enable it to discharge its mandate in this respect and (2) the reinforcement of the Swahili translation and interpretation services at the PAP, NEPAD and the AU through consistent policies in information technology as well as for staff training, recruitment and retention.

The establishment of African cultural centres with well-organised Swahili libraries and dynamic associations such as Friends of Swahili should be encouraged and promoted in major African cities. The African Union Constitutive Act (together with all the major documents of pan-African institutions such as

NEPAD, the PSC, the APRM and the African Court of Justice) should be translated into Swahili and used for the training of African heads of state and government and senior officials, including MPs. Finally, pilot adult literacy projects in Swahili should be encouraged everywhere.

Conclusion

If it is true that Africa will not be able to avoid multilingualism, it is also clear that African people will not be able to free themselves, develop or seriously envisage building democracy or achieving progress by using exclusively or predominantly languages that only a minority has mastered or understood. Given the pre-eminence of European languages of colonisation in general (in government; in the management of public services and of towns, cities, municipalities; in education, scientific research, social communication, intellectual and literary life and production, etc), one can say that in present-day Africa, as was the case in yesterday's anti-colonial struggles, African peoples and leadership are **still in a pre-liberation phase** as long as they have not managed to **free the African people's speech, by generalising the practice of scientific and political discourse in African languages**.

This way to envisage the future and raise the issue of African languages is in line with a perspective of true liberation and renaissance that is understood in terms of an alternative global project of society and civilisation aimed at the creation of conditions for the re-birth of Africa as an independent, mature and competitive centre of decision making in the world of today and tomorrow.

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CHAPTER 26

African Renaissance and Leadership: A Critical Analysis of the Continent from a Multi-, Inter- and Transdisciplinary Approach

Esther Kibuka-Sebitosi

Introduction

The purpose of this chapter is to critically analyse the African continent and the phenomena of Renaissance and leadership from a multi-, inter- and transdisciplinary (MIT) perspective. Simply defined, **multidisciplinarity** is studying a research topic using more than one discipline at one and the same time. **Interdisciplinarity**, on the other hand, involves bringing together distinctive components of two or more disciplines in a single mind, research endeavour or instructional programme; while **transdisciplinarity** refers to that which is across the disciplines, between the disciplines and beyond and outside the disciplines. Its goal is understanding the present world with all its complexities.

The Meaning of the MIT

A postmodernist view of knowledge production under MIT is that knowledge is not confined to academic disciplines. Knowledge is produced from various stakeholders and collective entities outside universities. For example, indigenous knowledge is produced by communities and tested over generations. Multidisciplinarity, then, implies the integration or interrelation of disciplinary generated knowledge and non-disciplinary generated knowledge and its application to complex problems and issues.

Challenges of MIT Approaches

Crossing from mono- to multi-

Most practitioners of MIT were first trained in traditional disciplines. They must learn to appreciate different perspectives and methods, for instance, qualitative and quantitative research methods. Often, practitioners within a discipline using mainly quantitative methods may think of themselves as being 'more scientific'

whereas colleagues in ‘softer’ disciplines may associate quantitative approaches with an inability to grasp the broader dimensions of a problem like feelings. In explaining the challenges of MIT, I draw upon the words of Pat Duffy Hutcheon in a keynote address to a conference on multidisciplinary studies of social sciences at the University of British Columbia:

All the earlier efforts to be interdisciplinary had two common problems: In the first place, all were dependent on the willingness to co-operate of a number of concerned individuals housed in a variety of academic departments ...; secondly, all attempts were based upon no formal scientific foundation ... This meant that there was no real logical or empirical basis for continuing research and knowledge building within the interdisciplinary frame of reference.

Thomas Kuhn, in his book entitled *The Copernican revolution*, quotes the astronomer Copernicus as saying: ‘It is as though an artist were to gather the hands, feet, head and other members for his images from diverse models, each part excellently drawn, but not related to a single body, and since they in no way match each other the result would be more monster than man.’

Ways of becoming MIT

- People/scholars from different disciplines coming together
- Student/citizen-centred approach – perceived needs of students set the agenda
- The most popular ideology: postmodernism/the African Renaissance
- MIT – interdisciplinary (biological, psychological, sociocultural constitution of the subject matter, strategies and solutions)

The Challenge of Looking at Africa from a Mono-Disciplinary Perspective

Africa is a complex continent, having over 53 countries with different languages, cultures and political agendas. To examine it using a monodiscipline is to ignore its complexity and the interlinkages that intertwine its development and existence over generations. This would prescribe solutions to complex challenges that require an integrated approach. For instance, the case of HIV/AIDS and endemic diseases, the economic development of African states and the reduction/eradication of poverty.

The challenge of addressing underdevelopment and poverty eradication is that it requires an understanding from various fields – a multidisciplinary

approach – to conceptualise and implement strategies that will solve the problems of Africa.

Approach and Theoretical Underpinnings: Africa in the MIT Mirror

MIT knowledge will help in the understanding of the reality of Africa both internally and in the global context. Secondly, the examination throws light on the policies relevant to the renaissance of Africa in order to transform the continent to its optimal position to compete globally. The sociopolitical structures that have underpinned its development were scrutinised in order to derive transformative policies and programmes and finally a look at the institutions and processes that would best gear the Renaissance. The study draws not only upon strategic management theories but also organisational behaviour, economics, social theory and marketing. The critical analysis looks at the local as well as the international context of the continent.

The analysis begins with a generic model, suggested by Porter (1985), that evaluates businesses. In addition, different frameworks from different fields of study, mainly management, marketing, social theory and education, including Porter's model, are used. The analysis of the external environment in which Africa exists is brought to the fore. An internal analysis of its resources and capabilities is performed, based upon the resource-based theory. This brings out Africa's tangible and intangible assets that have drawn competitors and exploiters from time immemorial. Furthermore, a look is taken at Africa through the theory of organisational architecture that aligns Africa's processes, structures, systems and knowledge production to create competitive advantages globally.

Finally, the continent is analysed based on the abilities of strategic leadership; this analysis includes aspects of strategic thinking, emotional intelligence and behavioural complexities with reference to transformational leadership and African Renaissance thinking.

Porter's Five Forces of Competition Framework

The framework views the profitability of an industry as indicated by its rate of return on capital relative to its cost of capital as determined by five forces of competitive pressure. They include three forces of horizontal competition namely competition for substitutes, competition from entrants and established rivals; the two sources of vertical competition are the power of suppliers and the power of buyers (Figure 1A).

Figure 1A: Porter's five forces of competition framework





Figure 1B: Porter's five forces of competition framework: Africa



Applied to the African continent, we can consider the five forces as follows:

Bargaining power of suppliers

Africa does not have a common voice or response to the 'suppliers', which include China, Europe, the USA and India. As a result of fragmented policies, the suppliers are making bilateral agreements with individual countries, to the detriment of the continent as a whole.

The strategic approach has been the establishment of regional bodies, SADC for example. There is a real need to strengthen the regional bodies and further unite the African states under the AU, as this would give the continent power to curb the increasing power of suppliers.

Bargaining power of buyers

These are internal and external: Here the impact of globalisation on the African economy comes to the fore. With the lowering of trade barriers, cheap imports have killed local businesses in Africa, especially the clothing and textile industries. Africa needs a corporate strategy that would determine how it could compete within particular industries or markets. This notion of competitive strategy, suggested by Grant (2010), means that the continent needs to define strategy options in pursuit of opportunities. This domain navigation in order to discover what exactly Africa should do is critical for the continent, as it provides the strategic directions and actions and forms the basis for coordinated and sustained efforts towards a long-term goal for development. In defining the corporate strategy, Africa has used the AU and NEPAD. Porter (1985) provides four dimensions of scope that affect the value chain of an organisation: segment scope (variety of products or services); vertical scope (the extent to which activities are performed in-house or outsourced); geographical scope (the regions in which a firm competes); and industry scope (the range of related industries in which the firm competes with a coordinated strategy). Applied to the continent, segment scope would be the products and services: Africa has many resources (including gold, oil and agricultural products) and should focus on adding value to these products.

Problem: Exporting raw materials from Africa is not a viable option for Africa's development, as it deprives the continent of valuable profits made by the buyer who returns the finished products to the African market.

Strategy: Africa needs to add value to its products before exporting them; hence investment in infrastructure and resource mobilisation in this area should be one of the top priorities for the leadership.

Vertical scope (in-house): This relates to the above; Africa needs to build oil refineries, and value-adding factories for the raw materials instead of out-sourcing.

Geographical scope: Markets and free trade areas in Africa (SADC, East African community and ECOWAS among others) need to be strengthened. Africa cannot afford to act in a fragmented manner. Lessons can be learnt from the EU, which is expanding its trading bloc to the former Soviet Union countries. Regional blocs would increase the power of Africa as a trading empire.


Industry scope: Africa has many industries but the biggest competitive value lies in agriculture and mining. Focus should be on our strength. Greater scope and therefore greater potential sources of competitive advantage by the continent can

be made internally or by entering into coalitions, joint ventures and strategic alliances with other countries.

Africa's Competitive Strategy

Any competitive strategy should consider elements such as the potential resources and capabilities available to the continent; the nature and extent of the external environment in which Africa operates; and the objectives of the key stakeholders. Africa could decide to compete based on cost-leadership by setting out to be a low-cost industrial producer. Already, the West takes advantage of Africa's skilled and unskilled labour to produce goods. Africa should do the same – use its competitiveness to make low-cost products.

Figure 2: Porter's generic strategies



Source: Hill and Stephens (2007); Viney and Gleadle (2007: 15)


Differentiation: Africa could seek to be unique in its industry along one or more dimensions valued by buyers. It should select attributes that the industry perceives as important and position itself to meet these needs. The differentiator is its perceived uniqueness with the potential for charging a premium price (often needed to cover the cost of additional differentiation). Africa is already unique in the products of its rich heritage, physical features, culture and African experiences. Hence tourism should be differentiated so that it achieves maximum benefits for Africa. Strategically, investments in tourism should make Africa the best destination.

Focused cost leadership: An organisation may pursue advantage from cost leadership or differentiation either in the broad marketplace or by focusing its strategy in specific areas/segments. Through optimising strategy for the target market, the

focuser seeks to obtain competitive advantage. For Africa, the regional trading blocs are vital for segmentation. Trade between Africa and the rest of the world should form the focus of the trade or market segments (Viney and Gleadle, 2007).

Africa's Strategy Amidst Globalisation

Figure 3: Common elements in successful strategies



Africa is a continent full of resources and human capital and, from the view of an organisation, has a diversity of cultures that have been exploited. Paradoxically, these very features characterise its strengths, opportunities and weaknesses. A resource-based analysis and SWOT analysis of Africa has revealed several findings, for instance, the strength of the human capital dispersed within the continent and in the Diaspora; the natural resources that have been squandered over the years; the rich culture including the indigenous knowledge systems; the potential leaders and leaders that need to be mentored; and finally the crisis of the African continent and what it needs to do to unravel the development traps that have been laid by colonialists for the sake of 'development'. It is argued that Africa needs to use an MIT approach in the analysis of its challenges and needs to draw upon its knowledge, resources and intellectual capital and upon the brains within Africa, the Diaspora and the experience of other continents to enhance its competitive advantage.


Resource-based View of the African Continent

Grant (2009) defines strategy as 'that match' which an organisation makes between its internal resources and skills and the opportunities and risks created by its external environment. Resources are inputs into the production process (capital, equipment, skills of employees, patents, brand names). The capability is the ability to perform the task or activity. While resources are the source of a firm's

capabilities, capabilities are the main source of its competitive advantage. Consider Africa like a firm, and examine its capabilities and resources as follows. Note that the financial balance sheets on which Africa has been evaluated are notoriously inadequate because they disregard intangible resources and people-based skills.

Six categories of resources have been identified, among others (Grant 2009): financial resources; physical resources; human resources; technological resources; reputation; and organisational resources. Organisations often fall victim to past glories. The key is to access capabilities relative to those of competitors. The resource-based theory of competitive advantage points to the characteristics of resources and capabilities that are likely to determine the sustainability of competitive advantage: mainly durability, transparency, transferability and replicability.

Figure 4: The links among resources, capabilities and competitive advantage



Africa needs to have a strategic approach and to make strategic choices in, for example, the following areas:

- Political governance, peace and security
- Business and economic development
- Natural resources, including mining, oil production and agriculture
- Culture and heritage, including languages and African knowledge, its production and application
- Health, including endemic, emerging epidemics and lifestyle diseases

- Education, innovation, and science, engineering and technology
- Harnessing the human capital with Africa and the Diaspora.


Natural Resources

The natural resources (mining, forestry, land); rain forests; the rich archaeological history; the culture and traditions that have been ignored or looked down upon; and the rich intelligentsia and human capital that lies in Africa and outside that is being used to develop other economies. The many societal structures and businesses, NGOs and institutions need to be mobilised in a structural process. Finally, the Renaissance has to come from within each one of us. The identity of the African people has to be born from within us to see ourselves in the place God made us to be, and to realise the potential, the power and authority that God put in us. The Renaissance begins with me – my thinking, my identity, my actions, habits and lifestyle. It begins with my family, community, society, nation and continent.

Key success factors for Africa

What are Africa's core competencies?

Figure 5: Identifying the key success factors in Africa



The current challenges of Africa in the 21st century include globalisation, in which Africa must determine her destiny and rightful place.

Globalisation Drivers

There are several factors that have been driving globalisation across the world. These have been triggers for change from local to global, and Africa has not been spared. Examples include cultural homogenisation, economies of scale, technological developments, deregulation and the lowering of trade barriers, strong international competitors and simple greed to exploit African markets. In Africa, national cultures that were distinctly different have become more alike as a result of increased international travels and global media and communication. As a consequence, similar products have been sold to similar groups of people, and a convergence of markets and the emergence of a global marketplace have occurred. This impact of cultural homogenisation on the convergence of markets has resulted in the emergence of global market segments, and Africa has bought into this at a high cost. For instance, African markets have supported the TV, clothing, technology and computer games industries which form part of the global youth market often at the expense of their own local industries.

The economies of scope and scale have been particularly used in Africa for example in the car industry where similar engines are used to decrease the cost per unit. Technological developments, ICT and the internet have narrowed the technology gap within Africa. Nigeria is one of the fastest growing emerging markets, where the mobile phone industry is expanding at supersonic speed. Deregulation means the removal of historic barriers, both tariff and non-tariff, at all levels. Free trade of goods, capital and labour has been achieved across member countries of the EU; the AU needs to examine the extent to which this free trade is impacting on Africa's development. Strong international competitors have come into Africa at the expense of local and indigenous industries such as publishing, and specifically educational textbooks. The zero-sum game of globalisation means that some people benefit and others must lose. Africa has lost in many cases as there has been no fair trade but, rather, exploitation in many industries in Africa.

Solutions to Globalisation

Globalisation has been driven by technology and deregulation. There are key strategic decisions Africa should take to reverse globalisation; for example, the anti-globalisation drivers comprise mainly regionalisation and

protectionism. Regionalisation may be the more important one of the two for Africa. Regionalisation is the grouping of countries into regional clusters based on geographical proximity, usually for trading purposes. Protectionism is the practice of shielding a country's (or region's) domestic industry from foreign competition.

Leadership


This section focuses on leadership as a key driver for African Renaissance. The fact that Western leadership philosophies and models may not necessarily be universal makes it important to understand the African context and cultural values applying to leadership. The kinds of leaders Africa needs now are those whose capabilities make them effective implementers and strategic leaders. The key competencies include the ability to think strategically, to be emotionally intelligent, to be able to use a range of effective behavioural strategies for each situation; the ability to utilise transformational or visionary leadership in addition to managerial leadership and to apply the African leadership philosophy which emphasises the concept of ubuntu. The key success factor to this kind of leadership is to have the right people in the right positions at the right time. The driving factor should include clarity of purpose for Africa's development, an understanding of the competitive advantage that Africa has over other continents; and then ensuring that the continent's resources are utilised to the best of their potential. The people in Africa (referred to as human capital) are vital and the ability to understand the culture, norms and values of African people is fundamental for the Renaissance and the transformation of Africa.

Leaders in Africa should have a different agenda which is distinct from that of the former colonial powers. They should show bias in favour of communally based African solutions, where respect, trust, integrity and consultation form the basis for negotiations, and the interests of the whole community and continent far outweigh individual interests. Indeed, it takes character and integrity to put aside the desire for personal power, adulation and glory that has characterised some of the past leaders, and instead, in the spirit of African Renaissance and ubuntu, to focus on Africa and its people.

Examples of this servant leadership can be seen in the Bible story of Jesus, and in leaders like Nelson Mandela whose compassion, integrity and humility transcended all racial boundaries. The African Renaissance leaders should build on the moral philosophy of Africa where the community is placed at the centre. The leadership should be citizen-centred, but the citizens have to be able to hold the leaders responsible and to demand delivery.

The key principle of leadership includes the ability for one person to influence another to move in a direction they ought to and influencing the behaviours of other people. While this leadership can occur at all levels (Fig. 6), the top leadership that Africa requires consists of leaders who are ultimately responsible for the survival and success of the continent and for strategy implementation, and who will determine the course of action needed to respond to the threats and opportunities of Africa and to the threats of the external environment.

Figure 6: Five levels of leadership



1. Position – rights: People follow you because they have to. Your influence will not extend beyond your job description.
2. Permission – relationships: People follow you because they want to. People will follow you beyond your stated authority.
3. Production – results: People will follow you because of what you have done – results for the organisation (country).
4. People development – reproduction: People will follow you because of what you have done for them. Long-range growth occurs here. Commit to developing leaders.
5. Personhood – respect: People will follow you because of who you are and what you represent. This step is reserved for people who develop leaders.

Source: *Brady and Woodward (2007)*

African Renaissance

The Renaissance for Africa will come when Africans manage and embrace change. Managing change is a complex process due to the interconnected sets of causes and consequences. Sometimes people resist change and make the Renaissance difficult to implement. For the leaders of the Renaissance, it would entail comprehending the strategic direction necessary for the whole of Africa, as well as the operational activities and culture of individual countries. It demands delicate political manoeuvring – a patient process of coaching the citizens and bargaining minds to change paradigms they have held onto for a long time. In essence, implementing Renaissance takes a deep knowledge and appreciation of who we are and a deep consciousness of our self-worth. True identities and authentic self must be at the core of the Renaissance, and unless we first define who we are, we cannot go forward on the difficult path of change. It entails confronting our belief systems, ways of doing things, assumptions and the cultures of Africa as a whole. A model for mapping and managing change in organisations called the cultural web (fig. 7) elucidates how African leaders can confront core assumptions underpinning their paradigms and facilitate the implementation of change.


According to the cultural web, everyday processes, behaviours and symbols are altered. In Africa, it is not going to be business as usual – the typical example of, ‘African time’ in my home country, Uganda, where time is not kept for appointments or meetings, will have to change. The key levers for implementing the Renaissance in Africa include the paradigm, power structures, African structures, control systems, routines, rituals, stories and other symbolic aspects of the continent.

The *paradigm* is a set of assumptions about the continent which are held in common and taken for granted both within Africa and outside it. These have been negative perceptions of underdevelopment, war and conflict, unpreparedness for catastrophes and major disasters like environmental changes (e.g. landslides and flooding) but most importantly, what Africans believe about themselves.

Power structures apply to the different powerful managerial groupings within the continent. The colonial legacy left Africa divided along ethnic lines and among languages. Thus the Francophone, Anglophone and other language groups follow their own developmental agendas linked to former colonial masters, making a common voice from Africa difficult to attain. These are likely to be strongly supporting Africa's co-beliefs and assumptions. The African continent's structures are sovereign states with interrelationships defined by power relations. These all contain both formal and informal structures, including cultural structures such as traditional leadership, informal systems and norms.

The *routines* include the ways in which the countries of the continent behave towards and communicate with each other. What are the common ways that Africans deal with each other? Issues of xenophobia, racism and gender equity need to be dealt with, as well as good neighbourly relationships among African nations. The stories told by members of Africa and the media are key to the success of the Renaissance. They legitimise certain sets of behaviour within Africa. Other *symbolic aspects* of the continent and its nature and character also need to be ascertained. What does Africa stand for?

Figure 7: The cultural web



Conclusion and Recommendations

For Africa to develop, it needs to respond to its environment. To position itself in the global leadership position, Africa has to formulate strategies, a game plan. Strategic leaders need to implement the strategies successfully. This Renaissance requires a change of operations in respect of the structures (regional bodies), processes and people (skills, knowledge, beliefs, performance). This will entail strategic resource planning, technology and market competencies. Early warning systems, controls and understanding of the continent's resources will have to be put into place.

The MIT approach has helped to elucidate the complexities of the African continent by utilising the frameworks for management, business and economic development, amongst others. Findings showed that Africa is rich in physical, intellectual and cultural resources. The challenges identified lie in the structures,

leadership, modes of communication and the complexity of the competitors in the external and internal environments. Coupled with these challenges is the lack of leadership principles, values and cultural identity that are vital for growth and development. External forces of globalisation, exploitation and intellectual capital continue to erode the continent of its ability to position itself competitively in the knowledge economy.

Recommendations include a new paradigm of development that is underpinned by the MIT approach. This would encompass delivery, pedagogy, administration and economic development, and take a holistic view of the continent. Leadership is a key element in Africa's progress, and African leaders need to be mentored, trained and constantly upgraded in leadership skills and principles. Strategic leadership is necessary for the African Renaissance with regard to setting Africa's goals and direction, nurturing servant leadership and mobilising resources and capabilities in the right positions. **The Renaissance is here, and now is the time to lead.**

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CHAPTER 27

Challenges and Prospects for Building on the Indigenous: An Appropriate Paradigm for Promoting the African Renaissance

Mogomme Alpheus Masoga and Hassan Kayah

Introduction

One cannot significantly advance the development of Africa unless those involved in the development process of the continent take African societies and cultures seriously, as they are, not as they ought to be or even as they might be. Sustainable development is never going to occur unless those involved build on the indigenous, by which is meant that which the local communities know and can afford. The question is: what is the indigenous and how can it be used as a basis to build development?

Indigenous is not necessarily the same as traditional. It refers to whatever the African masses in their specific local environments consider important in their lives and whatever they regard as an authentic expression of themselves. Building on the 'indigenous' means that the 'indigenous' will determine the form and content of African development strategy. This needs to be done to ensure that developmental change on the continent accommodates itself to the values, interests, aspirations and/or institutions that are important in the lives of the African people. It is only when developmental change comes to terms with the African people that it becomes sustainable. For instance, sustainable technology development in Africa will only occur when innovative technology is totally localised and assimilated into the life of the people. When the people see its relevance and accept it, they will be in a better position to make it an expression of their creativity by refashioning it according to their changing circumstances.

Implications of Building on the Indigenous

Basing Africa's development on the indigenous will lead to a development paradigm that would be radically different from the prevailing one. First, it would lead to a democratic and participatory development that would give primacy to the interests, values and aspirations of the people at large. The prevailing

paradigm of development in Africa suffers from relying too much on coercion and authoritarianism. This is caused by African leaders themselves (who use force to maintain power in the face of vanishing legitimacy), and development agencies – which see their development paradigm as scientific and objective and therefore expect to be met with neither doubts nor dissent – a situation that makes any form of negotiated consensus impossible.

Political authoritarianism and coercion have contributed greatly to the failure of various efforts to bring about development in the continent. To be specific, such an approach has led to the dissociation of development from social needs. The social basis of power and decision-making has been too narrow and has been dominated by interests that are too often in conflict with the public good. Authoritarianism has demobilised the African people by making it virtually impossible for their interests to register in public policy. Some African leaders have failed to mobilise people's energy and support. They have succeeded only in compelling their conformity and, in the course of doing so, have forced millions of people into a 'silent strike' against government policies. Coercion has brutalised African peoples to an extent that has become highly detrimental to their sense of efficiency. Those African leaders who are still busy coercing everyone to accede to the numerous demands of their self-serving policies have undermined the people's traditional capacity to cope in difficult local environments.

Secondly, the notion of building on the indigenous would help Africans to correct a situation in which development has become a process of traumatisa-tion and alienation. This situation has followed in the wake of the fact that the prevailing development paradigm has pressed the distinction between developed and underdeveloped into a dichotomy between good and bad. The underdevel-oped societies of Africa, including their people, are treated as though they have neither validity nor integrity and as though their interests or wellbeing may be violated at will. Their validity lies in repudiating what they are in order to be re-constituted into something new and better. The task of development is no longer how the African peoples themselves might move forward on their own terms, but has become a matter of how other people might transform them into an image of what they (i.e. the African peoples) ought to be. Seen from this perspective, development in Africa has become an exercise in self-alienation and humiliation.

The psychological injuries arising from this are not difficult to observe. The confidence of African leaders themselves has been undermined. They no longer act. They merely react, accepting submissively every development fad from the West and abandoning it as soon as the next fad comes along. African leaders have been criticised for not bringing about development in the continent, but we must now consider whether they had been in an appropriate position to seek

any genuine development for their poor masses, to execute any proactive steps that could have led to a truly heroic undertaking. What we so often see, instead, are signs of diffidence and self-contempt: easy developmental options thoughtlessly and cheerfully chosen, with an unshakable belief that other people would bring redemption. There are also the bizarre manifestations of insecurity among African leaders, for example and *inter alia*, forbidding the speaking of traditional languages and forbidding the wearing of traditional clothes in parliament (to name but two examples). This is a reflection of a serious lack of confidence. Development calls for consummate confidence and high seriousness, and these are neither displayed nor encouraged by means of the prevailing paradigm.

Thirdly, the notion of building on the indigenous would help Africans to avoid the assumption that the indigenous is never conducive to development, and to steer away from applying Western capitalist rationality too rigorously to African conditions. The prevailing paradigm is notoriously hostile to everything indigenous, especially when economic development and materialistic views enjoy priority. For instance, it spurns the communal tradition of African people, presumably because communalism delays the economy-related transition to a market society. It is conveniently forgotten that communalism is highly functional as a proxy social security system. In African societies, with their limited health and medical facilities, members of the extended family care for the majority of HIV/AIDS patients and orphans.

Primary group loyalty tends to be disliked by the current Western development paradigm as a regressive form of consciousness, because it is seen as a hindrance to the development of efficient rational bureaucratic structures. There is a lack of realisation that this form of loyalty is, in fact, the basis of the ethnic associations that have contributed greatly to the development of rural Africa. There is hostility against the household economy, because it is oriented towards the law of subsistence rather than the law of value and towards reproduction rather than production. Yet is the quintessential expression of those things that development agencies would like African national economies to become. It provides the very model of self-reliance, internal balance and auto-centric dynamics that need to be reproduced at the national level.

Fourthly, the paradigm of building on the indigenous is the necessary condition for self-reliant development in Africa to which there is now no alternative. These are the development values propagated by the philosophy of the African Renaissance and the NEPAD plan. More than forty years of political independence in Africa have shown that dependent development has failed. Its failure is manifested in the deep and protracted economic and political crisis in the continent, including the collapse of the various UN-initiated economic recovery

programmes for the continent. When the development choice is defined in terms of self-reliance, the African masses themselves become the means before ends of their development. Their interests, values and aspirations will determine the content, strategies and modalities of development.

Operational Significance of Building on the Indigenous

The remainder of this chapter attempts to show the operational significance of building on the indigenous. To begin with, one crucial aspect is that Africans, including African leadership, need to de-emphasise those factors that monopolise their attention today: the debt crisis, commodity prices, the balance of trade, levels of development assistance and foreign investment, and structural adjustment, to name but a few. It is important to acknowledge that the unfavourable situation of these factors needs to be reviewed and reversed. Giving such factors the highest priority is a serious mistake and to the disadvantage of sustainable development on the continent. This is due to the fact that these issues are only symptoms of an underlying pathology. Not so long ago, these factors were not as unfavourable as they are today, and yet Africa did not flourish then anymore than it does now. Indeed, if they were to be improved today, Africa would be unlikely to advance very much.

What needs to be done is to place emphasis where it should have been all along, that is, on the regeneration of the grassroots where there is still some vitality, before the rot goes too deep. To regenerate the grassroots, Africa's development needs to be localised. Without prejudice to the significance of bigger national projects, the emphasis has to be placed on smaller projects, developed and executed in a participatory manner and relying mainly on local resources. It is only when Africa's development is localised and democratically controlled that it can be consummated by becoming the right of each and the responsibility of all. It is only then that development in Africa will cease to be alienating and humiliating. This form of development will acknowledge Africa's moral autonomy and enrich the African people's humanity.

The above is easier said than done, because there are immense obstacles to the *operationalisation* of the paradigm of building on the indigenous. However, most of these obstacles are not economic, but political. The major problem is political resistance. This comes from some of the African leaders themselves, who are determined to maintain their control, and from certain Western countries that are cynically attending to their self-aggrandisement under the guise of developing Africa. The overcoming of this resistance will be a decisive breakthrough and must be regarded as a major item on the development agenda for the continent.

This also has implications for Western development agencies. For these agencies, the notion of building on the indigenous entails drastic adjustment. They have to learn to suspend the belief in the superiority of their knowledge and values. They will have to think in terms of much smaller projects developed and implemented democratically. This will be maddeningly messy, because they will have to curb their penchant for instant gratification, which lures them to invest in the so-called productive sectors as opposed to the social sectors. They will have to make it clear that they are assisting people, not governments. These adjustments will stir up significant contradictions, which they will hopefully confront without being squeamish, knowing well that they must get immersed in political struggles that will create problems for them at home and abroad. In any case, in getting involved with the development of Africa, they are interfering with vital indigenous social processes. Their interference might as well be useful.

Indigenous Knowledge as a Relevant Area of Research and Development and Social Upliftment

If one examines much of the literature on developmental issues in Africa, one sees that it has been dominated by the impact of the interaction between our continent and the West, especially Western Europe. While scholars, both from Africa and the West, disagree on the nature of the impact, what is beyond dispute is that the West has dictated the pattern of this interaction since the era of the slave trade, with the result that the benefits have been disproportionate.

One's attention is drawn to the fact that knowledge production and dissemination in Africa have suffered a similar fate to the African economies, that is, one of underdevelopment and disarticulation. What does it mean in more specific terms to say that an economy is disarticulated or incoherent? A disarticulated or incoherent economy is one whose sectors are not complementary. There is no reciprocity and linkage among the economic sectors. Production is not meant to satisfy local demand, but to satisfy the economic needs of the Western countries. The same situation applies to knowledge production, documentation, conservation and dissemination. This is shown by the following:

- The exploitation of local knowledge systems has become a part of the international capitalist exploitation of the resources of developing countries, including Africa. Through various mechanisms such as patent rights, Western countries have managed to control and exploit the local knowledge systems and products of African communities.

- The intellectual and research activities tend to be designed to support the Western exploitation of the indigenous resources.
- Research and knowledge production was meant to support and justify the theoretical assumptions of Western institutions about the nature and characteristics of Africa. The major educational and research institutions in the world, including resources such as equipment and libraries, are located in the Western countries, especially the former colonial powers.
- The few African scholars and researchers produced by Western education are also used to satisfy the research needs of the Western countries.
- This perverse situation is compounded by the fact that links between African institutions themselves are largely neglected in favour of partnerships with metropolitan institutions. Currently, there are more research and academic linkages/collaborations between African and Western institutions than between African institutions themselves. Not only did the colonial and apartheid educational systems create a sense of disaffection or desire to dissociate oneself with the native heritage, but it also affected the individual's sense of self-confidence.
- Another fundamental cause of extraversion of African scholarship is the fact that most academic activity is conducted in foreign languages. African scholars are expected to master these languages, thus reducing investment in and removing research and theory out of the indigenous conceptual sphere. This issue of language was key in the debate by the Kenyan intellectual Ngugi' wa Thiong'o, when he visited South Africa recently. He concluded that the route towards knowledge was through language.
- In the colonial and apartheid education there was no investment in theory building and interpretation for the colonial subjects that form the heart of the scientific process.
- Furthermore, African academic and research institutions are not often aimed at addressing local needs and concerns, but remain as 'floating islands without roots'.

It is, therefore, important that Africa be truthfully studied on its own terms and with a view to satisfying its people's needs through indigenous approaches. The philosophy and theory of truthful knowledge about Africa challenges all African researchers, academics and practitioners to unmask Western ideologies about their continent, and expose exploitation and injustices. Researchers and academics need to explore local knowledge systems that promote values that facilitate an agenda of social emancipation and equity among all sections of societies, women, men, children, youth, the disabled and HIV/AIDS victims.

The silence imposed on Africa's history needs to be shattered. Africans and their heroic struggles, victories and creative energies need to be rediscovered, promoted and celebrated. Since knowledge is not produced in a vacuum, knowledge production, documentation and dissemination must reflect African realities that have not been constructed through Eurocentric prisms. We should take on the challenges of Cheikh Anta Diop, Claude Ake, Kwame Nkrumah and many African scholars who challenged the Western notions of development, and who did so many years before globalisation.

Globalisation, through its sheer power, reinforces images of global uniformity, imposes its own version of knowledge about Africa on all parts of the world, but at the same time increasingly denies Africa a global space to produce the truthful knowledge of itself. Therefore, for Africa not to be silenced or reduced to a caricature of truth, African researchers, academics and indigenous knowledge systems (IKS) practitioners from different parts of our continent must unite to resist the marginality of the continent from global discourse on Africa. They must interrogate existing African studies and their shortcomings. They must make it clear, to the African masses in their various communities, the ways in which Western epistemology, including its methods, paradigms, production and dissemination, amounts to 'imperialism in the guise of modern scientific knowledge'.

This can be done by identifying and promoting indigenous approaches and methods that bridge existing gaps between Africans and those studying Africa in other parts of the world. In this age of globalisation and globalism, Africa must stand up and insist on being studied on its own indigenous terms, reflecting its unique historical, social, economic, cultural heritage and circumstances, and thus projecting the dreams, aspirations, interests and freedom of its peoples. This implies that research and knowledge production can no longer be conducted with indigenous communities as if their views do not count or as if their lives and personal experiences are of no significance. Research and knowledge production should not be taken as innocent or distant academic exercises, but as activities that occur in a particular set of ideological, political and social frameworks; as it is, much of the existing knowledge production on indigenous peoples is contaminated by Eurocentric prejudices.

It must also be acknowledged that most of the African universities and research institutions have not lived up to their responsibilities as guiding lights – either to the continent as a whole or to the societies within which they are located. However, despite the extraversion and disarticulation of knowledge production in Africa, the catastrophic history of the continent (slavery, colonisation, apartheid and globalisation) has not completely destroyed the African intellectual and spiritual heritage. The wealth of knowledge among the elders in African

local communities is an important source of vibrant intellectualism to which African researchers should turn. When researchers carry out their task, the big question is how to ensure that the local communities benefit, are recognised and are capacitated to use their knowledge for alleviating poverty and regaining their dignity.

South African academic and research institutions, including the government, have now taken the challenge to make IKS an important focus area for research, teaching and sustainable development. The South African government, through the national IKS policy (2004) and its national IKS office (Department of Science and Technology), has also taken up the challenge to promote IKS by emphasising the holistic and integrated character of IKS (including its interface with other knowledge systems). Mechanisms, including policy initiatives, have also been put in place, nationally, continentally and globally, to ensure that the intellectual property rights of local communities (including their knowledge holders) are protected from abuse and exploitation for profit.

The Need for a Code of Ethics in the Interaction between Researchers and Local Communities

If one looks at the current global race for knowledge, one sees the increasing use of knowledge and technology to add value to business transactions. This has created what is now known as the 'global knowledge economy' and the so-called global race for knowledge. This global race for knowledge works against developing nations, especially in Africa. It is now seen to be a new kind of poverty, that is, information poverty. Research in the Western capitalist world focuses on profits rather than on solving fundamental problems that directly impact on human beings (e.g. poverty).

The push and pull of globalisation is ruthless and African countries quickly find themselves left out, simply because there is a range of trade practices that exclude them. These practices are many and include a lack of market information; the presence of a dominant Western culture (introduced through advertising, the media, the internet and Western products); the dominance of English as a language of communication (which excludes the majority of local communities who are illiterate in the language); lack of capacity to access patented innovation; lack of access to internet facilities and electricity, especially in rural areas; and lack of cash and other resources to participate in this global race for knowledge, to educate and train African populations, to put in the infrastructure, and to deal with other, similar problems.

If we look at community research and bio-prospecting in Africa, including South Africa, there is definitely a policy vacuum in terms of researchers working with local communities. To obtain compliance in research with the communities, a code of conduct must be provided to researchers to guide them regarding the correct behaviour or practices in certain situations. An example here would be to compile a code of ethics in order to furnish researchers with guidelines pertaining to research on plant resources in South Africa, in cooperation with local communities. Researchers should know whom to contact when research of any kind is envisaged. There is also an increasing realisation of the importance of promoting the role of archives and the oral history of flora, and for that matter fauna, in order to support IKS research and development.

Participatory Research and Interaction between Researcher and Community

The starting point in the process of knowledge production, recording, conservation and dissemination should be the researcher and the community involved in this process. They should view one another as equal partners and be equally informed on what is to be done, and how the process is to be approached and executed, including the outcome and benefits of that outcome. As it is, the current process of interaction is not based on equality between the researcher and members of the community, the latter being precisely those who are familiar with their environment and who are the producers in their daily life activities. In by far the majority of cases, the situation is that the researcher sets the agenda and members of the community remain passive. More often than not even the language of the research process is foreign to them. There is also the issue of the ownership of the control of knowledge generated and documented in a community. There must be mechanisms and structures in place to ensure that the producers of this knowledge have access to, and control of, their own knowledge which they use to enable them to create sustainable livelihoods.

Orality is a human-centred way of communication that uses words and gestures in a holistic approach. Whereas orality includes informal body language such as gestures, twinkling the eye, or playing with the ear or twisting the lips, orature is more formal. It involves an organised, communal oral presentation of a piece of orality. The holistic nature of these different forms of orality is demonstrated by the fact that, historically, they were also channels through which the accumulated knowledge of society could be expressed or transmitted. At the same time, when they were articulated by certain key persons in society (e.g. elders, parents, chiefs, and community professionals such as hunters, traditional

healers, blacksmiths and goldsmiths, and midwives), they became sources of accumulated community knowledge and wisdom, especially for the younger generation. In this case, they became agents of socialisation.

In most indigenous African societies orality, in different forms, had a number of advantages: first, there were no written forms of communication, which meant that community information and other forms of knowledge were communicated by word of mouth. Second, orality was a powerful means of conserving consanguine or lineage relationships simply by using adult memory. For instance, it was a societal obligation for every member of the extended family who had reached a certain age to know, remember and recognise all members of his or her extended family. Third, family and community rituals and sacrifices (orature) and other forms of orality were used by the living to communicate with the ancestors (the dead), asking them to protect those who were still alive and those who were yet to be born. Fourth, joking relationships, even among former enemies, were used to cement good relationships between clans and ethnic groups.

Fifth, orality trained community members to master the art of narration and the sequencing of social events. Sixth, it encouraged community dynamism and creativity in the sense that the relationships and outcomes created by the different forms of orality encouraged or enticed each community member into really wanting to participate in certain community activities. In short, orality instilled a sense of belonging, or the need to find a place of recognition, in society.

Seventh, orality in the form of multilingualism provided a gateway to regimes of truth, knowledge and other cultures, especially when one knew these different languages very well. It gave one access to information that was held by a particular knowledge regime and culture. By entering the knowledge regimes or the knowledge orders, one was also able to engage with the producers and holders of that knowledge system. One became accepted into that particular cultural group because one spoke their language. One could share knowledge and information with them in a language they understood. It stands to reason that the same still applies today.

As far as the disadvantages of orality are concerned, the following may be mentioned: first, it is vulnerable to being de-contextualised and susceptible to manipulation to suit certain power interests. Second, the impact of technology on orality has been to decontextualise it by removing it from its original environment and context. Technologies have also led to the dehumanisation of societies and have undermined the importance of orality in communal life. They tend to promote individualism and the commodification of orality. Knowledge becomes an exchange value produced, conserved and disseminated for the market and for profit. Producers and holders of indigenous knowledge, including the community

as a whole, are increasingly losing control of their knowledge systems. They are becoming alienated from their intellectual properties.

The Role of Archives and Oral History in Indigenous Knowledge Systems Research and Development

Fortunately, academics are now showing an increasing interest in oral history as a valuable research tool. Scholars now recognise that written sources or records often do not offer a comprehensive picture of the lines and motivation of people and events that have shaped our history and society. Archives and archivists play a significant role in the documentation retrieval and dissemination of oral information about various aspects of society. In fact, archivists increase the public's understanding of a country's history and are tools for research. In this regard, archivists play a pivotal role in ensuring that the public has access to the records of the past.

Oral history cannot and is not intended to replace written records. It is often assumed that written sources are more reliable than oral sources, but written sources require the same scrutiny as oral evidence to establish the circumstances in which they are and were produced. Numerous documents have been produced that exaggerate facts to create a particular image or impression. Written sources offer immediacy, because they are written at or around the time an event occurred. However, they can be manipulated or written to mislead the reader. Furthermore, written sources were originally based on oral testimonies. A statement is not necessarily more reliable because it was written at the time of the event or later.

In this case, oral history provides a new technique for validating and filling in the gaps in written historical records. In most cases, especially in the South African context, oral sources become the only record, especially when no written documentation exists. Oral sources provide social and cultural information not available elsewhere, present convincing evidence, and are a form of first-hand prose that enlivens historical narratives. Furthermore, oral history can be helpful in filling the gaps that often obscure the motivation behind individual and institutional actions, and can help to contribute to our understanding of the actions of groups of people who do not appear in archival sources – either because of gender, race, class, religion or ethnicity.

This chapter argues that oral history is a history built around people. It allows for heroes and acknowledges their value; it does not simply focus on heroes who are or were leaders, but also recounts the deeds of heroes found among the 'unknown majority', that is, the people themselves. It brings history into and out of communities. It helps the less privileged, the old and the poor to gain

dignity and self-confidence. Oral history can take a major role in telling us more about our past and in democratising the study of history. When oral history is community-based it can be a liberating and participatory force.

Furthermore, oral history will connect students to the past by allowing those who have experience, or who were involved in the events in their communities, to narrate their stories in the classrooms or on tape. The classroom will come alive when recorded histories are collected by students and examined against the context of research from a secondary source. Oral history is the best method of teaching, since it actively engages students by using their natural curiosity about other people. However, the viability of IKS as a tool for development and sustainable livelihood is likely to be greater if IKS is integrated into the education system.

Prospects and Challenges of Incorporating IKS in the School Curriculum

Although IKS has been identified as an important instrument for sustainable development, this development will only be meaningful and sustainable if it is anchored and allowed to operate in an environment characterised by social cohesion at all levels of society, including the family. Incorporating IKS and indigenous life skills in the school curriculum could be an important instrument for inculcating African values in the young people of today. They, in turn, will promote social cohesion. Indigenous knowledge and life skills will enrich the existing Western-oriented school curriculum in the following ways:

- *Learning attitudes and values for a sustainable future.* Indigenous African communities have lived in harmony with the environment and have utilised resources without preventing nature's capacity to regenerate these resources. Incorporating African indigenous knowledge and life skills into schools can help to develop, in our students, sensitive and caring attitudes towards the environment and thereby promote a vision of a sustainable future.
- *Learning through culture.* Indigenous knowledge and life skills are stored in various forms, such as customs, folk stories, folk dramas, legends, myths and proverbs, to name but a few. These are all effective tools that can help to Africanise the school system. Teachers could involve learners through activities such as collecting stories, myths and proverbs from their local communities (from their parents and from elders). This could be done by giving assignments or projects to learners so that they can get involved not only in learning about indigenous knowledge, but also in finding out the sources of IKS.

- *Learning across generations to bridge the generational gap.* Indigenous knowledge and life skills will encourage learners to learn from their parents and elders in the community and to appreciate and respect local knowledge systems. This relationship will help to mitigate the generation gap and promote intergenerational harmony and social cohesion. It will also build trust between the older and younger generations.
- *Starting locally from the known to the unknown.* The integration of a learner's higher knowledge and local life skills into the school curriculum fits into the general philosophy that the learner abstracts knowledge from his or her previous experiences in the family and community. In other words, the learner does not come to the school as an empty vessel. He brings with him the vast knowledge existing in the family and local communities.
- *Learning outside the classroom.* Learning outside the classroom is essential, simply because classrooms are too small to accommodate all knowledge systems. Learners can learn a great deal from local communities – for example, learning the relationship between the soil and plants, and identifying the soil types and plant characteristics in a particular area.

There are many challenges involved in the incorporation of IKS and life skills in the school curriculum. The dominance of Western knowledge systems over African IKS has had devastating effects on the current education system in Africa. There is a need, therefore, to develop and promote strategies that will elevate the status of IKS in our educational system as a whole. The IKS Centre of Excellence and its research activities, including documentation and community outreach, are important simply because indigenous knowledge is still orally transmitted and is not documented. This poses a challenge to universities and research institutions: there is a need to document various forms of local knowledge so that this knowledge can be used in the school system. Fortunately, the Centre is already responding to this challenge. The sustainable integration of IKS in the school system requires that the following action be taken:

- Documentation, storage, and dissemination of the best IKS practices, as well as the establishment of networks that will ensure the dissemination and availability of relevant knowledge and skills.
- Promoting and supporting learning materials based on Africa's rich cultural heritage.
- Fostering the interface of the learner's prior experiences and community knowledge with related disciplines such as biology, mathematics, geography, chemistry and conflict resolution. More possibilities can be listed.

There are grounds for optimism: there is a growing interest, both globally and within Africa itself, in African IKS. In South Africa, academic and research institutions, including the government, are making IKS an important focus area for research, teaching and community outreach. This is creating an enabling environment in the pursuit of the African Renaissance. This reawakening and new enthusiasm in IKS will help increasing numbers of people to 'come into the fold', and will contribute to the increasing generation and dissemination of IKS. The globalisation process has made it imperative that Africa be taken seriously. Africa is increasingly seen as part of the global village and global economy, including the global body of knowledge. However, there is still a need for Africans themselves to create a favourable environment for more research into IKS.

Furthermore, there is an increasing realisation that, if the world is ever to be a peaceful place, and if global economic growth is ever to occur, Africa must be taken out of its marginal position and inserted into the global picture. This brings challenges to African scholars, research institutions and governments. They need to take advantage of the forces of globalisation such as information and communication technology (ICT) to promote and market African heritage and associated knowledge systems for poverty alleviation and the sustainable development of the continent. This chapter recommends the following:

First, African scholars, research institutions, governments and IKS practitioners need to develop and promote collaboration and cooperation with their counterparts in other developing countries in Asia, Latin America and the Caribbean in terms of policy strategies, research programmes and scholarly discourses. These relationships will help to strengthen African approaches in the documentation, conserving and utilisation of community knowledge systems for sustainable development. This will also form part of the promotion of South–South relationships in these areas. There is a tendency for African scholars to look at themselves entirely from the perspective of their relationship with America and Europe. They tend to ignore their historical relationships with other developing countries, countries that share certain commonalities with them in terms of cultural and colonial experiences.

This perverse situation is compounded by the fact that links between African institutions themselves are largely neglected in favour of partnerships with metropolitan institutions. Currently, there are more research and academic linkages/ collaborations between African and Western institutions than between African institutions themselves.

The colonial and apartheid educational systems not only created a sense of disaffection or desire to dissociate oneself from the local heritage, but also had a seriously detrimental influence on the individual's self-confidence. This

implies that African scholars also need to develop and promote more academic, research and community outreach exchange programmes among themselves, and that they make more effort to share available resources and local experiences. This will provide them with an opportunity to demystify at least some of the Eurocentric perspectives imposed on Africa. It will provide both students and educators with exposure to comparable local community experiences and places that they can refer to in their fields of study and research. Here it is worth remarking that most of the educators and students in South Africa have never been outside their home provinces.

Second, research in indigenous knowledge should be approached in a participatory way, that is, by emphasising the involvement of the community in the whole research process. Indigenous knowledge researchers in communities need to be sensitive in applying the techniques of interaction and data collection processes with local communities. The starting point in the research process of recording, conservation and dissemination of indigenous knowledge should be the involvement of the community itself in this process. Relationships between researchers and members of the community need to be taken seriously. A sense of trust must be developed between the two parties, especially in terms of the disclosure of certain information (i.e. information that is regarded as confidential by members of the community) and the way in which this information is going to be transmitted to the researcher.

In order for researchers and communities to create a spirit of trust and harmony, protocol in the community must be observed. Their leadership must be taken on board (i.e. by researchers) and leaders must be fully informed about any research that is being undertaken, because traditional leaders are the custodians of local knowledge.

Moreover, the issue of language in this interaction is important in order to avoid alienating the community as the producers and holders of knowledge. The language used in the interaction should not alienate the community. The current situation is that information is provided by the knowledge holders in one language, but documented and reported in a different language.

Very often, even the language of the research process is foreign to the community: it is either English or English translated into the local language, not the reverse. As a result, the meaning and content of the original knowledge tends to be lost or distorted. The interface between IKS and local languages therefore also needs to be taken seriously. The use of indigenous concepts in IKS should be promoted if IKS is to have a meaning to those who produce and use it directly in their daily lives.

Third, the global race for knowledge as a commodity means that there is a great need to develop codes of conduct governing the interaction between the researchers, the speculators and the local communities themselves. Only a code of conduct will ensure that the intellectual property rights (IPR) of local communities as producers and holders of indigenous knowledge are not abused and exploited, and that local communities themselves gain some benefit from research.

This brings us to the issue of ownership and the control of community knowledge. There must be mechanisms and structures in place to ensure that the producers of this knowledge have access to, and control of, their own knowledge. However, it is now acknowledged that community knowledge should be recorded and stored in the form of new technologies to make it easily accessible to other people, including its producers, and to ensure that it is preserved for future generations. Also, of course, it should be protected from abuse and exploitation by prospectors.

A greater awareness is needed amongst researchers on the various ways of dealing with communities ethically. The South African principle of *Batho Pele*, that is, putting people first, needs to become part of the activities of researchers and academics. The communities themselves need to be empowered to make them less vulnerable to exploitation. They should know what their rights are and what they can ask for in terms of contracts and agreements related to bioprospecting for their knowledge and resources. Fourth, the challenge that the IKS debate raises regarding 'conventional science' is the thematic outlook with which IKS approaches its field, that is, the fact that the discipline-based approach according to which conventional knowledge is ordered, is now being challenged. There is a need to view science and scientific thinking from the viewpoint of a thematic framework that includes social reality as a whole. This challenge comes at a time when the concept of 'science' is being revisited in the context of the humanities, the social and natural sciences, engineering, and technology. Because of its holistic and integrated nature, IKS brings the social, human and natural sciences together. If it were to establish an interdepartmental committee on IKS, the Department of Science and Technology would ensure that all government departments are involved in the IKS promotion process, and that all important aspects related to its development, research and utilisation were attended to.

Fifth, as far as the envisaged IKS national policy in South Africa is concerned, it has been suggested that IKS policy should be formulated in a generic and dynamic way to make its implementation effective. IKS itself is not one homogeneous group of entities. For instance, the crucial issues to consider are: Who are the people involved in IKS in a particular area? Where are they located in that area? What are their field clusters? And what are their capacities? What are their

skills? What are the facilities that they use so that they can be linked up with other segments that have been identified? Asking questions such as these is a useful exercise because, otherwise, one is likely to end up with a broad policy statement that, at the end of the day, cannot be implemented.

The dynamics of IKS over time also need to be clearly stated. For example, at present, the main problem facing the Southern African region is that of HIV/AIDS and poverty. However, by the year 2050, the region will be experiencing other problems. It would therefore be more meaningful if the IKS policy could be given in a much more dynamic and generic nature. An example of what I mean here would be to implement an IKS policy strategy that could contribute to the generation of a set of capacities which could bring forth appropriate directions of technical advance dealing with certain problems during particular periods of time. Moreover, one of the objectives and dynamics of the dimensions of the IKS policy is the fact that it should exercise an impact on economic development. In other words, it must make a difference to the livelihoods and quality of life of the people within South Africa and the continent as a whole.

The IKS policy should also interrogate the issue of language, given that this is an important tool that local communities can use to render their input on national IKS policies, policies that will have a direct impact on their lives. It has also been suggested that the promotion of IKS should be a constitutional matter, so that it becomes an obligation for everybody, including government departments, rather than being a project of certain individuals or institutions. At present, the South African Constitution does not explicitly cover the issue of IKS. Besides, the importance of interfacing IKS with other knowledge systems and practices reveals a need to take into account the linkage between IKS and globalisation. At this stage and in this context we are talking about IKS in South Africa, Tanzania, Kenya, and so forth representing stocks of knowledge, science and technology from outside that need to be imported through the technology transfer process. However, at some point it will become crucial to get involved in a process of mutual engagement, whereby a third space is created that will have a set of technologies produced by Africans themselves, using their own agenda to solve global problems. IKS policy must at least tentatively address what it takes, the kinds of capacities, the kinds of institutions and the kinds of skills and competencies that need to be built over time in our countries to enable us to engage in what might be called a 'cheek-to-cheek' dance rather than an 'arm's-length' dance.

Furthermore, IKS is not static. It changes with time and place. There are new local knowledge systems being produced over time and in different places. These interact with local knowledge systems to eventually form new local knowledge

systems. This is a dynamic process that IKS researchers need to be aware of. Researchers need to take into account the issue of symbolism in indigenous knowledge. Symbolism has a cultural content. One needs to understand the culture and language of a particular culture in order to understand and appreciate the meaning and significance of particular cultural symbolism. This helps in the interpretation of symbolism and the validation of indigenous knowledge. Indeed, a failure to understand the culture behind a particular symbolism creates a conflict of values among people who originate from different cultural backgrounds.

Conclusion

Building on the indigenous is a radically different development paradigm for Africa. It puts emphasis on democratic and participatory development by giving primacy to the interests, values and aspirations of the African people themselves. It provides the very model of self-reliance, internal balance and auto-centric dynamics that needs to be reproduced at the national level. The prevailing paradigm of development in Africa suffers from relying too much on coercion and authoritarianism. It is based on the assumption that the indigenous is never conducive to development and applies Western capitalist rationality too rigorously to African conditions. It is notoriously hostile to everything indigenous. What needs to be done is to place emphasis on the regeneration of the grassroots, where there is still some vitality, by localising Africa's development. Concentration should be placed on smaller projects that are developed and executed in a participatory manner, and more reliance should be placed on local resources. It is only when Africa's development is localised and democratically controlled that development will cease to be alienating and humiliating to the African masses.

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CHAPTER 28

A Working Model for African Development: Intra-African Trade and Investment

Siphelele Zulu

Introduction

The recent global economic recession, witnessed over the past two years, makes it necessary to debate a new African trade model in order to stimulate African economic growth and, therefore, encourage African development. This, however, is not a new debate: Africa and world economic leaders have diverse views on the economic strategic relationships that African countries should have with each other and the rest of the world. As a continent, Africa has the potential to be a significant economic power, given its resources. However, this depends on the establishment of a new economic strategic perspective based on, among other things, good governance, infrastructure development, international investment and regional cooperation on trade.

This chapter presents intra-African trade and investment as central to a strategic perspective on African economic development. To do this, the chapter reviews the constraints of intra-African trade and investment, and highlights the economic strategic value/benefits that the continent will derive from regional economic integration and cooperation. This is done within the context of world globalisation initiatives, given that Africa stands to benefit more from both 'Africa for Africans' initiatives and World Economic Development programmes. In fact, in recent years, we have seen increasing numbers of African countries responding to the opportunities presented by intra-Africa trade and global trade and investment. This has had a noticeable impact on growth performance (which has improved as a result). Investment ratios in sub-Saharan Africa have gradually increased over the past few years, but are still far lower than in other regions, as is the relative share of private investment in total investment.

The chapter emphasises the fact that, if Africa is to successfully eradicate poverty and underdevelopment, and if the continent is to be regarded as a significant, strategic partner in world affairs, and if it wishes to become economically independent, Africa has to establish a sound economic relationship with the international community.

Background

Africa is faced with a number of challenges as far as economic development is concerned. These challenges range from human capital, infrastructure, technology and governance, to mention but a few. Initiatives to address such challenges have been implemented already. The establishment of the African Union (AU) and New Partnership for Africa's Development (NEPAD) are some of the initiatives implemented by Africa for the African economic recovery programme.

In his address at the African Union Day Celebration in Addis Ababa, Ethiopia, on 25 May 2007, his Excellency President John Agyekum Kufour argued that the AU has provided the African continent with a new opportunity to find African solutions to African problems, not only in the promotion of peace, security and stability on the continent, but also in the acceleration of its political and socio-economic integration and development.

He further indicated that, in July 2001, NEPAD was established and followed up with the African Peer Review Mechanism (APRM) in order to address the political and corporate economic governance of the African continent.

Important bodies were established, such as the Pan-African Parliament (PAP), the Economic, Social and Cultural Council (ECOSSOC), and the Peace and Security Council (PSC). Efforts were also made to operationalise the African Court on Human and Peoples' Rights. According to President John Agyekum Kufour, all these bodies and institutions have improved the way in which African countries do business in Africa, have helped to bring peace and stability to large parts of the continent, and have increased the momentum for Africa's integration and development. Clearly, Africa as a region has, to a very large extent, established structures and policies to create social, economic and political conditions that are conducive to development.

Perspective on Africa

Africa is known to be one of the richest continents in the world. According to the Pan-African Perspective website, the great commodity riches of Africa are legendary. Oil, diamonds, gold, uranium, platinum, chrome, gems such as emeralds, sapphires, rubies, as well as foodstuffs such as cocoa, the ever-useful cotton plant, edible oils and numerous other commodities are found in Africa. According to the same website, Africa is responsible for giving the world some of its most popular and useful foodstuffs. For example, Africa is the home of the watermelon, the okra, the lobster and various species of fish and shrimp. African woods are among the finest in the world, and include both ebony and mahogany (<http://www.panafricanperspective.com/aec.htc>). In short, the extreme poverty

experienced by many African countries simply does not reflect the fact that the African continent is a wealthy continent.

Despite the negative perception of Africa, and of Africa's potential to rise above its challenges, the reality of the situation tells us a different story about Africa and what Africa can do for Africa. The initiatives already taken by African countries, individually and collectively, indicate that great strides have been taken on both the political and economic front. Political instability and conflict is no longer a dominant characteristic of the continent. In fact, the world is witnessing processes initiated by Africans to install democratic governments and good governance principles. We are told fiscal discipline is improving, interest and inflation rates are falling, and trade barriers are fewer.

According to the African Development Bank Group report by Brixiova, Kamara and Ndikumana (2010) on *Africa rebounding: When and how to exit from crisis intervention policies*, Africa has exhibited substantial resilience during this global recession, relative to the majority of other developing regions and its own past record. While some factors driving Africa's recovery have been external, the positive outcome to date has been mostly due to the good policies that African countries implemented before and during the crisis. According to *African Economic Outlook* (2010), a gradual recovery of African economies is expected, with average growth reaching 4,5 per cent in 2010 and 5,2 per cent in 2011. All African regions will achieve higher growth although, of course, the recession will leave its mark. Southern Africa, which was hardest hit in 2009, will recover more slowly than other regions. East Africa, which best weathered the global crisis, is likely to again achieve the highest average growth in 2010/2011.

Even more encouraging is the fact that African countries which are considered to be fragile and weak are also getting support from internal structures established by Africans themselves. Some of the efforts by the African continent include implementing economic policies and institutions in order to revitalise the African economy. According to the African Development Bank Group report, the *African Development Bank's experience in fragile states*, by Barungi and Davies (2010), the Bank's policy on fragile states, as outlined in its policy for enhanced engagement in fragile states, is to help such states to move from the condition of fragility to a path of sustainable recovery and development by providing them with tailored assistance at critical junctures of their re-engagement and recovery process. To achieve these objectives, the Bank set up the Fragile State Facility as a distinct financing vehicle in March 2008. The Fragile State Facility has three pillars: supplemental support, arrears clearance and targeted support. The cumulative resource envelope of the Fragile State Facility was US\$888 million as at

the end of December 2009. These resources originated mainly from the African Development Fund (ADF) and the net income of the African Development Bank.

There are ongoing discussions among Africans on how the African economy could be developed to the point that Africa can enjoy sustainable economic growth that will obviously encourage African development. Numerous possible economic solutions have been presented for further engagement and consideration. Intra-African trade has always been one of the possible starting points for African economic recovery. Generally, there seems to be some consensus that intra-African trade and investment should be encouraged (again, with a view to African development). Speaking at Wesgro's Western African Business Networking Forum, the Department of Trade and Industry's (DTI), Rirhandzu Mahlale, emphasised the need for South Africans to do business with their African counterparts. Mahlale said that the African continent has enormous growth potential. Indeed, while more established markets were heading for a recession, the African continent was experiencing a period of high growth (<http://www.dti.gov.za>).

Initiatives directed to facilitating intra-African trade and investment have been reflected in numerous agreements at bilateral, sub-regional and regional levels; efforts have also been made at national level to facilitate the flow of goods and services. As Charles Abuka (2005: 124–125) notes, such initiatives include trade facilitation measures that are being spearheaded within sub-regional organisations such as the East African Community (EAC), the Common Market for Eastern and Southern Africa (COMESA), the Southern African Development Community (SADC), the Economic Community for Central African States (ECCAS), the Economic Community for Western African States (ECOWAS), and the continental organisation, the AU. A number of regional trading blocks have been established as part of various intra-African trade and investment initiatives. Mothae Maruping (2005: 1343–134) identifies these initiatives as including the Central African and Monetary Community (CEMAC) in Central Africa, the East African Community (EAC) East Africa, SADC, and the Southern African Customs Union (SACU), Southern Africa. The Community of Saharan States (CEN-SAD) and the Arab Maghreb Union (UMA), North Africa, ECOWAS and its monetary union (UEMOA), West Africa, and other groups such as COMESA are all structures that reflect the progress made towards achieving African integration.

Challenges

Despite these notable efforts to integrate Africa's economic space and improve its international competitiveness, the economic challenges facing the African

continent are well documented. Scholars and African theoreticians have written quite extensively on the subject. According to Charles Abuka (2005: 127), trade has been a key driver of economic growth over the last 50 years for both wealthy Western countries and for some developing countries, particularly those in Asia. Asian countries have used trade to break into new markets and, indeed, change the face of their economies. But this has not been true of African countries. Charles Abuka argues (2005: 127) that the last three decades have been characterised by stagnation, resulting in a collapse of Africa's share of world trade from six per cent in 1980 to about two per cent in 2002. These challenges are highlighted as one of the key stumbling blocks for intra-African trade and economic development. It should be noted though that conflict and political instability are not always mentioned as the challenges Africa is facing and needs to be prioritised for the purposes of economic development. The reality of the situation is that, generally, Africa (with very few countries) is safer now than it was ten or twenty years ago. The only challenge facing Africa today is how to market and position Africa as the new continent with a revised vision.

Infrastructure

Research identifies infrastructure as being central to African development (through trade). According to Charles Abuka (2005: 122), it is the problems with roads, rail, ports, air transport, energy, telecommunication and other infrastructure that are among the chief constraints to economic growth in Africa. He gives, as an example, the fact that as much as 50 per cent of the harvest is lost in any part of Africa because farmers lack post-harvest storage. Charles Abuka (2005) also claims that Africa has the lowest electrification rate in the world. He argues, further, that only 23 per cent of Africa's population has access to electricity. What about internet access? Apart from encouraging developments in Botswana, Mauritius, Namibia and South Africa, the African region, again, lags seriously behind other regions of the world in the use of modern information technology. Africa's limited use of information technology is the result of inadequate, inefficient and very expensive telecommunication services.

Africa needs urgent, sustained, coherent and large-scale investment in transport and ICT systems, standardisation of cross-border procedures, and the establishment and strengthening of institutions to improve the functioning of its markets and to expedite the flow of goods (Abuka, 2005). Increasing the volume of trade by producing enough goods at the right quality and the right price will enable African countries to penetrate new markets and grow by seven per cent over a ten-year period. He also claims that the continent will be able to sustain

this growth rate thereafter. However, Africa must overcome those obstacles that discourage investment and create an economic environment that will enable her to, in effect, 'release' her entrepreneurial energies. Charles Abuka (2005) concludes that the development of an adequate infrastructure in Africa is a critical issue and that regional integration could play a vital role in solving problems that are common to a number of African states. He argues that infrastructure quality is a dominant explanatory factor of manufacturing performance and competitiveness; in fact, infrastructure serves as a key component of the investment climate.

Africa contends with high transaction costs. At present, the cost (and difficulty) of moving goods in Africa is far higher than in wealthier countries, leading to higher consumer prices. Furthermore, the burden of high transport costs is greater in land-locked African countries, where transport costs amount to three-quarters of the value of exports. Transport charges represent the equivalent of 80 per cent of the cost of cloth exported from Uganda. In short, transport-related problems make it extremely difficult to deliver goods to the market at competitive prices.

Capacity

One of the key challenges facing economic development in Africa is its skills shortage and, in particular, its technical skills. As a result of underdevelopment and poverty, the continent has failed to produce sufficient human capital for its own development. Woo, McCord and Sachs argue that the problem is that the typically poor African economy cannot afford to educate everyone even at primary school level. This is compounded by the continent's xenophobic tendencies where, according to Mothae Maruping (2005: 147), skilled professionals' freedom of movement is limited. Maruping (2005) suggests that xenophobia has partly hampered labour movement among Africans, while capital mobility has been constrained by largely underdeveloped financial markets

Geographic Fragmentation

Abuka (2005) states that this geographic fragmentation significantly reduces the prospect of creating growth by exploiting the economies of scale. Sub-Saharan Africa is fragmented into forty-eight small economies, with a medium size GDP of three billion dollars. He argues that the consequences of this fragmentation include higher production and trade costs (within Africa and with the rest of the world), the disadvantages of fragmented markets, and the negative effects of ethnic fragmentation, which are partly accentuated by the sovereign fragmentation.

According to Ndulu, Kritzinger Van Niekerk and Reinikka (2005: 106) geographical disadvantage is one of the factors underlying Africa's slow growth rate. Another problem is the burden of disease owing to the tropical climate, which hampers growth because of its adverse impact on life expectancy, human capital formation and labour force participation. This, according to Ndulu et al (2005), is compounded by a tendency to form trade blocs around neighbouring countries, for no obvious economic reason. For Schiff et al (2005), regionalism in Africa tends to focus on attracting foreign direct investment (FDI) and forming trade bargaining blocs for the purpose of increased trade gains in the World Trade Organization and, as such, is highly political in origin.

International Challenges

The recovery of African economies very much depends on international intervention. No matter how we look at it, Africa cannot, without the support of the international community, develop. Indeed, according to Matthew Martin (2005), Africa's relationship with the international community is crucial for its development.

The African continent has the potential to meet the United Nations Millennium Development Goals of eradicating poverty and underdevelopment through intra-African trade and investment. Clearly, as a starting point, Africa requires a lot of FDI and aid. The achievement of the Millennium Development Goals seems unlikely to happen if the international community reneges on its commitment to double its aid to developing countries, particularly those in Africa. The challenge, however, is the general perception among certain scholars and policymakers who believe that, no matter how much you invest in Africa, be it in the form of aid or FDI, Africa is incapable of recovering and sustaining itself as a result of entrenched macroeconomic mismanagement and poor governance.

This view is, however, challenged by Wing Thy Woo, Gordon McCord and Jeffrey Sachs. According to Woo et al (2005), many parts of Africa are well governed, and yet remain trapped in poverty. For Woo et al (2005), governance is a problem, but Africa's development challenges are much deeper. This view was supported by Andres Solimano, who worked at the World Bank (as cited by Woo et al (2005)). For Solimano, the quality of governance is, in itself, a result of the country's level of development. Good governance does not depend so much on the idiosyncrasy of a people, but on the availability of sufficient government resources to pay reasonable salaries to talented professionals.

Clearly, more money is needed to redress Africa's challenges. The international community has, to an extent, initiated programmes that will provide support

for Africa's economic recovery. According to Matthew Martin (2005: 213), the international community should double its aid to Africa. Annual flows at the moment are 25 billion and they need to rise to 50 billion immediately (not over the next five years) – an amount that Africa can easily absorb on essential health, education, anti-poverty and infrastructure spending. Above all, the international community should improve the quality of its aid to Africa.

Domestic and Private Debt

The domestic and private sector debt is also one of Africa's major problems. Matthew Martin (2005: 126) believes that the international community should use debt cancellation extensively since, if properly designed, this is a very high-quality aid instrument. According to Martin (2005), there is going to be an apparent increase of \$10 billion a year in aid over the next three years – but this is mostly going to be in the form of debt relief for Iraq and Nigeria – which means that this component should be stripped out to show what is really happening as far as global aid funds are concerned.

Insufficient Foreign Private Capital

Over the past few years, Africa has witnessed a substantial flow of foreign private capital. But recent studies indicate that such flows cannot be quantifiable in terms of figures and economic spinoffs (i.e. within the continent). What further complicates matters, according to Matthew Martin (2005), is the fact that foreign private capital is not necessarily going to the sectors and industries that are regarded as the key to African growth, because this capital is not being directed to the poorer regions in African countries.

International Experience

The establishment of the European Union and other regional trade communities confirms the importance of intra-continental trade. Trading blocks have now been established throughout the world. In Europe, there is the European Union (EU), in Asia, the Association of Southern East Asia Nations (ASIAN) and, in North America, there is the North America Free Trade Agreements (NAFTA), which has been at the centre of world economic development and investment. The EU, for its part, has established a single European market. Central to the development of this single market was the creation of a single European currency and monetary policy, as a result of the coordinated economic conduct on the part

of its member states, and as a result of these states acting together in international trade negotiations. Internal tariff and quota barriers within the EU were abolished. The single market rests on four pillars:

- Free movement of goods, persons, services and capital between member states
- The alignment of relevant laws, regulations and administrative provisions between member states
- EU-wide competition policy administered by the Commission
- A system of Common External Tariffs (CET – also known as the Common Customs Tariff) (<http://www.politic.co.uk>)

The above made possible the free movement of goods, services and money within the EU. People can now travel wherever they want, and cross the EU's internal frontiers for the purposes of both business and pleasure. This means that more companies are now competing against each other, thus lowering prices and providing the consumer with wider choices. What is more, most financial services have been liberalised. As a result, it is easier for consumers to use credit or debit cards abroad and to transfer money to another EU country. Bank charges for cross-border payments have also been reduced.

The direct beneficiaries of the EU were ordinary citizens from member countries. The establishment of a single market was not without its challenges. Some were political, whilst others were systematic. We still witness some trade areas which are yet to be finalised. For instance, Finn Skovgaard, in his article 'The European single market: Reality or the emperor's new clothes' (www.skovgaard.org/europolitics/eumarket.htm) states that there is constant room for improvement. According to him, freedom of movement is far from complete. The services sector, for instance, has opened up more slowly than markets for goods, although a major new law was adopted in 2006 enabling companies to offer a range of cross-border services from their home base. These challenges have also affected financial services and transportation, where separate national markets still exist. The fragmented nature of national tax systems also puts a brake on market integration and efficiency. These and other challenges are still to be overcome.

Skovgaard further argues that not all European citizens in the EU enjoy the offers in the market. Banks frequently refuse credit if you live in another country, which makes it difficult to have a bank account if you are a foreigner. Nor are pension schemes and the legislation covering them harmonised. However, despite these various challenges and delays, the old rules and regulations, along with the tax and customs barriers that once restricted human activity in Europe

and hampered the free movement of goods, capital and services, have now disappeared (www.skovgaard.org/europolitics/eumarket.htm).

What is commendable is that the EU's trade policy is closely linked to its development policy. The Union has granted duty-free or cut-rate access to its market for most imports from developing countries under its generalised system of preferences (GSP). It goes even further for the world's 49 poorest countries, all of whose exports – with the sole exception of arms – enter the EU duty-free (www.skovgaard.org/europolitics/eumarket.htm).

A number of lessons can also be learnt from Asian Plus Three (Asian countries, China, Korea and Japan). According to Lewis (2008: 43), writing for the *Global trade law series*, the Asian Plus Three Agreement was not just a free trade agreement (FTA) in the narrow sense of the word (i.e. agreements dealing with trade measures such as tariffs, quantitative restrictions and customs procedures), but also included economic partnership agreements (EPAs), which cover wider areas than an FTA. For example, the agreement contains issues such as trade in goods, trade in services, movement of persons, direct investment, customs procedures, competition policy, intellectual property, the improvement of the business environment, and cooperation in matters relating to the environment and energy. Again, the agreement boosted the Asian economy and created more jobs for the citizens of its member states.


A Working Model for Intra-African Trade for Economic Development

Based on an analysis of intra-African trade challenges and benefits, a model based on both economic and non-economic strategic pillars is proposed as a first step towards the establishment of an African single market. It is generally accepted that Africa, as a continent, could not, on its own, provide resources for its own economic development. Intra-African trade is generally viewed as one of the economic interventions and strategic tools for sustainable economic development. Such an initiative requires that Africa establish a political and economic relationship with developed countries. FDI, with more emphasis on foreign private capital, is central to African development. This will promote strategic partnerships between developing countries and private capital, resulting in the industrialisation of African economies, the diversification of African trade in goods and services, the transfer of skills, and the creation of employment. Unlike pure foreign aid, private capital would be production-driven and results-orientated.

On the other hand, foreign aid to Africa, which would include World Bank and the International Monetary Fund (IMF) aid schemes, should prioritise education and training for human-capital development. African education systems

should focus more on the technical know-how and vocational training required for infrastructure development and good governance. To create investors' confidence, Africa needs good governance and public administrators who can create an environment that is conducive to investment. First and foremost, this requires adherence to democratic principles, transparency and economic structural fundamentals, such as sound macroeconomic policies. This can only be realised through an education system that addresses the new socioeconomic and political requirements of the continent and, in fact, the world. The diagram below highlights key strategic pillars of the proposed model on intra-African trade for economic development.

Diagram 1: Africa economic recovery model



The diagram above highlights the importance of private capital investment: this is central to Africa's economic recovery initiative. According to Sam Tshabalala, in his article published in the *Star* newspaper, July 2010, a recent report by Paul Collier of Oxford University cites a comprehensive study of public trading companies operating in Africa for the period 2002 to 2007, mostly in the manufacturing and services sectors. It is claimed that these companies' average return

on capital was around two-thirds higher than that of comparable companies in China, India, Indonesia and Vietnam.

Given the latest developments in both the political and economic sphere, Africa has the potential to attract private investors and, indeed, to give them good reasons for investing more in Africa than in any other continent. The National Bureau of Economic Research recently cited empirical evidence that showed that poverty in Africa is declining quickly across a broad range of countries, and that economic growth, in the past two decades, has started to decrease income inequality from a Gini coefficient of 0,66 in 1990 to a current 0,63. As quoted in Sam Tshabalala's article (2010), McKinsey recently stated that Africa has 60 per cent of the world's uncultivated arable land, 316 million new cellular phone subscribers (registered since 2000), and a labour productivity rate that has increased by 2,7 per cent a year since 2000. All of this translates to real GDP growth for Africa, averaging 4,5 per cent in 2000 to 2009, against only 2,6 per cent in the rest of the world. One of the reasons for this performance is that Africa has the youngest population of all continents, and could constitute 29 per cent of the world's youth (14–24 years old) by 2050. A growing population needs food, clothing, housing, education, household products, financial services and telecommunications (among other things).

If the single market is established as envisaged, again according to Sam Tshabalala in the same article, it will be a formidable economic block with a combined GDP of \$739 billion (R5,48 trillion). This constitutes a whopping 60 per cent of Africa's GDP. As a single region, the African continent can be placed alongside, and potentially tower over, other emerging market giants such as China, India, Brazil and Russia. It has a higher GDP per capita than India, and 12 African countries have a higher GDP per capita than China.

However, for the proposed model to work, the African continent has to make certain political decisions to 'kick start' the process of creating a single market. These decisions will have to speak to both short-term and long term strategic objectives, which will consist of the following:

Short-term plan

Creation of a structure within the AU that is representative of key African countries, and that has the technical ability to communicate African challenges to the world and to fellow African leaders. The structure will be mandated to

- promote Intra-African trade as a concept among African countries to get buy-in and commitment on intra-African trade programmes
- create a strategic partnership between Africa and world economic leaders

- vigorously promote a positive image of the African continent to encourage investment
- monitor private foreign capital to ensure that industries and sectors which are likely to create employment and eradicate poverty are beneficiaries
- follow-up on United Nations Millennium Development Goals, to ensure that developed countries recommit on doubling aid for Africa to halve poverty and unemployment by 2015
- abolish internal tariff and quota barriers within the African continent
- provide law enforcement agencies with the capacity to fight crime and corruption, particularly cross-border crime.

Long-term plan

- Abolish internal tariff and quota barriers within the African continent.
- Create a single African currency and monetary policy.

Conclusion

The African continent has the potential to develop and achieve its goals of eradicating poverty and underdevelopment. Intra-African trade is one of the key strategic interventions to be used as a starting point for Africa's economic recovery. If the key challenges facing Africa are addressed, the continent is likely to be considered one of the main strategic economic partners in the world by 2025. The importance of regional cooperation cannot be overemphasised. More work is required, including obtaining buy-in from all African states so that all appreciate the importance and the economic benefits of regionalism and regional cooperation. Africa needs to use international forums, such as the United Nations, G20, the World Economic Forum and World Trade Organization to market the new vision of Africa. This will go a long way towards eliminating negative perceptions of Africa as the 'dark continent' – a continent beset by conflict, mismanagement and political instability. The reality is that Africa, today, has a new vision and a new mission. This is evidenced by the fact of peace and stability and the accountability of contemporary African leaders, leaders that have been elected via democratically established institutions.

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CHAPTER 29

African Economic Renaissance as a Paradigm for Africa's Socioeconomic Development

Vusi Gumede

Introduction

The chapter seeks to present, albeit partially, a socioeconomic development argument along the lines of the African renaissance. It proceeds from the assumption that the 21st century is almost midway through – there are about eighty years left until the 22nd century. The socioeconomic argument advanced in the chapter will mostly likely be realised in the 22nd century. Unlike our initial hopes that the 21st century would be an African century, it now appears that it is an Asian and South American century, given the levels of economic performance and development in Asia and South America. As the discussion demonstrates, economic performance in Asian and South American countries has surpassed that of African economies. The programme of the African renaissance in the 21st century has to do, largely, with the political, social and cultural emancipation of the African continent. One may argue, therefore, that African renaissance during the 21st century is about laying a proper foundation for an African economic renaissance in the 22nd century.

From the outset, I wish to clarify some important concepts used in the chapter. The first of these concepts is pan-Africanism which is essentially about an agenda of mobilisation; an ideology premised on the solidarity of Africans worldwide – this came about through the Caribbean movement, and later through African American intellectuals, before Africa adapted it. Modern pan-Africanism began around the early 20th century. The second is Afrocentricity¹ which should be understood as a paradigm that shapes the reconceptualisation of the historical reality of the African people. The last concept is the African renaissance² which is a philosophy and a programmatic agenda aimed at the rebirth of the African continent. The link between the three concepts, arguably, is 'African agency'. In other words, Africans should determine their destiny. In the chapter I invoke the notion of an African economic renaissance, which implies that Africans should decide on the African economy and the economic system that works for them. The point of departure is that Africans had, before the advent of colonialism

and imperialism, an authentic economy and economic system which worked for them.

Background

The world is experiencing increasing shifts in geopolitical and socioeconomic power. In other words, politically, the world is becoming multipolar. In socioeconomic terms, the high performers are no longer Europe and United States. As Wade (2013: 6) observes, ‘over the past decade, many developing and transitional countries have grown faster than developed countries. The middle-income countries (including India as well as China) grew at 6 per cent a year or more between 2005 and 2010, while the high-income countries grew at 2 per cent or less’. The socioeconomic rise of the developing and transition countries that Wade (2013) refers to pertains to, in the main, Asia and South America. This chapter concurs with this and the fundamental argument it makes is that the focus, especially in Africa’s case, should be to ensure that the 22nd century becomes, in no uncertain terms, an *African century*.

African economic renaissance as envisaged for the next century invokes Africa’s historical foundation and has contemporary implications. The historical basis of this economic model can be traced back to the communalism and associational existence that defined the social formation of the continent before the colonial intrusion. Of course Africa cannot switch the clock back to pre-colonial times but there is still a lot Africa can learn from the past and use in the present. An Afrocentric model and approach to economic development is even more germane today as the Eurocentric capitalist economic system, which was superimposed on Africa by the colonialists and imperialists, has destroyed African agency and associational existence – these are important elements for Africa’s economic renaissance. The overriding influence of foreign capital on the political economy of Africa has obfuscated and restricted the capacity of the state and civil society in Africa to promote inclusive development. The majority of Africans remain trapped in poverty and underdevelopment, in spite of reported higher economic growth rates.

Hence it is important to problematise the celebrated economic growth in Africa.³ In the following sections, the chapter will critically examine the level of development in Africa. Of late, gross domestic product (GDP) growth in the African continent is celebrated, largely because the majority of countries with high GDP growth rates globally are in Africa. Although it is convincing that GDP growth in Africa is increasing, the narrative that celebrates Africa’s GDP growth rates appears to ignore the ongoing global economic upheaval which is

most likely going to slow the growth of African economies. More importantly, the GDP growth rates in Africa have not translated into significant improvements in wellbeing of peoples of the continent.

One of the important issues, what does Africa need to do to sustain the levels of GDP growth as well as translate high levels of GDP into the improvement of the quality of life of people in the continent? The first part of the chapter looks at Africa against economic and social indicators. The next section discusses the performance of the African economies. This is followed by a discussion of the level of social and human development in the continent. Then there is a discussion on the Millennium Development Goals (MDGs) in Africa – this is important, particularly as the MDGs expire in 2015. The second, and the last, part of the chapter discusses permutations regarding what can be done to sustain high levels of GDP and what should be done to translate high levels of GDP into wellbeing improvements.

The point of departure and the frame of reference that shapes the analysis in the chapter is that any examination of Africa's economy should acknowledge the centrality of the historical experience of the slave trade, colonialism and imperialism which significantly shaped and/or negatively affected on Africa's political economy post-1500.

The Economy

GDP in a comparative context demonstrates that Africa is not doing as well as many have assumed. Looking at the years before the 2009 global economic recession and the subsequent Eurozone crisis, Africa's GDP has remained below the average of developing countries. Africa's average GDP since 1970 has remained below the average of developing Asia. Africa's GDP has remained below six per cent, while comparable economies have had GDP growth rates at a minimum of seven per cent. The period of analysis chosen for Table 1 is deliberately prior to the 2009 global economic recession. It is useful to focus on the period prior to the global economic recession in order to see how have the various economies, and the African economy, performed before the global economic recession.

Table 1: Annual average GDP growth rates by region

Total Real Gross Domestic Product by Region (Per centage)								
	1970–1980	1980–1990	1990–2000	2000–2005	2005	2006	2007	2008
World	3,8	3,2	2,8	2,8	3,4	4	3,8	2,1
Developing economies	5,8	3,9	5	5,4	6,7	7,1	7,3	5,5
Economies in transition	4,9	1,2	-4,8	5,4	6,1	7,2	8,2	5,4
Developed economies	3,4	3,2	2,5	1,9	2,3	2,8	2,5	0,8
Developing economies in Africa	4,5	2,3	2,8	4,8	5,7	5,6	5,9	4,9
Developing economies in America	5,8	1,7	3,2	2,7	4,7	5,4	5,7	4,4
Developing economies in Asia	6,2	5,7	6,3	6,5	7,5	7,9	8,1	5,9

Source: UNCTAD Handbook of Statistics (2008)⁴


In a nutshell, the picture that Table 1 presents is that although African economies have performed relatively well over time, since 1970, GDP growth rates in Africa remain comparatively lower than other developing regions (prior to the global economic recession). The same can be said about the period during the global economic recession and the Eurozone crisis period. The developing world in general has experienced comparatively higher economic growth rates than the traditionally developed world. Africa, however, on average has witnessed comparatively lower GDP growth rates. It can be argued that although most of the fastest growing economies are in Africa, GDP growth in Africa as whole, remains mediocre – GDP growth, post the global economic crisis, is about six per cent. Looking at individual countries, one gets the impression that the high GDP growth is simply a statistical artefact. A number of African economies are based on low productive bases. In addition, some of the significant African economies – such as South Africa – have performed poorly.

Notwithstanding the questionable nature of GDP growth in Africa,⁵ the celebrated GDP growth is yet to translate to an improved standard of living in the continent. The discussion, below, on social and human development and MDGs indicates that Africa remains behind the set targets. In fact, as an illustration, in per capita terms Africa also remains lower than other regions as figure 1 below shows. Per capita income refers to average income per person. It takes all sources of income in the aggregate and divides it by the total population. It is, in essence,

a measure of the standard of living. It is, however, not without shortcomings of which the main one, arguably in the case of Africa, is that because it is a mean value, per capita income does not reflect income distribution.

There is merit in looking at how per capita incomes change over time in order to get a sense of the trend and to get a sense of how standards of living, however imperfect, compare among different countries or regions. Figure 1 indicates that although the average standard of living has been steadily improving in Africa, the rate of the improvement has been poor in comparison with other regions. In purchasing power parity (PPP) terms, GDP per capita in sub-Saharan Africa has remained far below that of Asia and even further below that of Latin America and the Caribbean. It is worth observing that Latin America and the Caribbean and sub-Saharan Africa had similar levels of GDP per capita in the early 1990s.

Figure 1: GDP per capita: Africa, Developing Asia and Latin America and the Caribbean



Source: World Bank (2013) and International Monetary Fund (2011)⁶

As Figure 1 shows, Latin America and the Caribbean overtook Africa significantly from early 2000 – Latin America and the Caribbean are estimated to have double Africa's GDP capita now. The chasm between SSA and developing Asia is increasing in per capita terms. From about 2005, GDP PPP per capita between developing Asia and SSA appears to have been widening significantly. It is also in this context that the argument I make is that the 21st century would be remembered as having firmly established the ascent of the Asian continent and the rise of South American and Latin nations. The situation, as depicted above, highlights the importance of invoking a new paradigm for Africa's development. Hence, the chapter moots the idea of an African economic renaissance

Social and Human Development

As indicated above, welfare in Africa is stagnant if not deteriorating. On the eve of the global economic crisis, in 2009, the World Bank estimated that an additional 53 million people in developing countries were to fall into poverty on top of the 130–155 million generated by the impact of the food and energy crises of 2008. The number of people living on less than US\$2 per day was estimated to increase to over 1,5 billion globally.

For Africa, the figures – if accurate – are staggering: over 500 million Africans are expected to fall into poverty by 2015. In essence, this is not only because of the global economic recession per se, it is also because the global food crisis (preceding the global financial crisis) has not been addressed. As argued by Conceição and Mendoza (2009), prices of rice, soybean, wheat and maize remain far above their ten-year averages (each at least 30 per cent above its ten-year average). The political effects of the global economic recession for the developing world are largely similar to the effects of the food price shock, as well as the energy crisis, especially in Africa. In 2008, most African countries were dealing with food insecurity emanating from the food price shock, which has not been sufficiently addressed to date.

Table 2: Human development by region

	1980	1990	2000	2005	2009	2010	2011
Very high human development	0,766	0,81	0,858	0,876	0,885	0,888	0,889
High human development	0,614	0,648	0,687	0,716	0,734	0,739	0,741
Medium human development	0,42	0,48	0,548	0,587	0,618	0,625	0,63
Low human development	0,316	0,347	0,383	0,422	0,448	0,453	0,456
Arab States	0,444	0,516	0,578	0,609	0,634	0,639	0,641
East Asia and the Pacific	0,428	0,498	0,581	0,622	0,658	0,666	0,671
Europe and Central Asia	0,644	0,68	0,68	0,695	0,728	0,744	0,731
Latin America and the Caribbean	0,582	0,624	0,68	0,703	0,722	0,728	0,731
South Asia	0,356	0,418	0,468	0,51	0,538	0,545	0,548
Sub-Saharan Africa	0,365	0,383	0,401	0,431	0,456	0,46	0,463

Source: UN Human Development Report (2012)

Human development in Africa remains very low. Looking at the period from 1980 to 2010, as an example, sub-Saharan Africa's HDI has remained comparatively

too low, even compared to South Asia. Comparing sub-Saharan Africa and Latin America and the Caribbean, the point made above – that Africa remains behind other regions – is glaring. Again, this further suggests that when the 21st century is revisited, it will be remembered as the century of the socioeconomic rise of Asia and Americas.

The 2013 Human Development Report indicates that the average Human Development Index (HDI) value for sub-Saharan Africa is 0,475 (which is the lowest of any region, although the pace of improvement is rising). Between 2000 and 2012, sub-Saharan Africa registered average annual growth of 1,34 per cent in HDI value, placing it second only to South Asia. Although the index itself is debatable as to what it exactly means or measures, the HDI gives a sense of overall general wellbeing of a society or a region. The lower the HDI, by implication, the lower the quality of life because the HDI takes into account levels of educational attainment, access to healthcare and levels of per capita income.

Millennium Development Goals

Sachs (2005) warns that the issue of development should not be looked at from a 'one size fit all' continuum but should rather be viewed from a holistic development prism which encompasses everyone, first at the country level, then on the global front, to bolster development and growth for all. It was for this reason that when world leaders met in 2000 at the United Nations Millennium Summit, they agreed that there were eight fundamental economic and social development areas that needed to be achieved by the year 2015. These areas were, in no particular order, the empowerment of women, poverty eradication, universal access to primary education, reducing child mortality, improving maternal health, combating killer diseases such as HIV and AIDS and malaria, ensuring environmental sustainability, and fostering a global partnership for development (Sachs, 2005).

Realising that Africa was an exceptional case and a subsequent need to ensure that the benefits of the MDGs were realised in all corners of the African continent, the United Nations decided to set up the Africa MDG steering group (MDG ASG) in 2007, to specifically fast track the attainment of the Goals through the identification of tangible action plans (MDG ASG, 2008). The MDG ASG was enacted also because of the MDGs' potential in combating ongoing socioeconomic discrepancies in Africa through the identification of 'minimum thresholds in agriculture, nutrition, education, health and infrastructure' (MDG ASG, 2008).

For African countries, this was a script written in heaven as it promised many benefits which would, above all, end the socioeconomic ills of Africans as

we know them today and pull hundreds of thousands, out of the poverty trap⁷ (Aharonovitz, 2011). Indeed, extraordinary benefits await developing countries from successfully implementing the MDGs. According to Sachs (2005), immediate benefits range from raising a staggering 500 million people out of life-threatening poverty, whilst safely putting 300 million people in the no-hunger zone. Furthermore, such common tragedies as child mortality would be a thing of the past - which would also mean saving about two million more mothers from unnecessary death. Even more pertinent about the MDGs is the idea of realising a dignified lifestyle for all people through the provision of clean drinking water and basic sanitation, not to mention a life of freedom for women and girls characterised by 'more security and more opportunity' (Sachs, 2005: 2).

The United Nations through its subsidiary organisations and governments has worked tirelessly towards the global realisation of these goals. Undeniably, evidence suggests that there has been considerable global progress towards achieving the MDGs (MDG ASG, 2008). However, such progress has not yielded the desired results in sub-Saharan Africa, Latin America and the Caribbean (Sachs, 2005; Sachs et al, 2004). Sub-Saharan Africa in particular seems to be trailing behind in all aspects of the MDGs (Sachs et al, 2004; Sachs, 2005). In a set of eight different reports produced by eight taskforces; each assigned to one of the eight goals, the United Nations Millennium Project (2005) has reported that, by and large, sub-Saharan countries are failing to come up with sustainable programmes to meet all the requisite aspects of attaining the MDGs, at least by 2015.

Indications are that most of the MDGs are going to be met at a global level. The global trend, however, mainly reflects rapid growth in Eastern Asia, especially China, where the poverty rate is expected to fall to under five per cent by 2015. India has also contributed to the large reduction in global poverty. Projections for sub-Saharan Africa are slightly more promising than previously estimated. Based on recent economic growth performance and forecasted trends, the extreme poverty rate in the region is expected to fall below 36 per cent. However, the Human Development Index in Africa remains the lowest in the world, at below 0,5 as discussed above. By the time the 21st century slowly draws to a close, it will be remembered, socioeconomically, as the century that will have clearly confirmed the rise of the Asian continent and economies such as China, Republic of Korea and Vietnam and also the second rise of South American and Latin nations such as Brazil, Chile and Mexico.

The Economic Commission for Africa, in its 2012 Economic Report on Africa, contends that Africa's progress on the MDGs as a whole is gaining momentum. Economic growth in Africa has been averaging five per cent a year, and the

pattern of growth has been generally consistent. A handful of African countries have registered annual growth rates of seven to 11 per cent. The continent, therefore, continues to make steady progress on most of the MDGs. Even though it is unlikely to achieve all the targets by 2015, the rate of progress on several indicators – including primary school enrolment, gender parity in primary school enrolment, the proportion of seats held by women in national parliaments, HIV and AIDS prevalence rates and the share of women in non-agricultural wage employment – is accelerating. Indeed, as the 2012 United Nations Millennium Developmental Goals (UN MDG) Report indicates, in some cases Africa exceeds regions such as South-eastern Asia, Latin America and the Caribbean, and Western Asia. However, the recent global financial meltdown may have compounded the problem as it came with harsh consequences for the poor, not just in Africa but around the world (Baxter, 2008).

Prior to the recent growth experiences in Africa, there was already a high failure rate regarding the MDGs (Sachs, 2005). Sachs (2005) has proposed four broad reasons that try to explain the failure of the MDGs in most African countries. These are poor governance, corruption, poor economic policy choices and human rights infringement (Sachs, 2005). Aharonovitz (2011) has recently identified the failure to tap into existing knowledge as another reason why African countries continue to fail on the development continuum. The one thing that has come out clearly is the exogeneity of economic shocks on policymaking and the reality of their irrevocable yet colossal effects. For sub-Saharan African countries, it has also added salt to the wound – by worsening the already fragile situation (World Bank, 2008a). Over and above the fact that, in sub-Saharan Africa, people continue to live under serious economic hardships – with literally no safety nets from the governments for the poor – the effects of the global financial crisis on these very people has increased economic strains on the governments. This follows an unprecedented drop in official development assistance (ODA) and investments, and an increase in unemployment as the crisis gained momentum (World Bank, 2008b).

Table 3 below illustrates Africa's progress in the MDGs. Africa remains off track in many MDGs, especially and disturbingly in the MDGs that relate to human rights targets such as maternal and child mortality. In fact, the two MDGs that Africa is meeting (i.e. primary education and the empowerment of women) do not talk to the quality of life. For instance, children can be at school but not receiving quality education and women can be in senior political positions while domestic violence is rife. That said, it should count for something that Africa is meeting Goal 7 (i.e. environmental sustainability).

Table 3: Africa's MDGs performance at a glance

Goal 1: Eradicate extreme poverty and hunger	Off track
Goal 2: Achieve universal primary education	On track
Goal 3: Promote gender equality and empower women	On track
Goal 4: Reduce child mortality	Off track
Goal 5: Improve maternal health	Off track
Goal 6: Combat HIV/AIDS, malaria and other diseases	Off track
Goal 7: Ensure environmental sustainability	On track

Source: MDG Report (2012: 21)

Although Africa is making commendable strides, the availability of decent jobs remains a challenge, especially as the majority of jobs on the continent are in the informal sector which generally has low incomes, low productivity and poor working conditions (MDG Report, 2012). In addition, vulnerable employment accounts for 70 per cent of employment growth and is largely represented by women. Wide gaps remain in women's access to paid work in at least half of all regions. Following significant job losses in 2008–2009, the growth in employment during the economic recovery in 2010 was lower for women as compared to men and women employed in manufacturing industries.

Lastly, inequality and social disparities are also hampering progress in realising the goal of poverty reduction. The Africa Progress Panel in its 2012 Report highlights this quite strongly, stating that 'inequality constrains poverty reduction ... and social disparities are also acting as a brake on progress toward other MDGs'. Progress in ameliorating slum conditions has not been sufficient to offset the growth of informal settlements throughout the developing world. In developing regions, the number of urban residents living in slum conditions is now estimated at 828 million, compared to 657 million in 1990 and 767 million in 2000. Redoubled efforts will be needed to improve the lives of the urban poor in cities and metropolis across the developing world.

Sustaining Africa's Growth

The first fundamental question to address is: what has precipitated the celebrated Africa growth? There are two broad views that answer this important question. Before discussing the two views, it is important to indicate that it is not necessarily the resource or commodities boom that has mainly accounted for the rapid economic growth in Africa.⁸

First, growth in many African countries is largely a statistical artefact – the economies that come from a very low base witness high GDP growth rates (e.g. Mali, Mozambique, Somalia, DRC and Ethiopia). The second view is that the policy environment has been conducive for growth. In other words, the economic policy and political reforms that many African countries have embarked upon over the recent past contribute to improving factors that make up aggregate demand on the African continent. Improvements in economic infrastructure, macroeconomic fundamentals, public finances and increases in foreign direct investments and foreign trade, among other issues, have to do with what is considered an ideal policy environment.

However, the celebrated GDP growth rates, as argued above, are not as high in a comparative context. The policy environment, arguably, has not been as conducive to higher economic growth rates – Africa's GDP growth rates have remained below six per cent for decades, before and after the global economic crisis. The economic policy and political reforms that many African countries have pursued have largely ensured macroeconomic stabilisation. Further economic policy reforms are needed to place Africa on a higher GDP growth path. For the African economic renaissance paradigm, policy reforms must not be the type that is externally designed to serve the interests of the market, which in many cases breeds misery, underdevelopment, poverty, inequality and social disorder. Africa needs reforms that are designed with due consideration to the local peculiarity of the political economies of the continent, social inclusion and spatial spread. Among other things, policy reforms must involve paying attention to the informal sector, 'the moral economy of affection' based on kinship networks, family ties and empowerment of people in the rural areas, where the majority of the people live (Hyden, 2007).

As indicated above, some significant economies such as the South African economy have actually performed poorly in a comparative context and relative to size of the economy. For instance, Table 4 below shows that South Africa has consistently performed below its peers such as India, Brazil, Indonesia, Malaysia and Chile. For Africa's GDP growth to be sustainable, countries like South Africa need to have higher GDP growth rates.

Table 4: GDP growth, comparable countries

	2000	2001	2002	2003	2004	2005	2006	2007	2008	2009	2010
SA	4,2	2,7	3,7	2,9	4,6	5,3	5,6	5,5	3,6	-1,5	2,9
Brazil	4,3	1,3	2,7	1,1	5,7	3,2	4	6,1	5,2	-0,6	7,5
Chile	4,5	3,4	2,2	3,9	6	5,6	4,6	4,6	3,7	-1,7	5,2
India	4	5,2	3,8	8,4	8,3	9,3	9,3	9,8	4,9	9,1	9,7
Indonesia	4,9	3,6	4,5	4,8	5	5,7	5,5	6,3	6	4,6	6,1
Malaysia	8,9	0,5	5,4	5,8	6,8	5,3	5,8	6,5	4,7	-1,7	7,2

Source: Development Indicators (2012)

It is actually important to note that sound economies, such as the Indian and Indonesian economies, did not experience negative growth rates even in the context of the 2008/9 global economic recession. It is also worth observing that Brazil experienced an average negative growth rate which is far lower than that experienced by South Africa. The rebound of GDP growth rates of all the countries that are compared with South Africa, in Table 4, is very significant. Brazil's GDP growth rebounded to 7,5 per cent in 2010 and Malaysia's GDP growth rate rebounded to 7,2 per cent while South Africa's GDP growth rate rebounded to a mediocre 2,9 per cent, and the South African economy appears to be going into a recession.

Taking the next two years into account, the point made that South Africa performs relatively poorly still holds. The Nigerian economy, on the other hand, is growing much faster, as Table 5 shows.

Table 5: Gross domestic product and inflation, projections

	GDP projections			Inflation projections		
	2012	2013	2014	2012	2013	2014
World	3,3	3,6	4,1	4	3,7	3,6
Emerging markets	5,3	5,6	5,9	6,1	5,8	5,3
Sub-Saharan Africa	5	5,7	5,5	9,1	7,1	6,1
South Africa	2,5	3	3,8	5,7	5,5	5,1
Nigeria	6,61	6,75	7,27	11,98	9,76	9,49
Brazil	1,5	4	4,2	5,2	4,9	4,8
India	4,9	6	6,4	10,3	9,6	8,3
China	7,8	8,2	8,5	3	3	3

Source: South African National Treasury (2012) and Nigerian Statistical Agency (2013)

When comparing Nigeria and South Africa,⁹ Nigeria has much higher GDP growth rates at least six per cent while South Africa's GDP growth rates have remained below five per cent. Nigeria's economy is growing at rates comparable to India, even China. Nigeria's inflation rate is, however, very high, at similar levels to India. In fact, Nigeria's economy is growing above the sub-Saharan average and the emerging markets average. However, the inflation in Nigeria also remains high. There is still room for further economic stabilisation in Nigeria, as in many African countries, and the next set of policy reforms should focus on higher economic growth rates. Of course one acknowledges that fact that the sociohistorical contexts of these countries are totally different.

Developments in countries such as Brazil, Malaysia and others suggest that a country needs a robust economic policy framework to sustain GDP growth.¹⁰ So, although many countries in Africa embarked on policy reforms particularly during the 2000s, the policy environment is still not sound enough. There are two economic policy areas that require attention if the GDP growth rates that Africa has experienced are to be sustained. First, industrialisation remains a major policy challenge and an opportunity for provision of jobs along the value chain. Although many African countries are pursuing some economic restructuring, most of the countries do not have robust industrial development policies. Economic restructuring has been on the cards, in Africa, since the 1970s but many African countries are still reliant on a few economic sectors. There are very few countries in Africa that have some sectoral diversification. Therefore, more needs to be done on industrial development – and industrial development, in the case of the majority of African countries, should be linked with land and agrarian reforms.

The second policy issue is the labour market. Many African countries do not have clear labour market policies. Given the youthful nature of the African continent, it is critical that there are employment policies to address a very high unemployment level in the continent. In other words, active labour market type policies¹¹ should be pursued to ensure that the productive resources, especially the youth, of the continent are put into productive use in order to sustain the growth of the African economy.

Africa's Growth and Development

The issue of labour market policy discussed above is critical in many respects. From an economic policy perspective, the labour market is an important market for economic development. From a social policy perspective, the labour market is

critical as an instrument for transforming social relations and improving human development.

For high GDP growth rates to translate to improved welfare, the labour market should play an important role. Per capita income can only increase if people are in gainful employment – and per capita income is one of the main variables for the Human Development Index.¹² Therefore, besides investing in education and healthcare, the labour market should function optimally in order to increase the level of human development. To translate high economic growth rates to the improvement of wellbeing in Africa, it is important that as many people as possible are employed.

The last policy issue that requires urgent attention is social policy. It has been argued that most African countries do not have any social policies. Social policies are critical for both economic growth and social development. The transformation of institutions in order that they ensure equality of opportunities, as an example, is an important social policy issue. The protection of the most vulnerable in societies, especially in the event of external shocks, is another critical social policy issue.

Socioeconomic Development: African Economic Renaissance

As demonstrated above, Africa is to a large extent stagnant in terms of socio-economic development – Africa's time would, arguably, be the 22nd century. The fundamental challenge of Africa's development, from a political economy point of view has been thoroughly analysed. Samir Amin, Adebayo Adedeji and Thandika Mkandawire are among prominent African scholars who have written extensively about the African economy over time.

Recently, Benno Ndulu and Omar Kabaj have provided an extensive account of the performance of the African economy as well as made proposals on how to get Africa onto a higher growth trajectory. Unlike the earlier scholars of the African economy, say Samir Amin, the recent and/or current scholars of the African economy appear constrained by the neoliberal dogma that their respective institutions might be imposing or have imposed on them. In essence, an analysis of the African economy that does not take into account the evolution of the African economy since the precolonial times is inadequate because the manner in which the African economy has integrated with the global economy has significantly influenced the performance of the African economy.

The overarching message, which is indubitable, is that economic growth in Africa has remained below par. However, even if the African economy were to grow faster, as it appears to be doing presently or before the global economic

recession, it can be argued that the challenges of poverty and underdevelopment would remain. Adebayo Adedeji, in his Statement to the Economic and Social Council of the United Nations in Geneva on 12 July 1979, made a profound point, among others, that 'Africa needs complete restructuring and transformation of its political economies from dependent to self-reliant ones'. It could be argued that Adedeji was talking about a fundamental change in the structure of the African economy and the social processes that shape socioeconomic development approaches. The structure of the African economy is simply a legacy of colonialism. Because African economies were configured as satellite economies, they predominantly rely on a few sectors of the economy. I must hasten to add that the structure of an economy should be viewed not only in terms of sectoral diversification – ownership of the means of production as well as linkages among the subsectors is equally important. In South Africa, for instance, economists talk of a Mineral-Energy-Complex (MEC), implying that the economy is predominantly shaped in such a way that it is dominated by the relationship between the mineral sector and energy subsector.

Therefore, the central argument is that the structure of the African economy should be reconfigured. As it has been argued, repeatedly, the capitalist or free market or free enterprise economic philosophy does not work for many countries. Amin (1997: 95) puts it well when he said that 'contemporary society is manifestly in crisis, if we define crisis as a situation in which the expectations of the majority cannot be satisfied by the logic of the [capitalist] system'. Amin goes on to say that 'capitalism and crisis are not incompatible: far from it, because the logic of capital necessarily generates crisis. The solution implies a modification of the rules of the game ... an alternative social project' (p. 96).

For Africa, an argument can be made that the free market economic system, which came with colonialism, is not the ideal framework for Africa's development. The pre-mercantilist African economy functioned along the lines of what scholars have termed 'communalism'. Rodney (1973: 12) defines communalism as a system where 'property [is] collectively owned, work done in common and goods shared equally'. This is in sharp contrast to capitalism, which, according to Rodney, resulted in 'concentration in a few hands of ownership of the means of producing wealth and by unequal distribution of the products of human labour' (p. 12).

The challenge facing the African economy is fundamentally the socioeconomic development model that Africa adapted or was imposed on Africa. Netshitenzhe (2013: 21) argues that 'a new socioeconomic system should be an all-encompassing Continental Democratic Revolution'. Such a model focuses on ensuring higher rates of economic growth, deepening of democracy, and such like Gumede

(2010) concludes that the social processes associated with the capitalist economic system were to blame for the slow progress that Africa experienced. The answer is for Africa to pursue its own paradigm for economic and social development. In the meantime, perhaps because it is difficult to change the developmental model overnight, the restructuring of the African economy is the answer. In addition, as Tomori (1995: 248) puts it, ‘Africans should formulate and implement policies that are consistent with their needs even if these are not always approved by the international community’.

The issue of ‘policies’ for the African continent has been a matter of debate for a long time. Although there appears to be an overlapping consensus that different policies were or are needed for Africa, there are some African scholars – such as Godfrey Mwakikagile – who have peddled the neoliberal dogma blindly pursued by non-African economists such as Jeffrey Sachs. For instance, Mwakikagile (1999: 3) indicates that ‘there is an explanation for Africa’s poor performance: bad policies ...’. Mwakikagile laments that ‘many African countries still control much of their economies’ and he recommends that ‘African governments [should] privatize their economies and adopt other free-market devices such as lifting exchange controls and liberalizing trade in order to attract foreign investment and encourage local entrepreneurship’ (p. 5). These recommendations cannot be taken seriously, as Mkandawire and Soludo (1999) argue. As several cases of privatisation have shown, it has not been the magic wand for economic development that was presented by the West. With few exceptions such as the privatisation of the telecommunication sector in different countries in Africa, this neoliberal ‘cure-all medicine’ has become yet another opportunity for private capital accumulation by Western-backed multinational corporations and the comprador bourgeoisies in Africa (Odukoya, 2011).

Common wisdom – ‘international norm’ – has been that the state should not interfere with the market, except in the case of market failures. There is or was no mention of the citizen at all. The conventional approach to economic development has failed because of the neoliberal dogma that the market is all and in all. Amin (1972: 107) eloquently argues that ‘a society cannot be reduced to a mode of production. The concept of mode of production is *abstract*’. However, the neoliberal paradigm and its free enterprise ideology did not listen to Amin and others.

A better interface between the citizen, the state and the market has to depart from the view that the state leads socioeconomic development. The state should, however, have the appropriate capacity and it has to be organised in a manner that ensures that it is effective. The citizenry, on the other hand, should be able to hold the state accountable. The market should take a cue from the state. This

is an implicit argument made by Mkandawire and Soludo (1999); that the state should lead in development. However, as Gumedé (2011: 265) argues, the organisation and capacity of the state needs reconfiguration in many instances in order to improve long range planning. This suggests a central role that only the government can play. With regard to Africa, going forward, the fundamental answer is on rethinking Africa's political economy. Africa requires a different, if not new, socioeconomic development model. The rethink of Africa's political economy also means a different interface between the state, the citizen and the market. As argued, the state should lead and citizens should be in a position to hold the state accountable. This is the essence of the African economic renaissance paradigm.

A new or different social and economic development model – informed by the proposed African economic renaissance paradigm – which this chapter argues for, requires the following main components: robust social policies, effective industrial policies, entrepreneurship, state ownership and (lastly) intra-African trade. Social policy is an important instrument for transforming social relations, social welfare and institutions, as well as ensuring effective social protection of the most vulnerable (Mkandawire, 2001). Africa, or rather specific countries in the continent, requires robust social policies. For most of Africa, it can be argued that social policies, where they exist, are not comprehensive and/or not effective. The social policies that are very much needed have to be implemented in concert with economic policies. In particular, macroeconomic policies should not contradict social policies. For instance, fiscal and monetary policies have a tendency to be counterproductive in many countries in the continent which would contradict the main objectives of social policy. While fiscal and monetary policies may enhance macroeconomic stability, they may not be able to safeguard the wellbeing of people except when the state puts in place measures for wealth redistribution.

Industrial policies are the second main tenet of the proposed development model. The restructuring of the African economy that many economists have argued for over decades requires robust industrial policies, at minimum. Industrial policy is primarily about changing the sectoral composition of a particular economy. The standard narrative, which is essentially neoliberal, is that economies should progress from primary sectors to manufacturing to services sectors. Industrial policy is often pursued in order to 'pick the winners'; to select those sectors that can contribute a larger share to the output of an economy and to employment. I am proposing a different narrative; that Africa should 'create the winners' instead of 'picking the winners'. Therefore, Africa's industrial policies should be focusing on a different path and a different form of industrialisation and/or industrial development. It might be better to think of a developmental

strategy instead of industrial policy as conceived in the literature. As Chang (2007) argues, the developed countries of today used strategic industrial policy to achieve their present state of development. Chang (2007) actually contends that the industrial policies of countries such as France, Britain, Germany and the United States of America ensured that infant industries were protected against competition from foreign firms until such a time that they were strong enough to withstand such competitions. Contemporary examples from China and Brazil show similar patterns of strategic industrial policy for industrial growth.

The other two aspects of the proposed developmental model for Africa relate to society's role in business. It is argued that Africa needs to increase its entrepreneurial 'class' and governments should improve state ownership. In other words, Africa should be focusing on increasing the number and the role of African-owned and state-owned enterprises. This implies that the so-called increasing middle class in Africa cannot be celebrated, just as we cannot be celebrating the current rates of economic growth. This does not mean that Africa should not recognise that something positive is taking place. It simply means that Africa need not be derailed from the important cause it should pursue.

Lastly, Africa has to improve intra-African trade which is estimated at about 10 per cent of the total volume of trade in the region (World Bank, 2010). Although a recent study by the Africa Development Bank shows that the volume of intra-Africa trade has increased to 16 per cent, this is still very low when compared with over 60 per cent volume of trade with developed economies such as those of Europe and the United States of America (Kigombe, 2013). Trade within and/or among African countries can be improved if Africa gradually substitutes trade with non-African countries for trade within Africa. Increasing intra-African trade is closely linked to Africa's industrial development approach. Different parts of the continent could specialise in certain sectors and/or subsectors in order to trade with other parts of the continent, just as standard international trade theory suggests.

Conclusion

This chapter questioned the extent to which Africa's growth rates should be celebrated. It has demonstrated that GDP growth rates in Africa have not been as high, in a comparative context, as other emerging economies in Asia and South America. The chapter also discussed low levels of social and human development in Africa, indicating that from a per capita income perspective GDP growth in Africa has not translated to improved wellbeing. The chapter argued that in order to improve GDP growth and to ensure that there is an improvement in human

development, the policy environment needs tweaking. Industrial development and employment are two economic policy areas that the chapter argued need urgent attention for sustaining GDP growth. Labour market policy and social policy are the two areas that are needed in order to translate GDP growth to improved welfare in Africa. There could be many other areas that can sustain GDP growth in Africa, and perhaps an equally large number of areas that can translate economic growth to welfare gains. The chapter focused on what it considers to be fundamental or overarching areas, and it proposed a new and or different socioeconomic development model for Africa.

Further improvement of the policy environment could benefit from a developmental state¹⁵ framework. The notion of a developmental state, as a framework for socioeconomic development, highlights the areas that governments, in partnerships with key stakeholders and role players, should focus on. Social and economic policies are critical from a developmental state perspective. Capacity to deliver on a long-term vision is paramount from a developmental state framework point of view. It is recommended that African countries pursue means to further grow their economies, to ensure that growth is sustainable and that growth translates to welfare improvements. African countries should be advised to adapt the developmental state framework that can guarantee that African countries further develop socially and economically – African countries can tweak and or adapt parts of a developmental state framework that have relevance for their specific contexts.

More fundamentally, a lasting solution could be found in a new or different socioeconomic development model for Africa informed by an African economic renaissance paradigm. The proposed model is different from the predominant economic system. It is also different from what has been viewed as an alternative economic system (i.e. communism/socialism). The proposed model takes its cue from Africa's political economy before colonialism and imperialism. In other words, it could be viewed as an improved and modified version of *communalism*. This chapter did not deal with this subject extensively because it is a subject that requires a separate chapter or even a book. This chapter intended to table the broad notion of a new or different socioeconomic development model within the context of an African economic renaissance paradigm. It is argued that the 21st century would largely solidify the political, social and cultural emancipation of the African continent, and that the 21st century would lay the foundation for African economic renaissance.

Notes

1. Refer to AmaMazama, 2001. Molefi Asante, 2008, defines Afrocentricity as “a consciousness, quality of thought, mode of analysis, and actionable perspective where Africans seek, from agency, to assert subject place within the context of African history”.
2. The African Renaissance concept was first articulated by Cheik Anta Diop in the middle of the 20th century and it has been popularized by Thabo Mbeki during the 21st century.
3. Africa, like many other regions or continents, is huge and diverse. Countries in Africa differ in many ways and sub-regions of the continent also differ significantly. Although this chapter also discusses the ‘oil economies’ of the continent as well as the ‘Arab economies’, the focus is on the south of the Sahara (sub-Saharan Africa). The notion of sub-Saharan Africa (SSA), though ideologically contentious, is useful for analytical purposes. Sub-Saharan African economies warrant special focus given the peculiar socio-economic challenges they face, which North Africa and Middle East (NAME) do not endure or rather the nature of the socio-economic challenges, developments and prospects differ between SSA and NAME.
4. UNCTAD handbook of Statistics, 2008, Table 8.2.1 and updated with statistics. Available at <http://stats.unctad.org/Handbook/tableViewer/tableView.aspx?Report=2069>
5. The debate about the standard measure of economic performance (i.e. GDP) is not new. There is a broad consensus that GDP is not an ideal measure of societal development. The recent report of the Commission on the Measurement of Economic Performance and Social Progress. Available at http://www.stiglitz-sen-fitoussi.fr/documents/rapport_anglais.pdf by Joseph Stiglitz, Amartya Sen and Jean-Paul Fitoussi deal with this issue in detail.
6. World Bank, 2013, Africa’s Competitive Report. International Monetary Fund (2011), World Economic Outlook Database. Available at <http://www.imf.org/external/pubs/ft/weo/2011/01/weodata/index.aspx>.
7. Aharonovitz, 2011: 108, draws from Azariadis and Starchurski (2005) to define poverty traps as “any self-reinforcing mechanisms that causes poverty to persist.”
8. McKinsey Global Institute, 2010 estimate that, between 2000 and 2008, the natural resources accounted for 24% of Africa’s Gross Domestic Product growth
9. South Africa is placed as number 25 while Nigeria is number 30 in the global rankings of economies by the International Monetary Fund. Ranking of economies, particularly by the World Bank and the International Monetary Fund, uses constant prices (against a chosen year) and it is in Purchasing Power Parity (PPP) terms. PPP refers to a technique used to determine the relative price of currencies. It estimates the amount of adjustment needed on the price of currencies between countries in order for the exchange to be equivalent to (or on par with) each currency’s purchasing power.
10. Gumede, 2011, discusses this issue in detail, and makes proposals on what kind of a policy mix and vision of the African economy that are needed.
11. Active labour market interventions include programmes such as job search, in-service training, employment subsidies, etc
12. Human Development Index (HDI) is a composite index measuring average achievement in three basic dimensions of human development—a long and healthy life, knowledge and a decent standard of living

13. Refer to Gumede, 2010, on the treatment of developmental states in Africa. Gumede, 2008: 9 defines a developmental state as a “state that is active in pursuing its developmental agenda, working with social partners, and has the capacity and is appropriately organised for its predetermined developmental objectives”.

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CHAPTER 30

Pan Africanism and the African Renaissance: Extracating Paradigms of Underdevelopment

Shingai Ngara

Introduction

This chapter is organised into two main sections: the first part attempts to analyse global economic history seeking to understand why Africa remains ‘underdeveloped’ and contrasts Africa’s strategies and progress with working models in other countries. Central to this analysis is an in-depth discussion of the role of science¹ and technology² in economic development.

The second part proposes specific interventions, which include leveraging scientific and technological innovations that African governments can adopt in order to address underdevelopment. Some of the ideas proposed in this chapter are in the process of development through further research.

The chapter makes four key points:

1. The world is an interconnected globalised political economy which also exhibits chaotic behaviour.³ As such the relative wealth or poverty of individual nations can be attributed to decisions and actions within those countries *and* decisions and actions in other parts of the world. Any developmental orientation must take this interconnected reality into account when attempting to find effective strategies for poverty alleviation and economic growth.
2. Contrary to the advice that has come from Washington Consensus Institutions since the 1980s (and specifically the seminal Berg report that argues for minimal state intervention in developmental strategies), the history of the USA, China (including Taiwan), Japan, India and Brazil shows very significant state involvement in their development strategies, thereby protecting domestic industrialisation before opening up to international trade. It is also important to note that Washington Consensus policies have had a history of increasing instability in Africa and stability in the USA and other European countries. This is because a country that begins engaging in fair trade with other countries before its economic structures are transformed and solid usually misses the plot.

3. Advances in science and technology lead to advances in levels of industrialisation which create goods and services that stimulate consumer demand while simultaneously enhancing profitability levels. Increasing levels of industrialisation and corresponding profitability attract investment capital, which leads to further industrialisation in a virtual cycle. Conversely, where science and technology are stifled, a vicious cycle of loss of investment capital, less profitability, diminishing industrialisation and lack of availability of goods and services to meet consumer demands occurs thus leading to underdevelopment.
4. The African Renaissance, as advocated by former President Thabo Mbeki, will not occur unless Africa specifically positions herself to industrialise and, in addition, becomes an actor at the cutting edge of advances in science and technology. This requires the development of a holistic and strategic thrust to achieve this goal.

Africa and Underdevelopment

There is no universally accepted definition of development. What we argue in this chapter is a practical understanding so that strategies can be developed and so the definition that is proposed is not necessarily the most comprehensive definition but a working definition. For the purposes of this chapter, 'development' takes on a numerical definition. By development we mean

- growth in production per capita (PPC) (whether measured as gross domestic product per capita⁴ or gross national income per capita⁵),
- reduction in wealth distribution as measured by the Gini coefficient⁶
- size of population living in absolute poverty⁷ below \$1,25 per day
- ability to attract investment capital as measured by foreign direct investment⁸ (FDI)

Developed countries usually have high PPC, a low Gini coefficient, few people living on less than \$1,25 per day and high FDI. It follows then that an underdeveloped country will have a low PPC, a high Gini coefficient, a significant proportion of its population living on less than \$1,25 per day and low FDI.

Table 1: World development indicators

	Development Indicators 2009					
	Africa	China	India	Japan	Brazil	USA
GNI/capita (US\$ PPP10) 2009	1 680	6 710	3 230	37 870	10 260	46 730
Absolute poverty	46%	8%	25%		31%	12%
Gini coefficient 2009	67,9	46,9	36,8	38,1	57	40,8
FDI 2008 (US\$ bn)	15,139	147,791	41,169	24,552	45,058	319,737

Source: World Bank 2010, 25–50

The data clearly shows Africa as underdeveloped. We now need to understand the reasons for this in order that we might develop effective strategies for addressing underdevelopment, using technological innovation as an important lever towards these ends.

The Berg Report

Nobel Laureate, Joseph Stiglitz, explains the governing thesis for the creation of The World Bank and the International Monetary Fund:

The British economist John Maynard Keynes ... put forward a simple explanation, and a correspondingly simple set of prescriptions: lack of sufficient aggregate demand explained economic downturns; government policies could help stimulate aggregate demand. In cases where monetary policy is ineffective, governments could rely on fiscal policies, either by increasing expenditures or cutting taxes (Stiglitz, 2002: 18).

A quiet revolution took place in the World Bank in 1981 when President Robert McNamara, who had redirected the World Bank's efforts at poverty elimination with a focus on market failures and how governments could improve markets and reduce poverty, stepped down. With this change of the old guard to the new President William Clausen and new Chief Economist Ann Krueger came a new view. Krueger saw governments as the problem. Free markets were the solution to the problems of developing countries. In this new ideological fervour, many of the first-rate economists left (Stiglitz, 2002: 22).

It was in this climate that Elliot Berg released the now famous World Bank report on 'Accelerated Development in Sub-Saharan Africa'. The Berg report

cites 'critical domestic policy inadequacies' as reasons for Africa's economic challenges.

Essentially ignoring external factors the Berg Report takes aim at African leaders by saying that in pursuing import-substitution industrialisation, they had turned their backs on the continent's comparative advantage in raw materials in favour of propping up inefficient domestic industries and a bloated public sector. The Berg Report recommended returning to an outward-oriented programme of raw material exports, to be accomplished by rolling back state intervention and freeing up market forces. Specific recommendations promoted under the rubric of Structural Adjustment Programmes (SAPs) included eliminating subsidies and controls (on imports, wages, and prices), devaluing local currencies, and letting the market determine the prices for raw materials exports (Berg, 1981: 6).

Simply put: *do nothing else but specialise in agriculture and mining. Governments stay uninvolved so that the market determines the price at which you sell your produce.*

In concert with International Monetary Fund (IMF) stabilisation policies,⁹ The SAPs left African countries open to the chill winds of events elsewhere in the world and capital flight and high indebtedness levels were two of the biggest results with severe socioeconomic consequences (Moyo, 2009: 35).

The figures speak for themselves:

- 1960–2009 – US\$2 trillion from rich countries to poor countries
- 1960–2009 – US\$1 trillion from rich countries to Africa
- 1970–2009 – US\$300 billion to sub-Saharan Africa
- 1979–2009 – AID dependent countries experienced a -0,2 per cent growth rate in GDP i.e. Economic Contraction
- 1970–1998 – African poverty rate grew from 11 per cent to 66 per cent with significant growth in the Gini coefficient (Moyo, 2009: 77)

The characteristics and structure of African economies must then come into sharp focus and be contrasted with economies elsewhere.

The Wealth and Poverty of Nations

How have other countries achieved poverty alleviation and economic growth? Myrdal, a Nobel Prize winning economist, is highlighted by Erik S Reinert. According to Reinert, key considerations for understanding relative wealth between nations in an interconnected globalised political economy require that:

Audiences must appreciate that the main difference between rich and poor countries is that rich countries have all moved through a stage without free trade, which – when successful – subsequently made free trade desirable. This mandatory passage point in the history of all presently developed countries – allowing poor countries to emulate the economic structures of rich countries – is currently outlawed. Markets will not magically eradicate poverty ... Fair trade under current conditions could easily leave extreme poverty intact. It also means keeping a close eye on our (i.e. Western) governments to ensure that they are not interfering illegitimately in the internal affairs of poor countries (emphasis added).

... if you want to understand the causes of American and European prosperity, study the policies of those who created it, not the advice of their forgetful successors.

... Don't do as the Americans tell you to do, do as the Americans did' (Reinert 2007: 70).

These forgettable successors, including Clausen, Krueger and Berg, essentially created a paradigm for postcolonial Africa to *specialise in poverty* by not allowing the use of technology in areas of increasing returns.

Case – The Role of Science and Technology in an Economy

The United States of America understood very early that it is a strategic focus on maximising land ownership across the economy (De Soto, 2000: 20) and science and technology investment, coupled with control of capital flows that ensures rapid development (Bernstein, 1992: 16). Property ownership allows for collateral for financing initiatives. In the absence of collateral the lack of financing would stifle economic activity.

Various government-led and corporate-supported (and sometimes corporate-led and government-supported) scientific and technological initiatives established the USA as the pre-eminent global scientific destination. These included:

- railway building (1860s, under Abraham Lincoln moving away from Thomas Jefferson who relied on agriculture for economic growth) (Chaitkin, 1986: 3)
- the building of the Panama Canal (1900s, under Theodore Roosevelt)
- the assembly line for building Model T cars by the Ford Company (1900s under Theodore Roosevelt)

- the Manhattan Project that built the atomic bomb that ended the Second World War (1940s, under Franklin Delano Roosevelt)
- the building of highways (1950s, under Dwight D Eisenhower), (Luedtke, 1987: 175–260)
- the ‘man on the moon’ project (1960s, under John F Kennedy) (Schlesinger, 1965: 271)
- the creation of the internet (1990s under Bill Clinton) (Clinton, 2004: 576).

Each initiative left either enhanced goods and services, which stimulated aggregate demand, or greater efficiency which reduced the cost of capital. Some did both. Crucially, it was only *after* concentrated and accelerated scientific endeavour (CASE) closed industrialisation as led by Abraham Lincoln in the 1860s that America joined the Price Specie Flow (better known as the Gold Standard) in which it now began to trade with other powers as it now had a comparative economic structure (Kessler, 2004: 94).

The American example clearly shows that CASE, spurred on by corporate or government contracts with significant research budgets, almost always results in enhancement in practical technology, which creates goods which can then be traded once a country’s economy is ready and hence create enhanced profitability. Profitability then attracts global investment capital in a virtual growth cycle.

Why Poor Countries Keep Getting Poor

Kenyan-born Power gives two key insights into the nature of capital.

The first is that over time capital moves up a value chain seeking higher returns as goods become commoditised.¹⁰ He has identified seven dynasties:

1. Land (i.e. agriculture and mining)
2. Factory (i.e. labour intensive)
3. Heavy Industry (i.e. machine based industry)
4. Mass Production (i.e. assembly lines)
5. Mass Marketing and Mass Consumption (i.e. branding)
6. Mass Computerisation (i.e. information technology)
7. Intellectual Property (i.e. software, patents, films) (Power, Stephan, Hervey and Fonseca, 2006: 171).

By its very nature investment capital is on a march in search of higher returns. To that end it moves away from the first dynasty of commoditisation and progresses up to the seventh dynasty.

The second key insight that Power gives is that he links the seven dynasties to international capital flows.

Countries represented by 1st, 2nd, and 3rd Dynasty companies may have, as countries, commoditised. Those represented by 4th Dynasty companies are feeling the chill winds of commoditisation. Countries represented by 5th, 6th and 7th Dynasty companies are still value creating (Power et al, 2006: 201).


Using specific numbers from 2000 to illustrate, Power shows that USA, the Eurozone and Australia collectively received US\$502 billion in capital flows, including US\$266 billion of capital account flows through *capital flight and interest payment on debt* from the mainly poorest and smallest countries of the world. That amounted to four per cent of those countries' GDP (Power et al, 2006: 270).

An important observation is that one year's capital outflow at US\$266 billion is of the same order of magnitude as forty years (1970–2009) of development aid to sub-Saharan Africa at US\$300 billion.

The capital outflow is exacerbated by the presence of debt vultures¹¹ such as investment fund FG Hemisphere, which took court action to collect a debt first incurred 20 years ago, when the notorious dictator Mobutu Sese Seko was in power in the DRC. The debt now amounts to \$100 million, including interest and penalties. At least 54 companies are known to have taken legal action against 12 of the world's poorest countries in recent years, for claims amounting to almost \$2 billion (*Mail & Guardian*, 2009: 3).

So do rich countries finance poor countries or do poor countries finance rich countries?

China, India and Brazil: Lessons in Reducing Poverty and Inequality



Between them, Brazil, China and India account for half the world's poorest people and an even bigger share of those who have escaped poverty. In 1981, 84 per cent of China's population was below the poverty line of \$1,25 a day (in 2005 prices); in 2005 the share was just 16 per cent (see chart). This amounted to a 6,6 per cent proportionate annual rate of poverty reduction – the difference between the growth rates of the number of poor and the total population (*The Economist*, 2009: 14).

BRAZIL

Bolsa Familia is the largest conditional cash transfer programme in the world. By the end of 2008, it had reached around 11,3 million families, 46 million people, around 75 per cent of the estimated number of poor families corresponding to a quarter of Brazil's population at an annual cost of US\$4,5 billion (0,4% of the GDP). The programme provides income support to poor families subject to their fulfilling certain human development requirements such as child school attendance (ILO, 2009: 5).

CHINA

By 1997 a majority of the Politburo¹² members (17 out of 24) held university degrees; among those 17, 14 were engineers and another two had degrees in scientific fields (Miller, 2002: 3).

China cut poverty the most by focusing on agriculture first and then on manufacturing. However, by not maintaining a focus on agriculture as it

industrialised, the rural poor suffered and inequality rose, thus minimising the poverty-reducing effect of growth. In addition, social security in China is still provided largely through the enterprise system (i.e. companies), so it tends to bypass the unemployed in informal agriculture (*The Economist*, 2009: 15).

INDIA

At independence in the 1940s India had a fascination with ‘big science’ and ‘complex engineering’. The government sponsored the ‘Smiling Buddha’ nuclear testing project in partnership with Canada in the 1970s. It also created a software industry in the 1980s by attracting FDI by permitting foreign equity and duty-free¹³ import of inputs and products, creating an industry whose exports grew to 20,4 per cent of global market in 2002/3.

A key strategy for India has been growing entrepreneurship. Incubators have been set up to provide skills training, financing, procurement and marketing for entrepreneurs with the result that 45 per cent of industrial employment, 35 per cent of exports and 40 per cent of industrial output comes from small and micro enterprises (Prahalad, 2005: 185).

India had both growth and social policies, yet did worst because its policies reflect attitudes of the social caste system. Of the poor, the lowest 20 per cent are the least likely to have any kind of ration card (the key to public handouts), whereas the top 20 per cent of the poor are the most likely to (*The Economist*, 2009: 15).

There are some useful lessons to be learnt here for Africa’s development strategies.

- Government policy plays a big role in reducing inequality.
- Industrialisation through government intervention causes growth in GDP/capita leading to an economic structure suitable for export.
- If a country is not developing the inputs from its raw materials it should make it easy to import them by making them duty free.
- Strategic partnership countries help to overcome hurdles such as budgetary constraints in complex engineering undertakings.
- Specific pro-poor policies based on technology, such as utilising mobile banking tied to social conditions such as schooling, lift people out of absolute poverty.
- Policy bodies must have strong representation from practitioners in Science and Technology to create programmes of action which can yield positive outcomes.

- Discriminatory social policies enhance inequality and dampen the poverty reducing effect of growth.

Japan and Taiwan: Lessons in Economic Growth

In October 1999 at an Africa-Asia Business Forum, Malaysian Prime Minister, Mahathir bin Mohamad said:

When we Asian nations were struggling for a place in the economic sun, private sector investors from developed nations came and helped establish industries and businesses that brought benefits to all. This is what Africa has lost out on. Now it is time for Asia, with our fresh experience, our new found wealth, technology and skills to do the same for other less developed nations. This is what South-South cooperation is all about (*New African*, 2010: 18).

Japan gives the clearest example following the atomic bombing during the Second World War. US Army General Douglas MacArthur was despatched by President Harry Truman to reconstruct the country with his team of experts.

Their focus was on maximising land ownership and investment in science and technology.

‘Between 1947 and 1949,’ as Wikipedia reports, ‘approximately 4 700 000 acres (1 900 000 hectares) or 38 per cent of Japan’s cultivated land, was purchased from the landlords under the government’s reform programme, and 4 600 000 acres (1 860 000 hectares) was resold to the farmers who worked it. By 1950, 89 per cent of all agricultural land was owner-operated and only 11 per cent was tenant- operated’.

As Japan began to recover, the Americans opened their doors widely for any number of Japanese goods at concessionary terms – for, without ready markets an economic miracle is not possible (*New African*, 2010: 20).

MacArthur moved to Taiwan and repeated the same formula. The results are:

- GDP/capita (2009): \$32 000
- Absolute poverty (2009): 1,08 per cent
- FDI: \$107,2 bn

We can then therefore recommend the following strategies for Africa's development:

- Maximise land ownership across the population as quickly as possible.
- Invest in Science and Technology to create manufacturing capability.
- Have strategic partnership countries to buy your goods on favourable terms if your economy has an economic structure that makes trade desirable.

Bennu Economics

A new doctrine is advocated: no longer should Africa look to trickle-down economics but *Bennu economics* – rising from the ashes. The bird that is commonly referred to as the phoenix originated in Egypt as the Bennu. Like many ideas taken from Africa and then packaged as emanating from elsewhere, the Bennu, referred to as the phoenix by others, has been described as:

A mythical bird that never dies, the phoenix flies far ahead to the front, always scanning the landscape and distant space. It represents our capacity for vision, for collecting sensory information about our environment and the events unfolding within it. The phoenix with its great beauty, creates intense excitement and deathless inspiration (Chuen 1996: 5).

In sharp contrast to the West, the South African government spends one per cent of GDP on Science and Technology research (Marwala, 2010: 10). Moreover, land in Africa is concentrated in the hands of a minority of the population which stifles the collateral effect of property to stimulate economic activity. From this no CASE and its resultant inward investment capital flows can happen. Like China, economic and industrial policy bodies need strong representation from engineers and other scientists to ensure a technological thrust to development strategic initiatives.

Economists generally agree that Africa needs to grow GDP at seven per cent per annum over a sustained 25-year period (Moyo, 2009: 4) to break out of this cycle of poverty and underdevelopment. It is clear that a different engagement with CASE becomes important. This is possible because many African countries exhibit 'two-nations' characteristics whereby in one country some segments of society live as in a developed country while other segments of society live in an underdeveloped environment (Mbeki, 2000: 2).

Education

There are less ICT professors in Africa as a continent than in a medium sized American university (Dwolatzky 2010: 4).

A strategic thrust to rapidly focus training on science and technology needs to be implemented. World-class professors, especially from the Diaspora, must be attracted through competitive pay and must also groom the next generation of Africa-born professors. While science and technology must be broadly covered, their specific mandate must be to research and teach the leading edge of global science including anticipating and driving the trends in

- information convergence technology
- nuclear and alternative energy
- mobile banking
- resource industry technologies including mining and agriculture.

Entrepreneurship

Entrepreneurship in Africa remains largely informal as entrepreneurs have limited routes to market for their endeavours and so businesses take time to realise their full potential and have a high failure rate (Bloom, 2008: 5). Incubators such as the ones India has are suggested with off-take linked to large technological interventions driven by the public sector and private sector strategic initiatives. Hence, rather than public-private partnerships (PPP), private entrepreneur public partnerships (PEPP) are proposed to support sustainable entrepreneurship and economic growth.

Financing

A significant contributor to entrepreneurship failure is the fact that Africa has no well-established 'business angels' or venture capital environment. Africa lacks risk capital. Savings and investments are very well established with globally relevant banks and pension funds which constitute the bulk of foreign capital flows. However, it is only within a paradigm of a savings, investment and risk (SIR) strategy that growth can be sustainably realised.

The Middle East and China are the countries which were most resilient to the recent global economic downturn. It is important to note that capital from these areas consists of sovereign wealth funds, deriving their funds from oil sales or government-owned enterprises (*World Finance*, 2010: 56).

International banks are willing to lend money that the Washington Consensus institutes lend but simply on a commercial basis without imposing structural adjustment or stabilisation requirements. All they want are regular, reliable interest payments and Africa has the collateral in the form of 85 per cent of all untilled arable land on the planet (Moyo, 2009: 88) and vast quantities of mineral deposits. Through the correct legal structuring these can be viewed as more than just farms or mines; they can be viewed as collateral to raise risk capital in a coordinated resource management strategy.

The point being that gross capital formation¹⁴ requires risk capital that leads to enterprise development which in turn leads to high levels of employment and hopefully savings. A robust and transparent financial system can recycle pooled savings back into enterprise development in a virtual cycle.

The important point here is that the creation of such a system needs to be ‘home-grown’. On the back of this system, can trade with the world be effectively done in a way that does not increase balance of payments deficits?

Dynastic Interventions

Due to the ‘two-nations’ characteristic, government-led and corporate- supported technological interventions are proposed simultaneously across the seven dynasties of capital aided by the ‘home-grown’ financing model outlined, or in strategic partnerships with an ally such as China or other Asian nations like Malaysia in South–South cooperation where no SAP prescriptions are imposed. Key interventions include the following:

Dynasty 1

Integrated development consultant, Dr Paul Jourdan identifies resource industry linkages in which a country uses a ‘wasting asset to underpin growth in sustainable sectors’ (Jourdan, 2010: 3). Slightly adapting his thesis, Africa should look to use mining and agriculture to

- develop infrastructure such as transport, utilising home-grown capital formation
- develop nuclear, wind and sun energy, utilising strategic partnerships such as China provides in the Forum On China-Africa Co-operation (Shelton and Faruk, 2008: 3) where relationships are mutually beneficial without any SAPs
- use entrepreneurs with home-grown capital formation to develop upstream inputs such as plant, machinery consumables, etc, which can eventually be

used for export. Any other inputs which are not available should be imported duty free.

- use home-grown capital formation again to engage in downstream value addition, such as beneficiation or agri-processing, again with strategic partnerships were necessary.

Dynasty 2

Protect local textile and leather production from imports which may have a labour cost advantage to ensure that intensive labour production of agricultural output in the downstream value-added sector can also be used as a strategy against unemployment.

Dynasty 3–4

The strategic intention here is to leverage the mineral assets from the African continent and utilise existing labour supplies in the movement to high industry manufacture with a collateralised capital base:

- Use entrepreneurs with home-grown capital formation to develop upstream inputs such as plant, machinery consumables, etc, which can eventually be used for export. Any other inputs which are not available should be imported duty free
- Use home-grown capital formation, again to engage in downstream value addition such as beneficiation or agri-processing, again with strategic partnerships.

Dynasty 5

The pro-poor strategy should utilise mobile banking similar to Bolsa Familia. This thinking can be generalised so that servicing the poor is not seen as a social imperative but as a strategic business imperative where large markets of poor people giving low margin per unit still give financial return commensurate with small numbers of rich people.

Bottom of the pyramid markets, be they in telecom, personal care, health-care or financial services, impose very interesting business design criteria. MNCs have to fundamentally rethink the price-performance relationship. Traditional approaches to reducing prices by 5 to 10 per cent will not suffice. We should focus on an overall price-performance improvement of 30 to 100 times. This calls for a significant 'forgetting curve' in the organisation – an ability to discard traditional approaches to price-performance

improvements. However, these efforts can be justified only if the markets are very large and global and the returns are more than commensurate with the risks. Although the margin per unit might be low, investor interest in BOP⁴⁶ markets is based on expectations of a large-volume, low-risk and high return on capital employed business opportunity. BOP markets do represent an opportunity to create economic value in a fundamentally new way (Prahalad, 2005: 176).

Dynasty 6

Building on a large BOP market in which mobile technology is utilised for pro-poor strategies should be used to provide a capital base to expand on manufacturing capability to focus on mobile technology hardware. Allowing for protected production of the mobile handsets with guaranteed off-take linked to government-led initiatives to use mobile technology in collaboration with strategic alliance partners who already have proficiency in this technology will allow for an increase in local production in telecommunications.

Dynasty 7

Africans have already been operating in Dynasty 7 in information convergence technology and patents. Unfortunately, this has not been done in a concentrated and accelerated way as a strategic initiative. The beneficiaries therefore tend to be foreigners. An example of an innovator is Nigerian born Philip Emeagwali who developed the theory of parallel data computing that created supercomputers that could communicate with each other simultaneously and perform multiple calculations. This is the back-bone of the internet (*TIME*, 2007: 22). Analogously to India's initiatives in software development Africa could concentrate such capability to create cutting-edge solutions that attract investment capital to Africa.

Conclusion

In order to prevent a third world war, French businessman Jean Monnet noted that the solution lay in uniting Europe economically. He did this by first uniting energy supply and manufacturing through coal and steel. This led to the European Economic Commission and now the European Union in which the euro currency was formed. President John F Kennedy presented him with the Freedom Prize saying:

For centuries, emperors, kings, and dictators have sought to impose unity on Europe by force. For better or worse, they have failed. But under your inspiration, Europe has moved closer to unity in less than twenty years

than it had done before in a thousand. You and your associates have built with the mortar of reason and the brick of economic and political interest. You are transforming Europe by the power of a constructive idea (Gardner, 1995: 120).

Bennu economics can create an 'African Monnet' impetus that can create through concentrated and accelerated scientific endeavour the ability to attract global investment capital and achieve the required seven per cent GDP growth rate over 25 years. If Monnet and his associates could achieve in twenty years what had failed in one thousand years, Africans can do it too.

The patron of Thabo Mbeki African Leadership Institute, Dr Thabo Mvuyelwa Mbeki challenges us all:

The act of leadership that we are all called upon to exercise is the management of change and not conservation of the past. It therefore becomes necessary that, as individuals and as parties, we contextualise whatever position we take with regard to any specific act or action and measure its correctness by the degree to which it contributes to ... social transformation (Mbeki, 2000: 90).

Notes and References

1. Science defined as "systematic enterprise of gathering and condensing knowledge into testable laws and theories" (Prof Marwala, 'Harnessing Science and Technology for Africa's Development, 2010)
2. Technology is defined as "the objects or processes that are defined from the application of science"
3. Chaos theory is "a field of study in mathematics, physics, economics and philosophy studying the behaviour of interconnected dynamical systems that are highly sensitive to initial conditions" (James Gleick, Chaos, 1987).
4. Balance of Payments is "A systematic record of a nation's total payments to foreign countries, including the price of imports and the outflow of capital and gold, along with the total receipts from abroad, including the price of exports and the inflow of capital and gold".
5. Gross Domestic Product (GDP) Per Capita is GDP divided by midyear population. GDP is gross domestic product at purchaser prices. It is the sum of the gross value added by all resident producers in the economy plus any product taxes and minus any subsidies not included in the value of the products. It is calculated without deductions for depreciation of fabricated assets or for depletion and degradation of natural resources. PPP GDP is gross domestic product converted to international dollars using purchasing

power parity rates. An international dollar has the same purchasing power over GDP as a US dollar has in the United States. (World Bank, Organisation for Economic Co-operation and Development, and United Nations)

6. Gross National Income (GNI) Per Capita is GNI divided by midyear population.
GNI (gross national income) is gross domestic product (GDP) plus net receipts of primary income (employee compensation and investment income) from abroad. GDP is the sum of value added by all resident producers plus any product taxes (less subsidies) not included in the valuation of output. (World Bank)
7. Gini Coefficient or The Gini index measures the extent to which the distribution of income (or, in some cases, consumption expenditure) among individuals or households within an economy deviates from a perfectly equal distribution.
The Gini index measures the area between the Lorenz curve and the hypothetical line of absolute equality, expressed as a percentage of the maximum area under the line.
A Gini index of zero represents perfect equality and 100; perfect inequality where 1 person has all the income and everybody else has none. (Organization for Economic Co-operation and Development Glossary of Statistical Terms).
8. Absolute Poverty is defined as “a condition of life so degraded by disease, illiteracy, malnutrition and squalor as to deny its victims basic human necessities ... a condition of life so common as to be the lot of some 40% of the peoples of the developing countries.”
9. Foreign direct investment, net inflows are investments to acquire a lasting management interest in an enterprise operating in an economy other than that of the investor. They are the sum of inflows of equity capital, reinvestment of earnings, other long-term capital, and short-term capital in the reporting country as shown in the balance of payments. (World Bank and International Monetary Fund)
10. According to the World Bank Atlas Method on Purchasing Power Parity basis, we can compare countries levels of income and then classify them. Less than \$995, is Low Income, \$996–\$3 945 is Lower Middle Income, \$3 946–\$12 195 is Upper Middle Income and \$12 196 upwards is Upper Income
11. Stabilisation policy is essentially a macroeconomic policy, which is employed by governments to contain fluctuations in a country's inflation and employment rates while side- by-side optimizing its growth of national income.
12. Commoditisation is defined as “Movement toward perfect competition; the process by which a good or service thought to be unique or superior becomes like other, similar goods and services in the eyes of the market. Commoditization is the movement toward undifferentiated competition between two or more companies offering the same good or service. This leads to lower prices”
13. Debt Vultures are rogue creditors who actively prey upon countries likely to default on debt payments by buying the debt on significant discounts on the secondary markets and then go to courts, often in Britain or the USA, demanding that the countries repay their debt 100 cents on the dollar., (Noreen Hertz, Debt Threat, 2004)
14. The Politburo, short for political bureau, is a group of between 19 and 25 individuals who oversee the governing Chinese Communist Party (CCP)
15. Duty Free is defined as establishment in which imported goods are exempt from customs duties

16. Gross capital formation is outlays on additions to the fixed assets of the economy plus net changes in the level of inventories. Fixed assets include land improvements (fences, ditches, drains, and so on); plant, machinery, and equipment purchases; and the construction of roads, railways, and the like, including schools, offices, hospitals, private residential dwellings, and commercial and industrial buildings. Inventories are stocks of goods held by firms to meet temporary or unexpected fluctuations in production or sales and work in progress. According to the 1993 System of National Accounts, net acquisitions of valuables are also considered capital formation. (World Bank, Organisation for Economic Co-operation and Development, and United Nations)

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CHAPTER 31

New Perspectives on Integration in Africa*Paul Bom Kondé and Maty BB-Lay Diakhaté*

For the past 35 years three major factors have been generating momentum in the regional integration process in Africa. These are: (1) Africa's progressive emergence from political instability, (2) the emergence of South Africa as a major continental political and economic actor, and (3) a new wave of globalisation, marked since the end of the Cold War in the 1990s by the increasing opening up of markets and the rapid development of means of communication.

Africa's integration trajectory merits particular attention due to its specific nature and the challenges posed by the construction of a political and economic space. The process was launched 50 years ago, but the strategy has changed in the past few years. In fact, the meaning of regional integration for African countries, and regional and continental groupings, has been developing throughout the past 50 years. We have seen a shift from a political approach aiming to lift the colonial yoke, to economic integration in the 1980s (with the Lagos Plan of Action) which targeted poor governance, the absence of internal funding and political instability. A decade later, we have to concede defeat. Although Africa's leaders are increasingly taking note of the necessity for a stable political environment, there is a range of clearly-defined goals that need to be fixed for achieving the integration project. The African Union (AU) and all the other bodies (NEPAD, the UN Economic Commission for Africa and the AU Commission) seem to be sensitive to these facts.

Regional integration initiatives in other parts of the world were first based on the development of regional trade with the objective of commercial growth. The existence of good infrastructure facilitates such trade harmonisation. This is then reinforced by common economic policies. The integration approaches seem to depend, then, on the regulation of trade and the adoption of common policies. It is based on a theoretical framework that has not always been highlighted in studies of regional integration in the world. For the African integration project, certain structural factors could signal potential failure or the obstruction of such a mechanism. These include the absence of regional communication infrastructure, the paucity of common policies such as agricultural policies in the regional economic communities (RECs) and the absence of a single currency

and a monetary policy. Moreover, the technique of integrating certain parts of the whole in an uncoordinated manner has led to the risk of lags between the regions. This makes the expected results more difficult to predict. And, with the rise of globalisation, the risk of falling behind has never been more real.

In addition, integration cannot only be driven by the political leaders. In fact, Africa's integration is social even before it is political. This is one of the peculiarities of Africa due to its precolonial, colonial and postcolonial social history. The construction of regional spaces could be led, in parallel to the political process, by organs of civil society from below. The dynamics 'from below', that is, being led by civil society, would make themselves felt, leading to social innovations in the areas of education, training and social security. This social force could also effectively accompany the process of regional integration and contribute to the acceleration of continental integration. The integration project will depend on the development of a leadership capable of taking calculated risks in order to rise to the challenges. Without improved handling of the integration process, there is a risk of stalemate, which has in fact been perceptible since the 1980s. This risk has not only arisen due to political instability and poor governance. It is also linked to the absence of a coherent global framework for integration.

This chapter postulates that a coherent regional integration process in Africa needs to be based on a more solid plan. The mechanism must be based on a pre-defined analytical framework adapted to the African context. We will show that an understanding of such a framework, its articulation and its challenges is indispensable. The development of a realistic and harmonised integration agenda proceeds from the same logic. From this perspective, we propose to develop a critical analysis on the basis of four points in order to sketch out the key parameters and develop several axes for reflection.

- The first point highlights the challenges of regional integration through the lens of various schematic frameworks for analysing regional integration.
- The second point examines the specific forms of regional integration found in contemporary Africa, as well as their relevance.
- The third point briefly sketches the path of regional integration over the past 20 years.
- The fourth point will place these points in the perspective of a framework of convergent regional and continental integration, taking into account the importance of a suitable intellectual leadership to drive and manage the integration process. It also highlights the necessity and even the urgency of permanent congruence between civil society, the regional economic communities (RECs) and the continental institutions.

The Challenges of Regional Construction

A retrospective view of the regional integration process at a global level suggests a distinction between two complementary integration frameworks, which present various lessons for Africa's RECs. There is an approach in terms of 'constructing regional trade areas' on the one hand, and 'common regional policies' on the other. As we will see, these frameworks may have their own logics, but they are complementary at the operational level. In fact, this distinction helps us not only to clarify at each level the global objectives of regional integration, and the resources (funding, expertise, institutions, etc), but also to emphasise the levels of governance and the redistribution of responsibilities in the new continental architecture: from the national to the continental level via the regional level.

Construction of Regional Economic Communities

The first regional integration approach centres on the 'circulation sphere'. It is situated at the intersection of the transport economy, international law and the 'economics of regional trade'. The latter is seen here from the angle of negotiating for regional free trade accords at an intermediary level (groupings of countries). It is noteworthy that Jacob Viner's (1950) early studies focus on the effects of regional integration accords (RIAs). Viner's work adds to the standard regional integration approach. The main points of this approach are mobilised by political decision-makers in the construction of RECs. Regional integration can be inferred to mean the space for free trade created by a group of neighbouring countries to exchange goods and capital. Thus, the collective action of states leads to the construction of a trade community (over the short, medium or long term), which offers the protection of a customs union.

The resources for constructing a regional community, the infrastructure such as roads, railways, and airway and shipping routes, and communication by means of the national ICT (NICT), are the **foundations** of regional integration. In the regional communities among developed countries, these connections are often highly advanced (in Europe, for example). In the regional groupings in developing countries, the infrastructural connections are much weaker. The challenge for African countries is not only to break down the silos of production areas, but also to facilitate their connections on the national market and beyond in the markets of the other member countries of the REC (regional markets). This infrastructure constitutes a means of activating and growing the volume of regional commercial trade. It should be noted that in Viner's (1950) standard integration framework, it is assumed that infrastructure – as well as the regional supply of products – is a given and that it is operating in an optimal fashion. In

theory, the strong correlation between infrastructural connectivity and the development of regional trade is relatively unarguable. For example, the connection between the main urban metropolises of different RECs is likely to favour the development of commercial ties, while inter-regional connections may intensify commercial trade at the continental level. The absence of such infrastructure in Africa calls into question the validity of this hypothesis.

Apart from infrastructure, the second key driver of regional integration is **trade regulations**, which determine the mobility of people and goods. Regulations are the product of negotiations between the member states of a given economic community. Based on a defined timetable, inter-state negotiation cycles on the regional regulation of trade may lead to the liberalisation of trade (free movement of people and goods) and/or to the establishment of a customs union to ensure the protection of the regional economy (fixing common external tariffs for products that traverse the regional community). The adoption of free trade measures is also accompanied by the establishment of control provisions and the defining of new procedures to protect the movement of regional goods and services (reinforcing the technical functions of customs as they relate to intraregional or foreign trade).

To avoid introducing products that would compete in the regional economy (not to mention defective products or those falling below the required standards), operational structures for control and policing are essential. The free movement of goods and people within the RECs goes together with the creation of institutions and **the establishment of a harmonised regional legal system**. The latter must cover not only the regulation of commercial trade but also rights, in terms of people, citizens, work, social security, and the security of people and goods. For this reason, the RECs should not stint when setting up a regional legislative system.

In RECs such as the European Union, the emphasis is placed on the regulation of customs barriers and the movement of people (apart from the European administrative barriers). This schema is also found in the construction of African communities, notably in the East and West. But certain zones are trailing behind (Central Africa and the Maghreb). In terms of the **governance of RIAs**, the management of the process is steered by the group of states in a given region, whose mission is to manage the negotiating process and the regulation of trade. This prerogative does not call into question the responsibilities of the states. In fact, as is the case with international negotiations, the negotiating phase which precedes the signing of an accord does not require the transfer of powers nor resources to the specialised regional institutions. In contrast, the phase of implementing the accords obliges the parties to commit to a regional steering committee which has

executive functions. In other words, the functions of collective follow-up and control of trade accords may be left to the regional structures.

The **management of infrastructural connectivity** is the remit of the ministers of transport and public works (roads) as well as the ministers of information (NITC). This aspect is not linked to the negotiation of regional integration accords as much as to 'regionalisation' (common regional policies). It should be noted that in the colonial economic context, road and rail infrastructure was principally oriented towards the ports, as the key aim was the movement of raw materials to the European metropolises. Thus, in the current context, connectivity within the RECs is weak. However, work is in progress. All things being equal – regional good governance assured the existence of internal funding for states, and a highly qualified workforce – it would be possible to transfer this responsibility to the regional communities by putting in place specialised structures. The resolution of this problem will affect the evolution of infrastructural connectivity of some of the regional communities (in particular, the Economic and Monetary Community of Central Africa [EMCCA], and the Economic Community of Central African States [ECCAS]). A regional bank like the Central African Investment Bank does not finance any regional infrastructure. In contrast, the ECOWAS (West Africa) investment banks are heavily involved in regional infrastructure connectivity.

What we are finding here is an institutional limitation, which is also at the base of the problems encountered after the Lagos Plan of Action (1981) was signed, in spite of the text of the plan including a clause on the infrastructural dimension. In effect, infrastructure was not taken into account when implementing the plan.

With the Lagos Plan of Action (LPA), each state party was responsible for financing and implementing infrastructural projects along a predefined route which went right through the borders of the neighbouring states. The funding difficulties encountered by certain states were predictable, given their dependence on other bodies. In addition, the problems of poor governance and national priorities (payment of government salaries, for example) meant the plan was simply not realistic.

The response to such a situation must be based on harmonising regional and continental infrastructural policies. This approach forces states to commit funding as well as to implement infrastructural construction projects at the continental level. The scenario we are working towards is thus the external management of projects, their funding and their implementation. Since its creation in 2001, NEPAD has, in part, assumed such a responsibility for ensuring intra- and inter-regional connection, and could thus contribute to overcoming the LPA's shortcomings. To make NEPAD more visible and more operational, the

African states, during the last AU summit in Kampala (July 2010), entrusted regional construction to a continental body composed of the African Commission, NEPAD's Programme for Infrastructure Development in Africa (PIDA) and the African Development Bank (ADB). The latter is the main organ for financing and implementing infrastructural projects.

In sum, we have seen that the development of infrastructure requires an ambitious policy at the level of both objectives and resources. Within the context of African RECs, the connection of regional infrastructure, the lowering of customs and administrative barriers, and the coordinated management of common external tariffs (CETs) within the customs unions are the policies currently being realised. It is expected that these policies (RIAs and infrastructure development) are the key growth factors for regional trade volumes. The management of customs unions must be particularly rigorous to support the mechanism as a whole.

Regionalisation and Common Regional Policies

Within the developing country context, the link between infrastructural connectivity and the existence of regional trade is not a given. As a result, in addition to the framework, we need to elucidate the question of the establishment of infrastructure and the creation of conditions for a dynamic national and regional trade. It is symptomatic in this regard that geographic or regional economics accords such importance to regional integration (Beaumont, 1998; Arsene and Anh-Dao, 2004). From our perspective, referring to regional trade (including infrastructure) moves the debate from regional integration to 'regionalisation'. The latter is at the heart of geographic and territorial economics, which has an interest in the coordination of concentrated activities that bring together state powers, lobby groups and business.

The distinction to be made here is that the collective action of states and key actors in the 'regional productive system' are targeted in terms of a common policy at the interface of nation-states and the continental, even international, decision-making echelon (AU) (as far as the African RECs are concerned). We are increasingly seeing more interest in this level of action (Higgott, 1997). In the majority of RECs, regional integration develops a multidimensional character to the extent that it combines various aspects: political, economic, financial, social, educational, cultural and legal. The major credo of states is the mutualisation of resources for the achievement of objectives set in the framework of common multisectoral policies. Common regional policies must be linked not only to the international economy, but to the regional economic or the 'territorial economy' as it is also known. The emphasis is on coordination between specialised regional

public bodies and the key actors in the regional productive systems to contribute to the development of the RECs and their respective positioning in relation to the continental and global economy. This approach to constructing regional integration may be understood as a scale of collective action that a group of nation-states defines to achieve certain specific objectives. This scale of shared action may be centred on political, economic, financial, social, legal or cultural objectives that the states will set over the short, medium or long term. To achieve their goals, the states commit and mobilise the necessary resources to establish specialised regional institutions, to train experts to lead the regional integration process and to finance their activities.

At the level of governance, the regional integration process takes place at the interface of national economies, the continental (African) economy and the rest of the global economy. It implies an a priori ‘transfer’ or ‘centralisation’ of powers, responsibilities and funds from states to regional institutions so that these may formulate and maintain common regional policies. The distribution of tasks between the national and the regional power is thus indispensable because it may help to avoid the phenomenon of diversion of ‘commercial trade’ underlined in Viner’s works. In this regard, it is possible that national policies could be based on a valorisation of the national comparative advantages of the respective productive systems. In contrast, common regional policies are based on a valorisation and/or reinforcement of regional comparative advantages.

Common policies at the regional level must support a dynamic sub-regional economy to reduce the dependence of national and regional markets on foreign markets (and those of the industrialised countries in particular). The development of a common research and development policy takes on new meaning at the regional level, as it is a case of seeing which common sectoral research into intermediary goods could be used, for example, to diffuse the competitiveness of the developed countries.

Against the scenario of coordinated multisectoral regional policies, regional integration which is based on a geographic division (north-south, east-west, central, etc) could allow for a regrouping of countries. This could stimulate and diversify their production and trade in goods and services both within the domestic markets of each country and in the neighbouring or regional markets. In other words, in terms of trade, the coordination of common regional policies is situated upstream of commercial production, which is the ultimate desired result within the schema of regional integration. Thus, common regional policies could create a level of strategic positioning in the sub-regions in relation to globalisation. This positioning is justified by the consolidation and mutual reinforcing of national comparative advantage with regional competitive advantage.

At the social level, common policies aim to harmonise social standards, in particular with regard to employment, education and health. Social policies may be harmonised and contribute to the regulating of standards, starting with the promotion of a common wage policy based on criteria of convergence. Moreover, they represent an opportunity to define and implement a common regional health policy, focusing on health infrastructure, the production of medication, the prevention and treatment of illness, social security, facilitating the regional mobility of the seriously ill, and so on. There are in reality two levels for understanding regional integration which are, fundamentally, complementary.

- The first focuses on the effects of protection within RECs (CETs), and the regulation and implementation of regional free trade accords (for people and goods) on the wellbeing of consumers.
- The second focuses at a supranational level on common regional policies, one of whose aims is the strengthening of regional comparative advantages. Certain authors speak of regional 'public goods'. These common policies constitute one of the modalities for regional trade growth supported by regional infrastructural connectivity. This dynamic impacts on commercial production, regional competitiveness and the reduction of dependence on the developed countries. The potential of the African continent in terms of raw materials (agricultural and mining products and energy) justifies such an analysis.

The triptych of regional construction may be understood in terms of the regulation of commerce, infrastructure and regional trade. These levels have their own dynamics, but they remain interdependent. As we will see further on, the corresponding policies must be established according to the priorities of the RECs.

The Specific Trajectory of Integration in Africa

The idea of pan-Africanism has been the driving force behind integration. Thus, an understanding of the peculiarities of integration requires at least a basic knowledge of the pan-Africanist visions in different contexts and at different times – their motivations, their visions, their preferred methods and means, and the actions taken. This chapter does not pretend to provide a comprehensive overview. However, it should be noted that, at its origin, pan-Africanism was a vision held by activists and intellectuals in the African Diaspora. They made the call, in the successive contexts of the abolition of slavery, the colonial conquest of Africa by the European powers (1884) and the October Revolution in Russia, for the return of Africa's descendants to the continent, and for the liberation and

unification of the continent. The Berlin Conference had the effect of dividing and parcelling up Africa into small countries. Between 1940 and 1980, pan-African ideas were popularised by Kwame Nkrumah (Ghana), Julius Nyerere (Tanzania), Cheick Anta Diop (Senegal), Thomas Sankara (Burkina Faso), Jerry Rawlings (Ghana), and Muammar Gaddafi (Libya). After decolonisation, the end of the Cold War and the democratic transitions (still underway), many other intellectuals and political leaders revisited the idea of pan-Africanism and the construction of African unity, with various methodological variants: Thabo Mbeki, Abdoulaye Wade, Olusegun Obasanjo (NEPAD), Gaddafi, Wade (High African Authority, United States of Africa) and Asante Molefi (afrocentrism), among others.

That said, since the creation of the Organisation of African Unity (OAU), the thesis of the immediate integration and unity of Africa supported by Kwame Nkrumah (OAU, 1963) has been rejected by his peers. A core group of African countries – including Ghana – became independent after 1957, and began to engage, in partnership with the liberation movements of those countries still colonised, around the concept of the liberation of the continent from the colonial yoke to create one vast political space. With the failure of this political project, the idea of the economic integration of the sub-regions of Africa took hold, especially after the adoption on the LPA in 1980. The LPA was renewed and reinforced continentally by the Abuja Treaty. These outlines for integration had little concrete effect. The OAU, which became the AU in 1999, on the model of the European Union, helped to accelerate the integration of the continent. In other words, the evolution of integration has seen numerous reversals and upheavals. All of this turbulence is evidence of the unique character of the African trajectory. It would be helpful, then, to identify the African peculiarities before highlighting Africa's strengths and weaknesses within the framework previously sketched.

From Political Construction to Economic Construction

Compared to a number of REC throughout the world (EU, NAFTA, ASEAN, MERCOSUR, etc), the particular characteristics of African integration may be seen at three levels: (1) Firstly, the political space had previously been under foreign dominance. (2) Secondly, there has been a process of dividing the continent into regional groupings under different forms of coordination. (3) Thirdly, the African model is marked by a flux in the status and role of civil society in the construction of an integrated space.

A Continental Political Community Project

During the occupation of the continent (with exceptions in Ethiopia and Liberia), pan-Africanism was a vision, a dream, a struggle carried out by civil society in Africa and its Diaspora. Pan-Africanism had its precursors in the Diaspora, with Edward Wilmot Blyden (1832–1912) who moved to Liberia, Marcus Garvey (1887–1940) and many others. They called for the return to Africa of her descendants, the removal of the colonial yoke, the total liberation of the continent, self-government and the economic development of the continent. These ideas were popularised and deepened in Africa by Kwame Nkrumah, who theorised African unity and was the first president of Ghana. He studied in the United States, where he met a number of militant pan-Africans and civil rights activists. His thinking found a favourable echo among the African population and intelligentsia. In spite of Nkrumah's rise to power in his own country, his thesis did not receive much support from his peers. In effect, the idea of immediately unifying the core of newly independent African states in the 1960s was not popular among leaders of that era. The ideas that triumphed were a return of the idea of the sovereignty of nation-states and a political alignment of certain countries along the lines of the former colonial powers which were hostile to the emergence of a united political power.

Contrary to the analytical framework discussed earlier, the construction of a continental community was essentially conducted at a political level in this period. The causes are largely historical as, in contrast to Europe, Africa was not independent at the time when total political and economic unity was being sought.

From this perspective, the construction of political integration has three main characteristics:

1. In contrast to the best-known RECs (NAFTA, EU, ASEAN and MERCOSUR), the political integration process of the continent preceded the process of economic integration.
2. This form of political integration refers to a domain restricted to foreign policy which could be qualified as a common foreign policy centred on decolonisation.
3. Integration came about through membership of a continental cooperative organisation (OAU) of countries as they gained their independence.

Very soon, a common anti-colonial policy had the effect of reinforcing the solidarity among the African peoples. A number of countries, including Tanzania, Mozambique, Zimbabwe and Congo, received refugees on their soil. The African

peoples also came to realise that they shared a common cause. This situation had the benefit of reactivating the basis of living together at a continental level.

Establishing the RECs and Levels of Coordination of Integration: The Continental and the Regional Level

The second particular characteristic of African integration is the division into regional sub-groupings which is a necessary preparatory step in the construction of continental integration. This division is unique because other RECs in the world largely comprise a single geographic space with a single supranational governance structure.

Parallel to the liberation struggles and victories among the former Portuguese colonies, from the beginning of the 1980s the question of regional integration arose. This was in a context where the terms of trade, under North–South commercial relations, were deteriorating due to the growing extraversion of economies and the negative impact of the transfer of technologies on the economies of the South. To get out of this situation, economists such as Samir Amin called for the development of South–South relations to disrupt the economic dominance of the countries of the North which was creating growing disparities between the developed countries of the ‘centre’ and those of the South or the ‘periphery’. This theme appeared to have support from African political thinkers, but it contradicted the structural adjustment policies initiated at the beginning of the 1980s. According to Eric Toussaint and Damien Millet (2008), between 1979 and 1982, the growth in earnings from the exploitation of raw materials led to a huge rise in debt although it could have led to a reduction. Paradoxically, the African countries during this period increased their lending at a time when the interest rates in Washington rose by 400 per cent.

At the continental level, this period could have seen the launch of a negotiating round aiming to regulate trade and establish a customs union, combined with the establishment of common infrastructural and trade policies, but the African countries rather opted for the construction of sub-regional groupings. The construction of trade unions would thus depend on the unilateral membership of a sovereign state to a regional community.

It seems clear, based on the LPA and the Abuja Treaty, that there are two levels of integration: regional and continental. This model has implications in terms of coordination. The RECs are cut off from the continental body, while powers are transferred to the sub-regional bodies. These same RECs work together with the ECA even while their hierarchical status remains unclear, especially with regard to the maintenance and management of the RIAs. Their presence makes

the situation ambiguous. With such incoherence continuing, the colonial-type economy is reinforced. Countries remain focused on the global market without being able to take a meaningful place there.

Civil Society and the Process of Integration

What is striking is the fate of civil society in the integration process. As we have seen, the integrationist discourse was first popularised by civil society, and particularly the African Diaspora. The struggle for integration thus began with a dynamic external to the continent. Marcus Garvey, for instance, played a major role in the pan-African movement. But with decolonisation and the postcolonial struggles, the African descendant Diaspora lost control of the pan-African movement. Their struggle was taken on in the colonial and postcolonial period by the African Diaspora largely based in Europe. The Federation of Black African Students (FEANF) is the best-known movement of the period 1950 to 1976, when it was banned. It focused its activities on the struggle for independence and the denunciation of neocolonialism. But such movements did not appear to communicate or coordinate among themselves.

Diverse sociocultural movements (both in the Diaspora and in Africa) also contributed to the struggle. One example is the cultural and musical movement (reggae) led by the Jamaican Rastafari (in the 1980s), the cultural meetings between the Diaspora and Africa supported by political personalities such as Leopold Sedar Senghor (such as the Black Arts Festivals in Dakar), and finally, the early works of the historian and Egyptologist Cheick Anta Diop on the history of political and cultural unity in Africa.

The interest shown by civil society in the broad sense, that is, as opposed to the political sphere, may also be understood in terms of certain other facts:

- **The links between people:** it could be said that the politico-economic projects are not in tandem with the lived reality of many of the people. As Ahmed Mohamed Ghagdi (2009) reminds us, the African people have been powerless observers of the rivalries between their leaders, a fact which has heavily compromised their livelihoods. They have aspired to unity since independence. The role played by trade unions and women's groups in referendums on independence, although little known, reveal this desire to live together. Moreover, borders have always remained open and trading habits, family relations and transnational ethnicities have led to continuity in social history. The problem of integration is thus inter-governmental. Civil society institutions should be enlarged to the regional level and their integration should be encouraged.

- **Organised civil society**, unions and association, have a tradition of cross-border exchange in Africa. Certain forms of organisation date to the colonial period (the introduction of wages and unions of the European type) and others pre-date the colonial period and are linked to clan or family relationships. It is thus natural that integration should be openly effected by recognising such social facts.

Civil institutions (national education, hospital services, sports, etc) are created and managed by the state, but have a strong transnational character. As populations mix, or are displaced according to tradition or family ties, integration takes place by degrees, less perceptible than official commercial trade links, but real nonetheless.

Social integration must also focus, in the short term, on other civil institutions such as the education and training of the youth. Educating and training future African citizens together is a gauge of Africa's cohesion tomorrow. This vision will be progressively achieved, but the process must be started now. This is feasible and must be done with respect for cultures and diversity. We should also consider what processes have already begun, both regionally and on the continent. For instance, sport appears to be an integrating factor. It can be encouraged progressively, at the regional and then at the continental level. Football, the continent's favourite sport, would be an ideal area for experimenting. Research in this field could also look at the integration of sport into education, training and the sharing of resources at the state level (for equipment and infrastructure), as well as the regional and continental level (for funding and organisation).

In the institutional integration process, the people are well targeted by texts, but without their having any real impact. Institutions such as the AU Parliament could be spaces for people to contribute and be active. But there too, it has remained in the hands of governments. An opening up of this organ could contribute to accelerating the integration process. Rather than ignoring the will of the people, Africa's leaders could make a decisive step like instituting the election of parliamentarians. This would make the AU more visible and concrete for the African people. The history of the people of Africa shows that there is little need for a long gestation before they begin working together. Moreover, through the introduction of traditional mechanisms for social regulation, they could at last begin to see themselves in their institutions.

Strong Points and Limits of the Integration Processes Underway

The specific nature of the trajectory of integration thus far has highlighted the following aspects: the dynamism of civil society, both in Africa and the Diaspora, in driving pan-Africanism, pan-Africanism as seen from the lens of anti-colonial common policies, the effectiveness and nature of the powers vested in the continent's institutional architecture and, lastly, the incoherence between regional policies and regional divisions.

- **Civil society:** like a river, the first trajectory is a movement of thought and revolt within civil society which emerged from the activists in the African Diaspora (late 19th to early 20th century). This trajectory continued in the Diaspora during the colonial and postcolonial period. One of the forces driving this movement was the popularisation of its call for continental unity, which found support among the majority of African peoples. The principal shortcomings of this movement were the absence of historical and institutional continuity between the continent and its Diaspora (descendants from Africa and later migrants). Now, in more recent postcolonial Diasporas (due to recent migratory waves), African communities maintain much better ties with their countries of origin, their regions or even their villages. This compartmentalisation of networks hampered inter-community and even intra-community interaction. The latest wave is now contributing in large part to the funding of development and social security within families and communities of origin.
- The driver of integration came at first from African descendants in the Diaspora. But, since decolonisation, such descendants have become almost non-existent within the pan-Africanist movement, which has continued in Africa. Why this absence? The rise in racism in the United States after the abolition of slavery, the submission of Africa by the colonial forces, the two world wars in which African descendants and African civil society took part, all of these have fragmented the pan-African movement, which was on the ascendant in the early 20th century. We could add the various struggles which African and American civil society have been engaged in, such as the struggles for independence and against apartheid, and in the United States the civil rights struggle. This historical conjuncture marked by the distance separating the Diasporas, as well as language barriers, could explain in part the fragmentation of Africa's civil society (within the Diaspora and between Africa and the Diaspora).
- The theory of pan-Africanism, which the emerging anti-colonial forces supported in the early 1960s (a common anti-colonial politics), drew from the visions of the African descendants and Nkrumah. But in spite of this reductionist vision of a common anti-colonial politics, the OAU achieved its objectives

of liberating all countries from foreign domination. The economic orientation adopted later was not accompanied by a reflective common politics.

- The weak point of political integration was its partial nature. The common politics of the African countries can be reduced to a politics of solidarity towards those countries still under colonial domination or the suppression of apartheid. The political process was not broadened to an economic process. As countries attained sovereignty, they became divided along ideological lines between the 1960s and the end of the Cold War in 1990. It was impossible under such conditions to drive the policy of common economic and monetary integration. For the sake of practicality, the process of driving political integration of necessity created groupings of countries along ideological lines. For example, Southern Africa was divided during the 1970s and 1980s into the frontline states and those countries still under colonial rule (such as Mozambique, Zimbabwe and Namibia). Paradoxically, the continental bodies did not enter into dialogue with civil society in such cases.
- The institutional and continental architecture of African integration which emerged after the LPA revealed a decentralised entity, which did not really have the authority conferred by a transfer of power and resources from the summit to the sub-regions. In contrast, the continental organ drew the responsibilities, powers and financial means to undertake a policy of trade regulation, infrastructure development and manufacturing supply. Paradoxically, and despite the sovereignist thesis, the passage of time has seen the centralisation of powers and responsibilities in two directions. On the one hand, limited powers are being centralised from the states to continental bodies (e.g. the Abuja Treaty and the transition from the OAU to the AU). On the other hand, powers and responsibilities are being centralised from the states to the regions (RECs), at least since the 1980s and the LPA. This raises the question of how and by what mechanisms a new divisional map of responsibilities could be unleashed on the national, regional and even continental projects and policies of infrastructure construction, trade regulation and supply.
- The LPA enabled regional organisations to be established parallel to the continental integration process. But the LPA failed in its ability to manage appeals to national self-sufficiency (through the collective or individual action of states), and to disengage financial means, governance and coordination from proposed policies. It was assumed that states would contribute individually to their food security, through their own means. As mentioned earlier, the profiles of the incumbent governments did not allow for such an option to be envisaged. Many of them relied on foreign aid to support their economic policies. Critics have underlined the confusion of the document and a certain

incoherence which compromised the realisation of the proposed objectives. Moreover, if we add to the mix the growth of organisations, the slew of objectives, and the Structural Adjustment Plans (SAPs) imposed by the international financial institutions, then we have all the ingredients for inevitable failure. For example, the membership of certain countries in various RECs poses a number of problems, notably the management of CETs. A number of countries, including Côte d'Ivoire, Burkina Faso, Mali and Niger belong simultaneously to the Community of Sahel-Saharan States (CEN-SAD), UEMOA and ECOWAS. How, under such conditions, can a key instrument such as the CET be managed to improve regional competitiveness? This approach could only work if the RECs adopt criteria of convergence in terms of CETs, measures to protect their customs unions, and effective common trade policies.

Key Trends in Regional Integration in the Past 20 Years

The Abuja Treaty of 1991 set a timetable for the general integration of the different RECs, which had little follow-up or impact. NEPAD has been restructured and has recently become a continental structure. While this is not comprehensive, we will reveal in broad strokes the gains and setbacks of the current regional integration process in West and Central Africa.

The signing of free trade accords for the 'free movement of people and goods' is the foundation of regional integration. Negotiations follow a cycle of preparation, signature and implementation of accords. Generally, each regional grouping has its own agenda. What is striking is the delay shown by the francophone African and Maghreb countries. The most advanced zone is COMESA (East Africa), followed by SADC (Southern Africa). In the predominantly francophone areas, the most advanced zone is West Africa, with UEMOA and ECOWAS. Central Africa, although made up of countries rich in mineral and energy resources, is well behind in terms of regional integration, especially at the level of trade liberalisation and the construction of transport and communication infrastructure. Several key trends may be identified in West and Central Africa.

Free Movement of People and Goods

Movement of people: administrative barriers persist in spite of the signing of accords. The table below provides a snapshot of the state of progress of the free movement of people.

Table 1: Progress in suppressing administrative barriers

	ECCAS	CEMAC	UEMOA	ECOWAS	Inter-regional
Free movement of people	Current, agenda adopted in 2002	Single passport envisaged	Passport in circulation (including ECOWAS) Single visa adopted	ECOWAS passport since 2002 <i>500 000 issued in Senegal</i>	Single visa for those who want to move within the ECOWAS region
Free movement of merchandise	Not effective	Not effective, ongoing use of TCI (community tax for integration)	In force through the 'scheme for trade liberalisation'	Current, working on a platform to facilitate the free circulation of people, goods and services at zero tariffs <i>Expiry 2010</i>	No accord
Common external tariffs	Current, negotiating since 2007 Slow progress	CET in force Problem of enforcement	Raised in accordance with WTO rules	Raised in accordance with WTO rules	No accord
Enforcement of CETs	No	Effective, but contradicts community taxes	Effective, but difficulties in agriculture (dependence on imports)	Difficulties: sectoral weaknesses (e.g. pharmaceutical industry in Nigeria)	
Enforcement of movement of goods	Multiplicity of control posts and extortion	Multiplicity of control posts and extortion	Multiplicity of control posts and extortion	Multiplicity of controlposts and extortion	–

In spite of the accords signed by the RECs, the free movement of people, which is at the heart of regional trade, is only a partial reality. The free movement of people is an objective which the West African countries would like to achieve in the short term, but their accords have run into various enforcement difficulties. In ECOWAS, which encompasses UEMOA, the authorities have made a single passport available. This administrative provision facilitates and accelerates the movement of people in the ECOWAS space, especially pupils, students, businessmen and people travelling for various reasons (sporting and cultural events, family visits, etc). This mechanism will enable people to learn to know each other better, to mix more, to start common projects and to form partnerships. The coming of the single passport opens the way for a regional identity, even if much of the red tape at the borders still remains. This red tape is linked in part

to the existence of pockets of corruption and to the insecurity engendered by the conflicts in Côte d'Ivoire, Liberia and Sierra Leone over the past 15 years.

In the Central African countries, evolution towards the free movement of people is still in gestation. Apart from the absence of communications infrastructure, a single passport project has not got off the ground. CEMAC's biometric passport should have entered into force on 1 January 2010. But a number of observers estimate that the single passport remains a 'mirage' to the extent that visas are still demanded of visitors to the sub-region. The examples mentioned regularly are those of Gabon and Cameroon.

ECCAS has made hardly any progress in the area of establishing a single passport. A decision relating to the free movement of certain categories of visitors to the member states within ECCAS was adopted in January 1990 and was amended in June 2002. This decision *should have come into effect* after the official signature of the Convention on Cooperation and Legal Assistance by the 12th Conference of Heads of State and Government which took place in March 2005.

The Proliferation of a Multitude of Taxes is Hampering Accords on the Free Movement of Goods

Regional free trade accords already signed in West and Central Africa are far from getting off the ground. In place of customs barriers and levies, which have not yet been effectively suppressed, a multitude of taxes is benefitting the regional bodies, especially in Central Africa. In Central Africa, the Conference of Heads of State and Government adopted a decision (03/CEEAC/CCEG/XI/04) to establish a free trade area in ECCAS, which came into effect on 1 July 2004. According to the provisions, tariff reductions should have reached zero in December 2007. In this regard, a Compensation Fund was planned for lost revenue. This reduction in tariffs contradicts the TCI (community tax for integration) found in CEMAC. It should be noted here that all of the member states of CEMAC also belong to ECCAS. What is more, while the TCI is intended to contribute to the funding of regional projects and the functioning of the institution, it is becoming increasingly clear that the states are levying the tax for their own profit. For example, the funding of the functioning of ECCAS is partially supported by Congo and Gabon. A number of states have accumulated arrears in their contributions, which translates into enormous difficulties in making free trade schemes operational in the absence of compensatory mechanisms and a low level of achievement of integrationist projects (e.g. interconnection of electricity or transport networks, management of river basins and lakes, etc (ECCAS, 2008).

Legal and Judicial Integration

With regard to the law, integration has been undertaken largely through an organisation called Harmonisation of Commercial Law (OHADA). Of course, it aims at supranational provisions and not just harmonisation. OHADA develops regulations which are directly applicable to the states under the OHADA treaty (so it does not concern all of the member countries of the AU). Its objective is to modernise the legal system, to make the legal environments of states friendlier to foreign investment and to trade, and to support economic integration. OHADA is also driving judicial integration through the creation of a court of justice and arbitration. All the same, not only do national jurisdictions still exist, but the different RECs and other technical organs have created their own jurisdictions. This multiplication of jurisdictions constitutes a major risk of duplication, conflict and paralysis. A clear division of roles and responsibilities and especially a hierarchisation of national, regional and continental jurisdictions appear indispensable. In time, the role and place of OHADA in African integration must be decided.

The existence of supranational legal instruments is in tune with the idea of legal integration. But, while we approve of the method, fundamentally we cannot help but criticise the transposition of norms from outside the African context. They are intended only to reassure those economic operators interested in investing in Africa. They are being offered provisions that guarantee clarity, respect for property rights to their advantage, and in particular a flexible legal environment. The ordinary African entrepreneur is ignored by this system, and thus marginalised and thrown back into the informal sector or the category of 'local activities'. This while, in all regions of the world, small and medium enterprises are the ones employing and providing a livelihood for the majority of the population. They are thus supported and valued. In Africa, they are marginalised. There is thus a disconnect between the slogan, 'we should rely on ourselves', and the behaviour which tends to relegate this same group.

What is needed is a true, modern African law to be conceptualised in an integrated system, taking into account the ordinary people so that their knowledge and skills can be valued and they can gain access to financial institutions. More attention should be given to this question.

Commercial Trade

Intra-African trade remains below aspirations and possibilities. The level of trade among African countries is around ten per cent of all trade, while intra-Asian trade volumes are around 40 per cent. Similarly, intra-African investment is at

13 per cent, while it is 30 per cent in Asia. These investments are also heavily concentrated in North Africa and South Africa.

In terms of sub-regional integration, the highest share of intra-bloc trade is in the East African Community with 16,5 per cent, while the lowest is in ECCAS with just 0,6 per cent. Commercial trade among the member states of ECOWAS represents 12 per cent. Commerce within the Maghreb Union represents three per cent of total trade.

Table 2: Progress with infrastructure

	ECCAS	CEMAC	UEMOA
Highways	No highways	No highways	No highways
Roads	Cameroon-Gabon-Guinea equatorial route In progress: construction of a bridge over the Congo River to link the capitals of the two Congos, Kinshasa (DRC) and Brazzaville (Republic of Congo)	In progress: construction of a bridge over the Congo River to link the capitals of the two Congos, Kinshasa (DRC) and Brazzaville (Republic of Congo)	Strong connections between all countries of the sub-region
Railways			Senegal – Mali, Côte d'Ivoire – Burkina Faso
Air links	Bankruptcy of Camair	Bankruptcy of Camair	Bankruptcy of Air Afrique Air Ivoire

	ECOWAS	Inter-regional
Highways	Cross-border link between Benin and Nigeria	<i>In progress</i> <i>Bamenda- Abakaliki route: Principal highway linking ECOWAS and ECCAS zones</i>
Roads	Strong connections between all of the countries of the sub-region	ECCAS-CEMAC route: bridge over the Congo River (in progress)
Railways	Senegal – Mali, Côte d'Ivoire – Burkina Faso	
Air links	Bankruptcy of Air Afrique Air ivoire	Bankruptcy of Air Afrique and Camair

Transport infrastructure is poorly developed on the whole. The West African RECs are relatively advanced compared to Central Africa. Significant efforts have been made within the framework of NEPAD, and with funding from the ADB. For example, an interregional connection between ECOWAS and ECCAS, that is, between Cameroon and Nigeria, is in progress. NEPAD also predicts the construction of a ‘road-rail’ bridge between Brazzaville (1 million inhabitants) and Kinshasa (10 million inhabitants). This project forms part of the larger Trans-Africa Rail between Ndjamena and the Cape (South Africa), via Yaounde (Cameroon), Luanda (Angola) and Windhoek (Namibia). Numerous other projects are also planned, such as the TGV which will link Kinshasa and Luanda.

Table 3: Regional monetary policies

	ECCAS	CEMAC	UEMOA
Common currency	<i>Various currencies:</i> FCFA, Congolese Franc, Burundian Franc, Angolan Kwanza	Franc CFA	Franc CFA
Common monetary policy	No common monetary policy	Central Bank (BEAC) but no common monetary policy	Central Bank (BCEAO) but no common monetary policy
Exchange rates	Floating	Fixed	Fixed
GDP	(No data for) 120 million inhabitants	19 billion dollars for 32 million inhabitants	21 billion dollars for 71 million inhabitants

	ECOWAS	Inter-regional
Common currency	Various currencies: Franc CFA, Nigerian Naira, Ghanaian Cedi, Liberian Dollar, Sierra Leonean leones	Franc CFA CEMAC – UEMOA: parity is not fixed
Common monetary policy	Single monetary zone in progress	No current perspective on a single currency
Exchange rates	Floating	–
GDP	(No data for) 261 million inhabitants	

Strictly speaking, one cannot say that there are common regional policies in Central or Western Africa. UEMOA’s common agricultural policy is unclear as to its objectives for regional and international agricultural supply, common research and skills training, mechanisation and financing. As regards monetary

policies, the countries of the franc zone in UEMOA and CEMAC also belong to zones where the exchange rates are at once fixed and floating (see the table above). Among themselves, there is no common intra-, or inter-zone monetary policy, nor a common monetary policy with the non-francophone countries of ECOWAS and ECCAS. The actions of Central Africa's regional financing bank are entirely unclear. But there is worse to come. The most important decisions, such as the devaluation of currency, are externalised outside of the zone to the French Treasury, which manages the operating accounts where 65 per cent of reserves from the CEMAC and EUMOA zones are deposited.

It is necessary to initiate both a common regional trade policy and a common monetary policy within the RECs. The establishment of a central African bank working in partnership with the regional banks is indispensable. This should lead to the adoption of a common currency and a common monetary policy. The regional banks, with the mission of financing development, would play this role more effectively.

Limits, Forces and Perspectives on Regional Integration

With the current state of affairs, every grouping is playing its own role in terms of integration. The limits of the process are striking. However, there are also strong points that could be capitalised on. A framework for integration that articulates infrastructure, trade regulation, and common monetary and trade policies would open up real perspectives.

Limits on the Process of Economic Integration

Criteria for integration: In the political integration process, the acquisition of political independence by a country may be interpreted as the principal criterion to be fulfilled to become a member of the pan-African organisation known as the OAU. If the LPA and Abuja Treaty are taken into account, then *political independence* appears implicitly as the *principal criterion for convergence* among countries, before progressing to the phase of implementing regional and even continental economic integration. With this criterion, Africa has been able to compress a long and complex process of enlargement, such as that of Maastricht for the Europeans. But this criterion was not sufficient to drive regional and continental integration in a decisive way.

Regulation: The Treaty of Abuja created an entire dossier of steps to be taken in the process of regulation (from suppressing customs fees to creating customs unions). Unfortunately, the dossier is incomplete because it does not specify

how the negotiating cycles should be harmonised nor the expected effects of the regional accords. Each REC follows its own agenda despite the timetable set by the Treaty of Abuja. The management of regional integration accords is simply assumed. However, the reference to the management of negotiations within the WTO shows that a number of African countries have not mastered this process. Moreover, there is still uncertainty regarding the capacity of countries to protect the customs unions. Certain countries belong to various RECs, which is already a source of confusion for the integration process as a whole. The multiplication of additional taxes to compensate for losses (linked to the suppression of customs barriers) also shows that certain states have still not accepted the benefits of liberalisation.

The foundations of continental integration policy have still not, to our knowledge, received in-depth attention with regard to the protection of a continental customs union. Of the 53 African countries, 34 have access to the sea. This presages the vulnerability of a single customs union, if common provisions and policies are not well planned by the member states of the future integrated continental community.

Infrastructure: Transport and communications infrastructure remains weak. The colonial logic for connecting infrastructure remains in force as the majority of communication channels are oriented towards the ports, which were there to ensure the evacuation of raw materials to the colonial powers. Moreover, the African workforce has not been greatly involved in the current construction of massive infrastructure. The majority of Chinese projects in Africa are using mainly Chinese labour. It is inconceivable that Africans should be excluded from the reconstruction of their own continent, as they were during the colonial period. A trained workforce that gains experience in the construction of infrastructural projects would be a great source of consumers. The construction of 4 000 km of roads per country for all of the 53 countries (a total of 212 000 km) could generate employment and a number of benefits on a continental scale. This notion is equally valid in other sectors: railways, maritime connections, air connections and NICTs. Such reconstruction projects could stimulate the economy both in Africa and globally.

Common regional policies: The RECs are no longer developing multisectoral common policies. It is necessary to emphasise the comparative advantages at the national and regional level. For this reason, the process of transferring or centralising responsibilities to the supra-regional institutions must be completed. The valorisation of comparative advantages could concern both basic needs and intermediary product sectors. These strategies pave the way for common

research and development policies both at the continental level and at the level of sub- regions and countries.

NEPAD: NEPAD has struggled since its inception with its lack of a clear institutional mandate. Why? If we use the triptych framework described earlier, of infrastructure, regulation and common regional policies, NEPAD's positioning appears to transect these. It is concerned with the construction of infrastructure and agricultural development policies, which may emerge from a common policy (regional or continental) or state policy. If we recognise this problem, the question that must be asked is whether there is coherence between objectives, funding and the institutional means for conducting projects. We can add the delegation of powers to each level, continental and national, bypassing the regional level.

- As underlined earlier, the institutional positioning of the infrastructural thrust is an issue for the Programme for Infrastructure Development in Africa (PIDA) even if the correlation of projects is questionable.
- Secondly, the regulation of trade is a strategic thrust indissociable from infrastructural integration, yet it remains largely absent from NEPAD's preoccupations. The AU has also not taken into account the supervision and management of this thrust in relation to the states and RECs.
- Thirdly, the agricultural development policy recommended by NEPAD lacks clarity. It is unsure if it deals with an individual (state) trade policy or a common one (REC or continent). The real challenge now is to position such sectors both internally (national, regional and continental) and globally.

Outline for a Coherent Integration Framework

A coherent integration framework must be based on the triptych: **infrastructure, regulation, and common monetary and trade policies**. This framework is based on the following logic: there can be no regional integration without infrastructural connectivity. Regional infrastructure connected to national infrastructure breaks down silos around production zones and supports employment and the economy. The suppression of tariff barriers improves regional commerce and contributes to the wealth of the REC. There can be no regional trade in the absence of a common regional policy centred on the valorisation of comparative national and regional advantages. The monetary policy aims to facilitate transactions as well as controlling prices.

Infrastructure: Managing the construction of regional and interregional infrastructure should be externalised by the PIDA, a sub-organ of NEPAD. But from our perspective, PIDA's work should be continued within states and territorial

collectives. In this regard, it seems indicative that states and territorial collectives (regions and districts) should be capable of developing partnerships with PIDA for financing and infrastructural connectivity. The funding offered by the ADB should be extended for the development of regional tourism. In other words, PIDA, an infrastructural component of NEPAD, must work in partnership with states (on national projects such as highways) and territorial collectives (for local, regional and interregional connections, and the development of tourism).

Regulation: Regulation is a key factor in managing negotiating rounds. We propose, in addition to the WTO, the establishment of a regional trade organisation (RTO) in each REC. This would focus its activities on preparing for negotiations, following up on the implementation of regional integration accords, and settling commercial disputes. Above the RTOs, it would be desirable to establish an African trade organisation (ATO) at the continental level (the African Commission). Its mission would be to follow up on progress with accords, ensure the supervision of interregional integration accords which have already been prepared, supervise and harmonise commercial law in partnership with existing bodies (such as OHADA), prepare a general framework for continental regional integration accords, and serve as an interface for relations with the WTO, the European trade organisation, and other economic groupings.

Common policies: We need to develop, over the short, medium and long term, common regional policies focusing on evaluating comparative regional and national advantages. This would involve prospective studies, training of the workforce, national funding and where required funding from NEPAD, along the lines of the funding models suggested for PIDA.

Table 4 on the next page describes the objectives, means and expected effects of these actions.

The rhythm of the integration process of the RECs is variable. Without being unrealistic, it is important to return to three points. In terms of objectives, means and planned results, we propose a table that outlines a simplified global framework for regional and continental integration, emphasising three fields of action based on the triptych: infrastructure, regulation and common policies. It is necessary to define realistic objectives in each REC with due dates. An agenda for the setting up and implementation of integration, but especially the harmonisation of regional timetables, is also imperative if we are to move towards continental unity.

To achieve this, two kinds of resources must be taken into account: Firstly, the mobilisation of funds. For this purpose, the ADP, the BIAO and the BOAD will play an important role, especially in West Africa. Secondly, at the organisational level, the question of the establishment of institutions or agencies (economic,

political and technical) to oversee the implementation of projects must be addressed. ECOWAS has seen notable progress in this area. Through these institutions, it will be possible to define who does what in the negotiation of regional accords. For example, the definition and follow up of negotiating rounds within the RECs, the construction of transport and communications infrastructure, and the (re)definition of legal provisions.

Table 4: Strategic framework for rationalising regional integration

	Infrastructure	Regulation	Common monetary and trade policies
Objective: Short term Medium term Long term	Increase in infrastructural connectivity: continental, RECs, national, regional (roads, railways, shipping routes, flight paths, NICTs, electricity, energy, etc.)	Signature and implementation of regional integration accords: zero tariffs, management of CETs, lifting administrative barriers, managing negotiations, commercial and labour law, regional legislative framework	Multisectoral policies Policies centred on essential needs (food, housing, medicine), policies for protection (free healthcare, security) and intermediary needs, convergent monetary policies, decentralised cooperation policies
Resources: Funding Expertise Institutions	Regional banks, ADB, external funding African expertise in governance: AU, ADB, PIDA	Integration funding financed by states, regional trade organisation, African trade organisation, regional and African parliaments	ABD, regional investment banks (including decentralised financing), external funding
Expected results	Opening up production zones, rise in connectivity, production zones, large, medium and small towns, rise in commercial traffic, job creation, stimulation of demand	Rise in commercial traffic, free movement of people and goods, harmonisation of the legal system (penal, labour, commercial, etc)	Rise in trade in essential goods, trade in products with strong comparative national and regional advantages, job creation, better trained workforce, stimulation of demand
Assessment study of the state of progress	Impact studies of commercial traffic (RECs, countries, territorial collectives)	Prospective studies, assessment studies of progress in regulation	Prospective studies, follow-up studies and assessment

A recurring question arises with the signing of various conventions, whether social, legal, cultural or economic. What are the conditions for implementing these conventions through pragmatic political governance? A governance structure would inevitably lead to the definition of responsibilities and common regional policies at various levels (social, legal, cultural, economic and monetary).

Developing an Intellectual Leadership to Drive and Manage Regional and Continental Integration

Driving and managing the regional and continental integration agenda requires an appropriate intellectual leadership to be sensitised and developed. Sensitising politicians and intellectuals must be done on the basis of the values of solidarity, justice, human rights and democracy, which have been inspiring the continental project for more than a century. At the current level of integration, at least three areas must receive attention before implementation over the short and medium term:

- The development of leaders capable of managing the process of infrastructural connectivity
- The expertise located in countries, regional institutions, the continental institution and the Diaspora
- Common multisectoral regional trade policies must be informed by existing studies in the area.

The desired establishment of regional and continental trade organisations must be based on rigorous management. It is thus important to consider the content of training as well as the challenges for the regions and the continent as a whole. Because of the growing complexity of the regional economy, the *intellectual leadership* must be trained in management to be able to coordinate the planned policies at the regional and continental level.

Promote and Reinforce the Dialogue between Civil Society, and National, Regional and Continental Bodies

It is indispensable to promote the role of civil society in the integration process. Leadership problems ('the regime of seniors') have the tendency to undermine implementation timetables in the integration process. Civil society must increasingly influence and take part in initiatives to accelerate different scales of integration.

The coordination of state activities (by regional groupings) on the one hand, and the activities of civil society on the other, is indispensable in the short, medium and long term. We also need coordination among sub-regions, and between the continental body and civil society on important topics in terms of economic and social progress and democratic advances, if we are to achieve the process of integration.

Conclusion

We have shown that a general framework for integration requires a methodological articulation between a triptych of issues: infrastructure, regulation, and common policies. These thrusts are based primarily on two theoretical frames of references. The economics of regional trade from the perspective of the RIAs and, with regard to common regional trade policies, regionalisation with reference to geographic economics (cf. Paul Krugman, 1995). The infrastructural thrust is also based on common multisectoral policies. The definition of short, medium and long term objectives must be linked, at each level, to internal and external funding resources. A new division of responsibilities is required. The continental level is indicated for the financing and follow-up of infrastructural projects both at continental level and within the REC group of countries, regions and districts.

With regard to the second thrust, the key variable is the administration of regional integration accords. A regional body (regional trade organisation) similar to the WTO is required. This would supervise regional negotiations at the same time as coordinating these and minimising their costs. An African trade organisation must be established to follow up on construction within the RECs and prepare over the medium to long term for an integrated free trade area. Common regional policies require regional governance based on a strategic vision of valourising national and regional comparative advantages. Pan-African and regional funding is indispensable for such policies.

The creation of an intellectual leadership to direct the complex integration process must also be set in motion. In sum, national, regional and continental bodies must prepare for dialogue with civil society (in Africa and the Diaspora) around different themes: (re)construction of infrastructure, regulation of trade (free movement of people and goods), common policies (education, training, agriculture, finance, etc.). This dynamic constitutes one of the pillars of the African Renaissance.

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CHAPTER 32

Merging, Streamlining and Mainstreaming Regional Integration Efforts: A Solution to Some of the Challenges to Regional Cooperation in Africa

Phazha Jimmy Ngandwe

Introduction

This chapter argues that regional cooperation efforts in Africa and elsewhere are imperative, especially against the backdrop of globalisation. It shows that while regional cooperation is necessary in order to pool together the meagre resources of different African countries in a common repository for the common good of the peoples of Africa, the multiplicity and duplication of such efforts militate against the very objectives of integration. This is done by outlining the objectives of some of the regional organisations and demonstrating and revealing that their efforts are duplicitous. While structures such as the East African Community (EAC, 2000), the Economic Community of West African States (ECOWAS 1975), the Southern African Development Community (SADC) and the Common Market for Eastern and Southern Africa (COMESA) are imperative building blocks of the African Union (AU), structures that are found within SADC such as the Southern African Customs Union (SACU), the Common Market for Eastern and Southern Africa (COMESA) and the Common Monetary Area (CMA) have similar objectives and – to a great extent – serve the same purpose. It is further argued in this paper that the proliferation of integration efforts is not an indication of progress in this regard, but is in some instances a hindrance to any meaningful and significant progress.

Furthermore, the multiplicity of regional integration efforts leads to the depletion of resources, both human capital and financial capital. It is argued that it would be better for the continent to pool together its resources and merge its integration efforts for a common goal than to have each sub-region or state use its already meagre resources in small and fragmented markets without much success (Lyakurwa, McKay, Ng'emo and Kennes, 1999: 159). This chapter also argues that a shortage of resources, especially financial resources, in Africa is an aggravating factor that hampers integration and should not be seen as a mitigating factor since the shortage of resources is often cited as a scapegoat for the slow integration process on the continent.

While Africa is rich in resources, especially natural and raw material as Buthelezi points out, the same cannot be said about financial resources (Buthelezi, 2006). The AU suffers from financial kwashiorkor, as averred by Olowu (2003: 179). It continues to rely on additional international partners for funding and this cannot be said to be a sustainable arrangement. The current scramble for Africa by industrialised and industrialising nations is largely for the natural resources which Africa has in abundance.

Given its perennial and endemic shortage and mismanagement of resources, Southern Africa cannot at present afford to have multiple regional cooperation arrangements that deal with the same issues in a duplicative manner. This only exacerbates the problem by straining existing resources and, as a corollary, crippling integration efforts. Therefore, it would be prudent and judicious to merge, streamline and mainstream some of the bodies that have similar objectives (such as SADC and SACU, and COMESA and the CMA) and to pool together their resources under one umbrella in order to ensure effectiveness. Hence the topic of this chapter is merging, streamlining and mainstreaming regional integration efforts as a possible solution to the challenges of multiplicity and duplication to regional integration efforts and the shortage of resources.

Since the research for this chapter primarily focused on the challenges of multiplicity and duplication to regional integration, a thorough perusal of the literature on regional integration in Africa and in Europe was undertaken to obtain information and insight into these problems. Statutory documents of the regional and sub-regional structures were also invaluable.

Regional Cooperation Explained

It is important to understand what regional integration entails. Regional cooperation refers to a group of states that share common policies (economic or political) and are driven by common primary objectives. It can also refer to the tendency to have or make use of regional systems or methods. Regional cooperation forms part of international law, hence the latter governs and regulates the conduct of the former. International law is essentially made up of treaties that reflect the express agreement of states and customs that comprises rules of international conduct to which states have given their tacit consent (Dugard, 2005: 27–46).

Regional cooperation is often promoted with the objective to build peace. The logic behind this is that cooperation on issues of mutual interest (such as the environment or the economy) builds trust between states, creates mutual incentives for stability and prosperity, and facilitates more constructive relationships between states. Regional cooperation is an accelerator of good sociopolitical and

economic relationships with neighbours. It can significantly augment the process of replacing nationalism and intolerance with political dialogue and tolerance in a region (Feil, Klein and Westerkamp 2009: 10–14).

Regional cooperation is a crucial ingredient of political stability, conflict prevention, and peacebuilding and management – which are prerequisites for growth and development. Cooperation provides better prospects for political stability because it is instrumental in building trust, raises the cost of war and hence reduces the risk of war between cooperating countries. Integration can also help countries to develop common positions and to bargain as a group rather than on a country-by-country basis, thereby giving them significant bargaining power. This contributes to increased visibility and credibility and even better negotiation outcomes (UNEC, 2009: 27–29). Theoretically, regional cooperation has various aspects for which different priorities can be identified and focused on.

Types of Regional Cooperation

There are three types of regional cooperation.

1. *Regional cooperation initiatives as a direct mechanism to build peace and address conflict*

Efforts of this type support a particular political peace process or wider peace initiatives through regional or trans-boundary cooperation. In essence, this type of regional cooperation has a political dimension and is a crucial ingredient for political stability and conflict prevention, resolution and management (Feil et al, 2009: 8).

2. *Regional cooperation initiatives that are aimed at improving collaboration on particular issues, with anticipated peacebuilding effects*

This type of regional cooperation is primarily aimed at economic growth within the region by stimulating free trade, caring for the environment and developing energy, telecommunications and transport infrastructure. In most instances, it is also implicitly aimed at peacebuilding (Feil et al, 2009: 8).

3. *Regional cooperation initiatives that are aimed at maintaining security and enforcing justice*

This type of regional cooperation has as its core objective the maintenance of regional security and justice through combating organised crime and corruption, and strengthening regional cooperation among the police, prosecution and customs of different countries in the region (Feil et al, 2009: 8).

Regional Cooperation in Africa: A Brief Overview

Regional organisation in Africa can be traced back to the establishment of the Organisation of African Unity (OAU) and the adoption of the OAU Charter on 25 May 1963 in Addis Ababa (Ethiopia) (Charter of the OAU of 1963). The OAU was conceived as an organisation with general competence and member states retained their sovereignty. The *raison d'être* of the organisation is captured in Article 2 of the Charter as follows:

- To promote the unity and solidarity of the African States
- To coordinate and intensify their cooperation and efforts to achieve a better life for the peoples of Africa
- To defend their sovereignty, their territorial integrity and independence
- To eradicate all forms of colonialism from Africa
- To promote international cooperation

It is clear from the objectives of the organisation that its primary task was the unity and solidarity of African states in the fight against colonialism. Initially, only 32 states signed the OAU Charter and by 2001 when the OAU was dissolved, it had 53 member states (Dugard, 2005: 51–55).

From the Organisation of African Unity to the African Union

A number of factors (internal and external) led to a rethink on the relevancy of the OAU in the wake of new challenges which the continent faced (OAU Sirte Declaration of 1999), namely:

- the collapse of communism in the Soviet Union and Eastern Europe, which led to increased calls for democracy and accountability
- the implosion of some African States in the 1990s, which gave rise to the notion of 'failed states' such as Somalia, Zaire, Liberia and Sierra Leone
- civil wars and genocide in Rwanda, Burundi, the Democratic Republic of Congo, etc
- African rebirth or Renaissance, which gave rise to a renewed commitment and new vision for Africa and NEPAD (NEPAD Framework Document 2001)
- the search for 'African solutions to African problems'
- the need to establish a close link between development, democracy, security and stability

- the realisation that the achievement of the objectives of development, integration, democratic transformation and the strengthening of democratic institutions required peace and stability
- the rise of local policemen in the form of sub-regional organisations to take care of conflict prevention, management and resolution
- the precarious socioeconomic condition of the continent: absolute poverty, deterioration of the terms of trade, plummeting commodity prices, external debt, etc.

The AU was established under the Constitutive Act that was adopted at the 36th Organisation of African Unity Summit in Lome, Togo, in July 2000 (AU Constitutive Act 2000). It was formally launched in Durban in July 2002. At the summit in Durban, South Africa, a number of resolutions were adopted which had profound implications for peace and security on the African continent. These included the

- Protocol Relating to the Establishment of the Peace and Security Council of the African Union as a standing decision-making organ for the prevention, management and resolution of conflict (AU Protocol 2002)
- Common African Defence and Security Policy.

There are many sub-regional and intraregional integration arrangements in the African region that are pertinent to this chapter. However, because it is not possible to discuss and analyse all of them within the scope of this chapter, only the EAC, ECOWAS and SADC will be discussed. These bodies are also referred to as the building blocks of the AU. There are other integration arrangements within the sub-regions and only some of them will form part of this discourse. These include SACU and the CMA. Lastly, COMESA (an intra sub-regional integration body) will be analysed and discussed as a model for merging, streamlining and mainstreaming some of the other bodies. At this point, it is important to note that the analysis and discussion of these bodies is imperative in comparing and highlighting the areas where merging and mainstreaming can be particularly useful.

The East African Community (EAC)

The objectives of the EAC are set out in the EAC Treaty (EAC, 2006) as follows:

1. The objectives of the Community shall be to develop policies and programmes aimed at widening and deepening cooperation among the Partner States in political, economic, social and cultural fields, research and technology, defence, security and legal and judicial affairs, for their mutual benefit.

2. In pursuance of the provisions of paragraph 1 of the Article, the Partner States undertake to establish among themselves and in accordance with the provisions of the Treaty, a Customs Union, a Common Market, subsequently a Monetary Union and ultimately a Political Federation in order to strengthen and regulate the industrial, commercial, infrastructural, cultural, social, political and other relations of the Partner States to the end that there shall be accelerated, harmonious and balanced development and sustained expansion of economic activities, the benefit of which shall be equitably shared (EAC Treaty chap 5 art 5(1) and (2)).

The Economic Community of West African States (ECOWAS)

A synopsis of the aims and objectives of ECOWAS is encapsulated in the ECOWAS Treaty as follows:

1. The aims of the Community are to promote cooperation and integration, leading to the establishment of an economic union in West Africa in order to raise the living standards of its peoples, and to maintain and enhance economic stability, foster relations among Member States and contribute to the progress and development of the African Continent.
2. In order to achieve the aims set out in the paragraph above, and in accordance with the relevant provisions of the Treaty, the Community shall, by stages, ensure
 - (a) the harmonisation and coordination of national policies and the promotion of integration programmes, projects and activities, particularly in food, agriculture and natural resources, industry, transport and communications, energy, trade, money and finance, taxation, economic reform policies, human resources, education, information, culture, science, technology, services, health, tourism, legal matters;
 - (b) the harmonisation and coordination of policies for the protection of the environment;
 - (c) the promotion of the establishment of joint production enterprises;
 - (d) the establishment of a common market (Chapter 2, Art 3 (1) and (2) of the ECOWAS Treaty).

The Southern African Development Community (SADC)

SADC replaced the Southern African Development Coordination Conference (SADCC) in 1992 with the adoption of the Treaty of the Southern African Development Community. The aims of SADC are the following:

- To facilitate cooperation across a wide range of political, economic and social matters, including
 - cooperation in areas that are necessary to foster regional development and integration
 - the establishment of a free trade area among SADC members through the adoption of the SADC Trade Protocol in August 1996.

SADC operates through a Summit of Heads of States and Governments, a Council of Ministers, various commissions that are constituted to guide and coordinate cooperation and integration policies and programmes in designated sectoral areas, a Standing Committee of Officials, a Secretariat that is based in Gaborone (Botswana) and an Executive Secretary. The SADC Treaty also provides for a Tribunal 'to ensure adherence to and the proper interpretation of the provisions of this Treaty and subsidiary instruments and to adjudicate upon such disputes as may be referred to it'. The composition, powers, functions and procedures of the Tribunal and other matters regarding its governance are to be prescribed in a protocol to the Treaty.

The SADC Treaty is a framework agreement for establishing the institutions and structure of the community and providing for the adoption of such protocols as might be necessary in each area of cooperation. Apart from various protocols on privileges and immunities, SADC members have adopted 22 protocols that range from shared watercourse systems to illicit drug trafficking, energy, transport, communication and meteorology, tourism and trade.

The implications of the 1996 Trade Protocol are far-reaching. The main objective of the Protocol is to bring about the establishment of a free trade area amongst SADC members and involves the elimination of tariff barriers and quantitative restrictions within eight years of it coming into force. Other objectives of the Protocol are to further liberalise intraregional trade in goods and services; to ensure efficient production; to contribute towards the improvement of the climate for domestic, cross-border and foreign investment; and to enhance the economic development, diversification and industrialisation of the region.

Although the Protocol takes the form of a framework agreement on trade, it contains detailed provisions on rules of origin. It requires the harmonisation of sanitary and phytosanitary measures and technical standards and regulations. The implementation of the Protocol is based on the principle of reciprocity. This means that tariff preferences will be extended only to member states that have submitted their instruments of implementation.

The EAC, ECOWAS and SADC have many common goals. For example, the EAC and SADC generally focus on human development in all spheres of life;

ECOWAS (at least on paper) focuses on economic development. All three are primarily concerned with promoting cooperation among member states.

The Southern African Customs Union (SACU)

SACU (which consists of Botswana, Lesotho, Namibia, South Africa and Swaziland) has its origins in the British colonial administration of Southern Africa, which was first formalised in 1910 by customs union arrangements that linked the territories which now comprise Botswana, Lesotho, South Africa and Swaziland. Namibia (formerly South West Africa) became a de facto member of the union during the period of its administration by South Africa (Dugard, 2005: 546–565).

The 1910 arrangements were replaced on 1 March 1970 by a SACU Agreement that was concluded between Botswana, Lesotho, South Africa and Swaziland. Namibia became the fifth de jure member of SACU on 10 July 1990, following its independence earlier that year.

When apartheid was abolished in South Africa, SACU ministers met in Pretoria on 11 November 1994 to discuss the renegotiation of the 1969 Agreement. On 21 October 2002, after eight years of negotiations, a new SACU Agreement was signed in Gaborone (Botswana). Upon its ratification by participating states, the new agreement came into force on 15 July 2004 (WTO, 2003: 5–12).

The objectives of the 2002 Agreement are defined in Article 2 of the agreement and are as follows:

- To facilitate the cross-border movement of goods between the territories of member states
- To create effective, transparent and democratic institutions that will ensure equitable trade benefits to member states
- To promote conditions of fair competition in the common customs area
- To substantially increase investment opportunities in the common customs area
- To enhance the economic development, diversification, industrialisation and competitiveness of member states
- To promote the integration of member states into the global economy through enhanced trade and investment
- To facilitate the equitable sharing of revenue arising from customs and excise duties levied by member states
- To facilitate the development of common policies and strategies.

The 2002 Agreement established six institutions to administer the union: a Council of Ministers, a Customs Union Commission, a Secretariat, a Tariff Board, Technical Liaison Committees and a Tribunal. Certain elements of the 2002 Agreement were given effect in South Africa by the International Trade Administration Act 71 of 2002. The organisation is currently grappling with transformation debates because some members have signed the interim Economic Partnership Agreement with the European Union.

The Common Monetary Area

In July 1986 the CMA, which links all SACU members with the exception of Botswana, replaced the Rand Monetary Area between Lesotho, South Africa and Swaziland that had existed since December 1974. The basis of the CMA is now the Multilateral Monetary Agreement (MMA) of 6 February 1992 (WTO, 2003: 12–13). Namibia became a member of the CMA with its participation in the MMA on 6 February 1992. The administering organ of the CMA is the Common Monetary Commission.

The aims of the MMA are

- to achieve regional monetary stability and better economic and financial co-operation among its members
- the free flow of funds within the monetary area.

The Lesotho *loti*, Namibian dollar and Swazi *lilangeni* are pegged to the South African rand at par. Disputes that are not settled by negotiation have to be submitted to a tribunal that is appointed jointly by the CMA members.

SACU and the CMA are Southern African sub-regional bodies. SACU aims inter alia to facilitate the cross-border movement of goods and to promote a common customs area, economic development and the development of common policies among member states. The CMA deals particularly with achieving regional monetary stability, better economic and financial cooperation within the monetary area, and the free flow of funds. An opportunity to merge these bodies presents itself in their common objective of economic development, which is arguably their *raison d'être*. Obviously, merging the two bodies will present a challenge, particularly because of their difference in membership since Botswana is not a state party to the CMA but is a member of SACU. This is not an insurmountable challenge since merging these bodies will not necessarily mean collapsing them into one new body but rather that common mandates can be given to the body that is better placed and suited to carry it out. Moreover, a non-state party can be cajoled into becoming a state party in order to have a complete merger.

The Challenges of the Multiplicity and Duplication of Regional Cooperation Agreements

It is a well-documented fact that as far as regional integration agreements are concerned, Africa has more than any other world region (Buthelezi, 2006: xiv–xx). In other words, Africa has multiple regional integration agreements. The result of these seemingly ever-growing agreements is the inevitable overlapping and replication of memberships (Olowu, 2003: 179). As I explained earlier, some of the aims and objectives of the regional bodies overlap. While it is desirable that these bodies should operate harmoniously, their similar objectives lead to a duplication of efforts and this is counter-productive in addressing the pressing issues of the continent.

It is counter-productive because regional organisations end up competing to resolve the same issues, which in some instances lead to conflicting solutions to the same problem. The objectives of SADC and SACU are instructive in this regard. The proposed solution to this dilemma is that these organisations should be merged into one well-resourced and effective organisation that has the objectives of both merging organisations. Because their aims and objectives are similar, they are fertile ground for merging. However, their speed of implementation, timeframes and financial capacity militate against a merger.

Merging the Regional Bodies

The gravamen of the above is that once the organisations are merged, the problem of shortage and lack of financial and human resources will only be solved to some extent. From the outset, it should be understood that states on the African continent attained their independence and decolonisation against the backdrop of dire poverty. Individual independent African states were led to political self-governance without much-needed economic independence and, as a consequence, they have hitherto relied on financial aid from their erstwhile colonial masters.

An empirical example of merging integration efforts in a viable manner is COMESA. This body is an African inter sub-regional organisation which primarily fosters commercial and developmental cooperation between East African states and Southern African states by creating a common market for the eastern and southern parts of the continent. The aims and objectives of the COMESA are as follows:

- To attain sustainable growth and development of the Member States by promoting a more balanced and harmonised development of its production and marketing structures
- To promote joint development in all fields of economic activity and the joint adoption of macroeconomic policies and programmes to raise the standard of living of its peoples and to foster closer relations among its Member States
- To cooperate in the creation of an enabling environment for foreign, cross-border and domestic investment, including the joint promotion of research and the adaptation of science and technology for development
- To cooperate in the promotion of peace, security and stability among the Member States in order to enhance economic development in the region
- To cooperate in strengthening the relations between the Common Market and the rest of the world and the adoption of common positions in international fora
- To contribute towards the establishment, progress and the realisation of the objectives of the African Economic Community.

COMESA is a viable benchmark and a better hypothesis since it is an intra sub-regional body that operates in Eastern and Southern Africa. It would therefore be prudent to merge other sub-regional bodies in order to form one intra sub-regional integration body. States should not enter into regional cooperation arrangements for the sake of doing it, but should do so to attain the objectives of the regional cooperation initiative. States should make an informed decision when they enter into regional integration agreements in order to obviate the dilemma of affiliating different groupings with similar objectives or ones whose objectives are too divergent and conflicting. They should enter into arrangements in good faith and without any ulterior motives.

Conclusion and recommendations

From the foregoing discussion, it is evident that regional integration is not an easy task because states pursue their own interests – be it strategic, political or economic. The same applies to attempts to merge integration bodies, especially where there are discrepancies in membership and dual membership. However, it is clear that regional cooperation efforts are imperative in a region such as Africa which is in many areas underdeveloped. Regional cooperation is necessary to pool the meagre resources of different African countries in a common repository that can be used for the common good of the peoples of Africa. As this paper

suggests, one of the ways to do this is by merging some of the bodies so that they can be more effective and resourceful.

Merging, streamlining and mainstreaming regional bodies will in some instances entail completely collapsing different bodies into one as suggested earlier with regard to SACU and CMA. In other instances, the exercise will entail merging objectives to fortify and augment the efficiency and effectiveness of integration arrangements. In a way, this can best be described as streamlining integration efforts in order to eliminate multiplicity and the duplication of efforts.

This will partly solve the problem of lack and shortage of resources in Africa because after a merger, the merged body will get the resource capital of the constituting bodies. The rationale behind this reasoning is that the continent will be better off if it pools its resources for a common goal rather than to have each state use its already meagre resources without much success. Because of lack of resources, Africa cannot afford to have multiple regional cooperation bodies that deal with the same issues. It will therefore be prudent and judicious for the continent to merge some of the bodies that have similar objectives (such as SADC and SACU) and to pool their resources in order to ensure efficiency and effectiveness.

Notes and References

1. See the Constitutive Act of the African Union, adopted in Lome (Togo) on 11 July 2000 and entered into on 26 May 2001. Available at <http://www.africa-union.org/root/au/AboutAu/Constitutive-Act-en.htm>. Last [Accessed 20 October 2010].
2. See NEPAD's framework document, adopted in October 2001 in Abuja (Nigeria). Available at <http://www.nepad.org/2005/files/documents/inbrief.pdf> [Accessed 6 September 2010].
3. These structures include and are not limited to the East African Community (EAC), Economic Community of West African States (ECOWAS), Southern African Development Community (SADC), Common Market for Eastern and Southern Africa (COMESA) and the South African Customs Union (SACU).
4. The EAC is an intergovernmental organisation that consists of the five Eastern African countries: Burundi, Kenya, Rwanda, Tanzania and Uganda. The organisation was founded in 1967, collapsed in 1977 and was revived on 7 July 2000. In 2008, after negotiations with SADC and COMESA, the EAC agreed to an expanded free trade area that includes the member states of all three of these bodies.
5. ECOWAS is a regional grouping of 15 West African countries that was founded on 28 May 1975 with the Treaty of Lagos. Its mission is to promote economic integration. In 1976 Cape Verde joined ECOWAS and in December 2000 Mauritania withdrew.
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 11. Feil, M., Klein, D. & Westerkamp, M., 2009. *Regional cooperation on environment, economy and natural resource management – The initiative for peacebuilding regional cooperation on environment, economy and natural resource management cluster: Synthesis report*. April 2009. Available at <http://www.initiativeforpeacebuilding.eu> [Accessed 14 September 2010].
 12. See the Stabilization and Association Agreement and the Thessaloniki Western Balkans Agenda of June 2003. Integration areas help to solve, prevent and manage conflicts. The two cases of ECOWAS's contribution in the Ivory Coast crisis and the strong implications of IGAD in the Somali crisis are instructive. In Southern Africa, the admission of the Democratic Republic of Congo to SADC yielded invaluable influence for peacebuilding in the country.
 13. Kritzinger-Van Niekerk, L., n.d. *Regional integration: Concept, advantages, disadvantages and lessons of experience*. See also Polachek, S.W., n.d. Conflict and trade: An economics approach to political interactions. In Sard, W. & Anderson, P. (eds). *Economics of arms reduction and peace process*. The central argument is that doubling trade between two countries lowers the risk of conflict between them by 17%. However, this might not hold in cases where conflicts are often non-economic and intranational, although with significant spill-over. Available at <http://www.asrpn.org.za/documents/d0001249/index.php> [Accessed 10 September 2010].
 14. Kritzinger-Van Niekerk, op. cit., p.9. See also United Nations Economic Commission for Africa, n.d. *Sub-regional Office for Eastern Africa Report on the State of Regional Integration in Eastern Africa: Progress and Prospects (COMESA, IGAD, IOC, CEPGL, EAC, ICGLR): Brief note by SRO-EA*. The report was read at the 13th meeting of the Intergovernmental Committee of Experts (IEC) at Mahe, Seychelles, 27–29 April 2009. ECA/SRO-EA/ICE/2009/08. Available at http://www.uneca.org/ice/content/ICE-state_regional_integration-en.pdf [Accessed 10 September 2010].
 15. See Feil, M., Klein, D. & Westerkamp, M., 2009, op. cit.
 16. Charter of the Organisation of African Unity of 1963.
 17. Dugard, J., 2005. *International law – A South African perspective*. 3rd edition. Cape Town: Juta & Co, pp.51–55.
 18. See in this regard, the Sirte Declaration of 1999 and 2001 regarding the need 'to revitalize the OAU' to enable it to play a role that is more active and relevant to the 'needs of our people and to the demands of the prevailing circumstances'.

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23. Chapter 5, Art 5(1) and (2) of the Treaty.
24. Treaty establishing the Economic Community of West African States, signed in Lagos on 28 May 1975. Available at <http://www.comm.ecowas.int/sec/index.php?id=treaty&lang=en> [Accessed 11 August 2010].
25. See Chapter 2, Art 3 (1) and (2) of the ECOWAS Treaty.
26. For a discussion of SADC, see the 2003 Report by the *World Trade Organisation Secretariat Trade Policy Review: Southern African Customs Union*, WT/TPR/S/114, 24 March 2003, pp.13–15.
27. (1993) 32 ILM 116.
28. The Protocol came into force on 1 September 2000 after ratification by 11 members. It provides for the establishment of a free-trade area eight years after it coming into force.
29. In terms of Art 16(2) of the Treaty.
30. SADC Treaty, Article 16(1). Art 32 of the Treaty: 'any dispute arising from the interpretation or application of this Treaty, which cannot be settled amicably, shall be referred to the Tribunal'. Art 16(4): the Tribunal 'shall give advisory opinions on such matters as the Summit or the Council may refer to it'.
31. See Dugard, J., 2005. *ECOWAS Treaty*.
32. Dugard, J., 2005, op. cit.
33. Report by the WTO Secretariat Trade Policy Review, 2003. *Southern African Customs Union*, WT/TPR/S/114, 24 March 2003.
34. A review of central provisions of the 1996 Agreement and its 2002 successor Agreement is also given in the 2003 Report by the WTO Secretariat Trade Policy Review: *Southern African Customs Union*, WT/TPR/S/114, 24 March 2003:5–12.
35. Act 71 of 2002, gazetted on 23 January 2003. See also <http://www.itac.org.za> [Accessed 8 September 2010].
36. Botswana, Lesotho and Swaziland signed the interim EPA, to the annoyance of South Africa and Namibia who are opposed to SACU members entering into individual trade deals with third parties.
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40. In relation to these challenges, see the United Nations Economic Commission for Africa, *Sub-regional Office for Eastern Africa Report on the State of Regional Integration in Eastern Africa: Progress and Prospects (COMESA, IGAD, IOC, CEPGL, EAC, ICGLR): Brief note by SRO-EA*. The report was read at the 13th meeting of the Intergovernmental Committee of Experts (IEC) in Mahe, Seychelles, 27–29 April 2009. ECA/SRO-EA/ICE/2009/08, pp.6–7.
41. See Article 26 of the Vienna Convention on the Law of Treaties with regard to the principle of *pacta sunt servanda*.
42. In relation to these challenges, see the United Nations Economic Commission for Africa, *Sub-regional Office for Eastern Africa Report on the State of Regional Integration in Eastern Africa: Progress and Prospects (COMESA, IGAD, IOC, CEPGL, EAC, ICGLR): Brief note by SRO-EA*. The report was read at the 13th meeting of the Intergovernmental Committee of Experts (IEC) in Mahe, Seychelles, 27–29 April 2009. ECA/SRO-EA/ICE/2009/08, pp.6–7.

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CHAPTER 33

In Quest of Regional Integration in Africa: Can NEPAD Reconcile Economic Plurilateralism with Developmental Regionalism

Zoleka Ndayi

Introduction

Landsberg (2003), Nabudere (2002) and Rukato (2010) give a detailed account and analysis of the origins and nature of NEPAD. Established in October 2001, NEPAD is the premier socioeconomic development strategy adopted by the African Union (AU). As such, while the emphasis here is on economic strategy, specifically the theoretical trade aspect of NEPAD, this chapter refers to the programme as the AU/NEPAD. Though the AU/NEPAD seems to be the preferred strategy to promote economic progress on the continent, some commentators, including Bond (2002; 2010) and Akokpari (2008: 32–54), question the programme's neoliberal approach. Melber (2007) has also given a detailed criticism of the programme. This author suggests that the AU/NEPAD is an eclectic mix of the three major approaches of the international political economy: dependency, neoliberalism and neomercantilism theories. At the centre of the synthesis of these approaches, the AU/NEPAD overall appears to be a 'catch-up' embedded liberal strategy that tries to reconcile individualistic and collective developmental perspectives of member countries within the context of economic plurilateralism.

The first part of this chapter provides the background to the ideological evolution of the European Union (EU) in relation to African regionalism. While the evolution of regionalism in Western Europe does not provide a benchmark for regional integration in Africa, it serves to highlight the challenges of ideological back-loading on the part of the continent. The second section demonstrates embedded liberalism in action in Western Europe while Africa is lost in a dependency paradigm and unclear socioeconomic development strategies. The third part reflects on the economic patriotic element of the programme and highlights the interventionist/protectionist character of the AU/NEPAD as contained in the Social Policy Framework (SPF). The same section argues that the AU/NEPAD is an ideological catch-up programme in relation to 21st century economic patriotism and renaissance.

Background to European and African Regionalism

Regionalism is a contentious concept whose definition ranges from the supremacy of geography to that of societal actions. In a review article, Ndayi (2006: 113–124) attempted to address the contending meanings in detail. The present article concurs with Meenai (1998) that regionalism is the ‘feeling of belonging arising out of commonalities, based on geographic contiguity, culture, language, history or socioeconomic factors’.

Both the Western European and African regionalisms were established in the mid 20th century, at a time when the international relations system was characterised by the need to promote international economic growth and socioeconomic development within the context of the liberal-socialist, politico-economic divisions of the Cold War. The Great Depression of the 1930s and the Second World War, marked a paradigm shift from classical liberalism to embedded liberalism in the international political economy. In Africa, efforts to fight colonisation prevented the continent from being part of this development. Mazrui (1993: 105–126), Ake (1996) and Nnoli (1986: 104–111) give a detailed account of the history and nature of colonialism in Africa and the impediments to economic development.

Abdelal and Ruggie (2009) attribute the roots of the paradigm shift in the international political economy in the mid 20th century to the politico-economic chaos of the 1920s, the Great Depression of the 1930s, and the Second World War. This transformation from classical liberalism to embedded liberalism was triggered by the notion that, when markets are left to operate on their own, they always lead to adverse social consequences. Hence, in the post-war era, Western industrialised countries adopted economic liberalism ‘embedded to societal and political relations’ (Abdelal and Ruggie, 2009: 151–162). In line with embedded liberalism, Europe adopted strategies that sought to resolve the domestic trade-offs between social protection and economic competitiveness.

Owing to the international ideological division between the West and the East, and the need to fight colonialism, Africa adopted a policy of nonalignment to either the communist East or the liberal West. In reality however, Africa’s scale of loyalty was tilted towards the East. Hence, economic development on the continent was premised on the notion of Kwame Nkruma, cited by Ali Mazrui: ‘Seek ye first the political kingdom, and all things shall be added unto you’ (Mazrui, 1993). The notion was that political independence would yield other forms of emancipation. In light of this, the present writer sees the seeds for the dependency approach in Africa’s efforts towards economic development.

It is worth noting that European regionalism comprised politically independent countries, economically equal partners, liberal democracies and internationally

influential powers. Hence, from the outset, it was not difficult to adopt embedded liberalism. African regionalism comprised independent and colonised countries characterised by vast economic disparities, different ideological orientations and internationally weak players.

Although the EU could be traced to the creation of the Treaty of Rome of 1957, as primarily a regional conflict prevention strategy, its secondary embedded liberal economic strategy became dominant from the outset. On the other hand, in Africa the main objective of the OAU, formed in 1963, was to fight colonialism while remaining very junior within the international system (Chimelu, 1977: 164; Mazrui, 1993; Ake, 1996; Nnoli, 1986). Later in 1980, the OAU's economic initiative, the Lagos Plan of Action (LPA), was an initiative striving for economic regionalism in the form of self-sufficiency and collective self-reliance influenced by a dependency approach (OAU, 1980–2000). The section below details the 20th century nature and scope of both the embedded liberal and dependency approaches in Western Europe and Africa respectively.

The Mid 20th Century Western European Regionalism in Relation to Africa

Ruggie (1998: 62–84) terms the period 1945 to 1985 the era of embedded liberalism. The basic assertion of this kind of liberalism is that markets should be reconciled with societal needs and domestic welfare. As such, '[U]nlike the economic nationalism of the thirties, it [would be] multilateral in character; unlike the liberalism of ... free trade, its multilateralism [would be] predicated upon domestic interventionism'. Embedded liberalism posits that markets should be 'reconciled with the values of social community and domestic welfare' (Abdelal and Ruggie, 2009: 151–162).

Abdelal and Ruggie (2009) cite the most essential principle of embedded liberalism as 'the need for the market to enjoy social legitimacy, because their political sustainability ultimately depends on it'. It is argued that government intervention would neutralise the socially negative effects of the market without necessarily disrupting the welfare and efficiency gains derived from international trade. Accordingly, 'the core principle of embedded liberalism is the need to legitimise international markets by reconciling them to social values and shared institutional practices' (Abdelal and Ruggie). In that light, one would posit that embedded liberalism suggests that protectionism and neoliberalism are not mutually exclusive tendencies.

In line with embedded liberalism, the European Community (EC) adjusted its trade policy to accommodate and prioritise core domestic objectives, including the demand-led full employment and social expenditure (Abdelal and Ruggie).

These measures include unemployment, old-age and sickness insurance as well as subsidies for infant domestic industries unable to compete in the global economy. In line with European regionalism, the LPA also focused on socioeconomic development (LPA paragraphs 88–110). However, unlike the EC's approach, the LPA had no ideological clarity or guidance on how socioeconomic development measures would be implemented. Instead, the international financial institutions (IFIs) imposed the antithesis of embedded liberalism in Africa. The Structural Adjustment Programmes (SAPs) advocated less government involvement in economic activities and thus less social expenditure, among other conditionalities. Riddell (1992: 53–68) and Söderbaum (1998) provide full details of the effects of the SAPs in Africa; suffice it to say that they exacerbated the economic and socioeconomic conditions on the continent.

At a regional level, the EU introduced numerous embedded liberalism measures (Wade and Meunier, 2007), the most relevant being the Common Agricultural Policy (CAP). The CAP initially subsidised agricultural produce but now the EU imposes import tariffs and applies the Single Farm Payment subsidy. Besides being in the interests of self-sufficiency, the policy protects the EU farmers against foreign competition, specifically cheap agricultural produce from developing countries. In addition, the EU intervenes in the market when there is a surplus. Africa is notably the dumping site of the EU food surplus. Nevertheless, controversial as it may be, the CAP has succeeded in protecting domestic farmers against foreign competition and putting the European agricultural sector into the global arena. Borrel and Hubbard (2008) argue that this sector is now classified as the largest exporter of agricultural products.

Meanwhile, economically, the LPA (1980–2000) posited that Africa was dependent on industrialised countries and that these relations were exploitative by nature. While the dependency approach justifies the LPA's explanation of the continent's economic woes – attributing them to colonialism – it omitted the internal factors such as the uncomplementary interactions among African economies and poor governance. Consequently, African leaders advocated self-sufficiency and collective self-reliance through continental industrialisation and limitations on imports. Foreign investment was not seen to be yielding benefits to the continent. Nevertheless, both the LPA and the SAPs failed the continent dismally.

However, the latter part of the 20th century marked the end of colonialism, the failure of the SAPs, the ineffectiveness of the LPA as well as the end of the Cold War. These developments within the international politico-economic system and in Africa's political economy prompted the need for a paradigm shift on economic development efforts on the part of continental leaders. In 2001, the dependency-based OAU's LPA was transformed into the liberal AU/NEPAD. One

would like to believe that the 21st century resurgence of economic patriotism in Europe also triggered the AU/NEPAD to catch up on ideological back-loading, and thus the neomercantilist element of the programme. The section below explores practical economic patriotism in Europe and relates this trend to the AU/NEPAD.

The 21st Century Embedded Liberalism in the EU and the AU/NEPAD's Attempt to Catch up on Ideological Back-loading in Africa

According to Seifert (2007) the term 'economic patriotism' was first coined in 2005 by French Prime Minister Dominique de Villepin in a bid to prevent a take-over of French dairy giant Danone by PepsiCo of the United States. Academically, Clift and Woll (2009) define economic patriotism as 'economic choices, which seek to discriminate in favour of particular social groups, firms, or sectors understood by the decision-makers as "insiders" because of their territorial status'. Thus, economic patriotism is no different from economic nationalism or neomercantilism. According to Härtel (2006: 58–59), 'the renaissance of economic patriotism can be explained by the fact that it is no longer fostered by concerns of possible job losses alone, but is also encouraged by a fear of becoming dependent on outsiders'. Therefore, since economic patriotism also encompasses social and political concerns, one can deduce that it is informed by embedded liberalism. The latter suggests that economic patriotism and neoliberalism are not necessarily incommensurable or incompatible. Economic patriotism is prevalent around the world, especially in the industrialised countries.

In Europe, the EU member countries, individually and collectively, are embarking on economic patriotism. The absorption of national companies by foreign firms triggered the legitimisation of economic patriotism in Europe. In 2006, Europe's biggest steel company, Arcelor, was successfully swallowed by Mittal Steel, whose owner is of Indian origin. The French Prime Minister Dominique de Villepin reacted by urging French and other European chief executives 'to be far more organised to resist attacks by foreign companies'. This call came against the backdrop that Arcelor employed about 30 000 French workers and had employees in Spain, Germany and Luxembourg.

While the EU condemns intraregional national protectionism, it does promote economic patriotism against non-European companies. For example, in 2007 the EU tabled a proposal that aimed to liberalise the energy sector intraregionally, while giving politicians at national level the powers to protect domestic companies against foreign investors and funders. In this regard, Wade and Meunier

(2007) note that European companies are becoming ‘Europeanised’ rather than globalised.

In Africa, economic patriotism is practised at national level but based on the AU/NEPAD strategy. However, Matlosa, Mwanza and Kamidza (2002) posit that NEPAD seems to embrace a market-driven economic development path and is rather ambiguous on the role of the state in the development process. As pointed out already, staunch critics of the programme, Bond and Akokpari, see the programme as a failure and as nothing other than the continental extension of the failed SAPs. Contrary to this view, one would argue that while the AU/NEPAD strategy appears unambiguously neoliberal it is embedded liberalism par excellence. The embedded liberal perspective of the AU/NEPAD is hidden behind the programme’s social policy, whose roles are identified as, and not limited to, wealth redistribution, social protection, and the ‘residual role of addressing market failure’.

The AU/NEPAD’s embedded liberal perspective is reflected in the ‘AU/NEPAD African Action Plan (AAP) 2010–2015: Advancing Regional and Continental Integration in Africa’ document under the section: ‘Towards a human centred model of development: The paradigm shift from a narrow quantitative concern for economic growth to an inclusive social development policy regime in Africa’ (AU/NEPAD AAP 2010–2015: 53–58). This part of the document explicitly rebukes economic growth that does not embed socioeconomic development and calls for an ‘active role for government in the provision of basic social and other services at local and national levels’ (p. 53).

In the same vein, and among other principles, the AU/NEPAD calls for a social development policy that ‘should be coordinated with, but not subordinated to, economic growth and political development’ (p. 55). As such, the African Action Plan (AAP) Priority Programme in Social Affairs (2010–2015) contains the AU/NEPAD’s Social Policy Framework (SPF) with 18 areas of focus, including labour and employment as well as social protection (AU/NEPAD AAP 2010–2015).

However, unlike in Europe, where economic patriotism is practised at both the individual state and regional level, on the continent this economic renaissance is still domesticated; understandably there is no regional integration supranational body yet. Nonetheless, at a regional level the world is witnessing Africa reeling under political patriotism. The famous speech by the former President of the Republic of South Africa, Thabo Mbeki (2010: 7–14), ‘I am an African’ could be viewed as political patriotism, which hopefully would drive continental economic patriotism triggered by the vision of an African Renaissance, based on the continent’s political, economic and social renewal.

In line with the AU/NEPAD's espoused social policy, embedded liberalism in Africa is visible in South Africa, where economic patriotism is practised through demand stimulation. The 'Proudly South African' and 'Buy South African' are the local procurement campaigns meant to encourage the private sector and consumers to make use of South Africa's goods and services. With pressure from the Congress of South African Trade Unions (COSATU), South Africa also practises supply stimulation protectionism in the clothing and textile industry. Following the job losses estimated at 1,1 million jobs (of which 14 400 were from the textile and clothing industry between 2009 and mid 2010) (Vavi, 2010), in October the same year the South African government launched, among other protectionist measures, the Clothing and Textile Competitiveness Programme (CTCP) and its core funding mechanism, the Production Incentive (PI). This measure subsidises the clothing, textiles, footwear, leather and leather goods manufacturing industries. The objective is to invest in competitiveness improvement interventions (Trade Law Chamber, 2010).

The other embedded liberal strategy employed by the EU is labour patriotism. The 2007 European Globalisation Adjustment Fund (GAF) is meant to meet the challenges of globalisation facing the region's labour force. Its strategy is to help train and relocate about 50 000 workers annually throughout the region when they are retrenched due to the dynamics of international trade (see Regulation EC No. 1927/2006). In reaction to rising unemployment in that country, Japan has embarked on labour protectionism in the form of a repatriation plan, paying foreign workers to return to their countries of origin. The objective is to ease 'pressure on domestic labor markets and getting thousands off unemployment rolls'. In this light, Mr Jiro Kawasaki, a former health minister and senior lawmaker of the ruling Liberal Democratic Party urges that the country 'stop letting unskilled labourers into Japan' and 'ensure that jobs are paid well and are filled by Japanese' (*The New York Times*, 22 April 2009). In South Africa, where unemployment is close to 37 per cent (Quarterly Labour Force Survey, 2010), including those who have given up looking for employment, in February 2010 the government announced its plan to table a proposal to subsidise firms that employ unskilled and globally uncompetitive youths.

Owing to the above discussion, one concurs with a comment that 'the emergence of (the new) protectionism in the Western world reflects the victory of the interventionist, or welfare, economy over the market economy' (Kraus cited in Ruggie, 1998). It is in this light that the author is also tempted to explore how NEPAD reconciles developmental regionalism with economic plurilateralism. This discussion is triggered by the notion that while the industrialised countries are transcending regionalism, the continent is battling to realise regional integration.

The section below seeks to explore how the AU/NEPAD fits within these two seemingly opposing trade trends.

Reconciling Economic Plurilateralism with Developmental Regionalism under the AU/NEPAD

Plurilateralism encompasses relations of interdependence at intercontinental levels. This is often confused with ‘open regionalism’ (Garnaut, 2004). However, these are two different trends. For example, according to Payne (2004: 16), open regionalism is concerned with the elimination of trade barriers within the region while, at the same time, tariffs are not raised to extraregional relations. Contrary to Payne, one asserts that once these relations of interdependence transcend continental boundaries, they cease to be regional, and become plurilateral. Therefore, plurilateralism is any institutionalised intercontinental arrangement of interdependence among at least three countries.

Ndayi (2009) details the different dimensions and scope of this trend. From an economic perspective, this trend is characterised by actual economic transactions and competitive tendencies, and mostly involves relations across the North–South divide. As such it becomes economic and competitive plurilateralism. Examples include the cross-continental interregional arrangements such as the EU–SADC Economic Partnership Agreement (EPA); a series of connected bilateral relations at intercontinental distances such as the African Growth and Opportunity Act (AGOA) – linking the US to individual African economies. It also encompasses a region-to-country arrangement as is the case with the EU–Southern Africa Free Trade Area (SA FTA). Most of the major economies and regions are forging ties with the developing world, especially African economies. The focus here is on the EU and African countries.

A paragraph in the founding document of NEPAD explicitly calls ‘for a new relationship of partnership between Africa and the international community, especially the highly industrialised countries, to overcome the development chasm that has widened over centuries of unequal relations’ (AU/NEPAD basic document, para. 8). This paragraph reflects the neoliberal character of the programme and seeks to integrate the African economies into the international arena. In critiquing the ideological orientation of NEPAD, Akokpari (2008) cites UNCTAD 2004, making a reference to the notion that ‘Africa’s share of world trade has plummeted from 2,7 per cent in 1990 to just two per cent in 2002’. He affirms that this scenario underscores Africa’s marginalisation in the global economy.

While Akokpari applies background data to question the suitability of NEPAD as a viable development strategy for the continent, the current data suggests

that the AU/NEPAD is succeeding in placing the continent on the developmental roadmap through economic plurilateralism. According to the World Investment Report 2008, foreign direct investments (FDI) to Africa tripled between 2003 and 2008. The AU/ NEPAD African Action Plan 2010–2015 also records an impressive figure in FDI inflows to Africa – from about US\$13 billion in 2002 to US\$45 billion in 2007. At the inception of the AU/NEPAD, Africa's share of world trade was around two per cent (Akopari, 2008) and in 2010 it stood at three per cent (Hatageka, 2010). This increase could be partly attributed to the AU/NEPAD-induced investment-friendly environment, including progress in Africa's trade policy, which has opened up the continent's economies and increased market access to the industrialised countries.

In relation to Africa's extraregional relations, specifically trade matters, the AU/NEPAD's core objective is to 'place African countries both individually and collectively, on a path of sustainable growth and development; and to participate actively in the global economy' (NEPAD, paragraph 1). This call for economic plurilateralism could be understood against the background that Africa's intra-regional trade is insignificant compared with the continent's extraregional economic activity. In 2009, intra-Africa trade stood at ten per cent of the continent's total trade. According to the Economic Development in Africa Report 2009, since the turn of the millennium, intraregional African trade has remained stable while external trade has been increasing. Intraregionally, trade has increased by an average of 14 per cent, compared to 26 per cent and 61 per cent for the US and China, respectively.

Again, one would also attribute this positive development in Africa's international political economy to the economic plurilateral nature of the AU/NEPAD. China's trade relations with Africa are characterised by trade, investment and economic cooperation, with trade relations tripling since 2002. While China increased oil and mineral imports from Africa, the country's textiles have been increasing to the region. However, in this regard Cheru (2007) warns of 'recolonisation by invitation', and blames the neoliberal character of the AU/NEPAD. He believes that the programme should provide a coordinated regional and continental framework to 'slow down the Chinese onslaught'. The US is also connected to Africa through AGOA. The notable plurilateral arrangements involving African economies are the EU Economic Partnership Agreements (EPAs).

The EU is negotiating EPAs with 76 countries across Africa, the Caribbean and the Pacific regions (<http://www.eu-africa.org>). In West Africa, the EU is the major trading partner accounting for 32 per cent of the region's trade. Recently, the EU signed interim EPAs with the Ivory Coast and Ghana and there are ongoing negotiations with the Economic Community of West African States (ECOWAS)

and the West African Economic and Monetary Union (UEMOA) (Cheru, 2007). West African exports to the EU include gas, cocoa, iron and oil. Imports from the EU to West Africa include mechanical machinery, electrical machinery, vehicles and oil (Cheru, 2007). In Central Africa, the EU is negotiating an EPA with eight countries and in 2009 signed an interim EPA with Cameroon. The region's main exports to the EU include oil, wood, cocoa and diamonds, and it imports mechanical machinery, electrical machinery, vehicles, iron and steel from the EU (Cheru, 2007).

In East and Southern Africa, comprising the Common Market for Eastern and Southern Africa (COMESA) members, the EU has agreed to an EPA with six countries. The main exports to the EU comprise textiles, sugar, fish products, coffee, tea and spices, while the COMESA countries import mechanical machinery, electrical machinery, vehicles and cereals. In East Africa, since 2007, the African Economic Community (EAC) initialed an interim EPA with the EU. Interregional trade comprises coffee, tea, spices, plants, flowers, fish products and vegetables to the EU and mechanical machinery, pharmaceutical products and vehicles to the EAC. In Southern Africa, Botswana, Lesotho, Swaziland and Mozambique signed interim EPAs with the EU in June 2009 (Cheru, 2007). South Africa is already engaged with the EU through the 2004 Trade, Development and Cooperation Agreement (TDCA).

While the above economic plurilateral arrangements suggest that Africa is more interested in extraregional arrangements, the AU/NEPAD is also striving for regional integration in the sub-continent. It is in this light that Ndayi (2009) posits that NEPAD should not be viewed on its ideological character only, but on the conditions, both continental and international, that necessitated the adoption of a neoliberal approach. Among other factors she cites are insignificant intraregional trade and the attractiveness of extraregional trade opportunities as well as the need to avoid self-imposed marginalisation.

The political, market and social challenges, and the realities of Africa's political economy and the continent's relations with the international community suggest that a fully fledged continental integration project in Africa is not feasible in the near future. On that note, it becomes imperative to explore the AU/NEPAD in relation to regional integration.

The AU/NEPAD and Developmental Regionalism

The progenitors of regional integration-functionalism and neo-functionalism question the feasibility of regional integration in Africa. Functionalism emphasises the role of the market and societal forces as the propellers of regional

integration. Without the pressure from the bottom, the feasibility of regional integration is questionable. Neo-functionalism stresses the top-down approach whereby governments take a lead in driving the regionalisation project. While acknowledging the role of the market and societal forces, neo-functionalism's major assumption is that it is only the governments that can translate the pressure from the bottom into policy.

From a functionalist point of view, Rukato (2010) notes that the role of civil society is limited in pushing the NEPAD agenda. Although there are attempts to conscientise the wider societal structures, national governments and sub-regional governments about the programme, there has not been much in the realm of domestic and NEPAD strategy/policy alignment. From a neo-functionalist perspective, there is a notion that there is no synergy between national policies and the NEPAD strategies. Rukato makes reference to the notion that most countries distinguish between national development plans and NEPAD strategies. As such, they ignore NEPAD's priorities, principles and values in their development strategies. Because of this, Rukato argues that instead of using NEPAD as a vehicle to integrate or coordinate national policies to regional strategies, member countries of the AU use the programme as a milk cow for donor funds. However, as she correctly points out 'it is important that national priorities be logically embedded into the (sub) regional programmes, and ultimately into the continental framework' (Rukato, 2010).

Bond (2002; 2010) nevertheless laments that NEPAD 'evolved under ... a coy mix of imperialism and South African subimperialism' and questions Mbeki's 'promotion of the failed neoliberalism of the free market policies'. He believes that the programme serves Western rather than African interests. Cheru (2007) implies that the AU/NEPAD is an agent of 'recolonisation by invitation'. Nonetheless, while both functionalist approaches highlight areas where the AU/NEPAD could promote regional integration, they also serve to explain the challenges of regional integration at the sub-regional and continental levels. This also explains why the programme does not have a continental framework to deal with external trade challenges, as suggested by Cheru. African leaders are reluctant to pool sovereignty to a regional authority.

However, the AU/NEPAD developmentalist and protectionist element is clearly reflected in the earlier discussed Social Policy Framework. Because of the neo-functionalist challenges both at the sub-regional and continental levels, it becomes difficult to see an Africa-wide application of a protectionist approach. South Africa's intervention in the clothing and textile industry and the calls to subsidise firms employing the country's youth could serve as an example to other African countries. This move is in line with the AU/NEPAD's social policy

framework and the country's efforts towards a developmental state. It could also serve as a springboard for developmental regionalism in Southern Africa and the continent generally. In light of the above challenges, Paragraphs 1 and 2 of the AU/NEPAD basic document state that the continent is underdeveloped due to exploitation by the industrialised countries, and call for renewed and benign partnerships with the rest of the world.

The above statement suggests that the dependency paradigm only serves to diagnose the external roots of African underdevelopment, while the neoliberal and embedded liberal approaches prescribe the way forward. In that light, developmental regionalism offers the best approach within which to explore the programme in relation to economic development. This approach is further backed by the notion that the AU/NEPAD claims to aspire: 'provide unique opportunities for African countries, Regional Economic Communities and stakeholders to take control of their development agenda, work more closely together and to cooperate effectively with global partners' (NEPAD, paragraph 1). In this sense, the AU/NEPAD seems to be calling for developmental regionalism.

Lee (2002) sees developmental regionalism as requiring more state intervention than economic factors, and as mainly based on South–South cooperation. One views developmental regionalism as a compromise between protectionism and liberalism, with more emphasis on internal socioeconomic development while advocating for strategic integration into the global market. The AU/NEPAD is working closely with African Regional Economic Communities (RECs) in this regard. All the sub-regional arrangements on the continent could be classified as institutions of developmental regionalism in Africa. One of the main focuses of developmental regionalism is in infrastructure development which is viewed as the basis of facilitating intraregional economic activity.

According to the Economic Development in Africa Report 2009, one of the major problems of trade integration in Africa is the underdeveloped physical infrastructure and high transport costs. It suggests that halving transport costs could potentially expand trade fivefold. As such, one of the major areas of focus by the AU/NEPAD is the promotion of regional infrastructure. Such efforts are visible in the cross-border and trans-Africa transport, communication, water and energy initiatives. AU/NEPAD is working in cooperation with RECs to promote regional transport infrastructure to facilitate regional integration on trade.

Out of 23 regional transport priority projects, two are at the implementation phase, 12 at the project structuring and promotion stage, and the rest are either at the identification or feasibility levels. Most of these projects are meant to contribute to enhancing interstate and regional trade. In the COMESA, EAC and SADC regions, the Regional Infrastructure Development in Support of the

Trade Facilitation Programme is at the programme structuring and promotion phase, and so is the AfricaRail in ECOWAS. The Maghreb Highway Project is currently under construction. This is seen as the missing link in the development of high national and regional priority for trade and development in North Africa. In Southern Africa, the ongoing construction of the 'Unity Bridge' is meant to enhance regional trade (see the AU/NEPAD AAP).

Conclusion

Ideological back-loading on the part of Africa could be attributed to the fact that the continent had to reassert itself within the international system in which it held an inferior position in the last few hundred years. Looking at the gap between the outset of economic regionalism in Western Europe in 1957 and the adoption of the same trend in Africa in 1980, the latter spent more than two decades mainly focusing on political independence. Exploring the economic structure of both the regions conceptually, from the outset the European regionalism was an effort to manage the eroding powers of national states due to economic interdependence and to manage the creation of an integrated market. On the other hand, Africa's regionalism focused on nation-building sovereignty and combating colonialism while it sought to mitigate the effects of imperialism by advocating continental collective self-reliance. The embedded liberalism paradigm on the part of Western Europe and the dependency approach adopted by African regionalism clearly depict the latter's back-loading status.

However, the EU is continuing with embedded liberal regionalism through economic and labour patriotism, with the same objective of managing the negative effects of interdependence. Meanwhile in Africa, since it is practised at a single country-by-country level, economic patriotism could be viewed in the light of concerns to create and preserve jobs and to foster strategic integration into the global market. It is interesting to note that at the national level the AU/NEPAD seems to be closing the ideological back-loading gap between Africa and the rest of the world. The discussion on European economic patriotism and the AU/NEPAD's Social Policy Framework (SPF) demonstrates that the latter is indeed an ideological catch-up programme promoting embedded liberalism for the economic development of the continent's economies. South Africa's socioeconomic development approach as espoused by the afore-mentioned economic patriotism also suggests that the AU/NEPAD could be a viable programme to promote developmental states in Africa.

However, at the regional level Africa has not been able to apply economic patriotism. This could also be attributed to the notion that there are fundamental

theoretical and practical challenges for a fully fledged regional integration scheme at both the sub-regional and continental levels. This article argued that both the functionalist and the neo-functionalist approaches pose major challenges for regional integration in Africa. While these challenges suggest that AU/NEPAD's success depends on a strong collaboration between government, the market and civil society, they do not necessarily mean that AU/NEPAD's strategy is irrelevant for Africa's economic development.

While the AU/NEPAD is criticised because virtually no projects have been fully implemented since its conception, one believes that the programme is faring well in terms of meeting its objectives. The programme is credited with putting democracy and good governance at the centre of Africa's development agenda. While highlighting Africa's development challenges in the international arena, the AU/NEPAD has made remarkable progress in providing realistic approaches to the continent's economic development.

Furthermore, Africa's challenges to regional integration could also be attributed to the notion that the contemporary international political economy is characterised by the proliferation of economic plurilateralism. As such, African countries are the recipients of preferential access to the markets of many industrialised countries, and these relations question the feasibility of fully fledged sub-regional and continental regional schemes. In addition to this new development, some of the internal economic realities of the continent are not yet conducive to regional integration.

This article demonstrated that the AU/NEPAD member countries are more into economic plurilateralism than regional integration. This reality also questions the relevance of the dependency approach as an economic development strategy on the continent. This is especially true where intra-African trade is insignificant compared to extraregional trade.

Nonetheless, while acknowledging neoliberalism in the form of engagement with industrialised countries through economic plurilateralism, some commentators question the AU/NEPAD's efforts towards regional integration in Africa. In view of this doubt, this chapter has attempted to demonstrate that the AU/NEPAD acknowledges the internal impediments to the region's economic development and therefore among its priorities is infrastructure development to facilitate intraregional trade. In light of this dual approach to the continent's development efforts, the AU/NEPAD should be viewed as a compromise between economic plurilateralism and developmental regionalism; hence it adopts embedded liberalism.

Given the infrastructure challenges at both the sub-regional and continental levels, which are the AU/NEPAD's priority projects, this chapter posited that

the programme promotes developmental regionalism. However, considering the neoliberal character of the contemporary international political economy and the continent's extraregional trade relations, the AU/NEPAD is realistic in promoting economic plurilateralism. The AU/NEPAD therefore promotes embedded liberalism at the national level and strives for developmental regionalism at the sub-continental stage while it acknowledges neoliberalism at the plurilateral dimension. In conclusion, the AU/NEPAD is an overall strategy that is a compromise between economic plurilateralism and developmental regionalism in Africa's quest for economic development.

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Scientific, Technological and Cultural Dimensions of African Development

SECTION 4

CHAPTER 34

'I am an African; I Speak an African Language'*Hilda Israel*

How could a trained translator and interpreter contribute to greater achievements in Africa, where African languages are often valued as of lesser importance than English? When confronted by the economic clout and power of English, an individual African who cannot speak the language sometimes feels diminished, undermined and inadequate, even if she/he is highly competent in her/his African mother tongue. Her/his self concept and confidence is shaken, and pride in being an African falters. Achieving less than one could is the inevitable result, if one accepts that incompetence in English is the root cause of diminished potential and success. A compromise is needed, one where the value of the African language and that of English is recognised; where the different roles they play do not lead to one language being undermined by the other. Such a compromise can be achieved through the strengthened role of trained translators and interpreters who are competent in African languages and English. Even better would be an African interpreter of the same culture, because such a person would understand the social and cultural contexts.

In South Africa, the unfortunate situation is that the 'vast majority of the masses do not understand what is being said and done in their name. There is nothing as disempowering as not understanding what is going on' (Mangena, 2010: 6). Colonial languages define success, and the way to improve one's resources. Mangena adds that 'development is an act of the people themselves, and no people have ever developed on the basis of a foreign language. If we accept this, then we have to accept that the African people are in deep trouble with regard to development'. Mangena argues that we need a new 'African educated person who would unreservedly work for his or her people ... That person would help in engineering an economy that would benefit the majority of its citizens'. While this viewpoint is acknowledged, the process of changing this context needs to be initiated and pursued faster through an interpreter who is competent in English and an African language. Clearly this would be a compromise, but it is one that yields quicker results knowing the enormity of the need for people to be moved towards higher development.

Consider this context. Thandi, a farm labourer in rural Zululand in the province of KwaZulu-Natal in South Africa, has initiated self-development over the years through experience and hard work. She has even started her own gardening project, assisted by other women in the neighbourhood. Having heard of the possibility to expand into market gardening, is even specialising in particular vegetables – she is keen to learn more about market prospects. Her biggest handicap is that all the literature is written in English, as are the bank forms and legal documents. People who can help at relevant institutions all speak English. Wherever she goes, she is confronted by a language barrier that is limiting her further development, stifling her achievement and potential as a successful entrepreneur. With time she begins to feel frustrated and angry, irritated that her ability to speak only her African language is a handicap to her advancement in life. How can Thandi move from being a developing individual to an achieving individual? One solution is to use a translator and interpreter as the critical link between her current status to the aspired next level. Such a person would bridge the language gap for Thandi, supporting her in every possible way by interpreting relevant information for her at her point of need. Instead of Thandi spending valuable working hours going to school to learn English, she could instead be taught the knowledge needed in her African language, and she could start applying the knowledge immediately, with the results being visible immediately too. Thandi would feel empowered, her gardening project could be expanded, her income would be raised, and the quality of her life would improve. She would see herself as an achiever. Others would see her as a role model for achievement.

In an article on farm worker exploitation, reporter Margaret Harris (2010: 1) quotes an attorney who commented on their vulnerability, emphasising that ‘they often work in remote areas and have very little access to information regarding their rights ... the responsibility to enforce their rights falls to trade unions’. Not many trade unions operate in the rural areas, and lack of understanding, among rural workers, of the powers of employers and rights of employees creates mistrust. Thandi could very well be such an exploited person, except if she is helped by an interpreter. The interpreter and translator would necessarily have to build a long-term relationship with such workers so that trust and integrity would be the cornerstones of their relationship.

Focus on the interpreter and translator would establish the critical link played by such role players in Thandi's growth. This chapter argues that there should be many more such translators and interpreters; all of them should be adequately trained; government should invest in their education and training; careers as translators and interpreters should be consistently marketed; business should

employ them to reach a wider clientele and schools should promote knowledge of African languages as career-creating endeavours. If one interpreter can, hypothetically speaking, help five persons to move from mere ‘development’ to high level achievement, then imagine what many well-trained interpreters can do for one community, one country? Imagine also what some of the hidden outcomes would be: a better economy; wider distribution of wealth; and empowerment through knowledge.

Through a translator, African indigenous knowledge can also be shared with people who do not speak an African language. Charles Dhewa (2010) argues that indigenous African knowledge has much to offer science, but only if science can be translated into African languages. Such knowledge is embedded in local language and culture. The sciences in South Africa and most other African countries are English based, and making them accessible to the African people means investing in translation and translators. More than word translation is needed, but also the ‘expression of ideas and meanings, formed in one context and received and interpreted in very different ones’ (Dhewa, 2010). He suggests that intermediaries with specialist communication skills be trained for this, namely, people who can simplify and summarise complex ideas, concepts and implications in an African language. He identifies such skills as follows:

- Integrating and combining separate ideas (for example, indigenous and scientific concepts) into one body of knowledge in ways that are meaningful to local people.
- Filtering that includes editing and clarifying ideas for people to simply understand the benefits of science and technology.
- Synthesising, which is the ability to summarise key issues.

Translating requires all three skills and thus promotes cross-disciplinary sharing. Funding for translation activities should come out of national budgets, but the average spent across Africa is just 0,4 per cent (Dhewa, 2010). He further asserts that science translation activities in Africa are urgently needed to tap into the energy, entrepreneurship, creativity and intelligence of the African people. Government and the private and business sectors will have to work in close cooperation to enable such development, with leadership showing the necessary political will to meet the needs of the African peoples at their point of need.

The Need for African Translators and Interpreters on the African Continent

Language is an instrument for communication, a tool enabling meaningful interaction between social beings. A sociolinguistic approach to language is based on a fundamental principle – that language is primarily an instrument of communication (Webb, 1983: 229–238). Many of the problems of modern society are of a linguistic nature, and Webb pertinently asks: In a multilingual country like South Africa, with its complex language related problems, can linguists not afford to conduct socially relevant linguistic research aimed at the solution or, at least, the management of these problems?

In the fight against apartheid, language played an increasingly dominant role, culminating in the Soweto student uprising of 1976. The language of the colonial rulers, Afrikaans, was rejected as a medium of instruction in black schools. Mother-tongue instruction was demanded, but bloodshed and death were the immediate result. The uprising, however, was the trigger for subsequent changes in language status, planning, policy, implementation and education. Ideological language planning maintained the domination and control of white South Africans over black South Africans. Webb (2005: 151) clarifies that ideological practice is linked to power and hegemony, directed at control, domination, subordination and oppression, as was evidenced in pre-democratic South Africa. Then came the release of Nelson Mandela. The process of change in South Africa in the final years of transition is aptly reflected in the language of apartheid's opponents: from seizing power to transferring power to sharing power (Samoff, 1995: 1).

In democratic South Africa when any two people meet, how effectively they communicate is determined by their knowledge of a common language like English and perhaps their nationality, because South Africa has quickly grown into an international, cosmopolitan society. Immigrants, both legal and illegal, are from most African countries and non-African countries. It is estimated that the majority of the immigrants are from Zimbabwe. It is this new society that defines how urgently we need to understand each other better if we aim to develop and address some key challenges: a fractured society; unequal economy; lack of political will; poor education; and xenophobia. Language barriers are contributing factors to a stagnant economy, political conflict, manipulation, exploitation and discrimination. These are the factors that limit the movement from African development to African achievement. Ironically, what democratic South Africa's language policies state and what is implemented entirely contradict each other, leading Webb (2005: 148) to argue that ideological practice is evidenced in the use of English as an 'instrument for political domination and control'.

English, and to a limited degree Afrikaans, is the only language of general state administration and is used in courts, parliament and on television. Language policies in schools lean towards English as the medium of instruction, in effect directly contradicting the democratic rights of parents and the majority of learners. African languages are effectively sidelined. Analysing historical-structural language contexts, Bhaskaran Nayar (1997: 9–37) writes that ‘English is undoubtedly the preeminent language of the world today ... it symbolises general geopolitical power. Official recognition of control over English means control of power through control of interaction’. This is true for South Africa as the impact on the social, economic and political life of the South Africa citizen, especially one who is the product of a black township and rural school, means only that socioeconomic inequalities are further entrenched. Webb (2005: 151) makes a cutting conclusion: ‘English today is the language of control, inclusion and exclusion.’

One ad hoc solution to this dilemma is the use of informal translators and interpreters in social contexts. Often, such a translator is a young person who has some knowledge of English. She/he will be the interpreter between his parents (who may speak only an indigenous language) and any number of other persons who may be communicating in English with the parent, for example, neighbours, business people and teachers. On another level, informal interpretation occurs when international friends gather. Here, the person who has a common knowledge of the languages being spoken becomes the appointed interpreter. Multilingualism is defined as ‘the ability to speak, at some level, more than one language’ (Edwards, 1995: 33). On a semi-formal level, knowledge and experience have led to many multilingual persons being thrust into the role of translators and interpreters in different situations.

The point of this article is clear: South Africa needs trained translators and interpreters to enhance the achievement levels of its disadvantaged citizens, for better understanding of its internal indigenous languages and for the many internationals who are now part of its society. Indeed, a similar scenario can be projected to every African state. Multilingualism is, furthermore, ‘the result of members of different speech communities brought together into one political unit’ (Cluver, 1993: 51). In Africa, dense multilingualism is the norm. About 2000 languages are spoken as first languages on the African continent. To illustrate, Cameroon has 239 languages, the Democratic Republic of Congo has between 212–220, Nigeria 400 and Tanzania between 127 and 150 (Webb and Kembo-Sure, 2000: 27). Lingua franca is defined by Cluver (1993: 44) as any contact language ‘used to communicate across linguistic frontiers’. Ironically, the main lingua francas in Africa are the languages of the colonists: English, French

and Portuguese, with Kiswahili being the only African language growing into a lingua franca (Ponelis, 1998: 21). Further, Cluver (1993: 28) clarifies that when people value their ethnic identity, and see their language as a primary symbol of that identity, they feel very strongly about maintaining that language. It is not difficult to understand why language contact, competition and conflict are often root causes of people on the African continent being in conflict with each other (Kamwangamalu, 2000: 88). This too hinders the individual from the achievement of her/his full potential.

Possible Interventions

If South Africa is to carry out its multilingual policy, academically trained translators will be needed. Translation theory is a valuable tool which every trained translator should know, especially the role of contextual assumptions in interpreting a text. Together with any linguistic content or semantic representation, social and cultural knowledge should be included in the act of interpretation (Locket, 1996: 265). Effective translation and interpretation is based on dialogue between the source language and the target language. Kenyan author, Ngugi wa Thiong'o (2009) focuses on the dialogue in translation of African languages. In his book *Remembering Africa*, he argues that translation is truly the language of languages, or the common speech of languages if the vision and practices are seen as embodying the idea of translation. This is the kind of skill that a translator has to acquire in order to serve the people, and languages, of Africa.

The main problem facing translators who translate from English into the African languages is the lack of terminology in specialist subject fields. The study of terminology theory and practice for translators becomes clearer when they cannot depend on existing knowledge and/or dictionaries (Gauton, Taljard and De Schryver, 2003). As Locket and wa Thiong'o above confirm, more knowledge and skill in translation and interpreting is needed and the academic training institution has to meet that critical need, working in close collaboration with government, non- governmental organisations (NGOs) and industry. The nature of the translating and interpreting profession is such that it cannot work in isolation, making it imperative for more transparency and cooperation between the various sectors. Direct attempts to achieve this have to be made at local and regional level within an African state, while simultaneously meeting other critical objectives across Africa.

The need for African translators and interpreters to serve the needs of African people, on the continent of Africa and at international conferences held around the world, has clearly become increasingly visible. This is especially pertinent

at United Nations (UN) meetings and conferences. The UN Office in Nairobi (UNON) recognised the scarcity of any skilled language specialists in Africa, but especially in the fields of translation and interpretation. Such specialists had to be recruited from outside Africa. They noted that there are also very few adequate facilities in Africa to train such professionals (Muylle, 2008: 1). To address this problem, they identified Mr Noel Muylle to research and recommend to them how this gap should be addressed. Mr Muylle is considered a leading researcher on conference translation, having been with the European Commission's Directorate General for Interpretation (and Conferences) for forty years.

Will educating translators and interpreters make a difference to the achievement potential of the ordinary African citizen? What were the driving factors behind Mr Muylle's motivation? His purpose for the project can be summarised as follows:

- Highly qualified language specialists and mediators are identified as translators, community interpreters, conference interpreters and public service interpreters.
- There is a growing need for such specialists to be available on African soil to assist the governments of African states in their international relations and their peace-building efforts.
- Such specialists are also needed for better relations between inter-African governments, interregional and international bodies established in Africa.
- The need for them is also visible in non-governmental bodies operating in Africa.
- Language specialists are needed to fulfil the needs of the private market in business negotiations.
- International conferences held in Africa expose the greatest need for translators and interpreters.
- Students need to be trained to participate in competitions offered by international organisations – translators would enable such participation.
- Dependence on costly human resources brought in to Africa from Europe and the Western countries needs to be lessened.
- In Europe and the West it is also difficult to find language specialists proficient in some language combinations.
- Highly qualified, postgraduate language specialists can fulfil the 'sensitive tasks of intercultural and linguistic mediation in political and business settings' in Africa (Muylle, 2008: 2).

The above factors indicate the lack of specialists with the right language combinations in Africa. Those who are qualified prefer to work as independents, while some stay within government and others join regional and international bodies like the UN. The UNON vision for its pilot project was therefore to set up, revamp and develop academic and professional programmes at universities within Africa. The project was fully endorsed by the UNON, the director-generals of translation and interpretation departments in all European Union Institutions and many African members of the International Annual Meeting on Languages, Documentation and Publications (Muylle, 2008: 1). Mr Muylle's action plan identified five African countries as his point of departure: South Africa, Kenya, Cameroon, Egypt and Mozambique.

Universities and training institutions need to support the UNON intervention from an academic and research-based perspective, thus providing opportunities for students to study, train and find employment as translating and interpreting professionals. They need to also work closely with the identified stakeholders of the project: universities (for academic and skills training), the African Development Bank (for technical and financial support), the European Parliament, and the European Commission (for technical and pedagogical assistance) and the UNON. Intersector understanding and cooperation was perceived to provide the most effective foundation for the purpose of creating a bank of African translators and interpreters.

The outcome of the UNON intervention was The Gigiri Declaration (2009), which defines quality as the key characteristic of the training that is to be conducted, with the focus being multilingualism. Paragraph 34 (p. 6) of the Conference Report reads as follows:

A representative of Nelson Mandela Metropolitan University said that she saw the current project as a platform to develop students, key industries such as tourism and conferences, and ultimately the national economy. She stressed that those externally focused benefits should not obscure South Africa's need for translation and interpreting skills internally, as the government and industry endeavoured to operate in 11 languages. She suggested that language had a role to play as a tool in democracy.

Collaboration at national level would impact on the continent as a whole, ensuring that the vision of meeting the need for African translators and interpreters to serve the needs of African people would be met. Again, working in collaboration with the African Development Bank on implementation on the ground, barriers being faced and future plans is indicative of the need to integrate resources,

to establish cooperative learning opportunities, and to work together on using translating and interpreting skills to develop the peoples of Africa based on their local needs.

Academic institutions would have to, of necessity, ensure that training is open to graduates across faculties, that it is a professional degree and that the focus is translation and interpretation in South African and African languages. The motive behind this would be that South African and African translators and interpreters are needed across the board, in every discipline, in various careers, in every context. Language is integral to every human context, so drawing from the skills of each faculty is seen as providing opportunities for translators in as many contexts and careers as possible. The translating/interpreting profession presupposes competent language and communication skills, as well as ‘thematic proficiency, technical skills ... cultural skills and intellectual curiosity’ (Muylle, 2008: 1). Muylle further encourages the use of modern technology, e-learning, remote learning and contact learning, all with easy access to libraries, the internet and remote learning facilities. Multilingualism would ultimately form the backbone of the programmes being offered. Renowned linguist, Neville Alexander (1996: 9) strongly proposes that education would be the means through which South Africa’s multilingualism would be developed, chiefly because it implicitly binds identity, language and culture.

Undergraduate qualifications, in the form of a one-year certificate for locals already practising as interpreters, should be developed. Recognition of prior learning and experience might be the criteria motivating the introduction of such a certificate, given South Africa’s unequal past education systems. To illustrate this, consider the role of Mr Wiseman Hlophe, who has been a court interpreter for the past five years but has no formal training. He does, however, speak six African languages – isiXhosa, isiZulu, Sotho, Pedi, Ndebele and Venda. Through in-service government training, he has achieved certificates in interpreting, and holds the post of an Interpreting Practitioner at the Legasato Office in Port Elizabeth (Hlophe, 2010). Based on recognition of prior learning as an entry requirement, he can move from developing interpreter to achieving his full potential. Opportunities for such candidates, especially those from the previously disadvantaged communities of South Africa, are sorely needed.

Possible Collaboration Partners

Collaboration with other language units would add depth to any translation and interpreting programme. Linking with the activities of an NGO called Transfer of African Language Knowledge (TALK) would further benefit students. The

organisation, now called Phaphama Initiatives, promotes the learning of African languages and cultures by bringing South Africans from different communities together. They specialise in the Brewster Method: a sociocultural and culture-learning methodology based on the principle that each language learner is paired with a mother-tongue African language helper (Phaphama Initiatives, 2002).

A cyber project taking computing to South Africa's languages, Translate.org.co.za, won the 2006 African Information and Communication Technologies (ICT) Achiever Award for breaking Africa's language barriers. It uses an all-South African language keyboard, rated as the world's first. This is the first 'Africans-helping-Africans' software that enables fellow South Africans to use computers in their mother tongues, according to the founder Dwayne Bailey (2006). Such available technology would enhance the training of translators and interpreters and enable cooperation with the ICT industry.

The Telephoning Interpreting Service for South Africa (TISSA) provides emergency services to people speaking languages other than English and Afrikaans. It facilitates access to public services in all South African indigenous languages, using interpreters to bridge language barriers over the telephone. The project is enabled by Pan South African Language Board (PANSALB) and the South African government (TISSA, 2002). Practical experience for students would be possible through practice as TISSA facilitators, once collaboration is established.

Establishing links with the Pan African Centre of Translation and Interpretation in Bamako, Mali and the African Academy of Languages (ACALAN) would widen the scope of any academic programme, making African languages the real instruments of the continent's sustainable development. In 1986, Kiswahili, Arabic, French, English, Spanish and Portuguese were recognised by the Organisation of African Unity (OAU) as working languages in a multilingual context for economic, political and sociocultural reasons. The object was also to build the African and citizen consciousness through African languages and, critically, by developing tools and methods for translating and interpreting.

By working collaboratively with all relevant stakeholders, academic researchers will gain insights into problems arising from practice. The result would be a better informed, holistic perspective of translation and interpretation studies, simultaneously contributing towards social change and informed knowledge. Researchers will benefit from the experience of professional translators in that they can be involved in daily activities that they often only know of in conceptual terms. Professionals will benefit from this interaction with scholars, who may point ways towards solutions to problems on the basis of theoretical premises. Promotion of the training and education of translators and interpreters

through action research is recommended. The beneficiaries would be translators themselves, students and translators-to-be, teachers of translation, and the end product consumers, namely, real people in the real world (Cravo and Neves, 2007: 16–17).

Challenges

At African continent level, tension between national language policy and education language policy is a recurrent theme. Contradictions in policy and implementation further complicate these tensions. Language planning for the state is put on the backburner as political issues dominate action plans. Akinnaso (1991: 29) cites such problems in Tanzania and Nigeria where indigenous languages are marginalised because English is essential for political and economic power. In South Africa, the African National Congress (ANC) government passed the Schools Act of 1996, which promotes multilingualism. Society, however, and specifically black society, prefers English as the medium of instruction at their schools. The people make such choices believing that opting for an indigenous language will linguistically isolate them from economic progress and the rest of the world. The reality is that African economies will be stimulated by relevant use and knowledge of indigenous languages. Heugh (2002: 449–475) argues that African needs must be embedded in the political, economic and education policies of each country, with the aim being globalisation and international communication. Focus should be on technology and communication, relevant knowledge and business rooted in local and regional economies. Success will in turn be rooted in language proficiency and knowledge. Heugh further suggests that since government appears not to be committed to the importance of language planning, it should be taken up by NGOs.

A deeper challenge is the general public attitude to South Africa's indigenous languages. Webb (2001: xiv) quotes a senior NGO official stating that using African languages for training purposes was 'nonsense'. He adds that many South Africans discuss languages from a simplistic, speculative and emotional viewpoint, having little insight into the nature of the interrelationship between language and society; of the role of language in public life, educational development, economic performance, political growth and national reconstruction and development. Eradicating the consequences of ideological language planning is difficult, even if they are seen to be 'educationally, economically, politically, socially and culturally destructive' (Webb, 2005: 149), leading to subordination, subjugation, marginalisation and exclusion, as well as the economic disadvantaging of the majority of the citizens.

The need for trained language specialists does not seem to be sufficiently recognised by government and education institutions. Language as a field of academic training and inquiry, for example, language planning, the sociology of language and the politics of language are not offered at undergraduate level. Webb (2001: xvi) argues that the study of language and public life in post-apartheid South Africa is a unique and ground-breaking opportunity, one which would lead to transformation within our public life. He adds that all African states face similar challenges. If the South African education system can 'handle the language issue in an effective way, giving meaningful substance to linguistic pluralism in every-day life, it could make a useful contribution to the resolution of similar problems across the world' (Webb, 2001: xvi).

Govender (2008: 5) writes that most black pupils prefer to study English or Afrikaans, not an African language. Statistics from the national Department of Education revealed that 590 000 learners sat for Grade 12 examinations in 2008. The vast majority of them chose English as a second language, not an African language. Only 1 023 coloured, white and Indian learners enrolled for an African language. Of the 488 786 black learners sitting for the examination, 71 963 chose Afrikaans over an African language. Refer to Table 1 below.

Table 1: Number of Grade 12 learners enrolled for SA's 11 official languages in 2008 (Govender 2008: 5)

Language	Taken as 1st Language	Taken as 2nd Language
English	97 579	495 298
Afrikaans	57 845	115 489
Zulu	153 635	10 012
Xhosa	68 529	1 602
Sotho	34 655	682
Tswana	45 805	183
Sepedi	70 792	460
Tsonga	25 255	38
Swati	20 731	162
Venda	17 771	16
Ndebele	4 409	42

All African languages were introduced as having equal status into South Africa's school curricula in 1997, with learners being encouraged to learn other languages. South Africa's Schools Act of 1996 states that each school has to provide evidence of how it would promote multilingualism. However, it is a school's

governing body that makes the final choice of which languages will be offered. Most schools offer Afrikaans and English, with African languages being consistently sidelined. Govender (2008: 5) adds that education experts believe that black learners feel that since they speak an African language fluently, they have no need to make an academic study of it. Mhlanga's (1995: 42) study supports this view, with a telling comment from a parent:

When we send children to school we expect them to acquire new knowledge. By school-going age a child is already a fluent speaker of Zulu ... so there is no need ... that child must learn English and be taught in English.

Exacerbating the problem is the shortage of African language teachers at primary schools, and a perception that the languages are difficult to learn; that the grammar is too complex. Parents contribute to the problem by boasting of their child's English language skills, proudly exclaiming that their child does not speak an African language. African languages are seen as not having any benefit, not contributing to one's career and economic advancement or lifting one out of poverty.

Conclusion

The new SA is a liberal democracy, one in which all linguistic groups have equal rights. Multilingualism should be the norm, visible and an integral component of every public domain. Training language specialists would be one way of acknowledging cultural and linguistic diversity and contributing to the development of a fair and just society. However, this cannot be done by one institution alone. Close cooperation with industry, the local community, NGOs, academic institutions, government, the African Union and the UNON is needed. If the outcome is one individual moving from developing to achiever status with the help of a trained interpreter, then the vision to train them on a large scale justifies itself. The concept can make a difference. The concept can bring back pride in one's language and one's identity. It is hence worthy to repeat: *I am an African. I speak an African language.*

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CHAPTER 35

Our Own Regeneration of Ourselves: Challenges for Grassroots Mobilisation for Indigenous Knowledge Systems (IKS)

Wally Serote

In 1998, four years after the democratic elections in South Africa, intellectuals from various parts of the continent convened at the Indaba Hotel in Johannesburg to explore ideas, concepts and possibilities which would define the forward movement of the continent. This was on the basis of the African Renaissance (AR) concept, which up until then had been placed on the national agenda by the then Deputy President Thabo Mbeki. The African Renaissance Institute (ARI) was launched in Pretoria at the Presidential Guest House and based in Gaborone, Botswana. In attendance were some dignitaries such as the late President Julius Nyerere. This laid the foundation for the launch of the South African chapter of the African Renaissance (SACAR), which emerged two years later. At both launches, Mr Mbeki not only gave keynote addresses, but participated in the discussions about the emergence of these organisations and later also played a guiding role in the functioning of the organisations and their being resourced through the presidency. In other words, SACAR and ARI received support from the highest level of government in South Africa. It is important to note this fact because organs of civil society, I suppose the whole of the continent, can play a vital role in advocacy, conscientisation and mobilisation of the masses if a definite objective is set for both nation and continent building. For that to happen, the organs must have a well-defined mandate to explore resources in the four areas of funding, namely, government, the private sector, the people and the international community.

I have to come back to this issue of resources. Besides the fact that it is important to have an independent and arm's-length relationship between organs of civil society and government, it does seem to me that government cannot be given a blank cheque to implement its manifesto through which it assumed power in the country. This is ensured through the democratic process and by debate with opposition parties. In the same way, a means for accountability must be established for civil society organs. There must be an agreed upon mandate

which must complement the national priorities that are a programme of the party in power.

The African Renaissance Organisation of Southern Africa (AROSA), which was founded in Maputo, Mozambique in 2004 by several Southern African renaissance organisations from countries like Mozambique, Lesotho, Swaziland, Botswana, Zimbabwe, Namibia, Tanzania and Zambia, represented the sixth region on the continent, the others being the North, East, West and Central. All of them were to be comprised of national chapters. It did seem then that a continental platform had been put in place for dialogue to begin, within organs of civil society, at national, regional and continental levels. I must hasten to state that at this stage, all the above organisations consisted mainly of African academics, conventional intellectuals and the elite. It is vital for this sector to be part of the organs of civil society; however, given the colonial background of all African countries, it is important to find a basis to open dialogue on key issues with the various sectors of organic intellectuals of that country. It is this factor then which dictates that the emerging organ must find and define a complementary and agreed upon point of reference with the government of the day.

While organs of civil society must adhere to the principle of non-partisanship, they cannot be neutral and active on national matters or adopt a watchdog attitude to government activities. That would be a contradiction in terms. Also, if these organs take the position of watchdog status, how would their status to exercise that power be evaluated and rectified? Is it a matter of principle to found that position on a continent marred by underdevelopment, poverty, excessive exploitation of national resources by foreign countries, within a global context with a history of the law of the jungle and the cowboy hunt and kill Indians culture?

A précis which became the understanding of what the AR meant is that it is the furtherance of pan-Africanism on the continent and within the global context. However, ARI was disbanded owing to a lack of resources which forced the chairperson to relocate, but a year ago was replaced by the iARi, which is based in Midrand in Johannesburg.

The similarities between all these organisations mentioned are that they propagate and advocate for the regeneration, rebirth and renewal – African Renaissance – of the continent, which is also the furtherance of pan-Africanism on the continent and within the context of the globe. These organisations are organs of civil society and they explore the AR strategy on the basis of processes, programmes and projects anchored on indigenous knowledge systems (IKS), a way of returning to the source, guided by the principles of the liberation struggle and governance of each country.

The differences are really their scope, with SACAR being a national structure, AROSA regional and iARi continental. They therefore also differ in tactics, programmes and projects. To date, SACAR has also facilitated the emergence of Indigenous Knowledge Systems of South Africa (iIKSSA), which specialises in research in IKS and the mobilisation of IKS practitioners in South Africa. In its specialities, iIKSSA has created a platform for contact and dialogue between organic and conventional intellectuals in the country. iIKSSA incubates thoughts, ideas and opinions emanating from IKS, based on unpacking the worth and relevance of a return to the source. Through the other organisations mentioned above, these views, experiences and experiments can have a continental reach, as happened in Southern Africa through AROSA. AROSA made possible dialogue in Southern Africa on issues of the AR and IKS. It sought to synchronise a relationship between the AR and IKS as a means of engaging the masses of the sub-continent by consulting on IKS, a knowledge which not only resides within them, but which has also been their means of survival and resistance against colonialism and oppression.

Rivone is an organisation which emerged from a distillation of ideas from the dialogue in Southern Africa facilitated by AROSA. Its objective is to debate and explore the means to expand health resources, based on different methods, medicine and health knowledge bases in South Africa. It also aims to seek ways and means of making medicine, which is otherwise expensive, affordable to the poor, by organising roundtables which explore issues based on poverty, nutrition, health and conflict resolution. Participants in the roundtables consist of traditional healers, medical doctors, psychologists, psychiatrists, scientologists, spiritual healers and members of other types of healing systems.

The history of these organisations has been briefly outlined and the national memorial and monument, Freedom Park (FP), enhanced their potential. The relationship between these organisations also served as a start for building the Pan-African Archives at the Park. The FP facilitated the emergence of the African Renaissance Youth Movement (ARYM) to mobilise youth around five issues: history, culture, heritage, IKS and national continental symbols. The objective of the youth movement is to establish a dialogue among African youth on pan-Africanism, a return to the source and the continent's survival within the global context as a means for building both a continental and national consciousness and patriotism. This view of mobilising youth in this manner emerged through discussions which were held within the diasporic community and some Cuban patriots, when the question was asked: How has Cuba been able to instil patriotism among its youth?

A journalist once asked the question: how will SACAR interpret the African Renaissance concept for a grandmother in a village? It is this question which led to collaboration between iIKSSA and SACAR. If there is IKS, and if this knowledge resides within people in the rural areas, does it not provide the possibility for a fresh debate with the potential for paradigm shifts within academic but also organic intellectuals? A predecessor structure of iIKSSA, the IKS Secretariat which was based at Parliament in Cape Town, held an IKS conference for IKS practitioners in 1998 in Mafikeng in the North West Province. There it received a mandate to organise IKS practitioners nationally, to seek possibilities for government support for the protection of IKS in Southern Africa, and to find the possibilities to form a Southern African IKS structure. This conference was groundbreaking in that there had never been a conference where 70 per cent of the participants were IKS practitioners from the nine provinces of South Africa. The challenge was how to link IKS to AR and to use this to mobilise an AR social movement, firstly in South Africa, and then if possible in Southern Africa, to link the discussions through the African Union organs of civil society across the length and breadth of our continent.

Besides the fact that this was intended to widen the area for the protection of IKS intellectual properties, it was also a means to open debate, dialogue and discussion in Southern Africa which was also cross-cutting. It is the debate around these three issues, namely, tactics to mobilise rural people into the AR, to seek government support for the protection of IKS in South Africa and Southern Africa, and the possibility of forming a coordinated structure in Southern Africa linked to the AR for the protection of IKS, which led to the formation of the structures named above. While it was important and necessary to protect IKS from exploitation and pillage, in fact, not only to protect it but to also innovate and promote it, the question which was constantly raised was – what is IKS? The question also implied another serious one: Is there such a thing as IKS? Answers to these questions opened all kinds of avenues, which either needed organised probes, or required specialised knowledge. For those who were activists in this movement, a major question confronted them: What is the role of an African university? The Parliamentary Portfolio Committee of Arts and Culture, Languages, Science and Technology spearheaded partnerships among universities, science councils, IKS practitioners and various government departments to verify and validate IKS. Not only was it confirmed that there is indeed such a thing as IKS, but it was established that it can be divided into five categories: liberatory processes, institutions, social issues, technology and biodiversity. It is these issues which AROSA then took up and another dialogue in Southern Africa opened between Botswana, Lesotho, Swaziland, Mozambique, Zimbabwe, Mauritius, Zambia,

Angola, Tanzania, South Africa, the DRC and Namibia based on AR and IKS. Three colloquiums were held at Southern African level to probe and elaborate on the three concepts: What is the African Renaissance? What is IKS? Are the two compatible, and can they complement each other for openness, creativity and both social and economic upliftment in the Southern African region?

The endorsement and funding for the construction of Freedom Park presented an opportunity and challenge to answer the questions about AR and IKS. By partnering and collaborating with the organisations already mentioned, the wheel did not have to be reinvented, but tested knowledge and understanding were used to construct the monument and memorial. As an example, the institution of traditional healers was immediately enlisted to organise and conduct the cleansing, healing and return of spirits and advise on the construction of the African shrine Isivivane. In addition, the institution applied its knowledge to analysing, selecting and creating categories of plants and constructing a nursery for the medicinal, food and adornmental plants which were found on site. Besides this category of IKS practitioners, other organic intellectuals were mobilised to become part of the 21 organisations which the FP management used by employing groundwork done by other organisations, whether in South Africa or in Southern Africa, and later parts of the continent and African Diaspora. Ninety per cent of the design and construction of the FP is based on knowledge yielded and derived from IKS. Should it have been declared an AR project, or was it an AR expression? As issues for its construction were discussed, these questions were posed. A tour of the entire FP does raise issues of the regeneration, rebirth and renewal of the African continent and a study of the phenomenon of the African Diaspora.

Rivone and iARi have exploited the gaps left by the other organisations. Both espouse AR concepts. Both utilise IKS as a basis for further exploration of ideas. Rivone is national. iARi, not to be mistaken for ARI, although so inspired, is continental in scope, and has defined itself as a non-profit organisation like all the others, except for FP which is a cultural institution. iARi has four focal points: distillation, facilitation, incubation and innovation. On the one hand, it seeks to acquire knowledge and understanding from AR and IKS; on the other, through partnerships, it seeks to incubate these ideas, with the objective of innovating them into possible products of one type or the other.

Rivone mobilises all kinds of health workers, with the objectives of opening dialogue on health facilities for the purpose of seeking to expand health resources, putting on the national agenda and facilities outside of government, in communities, all issues related to incurable disease and to break down the barriers which result in silos among these specialised structures at the expense

of the health of the nation. The roundtable discussions organised by Rivone are recorded on video and form part of the Pan-African Archives of the FP. There are negotiations afoot between Rivone and the SABC to seek space for these videos within the programmes of the public broadcaster.

The tactic employed by all these organisations to achieve the dialectic relationship between the contribution to the regeneration, rebirth and renewal of the continent and its people and the knowledge which resides within and among the rural poor, who are mostly women, was to find a manner to anchor AR within and among the masses, especially women, who are the ones in charge of children and raising them. The purpose was also to begin discussion and debate among the youth, through the ARYM, about IKS and AR.

The 21st century is the African century. It has also been declared as the century of knowledge. What are the agenda items which must turn these statements into reality to give qualitative change to the levels of the African masses? Does the link between the AR strategy and the IKS tactic, based on the objective to bring about the social and economic upliftment of the people of the continent, promise to yield these items of the African agenda? How must the African university become the intellectual African motivating force for change to emerge? And, lastly, how can the masses be transformed to become the citizens of the continent?

CHAPTER 36

Diversity and Social Cohesion in Africa: A Blueprint for the Culture of Ubuntu

Onuorah Jonikul Obodozie

Introduction

My career as a diplomat spanned 35 years, during which time I represented the Nigerian Foreign Service in different parts of the world. During the course of that career, I was trained in the language of *politesse* and diplomatic decorum. So forgive me if I have not totally learnt the professional comportment of an academic. However, I shall do my utmost to conform to proper academic expectations. Oftentimes, the language of the diplomat is one of make-believe: how does one express the unpalatable or the abominable with the utmost civility? This is a dilemma that faces the average diplomat in all parts of the world at different stages of their careers.

I have now retired from the service and I am compelled to use this opportunity to discuss my country of origin, Nigeria. In this instance, for the sake of academic rigour and intellectual honesty, I must forget about my past as a career diplomat and cast an unflinching gaze on my country. I do not wish to be unduly harsh; I merely bemoan the fact that Nigeria after 50 years of independence has not lived up to widely held expectations in all areas of its problematic existence, be it in the areas of politics, peace and security or economic development. Fifty years of independence ought to provide the much-needed opportunity to reflect on where Nigeria as a nation went wrong and what can be done at this late stage to make amends. We must bear in mind that if Nigeria fails as a nation, the impact would be devastating for the whole of the African continent and beyond. There are about 150 million Nigerians and at least one in four Africans is a Nigerian. Nigeria is made up of about 250 ethnicities and, by some estimates, over 500 languages and dialects. This makes Nigeria incredibly diverse, in fact, one of the most diverse countries in the world.

Diversity and Social Cohesion

In this chapter, I will tackle the issue of diversity with particular reference to Nigeria. My argument is a simple one. If Nigeria employs the spirit and culture

of ubuntu its immense diversity can become a source of great strength. One of the most immediate benefits of this is that Nigeria would become more amenable to good governance. Nigeria's diverse nature is well known. For instance, there are 36 states that make up the Nigerian federation. At present, it has at least 12 registered political parties, including the Accord Party, Action Congress, All Nigeria People's Party, All Progressives Grand Alliance, Alliance for Democracy, Conference of Nigerian Political Parties, Democratic Peoples' Party, Fresh Democratic Party, Labour Party, National Democratic Party, the Peoples' Democratic Party and People's Progressive Alliance. The high number of political parties in Nigeria attests to its varied and boisterous political terrain. In the area of industry, it produces crude oil, coal, rubber, tin, columbite, wood, hides and skin, cement, footwear, chemicals, fertiliser and steel. In the agricultural sector, Nigeria produces fish, cattle, sheep, goats, pigs, cocoa, cotton, sorghum, millet, maize and cassava. Again this diversity of products is a reflection of the diverse nature of the federation.

A key concept I employ is the South African notion of ubuntu. The concept means humanness, strong fellow feeling between human beings as a means of establishing harmonious social relations. If we adhere to the spirit and letter of this useful concept then unduly divisive social conduct would be avoided. I would argue that the policy of rapprochement recently adopted by the federal government of Nigeria in which it granted amnesty to the militants of the Niger Delta has similarities with the concept of ubuntu. Instead of wielding the big stick as it usually does, the government decided to engage the aggrieved militants of the besieged region in dialogue so as to foster peace, stability and social cohesion. In my view, this is a commendable policy and approach.

Out of Nigeria's context of diversity, its human capital boasts a rich pool of talent, much of which has been lost to different parts of the world. In a world that is increasingly becoming homogeneous and unduly standardised through various forms of cultural imperialism and the downside of technology, Nigeria presents a captivating canvas of colour, brilliance and difference. It is still a veritable source for discovering the untapped potential of humankind. But alas, this has not been completely the case. Nigeria has experienced a full-blown civil war that lasted between 1967 and 1970. The psychic and physical wounds that resulted from that unfortunate event can still be felt to this very day. In this instance, rather than the country drawing on its diverse strengths and potential, it succumbed to the chancre of divisiveness and parochialism. Many decades after that national tragedy, Nigeria's ethnicities still view each other with mutual distrust, suspicion and hostility.

At this juncture, it is necessary to reflect upon some of the telling paradoxes of diversity to be found in Nigeria. Since petroleum was discovered in the Niger Delta in 1956, there has been a rapid shift from the diverse revenue base of the nation to a monoculture of petroleum production. Accordingly, palm oil production declined drastically. So did coal and tin production. In the agricultural sector, the production of cocoa in the western part of the country and groundnuts in the north also declined. The groundnut pyramids were a famous produce for export and were also a remarkable visual sight because of their pyramidal structures.

Nigeria has a multiplicity of natural minerals that can be exploited to broaden and diversify the resource base of the country. Unfortunately, this has not been the case. Instead, there has been a unilateral dependence on petroleum to the extent that Nigeria has become the most graphic example of what is known as the Dutch Disease. This syndrome, which is prevalent in developing countries, simply means those nations exhibit the worst kinds of developmental anomalies in spite of real national wealth and resource endowments. The appalling instances of environmental degradation and pollution in the Niger Delta are well known. It is also frequently presented in international news media that the Niger Delta is plagued with violence and unrest directed at both the federal government and multinational petroleum concerns. Also, a series of both legitimate and illegitimate social movements have sprung up all over the troublesome region, canvassing for all kinds of rights and demanding that their grievances be addressed. It will be recalled that Wole Soyinka, our irrepressible fighter for a just society, once said in a moment of pique that he wished he came from a small resource-starved country in an obscure corner of the world. Being a Nigerian, I know exactly what he means. How can a country as naturally diverse as Nigeria succumb so easily to the pitfalls of a defeatist monoculture of petroleum production? How can the energies of our people be continuously sapped by a single commodity which suppresses the value of all other commodities but which paradoxically generates the divisiveness and hostilities of the country's ethnicities? This is something that continues to baffle many observers of the Nigerian predicament. Here, we witness the logic and rhythms of diversity being stripped to a monochrome barrenness, such that it is now threatening the very foundations and hence existence of the Nigerian nation.

The social cost of the paradox of diversity is equally immense and almost unmanageable. It has unquestionably stunted Nigeria's entry into the annals of modernity. Instead of horizontal social relations developing based on common mutual interests, a culture of prebendalism has taken root in which the ills of nepotism, clientalism and favouritism proliferate. Richard Joseph (1988), using the Shehu Shagari administration as a case study, has written eloquently on the

enormous social costs of client-patron social relations in postcolonial Nigeria. Many of his analyses remain valid till this day. Perhaps only the current term for prebendalism has changed somewhat. Today, it is called *godfatherism* which reminds one of Francis Ford Coppola's inimitable film, *The Godfather*. Indeed there is something somewhat mafia-like about Nigeria's current syndrome of godfatherism. For the sake of definition, godfatherism refers to the sociopolitical culture whereby political entrepreneurs attach themselves to kingmakers for the sake of political advancement, office and patronage. In this instance, the electorate is short-circuited and promptly ignored while its future is hijacked and mortgaged by a cabal of shady political opportunists who operate according to a code that serves largely to undermine the ethics of social solidarity. This is what largely obtains in Nigeria's political kingdom at the present time. But what are the most immediate consequences of the culture of godfatherism for the nation-building project as a whole?

There has been an undermining of the concept of the social compact as it obtains in other nations of the modern world. In conceptual terms, Thomas Hobbes's notion of the state of nature can be applied. This is because instead of the consolidation of the social compact according to the model explicated by John Locke, there has been a withdrawal into the enclaves of nepotism and tribalism in which any concerted effort towards building a modern nation-state becomes virtually impossible. At this juncture, I would advance yet another paradox of diversity; the monoculture fostered by the sole dependence on petroleum has produced an increasing number of ethnic conflicts over dwindling national resources. Rather than ethnic diversity constituting a source of strength, it becomes instead a source of conflict, unhealthy contestation and violence. Frantz Fanon predicted quite correctly this distressing postcolonial scenario. Fanon warned that the actual demise of colonialism should not provide an excuse for complacency. He argued that the political elites who took over the administrative and political structures of colonialism would also take over and mimic the foibles of the erstwhile colonial overlords. In the case of Nigeria, the political elites frequently employ the politics of ethnicity to foster narrow careerist ambitions to the detriment of the wider pan-Nigerian nation-building project. I am not saying Nigeria is the only African country where this shortcoming is evident. All over Africa, we have seen how the politics of ethnicity has been mobilised by colonial and postcolonial administrators and agents to derail the enduring senses and structures of nationhood.

In Nigeria, as I have mentioned, the negative politics of ethnicity led to a civil war. The Rwandan tragedy of 1994, in which about a million people were butchered in three months, speaks volumes about not only the scourge of ethnicity

in Africa but also the sorry state of development. In the case of Rwanda, people were butchered using the most rudimentary means: clubs and machetes. The movie, *Hotel Rwanda*, with Don Cheadle and Sophie Okonedo as lead actors does not quite capture the grisly dimensions of the African-type massacre. Rwanda is not a specific tragedy. It is an African failing for which we must all bear some responsibility. True, the colonial event prepared the grounds for the tragedy but what did we as Africans do to avert it? How have we employed our indigenous knowledge systems to defend and consolidate our societies? We obviously did not do much in this regard and that is why we ended up with something as devastating as the Rwandan tragedy.

Thabo Mbeki, the former president of the Republic of South Africa, delivered a speech at the Tshwane University of Technology on 16 September 2010 that touched on this very issue. Aptly, the title of his submission was 'Africa – war and peace'. Mbeki's message was clear. He explained that as Africans we all possess multiple identities even when we claim to be South African, Zambian, Ethiopian or Egyptian. According to Mbeki, Africa has always been a place of migration, cultural interaction and multiple race relations. In the 19th century people came from Malawi, Angola, Mozambique and Zimbabwe to work on the gold mines at the southern tip of the continent. As a result of these migrations new African identities were created and so, as Mbeki explained, he could not understand incidents such as the xenophobic outbreaks of violence that occurred in 2008 in parts of present-day South Africa. Mbeki reminded us that South Africa, whether we like it or not, has become the home of numerous Malawians, Mozambicans, Ethiopians, Somalis, Senegalese and Nigerians. He argued that xenophobia is essentially antithetical to the spirit and culture of ubuntu. I agree with him. He makes a strong point that all Africans share a common destiny and must struggle to preserve that common future. This task is even more urgent today when dominant superpowers are busy constructing policies and architectural designs for global peace that exclude Africa. It means that if Africans are excluded from processes designed to secure global tranquility and stability, then it becomes incumbent upon Africans to erect their own structures for continental and eventually global peace. Again, I agree with this view.

Thabo Mbeki draws our attention to Clarence J. Bouchat's monograph, *Security and stability in Africa: A development* published in 2010 (Bouchat, cited by Mbeki, 2010: 10). Bouchat points out the following:

Since their independence, Sub-Saharan countries have endured over 80 successful and 108 failed coup attempts, accounting for 44 per cent of the world's total. The worst example of violence is the Democratic Republic of

Congo's intra- and interstate fighting, which since 1996 has claimed 5,4 million lives, making it the bloodiest conflict since World War II.

Undoubtedly, Africa can no longer engage in wars. It is too costly in every sense. An Oxfam study published in 2007 concluded that conflicts in Africa between 1990 and 2005 cost the continent US\$300 billion. This is simply unacceptable and we must find ways to end the outbreaks of violence that continue to stunt the development of the African continent. The African Peer Review Mechanism instituted by African political leadership is a step in the right direction.

Mbeki avers that the sources of violent conflict in Africa include the following:

- a scramble for and mal-distribution of resources
- concentration of political power in the hands of a political elite which abuses its power to accumulate wealth for itself and particular factions of the population, marginalising important sections of that population
- use of repressive measures by this elite to keep itself in power
- the absence of the power processes and institutions which would enable the people to freely express their views, up to and including the possibility to freely elect governments of their choice
- persisting imbalances in the distribution of global power and wealth.

African intellectuals such as Mbeki and Kwesi Kwaa Prah argue that ethnicity is not the bane of African development. Instead, they contend that the scramble for inadequate resources is the cause of most of Africa's violent conflicts. I would like to add a few insights of my own. In this instance, I would like to draw attention to Peter Ekeh's thesis in his seminal paper, 'Colonialism and the two publics in Africa: A theoretical statement' published in 1975 in the journal *Comparative Studies in History and Society*. Ekeh contends that the evolution of the African public realm follows a different trajectory from the classical formations of European civil society. In this sense, the African public sphere has a bifurcated structure that includes a primordial domain on the one hand, and a civic domain on the other. The primordial domain elicits fervent African support because it connotes blood ties to the village or the tribal homeland. It is a domain filled with numerous emotive baggage and encumbrances. It is also deemed to be indigenous. The civic domain, on the other hand, is viewed as a colonial imposition, an alien superstructure that bears no direct relation to the everyday lives of Africans living in a rural time zone. Because of this kind of attitude, the modern nation-state in Africa has drawn ambivalent feelings and truncated loyalties. The

question at this juncture is: How do we move beyond this cumbersome impasse and forge ahead with the task of rebuilding Africa?

Conclusion

I would argue that the culture of ubuntu is a formidable tool of social engineering, healing and cohesion. Just as Julius Nyerere's philosophy of *ujamaa*, the culture of ubuntu is an indigenous African tool of social engineering that can be fashioned to meet the challenges of building modern nation-states in the era of globalisation. Ubuntu suggests that all Africans share a common destiny. For me, the interconnectedness of the philosophy of ubuntu is genuine and it is as potent in its connectivity as the internet. If it is possible that each and every African sees the real connection to the next African, then violent conflicts would be drastically reduced. I share the optimism of African leaders and intellectuals who see a bright future for Africa. We need to make instruments such as the African Peer Review Mechanism act as a check to undemocratic political machinations. We need to continue to find ways to strengthen and broaden the reach of such a mechanism. We cannot allow Africa's detractors to derail it from realising its destiny, one that is immensely rich and diverse and at the same time one that is harmonious.

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CHAPTER 37

Re-[membering] My Ways of Knowing and Learning While 'Learning Otherwise'

Ramadimetja Shirley Mogale

Introduction

The dialogues which the writer has engaged in during the doctor of philosophy (PhD) coursework in Canada has made her realise that she has and embodies unique knowledge. The dialogues brought forth memories; it was as if her unconscious database was brought into conversations (Banks-Wallace, 2000). The conversations enabled her to re-(member) things that she was forced to forget and never chose to forget; it was here that she remembered her great-grandmother's knowledge.

In this chapter, the writer is interrogating the ontological and epistemological stances regarding nursing knowledge in the West and in Africa as her professional identity vis-à-vis her African heritage. Furthermore, she deliberates on the development of nursing knowledge as the nexus by which she re-(membered) her African ways of knowing and learning. The endeavour is to address some of these questions: can one reflect out loud (Cruz, 2008) about African knowledge in the context of Western academia?; Why do Africans keep audibly silent about the knowledge they have?; Is her African knowledge considered knowledge by the West?; and, Is Western knowledge relevant for her as an African or is it relevant for her nursing practice?

The Patterns of Knowing in Nursing

The work of nursing scholars such as Carper (1978), White (1995), Meleis (2007) and Chinn and Kramer (2008) identifies multiple ways of knowing because no single set of ideas holds all the answers (Nzimande, 2009), especially in clinical nursing settings. These nursing scholars identify the following four essential elements as the major patterns of knowing in nursing: empirics (science of nursing); aesthetics (art of nursing); experiential (personal knowing); and ethics (moral component of knowledge in nursing).

Apart from the empirics, all these patterns together with the emancipatory pattern are echoed as the major patterns of knowing and learning by Africans in

Africa. While these are the African ways of knowing, the tenets of learning and knowledge are coined around: (i) etiquette; (ii) reciprocity; (iii) engagement; (iv) reflection and reflective practices; and (v) dialoguing and conversation. As Africans, we often use the humanistic approach in our ways of knowing as opposed to the empirical way of knowing, while the Western cultures primarily favour the empirical ways of knowing. The writer agrees with Magga (2005), who suggests that both approaches are ‘not entirely mutually exclusive’ and separating the two approaches would be an act of gross negligence (Magga, 2005: 8).

The writer’s reflections lead her to believe that her African genesis has provided her with the knowledge that makes her proud among foreign nations. She took this knowledge to be part of her precious stone necklace ‘*Pheta ya thaga*’. Africans should not allow anyone to take this away from them as it is part of who they are and have been. And as Nana Mansa II reminded us, Africans could have collectively chosen to or been seduced into forgetting who they are as Africans given the weight and power of memory and the truly radical act that re-mem-bering may represent in people’s present lives. Through the ravages of slavery, colonisation and apartheid and their inequitable outcomes, Africans have learnt to be both complicit and vigilant in this process of figuring out what and how they want to know and learn as Africans.

The Writer’s Personal Memories

The first question which I tried to address was: “Can I reflect aloud (Cruz, 2008) about African knowledge?” Posing this question was very difficult, as it was an acknowledgement of what I have never expressed or doubted while in my beloved continent. I know that I am the great-granddaughter of Sekhukhune and my umbilical cord was buried at Ga-Mphahlele. It was a painful question to ask myself, as I was to succumb to the pain of embracing Western knowledge that perpetuates colonisation and segregation in my country even after decades of democracy. I became restless as I realised that I was on the part of the conveyor belt and transmission line of Western nursing knowledge in Africa.

As mentioned already, my thoughts about African knowledge surfaced during my PhD coursework. In one particular course we deliberated and discussed the origins of nursing knowledge from the perspectives of various nursing scholars. I was overwhelmed to such an extent that when I was alone, I always held personal conversations with myself. I was looking inward to see if I knew anything regarding this ‘knowledge’ they were talking about.

As the course advanced I began to realise that I too have unique knowledge which was passed on to me by my great-grandmother. In my awakening I reflected on the knowledge that my great-grandmother passed to me and began to see it as unique knowledge that echoes personal authenticity which helped me to appreciate 'others' frames of reference and collective reciprocity (Prinsloo, 2000). These features asserted my identity as an African woman because they bear witness to who I am. Above and beyond this, people around me are able to distinguish me because of my African ontology.

This question took me back to Ramorake, a small village in Ga-Mphahlele, Limpopo. I remember that as young girls, every night in our homes wise women of the village taught us about womanhood in the African ancestral ways of knowing (Cruz, 2008). The teachings involved knowing and learning opportunities for the elders and the young. We went through the teachings knowing that one day we would have to teach our children, their children and their children's children, as our African knowledge is organic and circular (Venter, 2004). These memories led me to realise that I can reflect aloud about the African knowledge which I possess in academia, despite the fact that there is an absence of written records on these ancestral ways of knowing which I acquired (Wane, 2005).

The West as Fortress of Global Knowledge

The second disturbing question is: 'Why do Africans keep audibly silent about the knowledge they have?' The writer struggles with the point mentioned by Cruz (2008), that academia is a place where knowledge is produced. The writer agrees with Sofola (1998) in Nnaemaka (1998) that academia is an irrelevant place to seek knowledge on things pertaining to Africa because it dictates to African students what constitutes knowledge. As a Western territory it silences anyone who attempts to walk and talk outside this assigned place (Cruz, 2008). As I revisited both the breadth and depth of my knowing and learning, I re-(membered) that as Africans what we have learnt is not only from the four corners of the room or behind the desks, but from the communal fireplaces, under the tribal trees and from our own grandparents. As my reflections were getting deeper and deeper on this particular question, I asked myself how I could validate the authenticity of these ways of knowing and learning that I possess. The work of Adler (1965) speaks directly to me on this aspect. Adler (1965) says that knowledge is to be validated by those who are to embrace it. The work stipulates that there should be cooperation among the people who are embracing the knowledge; they should disagree and/or agree about the answers or seek adjudication regarding the

difference; and the place and context for which the knowledge was developed must be willing and able to answer the same questions piecemeal.

The knowledge that I proclaim is African, and it has been handed down to me by the greatest men and women of Africa. My knowledge is de-centred by the texts of the academics, as it is 'lived, experienced knowledge'; it is organic and circular, and that is how it is validated. The imperial eyes of the West legitimise any work that fits their framework (Tuhiwai Smith, 1999). The Western framework is in contrast with the African framework and others around the world. I used the work of Polifroni and Welch on 'Truth: An exploration and intuition' (Polifroni and Welch, 1999). In the work they list the sources of truth as authority, tradition, common sense and science, while Kikuchi and Simmons (1999) elaborate more on common sense as a practical nursing judgement. These nursing scholars indicate that knowledge can be validated as the truth through these sources. This verifies my certainty that the character of African knowledge validates itself as truth. In my case, the fundamental truth that I assert is that African knowledge is, indeed, true. I share this statement with Kikuchi and Simmons (1999) when they state that the truth of a judgement is solely based on a specific individual. On the other hand, in order for me to be heard I must locate myself within the prescribed and described way of the West. Through this I am forced to surrender to the mind of the coloniser, which is silencing and contaminating my ways of knowing and learning.

As a product of Bantu education under apartheid, my educational knowing was determined for me, but not by me. Hence today I experience this internal distress about my ontology and epistemology irrespective of the fact that I am aware of my African existence. My internal distress is due to the fact that Africans are made to have no clear knowledge any more. The four main impurities of knowledge: slavery, colonisation, postcolonisation, and even globalisation (Gaye Hanson and Smiley, 2006) are contaminating African knowledge, including knowledge used in nursing practice. The healthcare systems in Africa are the poorer for embracing foreign paradigms for healing and caring for African patients (Wane, 2005). I agree with Wane (2005), who maintains that African healing practices and caring dimensions were deliberately attacked and distorted by the missionaries.

Africa as the Outpost Knowledge Production

The third question is whether African knowledge is considered knowledge by the West. Nnaemeka (2003) states that Africa is viewed as the outpost of knowledge production by the West. Elaborating on this perspective further, Nnaemeka

(2003: 367) makes the point that Africans are instrumentalised as researchers/scholars. This implies that they are the instruments for the collection of raw data which foreign (Western) scholars use to manufacture knowledge.

Furthermore, the West perceives Africa as a place where their scholarship is produced, and where careers are built. This notion is observed when Western researchers do not include Africans as collaborators or co-authors but as informants who are thanked at the completion of the research projects (Nnaemeka, 2003). No efforts are made by the West to transform the raw data and findings together with the African informants as equal participants in the intellectual enterprise (Nnaemeka, 2003). Instead, the Western scholars/researchers use the raw data for the development of theories and further exercise proprietary rights over the developed knowledge – clearly, a form of cognitive imperialism (Wane, 2005). Cognitive imperialism uses the raw data from Africa by manipulation to fit the language, culture, and frame of reference of imperialism (Wane, 2005). This results in the deliberate omission of African knowledge in the academic arena.

The Writer's Coconut Status

The final reflection in this chapter is based on the question of whether Western knowledge is relevant for me as an African; or is it relevant for my nursing practice. If the answer is in the affirmative then I am a coconut. This implies that I am brown outside and white inside. In a democratic nation I am at liberty to embrace any knowledge I encounter, until I abandon it when new and better knowledge is available to be embraced. The push and pull forces which I am experiencing are caused by the monocultural (Mulholland, 1995) development of global nursing knowledge which is also a unidirectional enterprise (Nnaemeka, 2003).

Written Eurocentric history tells us that nursing knowledge originated from the Western world. Surprisingly, this knowledge is usually applied to every location worldwide. This notion is questionable, as universal validity and application of knowledge take place in the clinical setting where the research question originates (Lutzen, 2000). This implies that as African nurses within African healthcare settings we are validating knowledge which was developed by the West for their patients. Mulholland (1995) alludes to how transcultural models were introduced in healthcare settings, especially in nursing, after the increase in recognition of the monocultural aspect of knowledge development. The transcultural theories address the universality of nursing across cultures (Ketefian and Redman, 1997). From my perspective as an African nursing scholar, the transcultural nursing theories do not recognise my personal embodied knowing.

The transcultural theories are relevant for those nurses who are caring for patients from a different cultural background in order to provide congruent cultural competence in nursing care. In my case, I share similar cultural dimensions with my patients. The only way I differ from the patients as fellow Africans is my nursing training, which is derived mainly from Western ideologies.

Lutzen (2000) however mesmerises me when she identifies the key issues which need to be critically analysed for the development of global nursing knowledge. She emphasises the issue of distinct values in nursing from country to country, together with the issue of importing and exporting nursing theories among countries. But, I am completely against the global development of nursing knowledge which is both monocultural (Mulholland, 1995) and often a unidirectional enterprise (Nnaemeka, 2003). Both perpetuate the universality, rather than the diversification, of nursing practice.

By reflecting on these four issues I realised that I was in the second phase of colonial repression and cultural trauma as identified by Mborn (2004). It is stated that in this phase the colonised, after being assimilated into the coloniser's culture, will start experiencing disturbing feelings and will start remembering who they are. Furthermore, Downing and Roush would assert that I have developed a pseudo-identity, as I am working against both the traditional African ways and the dominant culture of Western ways (Downing and Roush, 1985). I yearn for the day when African nurses will interrogate 'their to be' nursing knowledge piece by piece because doing so will be relevant to their African nursing practice. I raise this because knowledge and power go hand in hand, as cited by Mulholland (1995). White (1995) supports this statement, suggesting that knowing is a sociopolitical pattern. In other words, you know what is socially and politically acceptable for your context. As long as knowledge development is still in the hands of the African colonisers, Africa will remain a colony with contaminated knowledge, which is not relevant to her people.

Outside the borders of Africa and being located in the West, I am forced to speak in the manner of the West. In this context language, as Cruz (2008) points out, becomes a vehicle for colonisation but can also be a vehicle on the road to liberation. I came across sources in the literature which suggest that the barrier to producing an appropriate knowledge for Africa is the issue of language (Ajula, 2001). I do not worry about the kaleidoscopic nature of ethnic differences in Africa, as I know that the people of Africa share the same African philosophy, called *botho* in my South African mother tongue.

Conclusion

In my awakening I have realised that never again will I be silent about my position as an African with unique knowledge. However, when considering the issue of honesty to my reflections, I have mixed feelings on how African nurses can best develop their own nursing knowledge which is relevant to their own nursing practice. From the presentation in this article, I may propose the following possibilities:

- *Fusion of horizon*: Where both African and Western knowledge ideologies can meet as equal but different in order to
 - unite the search for nursing knowledge strategies for relevant nursing practice for the two worldviews
 - facilitate an interactive turn by the universal dominant knowledge development arenas
 - enhance collaboration of nursing scholars in the West with the African nurse scholars in knowledge development rather than developing nursing knowledge for them.
- *Absolute erasure of Western nursing practice from African nursing terrains*

This will promote the Africanisation of nursing, which is not what African nurses yearn for. The African nurses yearn for an African-based nursing practice that is embedded in specific African cultures across the continent in order to address African diversity. In other words, a nursing practice that will connect with real-life issues of the African population. Furthermore, it will be a nursing practice that has the identificatory possibilities (O'Loughlin, 2009) of both the practitioner and the patient. According to Wane (2005), this is possible if nurse scholars in Africa can: (i) deconstruct the way in which the current nursing knowledge was developed and used; (ii) renew their understanding of the concepts of health, nursing, and healing; and (iii) opt for a bottom-up strategy in their expedition of learning and knowing, as the grassroots people are the knowers of what needs to be known.

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CHAPTER 38

South African Scientists and Engineers Leading the Walk to Innovation

Kedibone Aphané and Hendra Van Zyl

Background

Over the past four years, the Web and Media Technologies (WMT) has implemented a community informatics project, profiling the National Science and Technology Forum (NSTF) award winners as ambassadors of science and technology at South African universities. The aim of this project is to encourage university students to pursue postgraduate studies in the fields of science, engineering and technology. The ultimate goal of this endeavour is to increase the current research and development (R&D) workforce within the science, engineering, technology and innovation (SETI) organisations in South Africa. The NSTF award winners are individuals and teams which have made outstanding contributions within the science, engineering and technology fields by either their research outputs or innovation. They are based at science councils, universities, science centres, small and medium enterprises, and not-for-profit organisations. It is against this background that the WMT identified universities as ideal environments in which the NSTF award winners can share their knowledge with students within the science, engineering and technology fields.

Since 2007, knowledge sharing activities have been implemented in the six provinces of South Africa (Eastern Cape, Free State, Gauteng, Limpopo, KwaZulu Natal and Western Cape) in the following institutions:

- Cape Peninsula University of Technology
- University of Cape Town
- Fort Hare University
- Bloemfontein campus of the University of Free State
- QwaQwa campus of the University of Free State
- Polokwane campus of the University of Limpopo
- University of KwaZulu Natal
- University of Pretoria
- Rhodes University
- University of Stellenbosch

- Witwatersrand University
- University of Venda

Surveys were conducted on both the NSTF award winners and students who participated in knowledge sharing events. Semi-structured questionnaires were administered to students after the talk by the award winners. The questionnaires had three objectives:

- To determine which of the ICTs on their campuses is most effective in publicising the knowledge sharing events.
- To establish whether students comprehend the content of the award winner's presentation.
- To establish the students' perceptions of career and research in the area of science, engineering and technology.

A different kind of questionnaire was administered to the award winners. The objective of the award winner's questionnaire was to gather inputs that can enable the WMT to improve the processes in the expert-to-student knowledge transfer model. Since 2007, a total of 852 questionnaires have been completed by students who have attended the knowledge sharing activities, of which 694 were from the special lectures and 258 from motivational talks.

Project Aim

To encourage students to pursue postgraduate studies in the fields of science, engineering and technology.

Project Objectives

- To clarify the science of the NSTF award winner's field of expertise.
- To highlight research opportunities within the NSTF award winner's field of expertise.
- To explore various career prospects within the NSTF award winner's field of expertise.

ICTs used to Publicise Knowledge Sharing Events

Campus radios, intranet and e-mails were used to publicise the knowledge sharing events. The notice for special lectures, better known as public service

announcements (PSA), were announced on campus radio three days before the special lectures. The adverts were also placed on the university intranet, the campus e-newsletter. E-mails were sent to students in the relevant departments and printouts were placed on notice boards of these departments. Social network sites; Twitter and Facebook were also used to publicise special lectures and motivational talks. The WMT has created a group on Facebook: Friends of NSTF award winners. This group is open to anyone who would like to share information on innovations in science, engineering and technology. Everyone who is a member of this group automatically receives an invite to attend a knowledge sharing event every time an event is added on the wall of the group.

Definitions

Community Informatics

Gurstein (2008: 30) defines community informatics as the application of information and communication technologies (ICTs) to enable community processes and the achievement of community objectives. In this project, the campus radio, intranet and e-mails were used to publicise knowledge sharing events between the NSTF award winners and students.

Community Objectives

- Clarifying and explaining the science of the award winner to the students.
- Highlighting research opportunities within the award winner's field to the students.
- Exploring possible career prospects within the award winner's field to the students.

Knowledge

Alavi and Leidner (2001: 32), Linh (2004: 17), Davenport and Prusak (1998: 45), and Nonaka and Takeuchi (1995: 47) are in agreement that knowledge is a fluid mix of framed experience, values, contextual information and expert insight. The above scholars have made a distinction between two qualities of knowledge: explicit and tacit. Explicit knowledge can be expressed by words, tacit knowledge cannot be expressed in words, but it refers to visible and demonstrable skills.

This project adopts Alavi and Leidner's definition of knowledge as a justified belief that increases individual capacity to take effective action. The award winners, by virtue of being recipients of the NSTF awards, justify their roles

as science, engineering and technology ambassadors in tertiary institutions. In support of Alavi and Leidner's definition, Linh (2004: 17) defines knowledge as a combination of data and information to which is added expert opinion, skills and experience. Therefore, that expert opinion, skills and experience result in a valuable asset which can be used to aid decision making. Davenport and Prusak (1998: 45) suggest that knowledge has to do with flexible and adaptable skills and a person's ability to generate and apply information. It is against this background that exposing students to role models of the calibre of NSTF award winners can encourage them to pursue postgraduate studies in the areas of science, engineering and technology.

Knowledge Transfer

Lockett, Kerr and Robinson (2007: 93) suggest that knowledge transfer is the two-way transfer of ideas, research results, expertise or skills between one party and another that enables the creation of new knowledge in its use.

Theoretical Frameworks Guiding the Implementation of the Expert-to-Student Knowledge Transfer Model

Nonaka and Takeuchi's knowledge management model

The expert-to-student knowledge transfer model draws from Nonaka and Takeuchi's (1995: 59) knowledge management model. This model explains the transformation of tacit knowledge into explicit knowledge. It follows a four-step process:

- Socialisation
- Externalisation
- Combination
- Internalisation

First step: Socialisation (tacit-to-tacit)

Nonaka and Takeuchi (1995: 52) propose that socialisation is a process of sharing knowledge through social interactions. People have know-how, secrets and personal skills that will never be shared if nobody works on them and makes them explicit. It is very important to try to gather this knowledge by socialising, which is, using face-to-face communication or better, sharing experience directly at work through two roles: the tutor and the apprentice. This sharing involves arriving at a mutual understanding through the sharing of mental

models. That way, there will be little risk that the know-how of a company is lost when long-serving employees retire. *Socialisation* is a very effective means of knowledge creation, maybe one of the easiest but nevertheless among the more limited. It is also very difficult and time-consuming to disseminate all knowledge using this mode only. Although the students can engage in face-to-face communication with the NSTF award winners, the allocated time for the special lectures and motivational talks seems to be inadequate for the socialisation.

Second step: Externalisation (tacit-to-explicit)

The process of *externalisation* (tacit-to-explicit) gives visible form to tacit knowledge and converts it to explicit knowledge. It can be defined as an ideal knowledge creation process in that tacit knowledge becomes explicit, taking the shapes of metaphors, analogies, concepts, hypotheses or models. In this mode, individuals are able to articulate their knowledge and know-how and, in some cases, their know-why and care-why (Nonaka and Takeuchi, 1995: 53). An intermediary is often needed to execute this process. For instance, a journalist can be considered as the typical person able to interview knowledgeable individuals in order to extract, model and synthesise their knowledge in a different way (format, length) and thereby increase its scope so that a larger audience can understand and apply that content (Nonaka and Takeuchi, 1995: 54). In this project, the campus radio presenters, during the interviews with the NSTF award winners, play an intermediary role by asking relevant questions that enabled the externalisation of tacit knowledge.

Third step: Combination (explicit-to-explicit)

According to Nonaka and Takeuchi (1995: 54), combination is a process which involves recombining discrete pieces of explicit knowledge into a new form. The content has been consolidated so that it will make more sense. In this project, the combination process occurs when the NSTF award winners consolidate their knowledge into a content that can be understood by students. The WMT uses the questionnaire to determine whether that content makes sense to the students or not. To date, the feedback from students indicates the success of the combination process.

Fourth step: Internalisation (explicit-to-tacit)

The last conversion process, *internalisation*, occurs by diffusing and embedding newly acquired and consolidated knowledge. Internalisation is strongly linked to 'learning by doing'. Internalisation converts shared or individual experiences and knowledge into individual mental models. Once internalised, new knowledge

is then used by people who broaden it, extend it and reframe it within their own existing tacit knowledge (Nonaka and Takeuchi, 1995: 55). Although this process does not happen instantly in this project, it is one of the long-term goals of the project, in terms of which students would have completed their junior degrees and be working as interns whilst pursuing their postgraduate degrees.

Lasswell's Communication Model

This is a linear communication model in that it consists of the speaker, message, medium, audience and effect. In this project, the campus radio interviews in which the NSTF award winners talk about research and career opportunities are drawn from Lasswell's (1948: 40) linear communication model. The award winner plays the role of speaker, the message is the content of the interview and the radio is the medium. The student population is the audience and the assumed effect would be an increased interest in pursuing postgraduate studies in science, engineering and technology.

Shannon and Weaver's Communication Model

According to this model, the communicator's mouth is the transmitter, the voice and body language of the communicator is the signal and the ears of the other person are the receiver. The communicator sends the message to the other person through the air. During the message delivery, there are some distortions such as noise, and environmental distortions that could cause miscommunication. While this message is being received by the other person, he or she has to decode it to access the meaning. Both sender and receiver are responsible for ensuring that the communication is a success, such as by re-asking (Shannon and Weaver, 1949: 40). The setting of special lectures and motivational talks creates a platform on which students can ask for clarity from award winners and that clarifies any misconceptions about academic careers in the area of science, engineering and technology.

Refinement of the Expert-to-Student Knowledge Transfer Model

In addition to the face to face and radio knowledge sharing activities, the WMT developed a discussion forum on the NSTF Award winner's website. According to Callan (2005: 40), discussion forums are online platforms positioned for knowledge sharing whereby one can post information on a particular topic and everyone who belongs to that forum can comment and the comments are not

bound by time. Discussion forums are pull technologies which enable the capturing and sharing of information. Considering their nature, discussion forums can create and develop into valuable information repositories. The fact that the discussion is not in real time means that it rarely turns into heated arguments, as people are given time to research and consider their comments before replying, which makes for mostly high quality discussions. WMT, cognisant of the benefits of discussion forums, initiated a discussion forum project with the science and engineering departments of various tertiary institutions. These platforms were created on the NSTF award winner's website. Both the NSTF award winners and students were informed about the steps to login, and passwords were granted for both parties. The expected interactions on the forums did not materialise.

Challenges

Although discussion forums were considered as ideal platforms for sharing knowledge between students and NSTF award winners, students still preferred the face-to-face interaction. Time remained a huge challenge for both the NSTF award winners and students. The NSTF award winners are not only top South African scientists, but they are involved in international projects with other scientists and their extensive travelling schedules contributed to the time constraint.

Way Forward

The results of the questionnaires from both the students and NSTF award winners indicated that both parties are keen to continue to engage in issues relating to prospects in science, engineering and technology, but they are prohibited by time constraints. In an effort to address this time constraint, the WMT optimised on the anytime, anywhere and anyhow feature of social networking sites. A Facebook group was created with the aim to enable students and NSTF award winners to continue with the dialogues in their own time and in their own space. Both NSTF award winners and students were requested to join the Facebook group. What makes Facebook unique from other social network site is it is mostly used to maintain pre-existing relationships (Ellison, Steinfield and Lampe, 2007: 12, 144). This unique functionality of Facebook motivated the WMT to explore it as an optional platform to address the challenge of time constraint. At the moment the Facebook group has 49 members which are constituted by NSTF award winners and people interested in engaging issues in science, engineering and technology.

Conclusion

Although the rate of online interactions between the NSTF award winners and students has not yet reached the expected outcome, the offline interactions indicate a high level of appreciation from both students and NSTF award winners.

Comments of students on the benefits of knowledge transfer activities include:
‘It opened my mind to new ideas.’

‘I am very motivated to continue my studies in organic chemistry’; ‘Understanding the application of genetics is useful and to see how learning opportunities are created is inspiring.’

‘Encourages young future scientists to join the research sector to help improve the issues related to the investigated subjects.’

‘I have come to realise that in any skills you acquire you can develop something for the community or the whole.’

Comments from NSTF award winners include:

‘It was refreshing to make a small contribution as a potential role model to the young and upcoming scientists.’

‘I enjoyed giving the special lecture because it gave me a chance to express my views on basic research to a large audience.’

‘Personally it meant a lot and I was more encouraged and motivated to keep on promoting science.’

‘Often one is talking to the converted – would be nice to have a way of talking to others such as scholars and policymakers.’

In conclusion, a clear message was sent by students that they greatly appreciated the opportunity to learn from these experts; and NSTF award winners in turn graciously made time in their busy schedules to participate in the knowledge transfer activities, as they recognised that these would benefit the students.

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CHAPTER 39

African Research and Development Surveys: Highlights from the South African Success

Saahier Parker and Natalie Vlotman

Introduction

Throughout the history of humanity, the world has played host to numerous revolutions taking shape in as many forms. Adopting the definition of a revolution as ‘a fundamental change from one mode of existence to another’, we have seen the agricultural, industrial, scientific and countless political and ideological revolutions change the shape and course of human existence. In this very same spirit, the history of economies is bookmarked by the events that brought about radical change in the means of productivity for populations, and most often has proved infectious as this altered the means of economic mobility spread across regions.

The world today is again involved in this process of change, in which economies the world over are shifting importance from industrially or agriculturally based economies to a more knowledge based economy, in which the production and dissemination of knowledge is itself the key in the creation of wealth and future economic upward movement in the given system. Moreover, this has now more than ever reduced the nodal ideology within the global economy and placed far greater importance on the ability and necessity to be connected to the global platform in order to provide further relevance and importance to local economies. Science and technology play the most important frontline roles in such revolutions, providing the solutions as well as the appropriate questions to resolve current and future social, commercial and scientific problems, and thereby contributing to continued prosperity.

As the steady and often invisible evolution of the knowledge-based economy progresses, academia and governments alike have had a keen interest in tracking the development and impact of knowledge economy evolution through the use of various indicators and similar measures of impact and assessment.

This chapter explores science and technology systems on the African continent and seeks to provide an understanding of their value and importance by looking at some of the successes that have been achieved through the adoption and adaptation of international best practices from Europe and the Americas. By

examining the work of the African Science, Technology and Innovation Indicators (ASTII) initiative, the intention was to evaluate progress within the African S&T system. However, because the publication of the results of the various African R&D surveys has been delayed, the chapter relies on pre-existing African S&T data and looks at issues of measurement and measuring S&T in Africa. It further highlights the successes from the South African system by presenting findings from the latest South African national R&D survey for the first time, following the official launch on 9 September 2010 by the Minister of Science and Technology.

Value and Importance of R&D Surveys

Science and technology (S&T) has a major role to play in current and future development on the great African continent. With the vast array of developmental challenges, current thinking needs to be expanded so that technologies can provide increased and enhanced solutions and African scientists enabled to produce African responses to the very many shared challenges affecting the continent, both as individual nations and the continent as a whole. Key to addressing domestic, regional and continental challenges is the establishment of integrated S&T systems and, on a broader level, S&T networks within and across nations. The objective is to create an understanding of the extent of research and development currently undertaken within individual territories and across the continent as a whole. This is where the issue of measurement becomes salient, and the various methodological and practical boundaries that constantly envelop S&T measurement.

S&T measurement can be considered to be as old as science itself since it involves practitioners collecting and documenting research endeavours as a basic constituent of scientific and academic conversational records. However, the formalisation of modern S&T measurement can be traced to the 1950s, when the National Science Foundation in the United States of America (USA) began a process of measurement formalisation and eventually published *Science Indicators*, giving rise to regional and international measurement and comparison systems. In Western Europe the OECD had already been working within the European Community – now the European Union – to standardise measurement methodology and comparison techniques across the region towards developing standardised measurement manuals that are still in use today and are considered as international best practice. This standardisation in measurement techniques has ensured reliable multi-region comparison across surveys.

S&T surveys have proven extremely valuable in measuring not only local S&T investment; they also serve as a healthy comparison across regional

expenditures. With the adoption of international best practice in guideline manuals such as the Frascati (R&D surveys), Oslo (Innovation surveys) and Canberra (Human resources) manuals, measurement standardisation has come a long way to the point of making comparisons possible and viable within and across regions. While a number of varying S&T indicators are currently in use, the most commonly used and most often quoted of these indicators is R&D expenditure intensity, frequently measured in national surveys of research and experimental development (R&D). R&D surveys form the most widely used part of a total system of indicator producing research (where available) and, together with innovation, human resource and funding sources based surveys, they form a powerful suite of tools at the disposal of academics, politicians and policymakers within the national scientific system. This salience of R&D survey results may be in part due to the experience by a larger community of practice that makes producing R&D indicators more accessible due to their being more readily measurable than any other type of S&T indicator.

In addressing the current societal challenges as well as new ones in the emerging knowledge economies, the value and importance of R&D indicators becomes more apparent not only as a scorecard for comparison, but more so as we examine these indicators and understand the potential value-output to be derived from the measured value-input into R&D within particular fields of science. Important here are outputs affecting socioeconomic development, bridging urban-rural divides (using technology), social transformation and international competitiveness. Moreover, tracking and reporting R&D (and S&T as a whole) through surveys is also important as it allows policymakers to understand funding flows allocated to R&D projects by both private and public funding sources. Furthermore, this also enables a tracking system identifying human resource capabilities and strategic HR gaps that may exist at various spheres.

The Known and Unknown: African R&D Surveys

R&D surveys have become commonplace throughout most of the developed world, especially in the North American region and throughout the Eurozone. However, within the developing world, not many nations have seen the value of identifying national competitiveness in global knowledge economies or the importance of knowing one's strategic R&D capability by running a national R&D survey. Certain developing countries in South East Asia and the Southern and Central Americas have also produced R&D surveys, and have since maintained a steady series of survey data. Some of these countries have gone on to meet the requirements of becoming member states of the OECD, including Chile, Mexico,

Japan and Korea. However, that being said, much of the developing world still does not maintain regular data sets on R&D and innovative capabilities.

In Africa, South Africa has long been conducting R&D surveys according to the Frascati methodology, albeit on an interrupted basis since 1966. Within the SADC community, many member states now have dedicated departments overseeing state S&T initiatives. Although South Africa has the most developed S&T system on the continent, in recent years other SADC countries like Mozambique, Botswana and Namibia have initiated projects to measure R&D activities within their territories. Despite this, further north, R&D measurement on the continent is uncommon, both as a result and as a cause of underdevelopment. Within the countries that have conducted R&D surveys, many have not yet established a regular series of R&D surveys or are yet to adopt the Frascati method to promote greater international comparability and recognition of the survey results.

Nonetheless, in the rest of the African region a few countries have conducted R&D surveys. These countries include Algeria, Angola, Burkina Faso, Cameroon, Egypt, Ethiopia, Gabon, Ghana, Kenya, Lesotho, Malawi, Mali, Nigeria, Senegal, Tanzania, Uganda and Zambia. In December 2009, representatives of these countries met in Addis Ababa, Ethiopia to discuss a strategic partnership under the African Science, Technology and Innovation Indicators (ASTII) initiative, with the view of building shared knowledge and learning surrounding S&T indicator production on the continent and the formation of an African observatory for science, technology and innovation.

The rationale behind the formation of ASTII is primarily to adopt a unified approach toward the measurement and monitoring of Africa's scientific and technological development with a view to addressing many of the grand challenges that affect the entire region. These challenges, continental and regional, include but are not limited to food security, regional security and stability, economic growth, health and education. In order to achieve this, participant countries have agreed to collaborate in order to conduct R&D and related S&T surveys within their regions as a first step toward establishing domestic records of internal systems of innovation. This data will then be collected and stored by the newly established African Observatory for Science, Technology and Innovation (AOSTI), a move towards standardisation and a central point of networking within the region on S&T related matters.

In March 2002, S&T policymakers within the EU Council agreed on a benchmark of three per cent (of GDP) national spend on R&D for member countries by 2010. In South Africa the Department of Science and Technology set a target of one per cent of GDP by 2010 as an initial expenditure benchmark. This benchmark has been adopted by the ASTII initiative as a target for bolstering S&T

development across the region for African member countries. As a goal of the initiative, measurement and eventual achievement of the goal of one per cent of GDP spent on R&D within member countries is at the fore, but the ultimate objective of the initiative is to build Africa's capacity to develop and effectively use S&T indicators to respond to the various challenges mentioned above and to systematically enhance the region's strategic capability to meet those challenges through shared resources, training and development.

Many of the member states have undertaken surveys on research and innovation partly funded under the ASTII initiative and due to this the most recent results of individual country surveys were expected to be published in the ASTII report in the fourth quarter of 2010. Many historic datasets exist for regions across Africa although, as previously mentioned, many of these datasets are not part of a reliable data series and most if not all of the data sets are not based on survey data (Frascati or otherwise) but are instead data generated as a result of partial datasets or based on estimation by national experts from within the regions. Furthermore, the only complete dataset available for a single year is – as indicated in table 1 below – for 2005. All preceding and subsequent years do not have annual representation by all of the countries listed below. The only regions reporting survey-based data (rather than estimation or partial data) are Botswana, South Africa and Uganda, with South Africa conducting annual R&D surveys.

Table 1: GERD as a per centage of GDP

2005 (UNESCO data)	
Country	GERD as a % GDP
Algeria*	0,067
Botswana	0,383
Democratic Republic of Congo**	0,479
Egypt*	0,249
Ethiopia*	0,181
Madagascar*	0,175
Mauritius**	0,379
South Africa	0,919
Sudan**	0,289
Tunisia**	1,022
Uganda	0,227
Zambia*	0,028

Source: Unesco (2005)

* Partial data only

** Estimation data

The South African R&D Survey

South Africa has conducted a number of R&D surveys with the first survey based on the OECD guidelines completed in 1966 (Blankley and Kahn, 2005). The OECD Frascati Manual presents standard practices and guidelines, definitions and methodological recommendations as international best practice for R&D surveys. The Frascati Manual is based on experiences gained from collecting R&D statistics in OECD member countries; however, as a result of initiatives of the OECD, the United Nations Scientific and Cultural Organisation (UNESCO), the EU and various other regional organisations, the Frascati Manual has become a standard for R&D surveys worldwide (OECD, 2002).

Blankley and Kahn (2005) describe the history of the South African R&D surveys, tracking it from 1966 and describing the various government departments and scientific bodies which initiated and conducted the surveys. The R&D survey was put out on open tender from 1991–92 and was awarded to the Foundation for Research Development (FRD). After 1992, the R&D survey was conducted by different service providers and was consequently subjected to different approaches and methodologies. In 2002, the Department of Arts, Culture, Science and Technology – currently divided into the Department of Science and Technology (DST) and the Department of Arts and Culture (DAC) – commissioned the then newly formed HSRC Knowledge Management Group to conduct and re-establish the R&D survey series (Blankley and Kahn, 2005).

These gaps in the survey series, as well as the DST's commitment to increase the rate and quality of research and innovation in South Africa, gave rise to the continuing R&D survey series with the 2001/02 R&D survey as the baseline. A memorandum of understanding was established between DST and Statistics South Africa (StatsSA) declaring the R&D survey results as official statistics. The DST now contracts the Centre for Science and Technology Innovation Indicators (CeSTII), based at the HSRC, to conduct the R&D survey on an annual basis. Since its inception, CeSTII has conducted seven R&D surveys (2001/02; 2003/04; 2004/05; 2005/06; 2006/07; 2007/08; 2008/09) with the eighth survey that was underway towards the end of 2010.

Methodology


The R&D survey is conducted nationally on an annual basis and covers both private and public sectors. The private sector includes the business sector, comprising large, medium and small enterprises (state-owned enterprises included), and the formally registered not-for-profit sector comprising non-governmental and other organisations. The public sector comprises the government sector

(national, provincial and local government departments with an R&D component, research institutes and museums), the higher education sector comprising all 23 public higher education (tertiary) institutions, one private university and the nine science councils.

The sampling methods per sector vary because sector-specific conditions require these minor variations. The business sector and not-for-profit sector follow a purposive sampling method of all known or most likely to perform R&D organisations. Government departments, higher education and the science councils in turn are surveyed as a census. In-house registers for each sector have been developed and are continuously updated. Registers contain organisational information and respondent information as well as contact information. Survey data is collected using a questionnaire that is similar across the five sectors. Higher education and business sector questionnaires differ slightly as they include a few extra questions which are sector specific. Questionnaires also include some questions which are not required by the Frascati manual, but which are of importance to the South African policy environment. Questionnaires are administered by post, electronically, telephonically and during contact interviews. All R&D data is captured on a database called the Survey Management and Results System (SMRS). Once the survey data has been captured and analysed, the Key High Level Results booklet of the R&D survey is produced, followed by a more comprehensive report which includes the detailed results. Only aggregated data is published to ensure the confidentiality of an organisation's information as required by the Statistics Act 6 of 1999.

Selected Key Findings of the South African R&D Surveys R&D Expenditures

Figure 1: Change in GERD as a percentage of GDP over time (2004–05 to 2007–08)



Source: South African R&D survey

Data on gross expenditure on R&D (GERD) as a per centage of GDP from 2004–05 until the most recent publicly available data can be seen in figure 1. The graph depicts steady increases in gross expenditure on R&D as a per centage of GDP from 2004–05 and a decrease in R&D from 2006–07 until 2007–08. Further R&D data will inform on whether there appears to be a slowing down in the rate of GERD to GDP over the last two surveys, but this picture will emerge in detail once the most recent R&D data becomes available.¹

R&D Performers

Table 2: In-house R&D expenditure per sector (2004–05–2007–08)

	2004–2005	2005–2006	2006–2007	2007–2008
	R	R	R	R
TOTAL (R 000)	12 009 981	14 149 239	16 520 584	18 624 013
PERFORMING SECTORS	(%)	(%)	(%)	(%)
BUSINESS	56,34	58,26	55,95	57,66
GOVERNMENT	4,29	5,97	6,18	6,20
HIGHER EDUCATION	21,10	19,31	19,97	19,45
NPOs	1,65	1,60	1,29	1,20
SCIENCE COUNCILS	16,62	14,86	16,61	15,50
TOTAL	100,00	100,00	100,00	100,00

Source: *South African R&D survey*

The above section has alluded to a drop in the ratio of GERD to GDP as indicated in figure 1; however, in monetary terms it is clear from table 2 that expenditure on R&D has increased in South Africa, although not at the same rate as the increase in GDP, thereby causing the decline in the indicator GERD to GDP to the current level. The business sector is the biggest performer of R&D and accounts for more than half of the total R&D expenditure (table 2), followed by the higher education and government sectors. Historically, the NPO sector accounts for a small proportion of R&D (usually around 1%).

In their study of historic time series of R&D survey data, Blankley and Kahn (2005) mentioned that R&D spending did not keep pace with the rise in GDP. The most recent data still reflects this, as it is evident that there are increases in R&D

spend per sector but these increases are not noticeable in gross expenditure on R&D (GERD) as a percentage of GDP.

Human Resources Devoted to R&D, by Type of Personnel and Employer

Table 3: Headcount and FTE figures of R&D personnel by sector (2004–05–2007–08)

	2004–2005		2005–2006	
RESEARCHERS	Headcount	FTE	Headcount	FTE
Business	6575	5300,66	7480	5895,74
Government	692	491,05	874	650,61
Higher education	18270	3506,48	18877	3555,19
NPOs	285	234,18	243	198,58
Science councils	1846	1548,83	1790	1323,3
TECHNICIANS				
Business	3724	2856,53	4143	3050,04
Government	494	376,25	495	353,32
Higher education	2801	568,1	1925	535,03
NPOs	40	30,69	84	59
Science councils	1582	1344,13	1678	1250,85
SUPPORT STAFF				
Business	4038	3138,8	4698	3290,14
Government	1125	800,02	632	479,09
Higher education	2722	473,04	1958	841,36
NPOs	184	97,81	158	107,3
Science councils	2742	2096,6	2211	1528,95
TOTAL RESEARCH STAFF	47120	22863,17	47246	23118,5

	2006 –2007		2007–2008	
RESEARCHERS	Headcount	FTE	Headcount	FTE
Business	8227	6110,87	8336	6047,5
Government	1111	784,55	1138	757,6
Higher education	17459	3657,8	17008	3672,32
NPOs	252	203,55	264	215,55
Science councils	2255	1982,74	2594	2300,2
TECHNICIANS				
Business	5113	3735,01	5303	3796,4
Government	831	555,7	739	495,56
Higher education	2170	643,76	2006	612,8
NPOs	77	55,25	77	56,5
Science councils	1570	1342,07	1351	1099,2
SUPPORT STAFF				
Business	4127	2749,41	4312	2617,36
Government	982	728	917	696,85
Higher education	2117	867,34	2351	893,02
NPOs	155	103,94	161	107,04
Science councils	1973	1631,25	2043	1659,4
TOTAL RESEARCH STAFF	48419	25151,24	48600	25027,3

Source: South African R&D survey

A critical element of any system of R&D and innovation is the ability to develop and deploy the appropriately skilled knowledge workers to the required industries. The South African government is acutely aware of the shortage of skills in the country and has in the recent past established numerous programmes to address this, with varying degrees of success. Table 3 is representative of the human resources dedicated to research in the country. The figures appear to be quite static in nature, as no major increases in the number of research personnel has been measured over the last few survey periods. The question posed is, therefore: Are our human resources presenting a bottleneck to expanding our R&D capacity and potential?

Over the last decade much effort has been made towards the transformation and intensification of research activities in the country, with the expectation being that the process will lead to a recovery and retention of researchers in the

system. More in-depth analyses of the data in conjunction with all the policies and frameworks should yield results in this area and is well worth looking into.


Table 4: Higher education (HE) postgraduate student headcount and full time equivalent (FTE) by qualification 2004–05–2007–08

Qualification	2004–2005	2005–2006	2006 –2007	2007–2008
Headcount				
Postdoctoral fellows	482	505	542	615
Doctoral students	8851	9497	9745	10129
Master’s students	22826	26015	24991	25011
FTE				
Postdoctoral fellows	472,6	494,7	501,3	599,2
Doctoral students	6360,71	5184,9	5331,8	5728,0
Master’s students	11510,96	9145,39	11039,8	11154,8

Source: South African R&D survey

The static pool of researchers is also noticeable in the marginal increase in postdoctoral and doctoral students. Which leave us with the question: Can our institutions meet the high demand for skilled employees?

Figure 2: R&D expenditure by research field (RF) 2004–05–2007–08



Source: South African R&D survey

Data from the last four R&D surveys show (figure 2) that there is a strong focus on engineering and natural sciences, followed by medical sciences.

Within the other research fields there do not appear to be too many variations.

Highlights from the 2008–2009 R&D Survey Key Indicators

Table 5: Key R&D figures and indicators (2008–09)

INDICATOR	VALUE	
	2007–08	2008–09
Gross domestic expenditure on R&D (GERD) (Rand millions)	18 624,0	21 041,0
Gross domestic product (GDP) at market prices (Rand millions)	1 999 086	2 283 822
GERD as a per centage of GDP	0,93	0,92
Total R&D personnel (FTE) a	31 352	30 802
Total researchers (FTE) b	19 320	19 384
Total researchers per 1000 total employment (FTE)	1,5	1,4
Total R&D personnel per 1000 total employment (FTE)	2,4	2,2
Civil GERD as a per centage of GDP	0,87	0,87
Total researchers (headcount)	40 084	39 955
Women researchers as a per centage of total researchers	40,3	39,7

a: FTE = Full Time Equivalent


b: Following OECD practice, doctoral students are included as researchers

Source: South African National R&D Surveys and Stats SA P0441 Gross Domestic product, First Quarter 2009

Within the 2008–09 R&D survey results, we see how the growth of GDP has again outstripped that of GERD, thereby producing another reduced result from 0,93 to 0,92, equalling the level achieved in the 2005–2006 R&D survey. That being said, it is important to note that although the ratio of GERD to GDP has decreased, actual spending on R&D has increased by some R2,4 billion in this survey period. While spending on R&D is up, in real terms we have to ensure that increases in spending are on par with GDP increases, if we are to achieve the one per cent goal of GDP spent on R&D activities. For the most recent set of results, an additional R1,7 billion of R&D spend would effectively place the South African S&T system at the one per cent mark; however, more attention is required to focus that spending within the correct economic sector for sustainable long-term R&D growth.

Expenditure on R&D


Figure 3: South African gross expenditure on R&D (GERD), 1991–2008



Source: South African National Research and Experimental Development Surveys 2007–08 and 2008–09

R&D expenditure in South Africa has been showing steady growth in both nominal and real terms since 1993. Between 2007–08 and 2008–09, total R&D expenditure increased from R18 624 million to R21 041 million, which is a nominal annual increase of about 12,9 per cent and an increase of 1,3 per cent in real terms.² This together with the data in table 5 above indicates that more work is required both from investment in measurement methodologies and from support programmes to grow R&D spend. Further, more is needed in appropriate technology and human resource capabilities not only to promote domestic R&D activities but also to attract foreign investment in the South Africa system of innovation not only as a knowledge economy but also as a fertile *knowledge colony* for the many multinational companies looking to invest in developing economies.

Figure 4: Comparison of gross expenditure on R&D (GERD) as a per centage of GDP 2008 (* or latest year available)




Source: International comparisons – OECD Main Science and Technology Indicators (2009 2nd edition). Data for India are from UNESCO Institute for Statistics (UIS).

South Africa's GERD as a per centage of GDP is currently at 0,92 per cent. Few OECD countries have a GERD equivalent to less than 1,0 per cent of GDP. Leading countries in R&D expenditure such as Sweden, Finland, Japan and Korea have R&D expenditures exceeding three per cent of GDP. It must be mentioned that three per cent is the EU benchmark value for GERD to GDP ratios, as one per cent is for South Africa and African countries. Many countries including the United States, Australia, France and China are yet to achieve the three per cent target, despite having larger economies, knowledge labour force and access to facilities and technologies. Despite this, South Africa recorded R21,041 billion R&D expenditure for the period 2008–2009, and in terms of the financial gap was just R1,7 billion short of attaining the benchmark figure.

Performance of R&D


Figure 5: South African performance of R&D by sector, 2007–08 and 2008–09



Source: South African National Research and Experimental Development Survey 2007–08 and 2008–09

R&D data shows that there has been an overall increase in R&D expenditures across all the sectors. For the 2008–09 period the business sector accounted for 58,6 per cent of R&D performance in South Africa, followed by the government (including the science councils) at 20,4 per cent. Government’s share of total R&D expenditure decreased by about 1,3 per cent. Higher education’s share of R&D performance increased slightly by 0,5 per cent. The not-for-profit sector’s share of R&D performance continued to drop, from 1,2 per cent of the total in 2007–08 to 1,1 per cent in 2008–09.


Figure 6: South African expenditure on R&D by major research, 2007–08 and 2008–09



Source: South African National Research and Experimental Development Surveys 2007–08 and 2008–09

R&D expenditure in the engineering sciences increased from 22,5 per cent of total R&D expenditure in 2007–08 to 24,4 per cent in 2008–09. The expenditure in the natural sciences and social sciences and humanities remained relatively stable at 20,6 per cent and 12,5 per cent respectively. Expenditure on R&D in the medical and health sciences increased slightly by 0,9 per cent while the agricultural sciences' share of expenditure decreased by 1,3 per cent. More details regarding the funds spent on these categories are available in the full R&D report and give more insight into the trends in spending. Applied sciences and technologies and information, computer and communication technologies all showed decreased shares of R&D expenditure during the 2008–09 survey period.

Figure 7: South African expenditure on R&D by type of research




Source: South African National Research and Experimental Development Surveys 2007–08 and 2008–09

The 2008–09 R&D survey showed that expenditure in applied research accounted for 33,3 per cent, which indicates a decrease of 0,9 per cent from 2007–08. The share of R&D expenditure devoted to basic research decreased slightly by about 0,4 per cent. R&D expenditure on experimental development has always accounted for the largest portion of expenditure, and this is still the case with the figures of 46,5 per cent of total R&D expenditure reported in 2008–09.

The allocation of funding toward projects by type of R&D is also a reflection of the broader economic climate, as in many ways R&D is an expense as much as it is an investment, and in a climate of tighter purse strings, one would expect to see a decline in basic research and an increase in applied research and, more so, experimental development as more funders are keen to see ideas in action and ultimately in production or practice rather than investing in areas of basic research.

Figure 8: International comparison of basics research as a per centage of GDP for 2008–09 or the latest year available




Source: International comparisons – OECD Main Science and Technology Indicators (2009 2nd edition)

Basic research expenditure (as a per centage of GDP) is an indicator that signals the R&D capacity that is responsive to new challenges and new knowledge. South Africa's expenditure on basic research remained the same as in 2007–08 (0,19 per cent of GDP). Most of the countries shown have had a relatively stable per centage of GDP devoted to basic research over the past few years. France has one of the highest basic research intensities in the world, but the huge expenditure on basic research (\$70 billion) by the United States dominates all the other countries.

Human Resources for R&D


Figure 9: Number of full-time equivalent (FTE) researchers per 1000 total employment in 2008 * or latest year available.



Source: International comparisons – OECD Main Science and Technology Indicators (2009 2nd edition)

The 2008–09 survey results indicate that South Africa's FTE researchers per 1 000 total employment had decreased to 1,4 in 2008–09 after remaining at 1,5 for the previous three years. Compared to other countries, this indicator of human resource potential for research is relatively low. It needs to be monitored since the number of researchers in a country determines its R&D output potential.

Figure 10: Women researchers as a per centage of total researcher (headcount) * or latest year available



Source: International comparisons – OECD Main Science and Technology Indicators (2009 2nd edition)

The South African number of women researchers as a per centage of total researchers is relatively static and remains at 39,7 per cent. Argentina and the Russian Federation continue to lead, with women researchers comprising 51,5 per cent and 41,8 per cent of total researchers, respectively.

Conclusion

The advancement of S&T is one of the most important driving forces to enhance economic growth and development. Increased S&T capacity is essential for contributing to a country's competitiveness within the global arena. Internationally, national competitiveness depends on the country's ability to produce world-class advancements in answer to the most asked questions in the modern world. In order to achieve this, systems of innovation must promote researchers, scientists and engineers as well as transform research outputs into products and services

that contribute to the greater economic ideals and needs of a people. On the African continent, policymakers understand and acknowledge the critical role that science, technology and innovation (STI) can play in positively addressing the long-term economic and social issues. Most countries face the challenges on how to develop and sustain their S&T capacity, and with the establishment of OSTII and ASTII, Africa will now have a centre of gravity for producing and building information banks on S&T within and across regions. Before one can sustain capacity, we must be able to measure or assess the current capacity, which in turn will inform future policy interventions toward meeting set goals and system benchmarks.

Initiatives such as ASTII have made great progress where African countries have come together and agreed on definitions, statistics, indicators, and methods of collection and of interpretation of data. Many countries have also put processes in place to conduct their R&D surveys. Tools such as the OECD methodology on conducting R&D surveys will be a great resource to further the importance of conducting R&D surveys in African territories. Taking into account that Africa produces a large portion of the world's mineral resources, S&T measurement and development will lead to many nations moving into secondary and tertiary industries, which in the long term may be the answer to alleviating many of the pressing ills in Africa, some of which can be directly traced to issues of poverty and low social status.

Following from this, the potential remains for Africa to develop systems to measure innovations in ways that are appropriate to circumstances unique to Africa. However, it is still important to use or adapt international best practice methodologies as a basis to ensure that ongoing international comparison and competitiveness is measured and achieved. This suggests that we do away with an *African* R&D survey, and simply produce high quality R&D surveys, comparable and competitive in the international arena. South Africa has adopted the OECD methodology to conduct R&D surveys. This chapter has described the methods and procedures South Africa has followed. South Africa has also played a role in supporting and training researchers from other African countries that have committed to undertaking their own R&D surveys. In addition, the South African R&D data give an insight into the indicators that are important; it provides an overview of the South African R&D system; and it can also be used as an example to countries that wish to follow suit.

The widely acceptable international trend is that R&D is mainly performed by large business enterprises. It is expected that in developing countries the percentage of companies performing R&D will be much lower than in wealthier countries. While this bodes well for development and foreign investment, more

state investment in future R&D capability, through science councils and the higher education sector, could prove more valuable in the long run.

South Africa's R&D data has shown that most of the R&D is concentrated in the big firms, with nearly 80 per cent of business expenditure on R&D (BERD) being accounted for within the top 100 firms. However, one should not lose sight of the fact that state-owned companies are included in this sector; therefore the role of government in R&D should not be underestimated. The state is also a major funder of R&D, but the data confirms that business is still the biggest funder of R&D in South Africa (R&D surveys, CeSTII). The South African government has also initiated various activities to encourage business to invest more in R&D by means of R&D tax incentives and other financial support programmes such as the Support Program for Industrial Innovation (SPII), the Technology and Human Resources for Industry Programme (THRIP) as well as the Innovation Fund.

R&D is also concentrated in the higher education sector and the science councils. The top five universities in South Africa in research output in S&T fields are well established and to date still have the tendency to dominate the research arena. Science councils are mandated to perform research which is critical to the direction of policy and the achievement of developmental goals. It is therefore no surprise to see the concentration of research in this sector.

South African R&D data is robust and has become more reliable over the past few years. Factors influencing the quality of the data have been the complexity of certain sectors, poor response rates, concerns over confidentiality and the inundation of respondents by various external surveys and questionnaires. Despite many of the challenges, the existing reliable data has become a very valuable source for South Africa. More detailed data can be found in the annual reports that are released by the DST for each R&D survey. This rich source of data can assist policymakers to make informed decisions. The international comparability of the data is a huge advantage to South Africa and other developing countries on the African continent. The considerable learning that has happened through the establishment of the R&D surveys has already been shared with some of the African countries that have shown an interest in measuring their existing science and technology systems.

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CHAPTER 40

A Call to Arms: Enlisting the Skills of University Graduates to Teach and Inspire South Africa's Children

Sara Muller, Siyabonga Mhlongo and Phathutshedzo Tshivhengwa

Introduction

Much is being made of the crisis in education in sub-Saharan Africa, particularly in South Africa. The legacy of underdevelopment, poverty, unemployment and reliance on the exporting of unrefined primary goods persists: a legacy that cannot and will not be transformed in the absence of quality education provision to the majority of students attending publicly funded schools. Learners need teachers who are deeply knowledgeable about their subject and who can communicate with them in a meaningful and rich manner, using language and pedagogical skills to inspire and enrich the minds of learners. These teachers are hard to find, but they must be found if African nations are to realise the development goals they seek.

Background

Despite education receiving the largest slice of the public fiscal pie, with an allocated R165 billion budget for 2010 (Gordhan, 2010), South African students are still struggling to perform at the senior certificate level generally, and in mathematics and science in particular.¹ The declining senior certificate results paint a bleak picture for the economic prospects of a significant portion of South Africa's youth, with the majority of those struggling coming from 'previously' disadvantaged backgrounds (the use of the word 'previously' is erroneous as their disadvantage persists!). Erasmus and Breier (2009) of the Human Sciences Research Council explore the complexity of the skills shortage in the South African labour market, and highlight the following 10 areas as key shortage areas of skills: management, social work, engineering, medicine, law, information and communications technology, schooling, city planning and artisan trades. It is not difficult to conclude that the other nine categories will not be satiated from the massive pool of unemployed South Africans in the medium or long term unless the shortage in the area of quality educators is addressed. In addition to this, the current profile of skilled labourers, especially in the secondary and

tertiary sectors, is still significantly biased against historically disadvantaged individuals (Chandra, Moorty, Rajaratnam and Schaefer in Daniels, 2007) and the recent senior certificate results indicate that with the best intentions in the world, tertiary education institutions and Sector Education and Training Authority (SETA) approved training programmes will not be able to address either the bias in employment or skills shortage that the private and public sectors suffer from.

In December 2009, teachers based in Mpumalanga raised concerns that the maths paper sat by their Grade 12 students was too hard even for them to pass! (Govender, 2009). Most teachers in the traditionally disadvantaged areas (particularly the rural areas) themselves have very little further education than the senior certificate they teach, and many themselves are unfortunate recipients of 'Bantu' Education, particularly the more regressive form of the apartheid education policy that was put in place post 1976 (Heugh, 2002). While these teachers are not in any way to be held responsible for the limited opportunities they themselves have received to further their own studies and education, they are, alone, unable to turn the tide for their students.

Parallel to this situation occurring in the classroom, very few – if any – of the top graduates (of all backgrounds and races) qualifying from tertiary institutions with degrees in the areas outlined above are choosing to recycle their acquired skills back into the state-maintained education system (Cosser and Sehlola, 2009). The reasons for this include a lack of prestige attached to teaching, lack of remuneration, the geographical location of the most needy schools (poor and rural areas) and, conversely, the presence of highly prestigious, highly remunerated positions in the urban centres. Compounding the matter, Black Economic Empowerment (BEE) measures ensure that young black graduates, who are typically those who speak the required languages for the neediest of schools, are snapped up by private employers, further drawing the small base of overlapping technical and language skills into the private sector or other areas rather than into classrooms.

Why is Language so Important?

Cummins (1984) describes the different levels of language used by students when learning. The surface of language development is what Cummins refers to as Basic Interpersonal Communication Skills (BICS) and learners who are immersed in a language different from their first language or home language begin to display BICS fairly rapidly. Cummins's work showed, however, that cognitive development in a second language cannot happen based on BICS alone, but rather that a learner needs a deeper proficiency in the language (CALPS – cognitive

and academic language processing skills) in order to engage with learning in that language. MacDonald (1990) went on to show how if learners swap to a second language before they have had sufficient cognitive development in their first language, or mother tongue, they will perform significantly worse than their mother-tongue educated counterparts. The importance of teaching for at least the first eight years of schooling has been re-emphasised by Heugh (2002), Wolff (2000) and others, and is supported by the 2009 Grade 12 results, where in the Western Cape – the province where 80 per cent of the learners passed their senior certificate – 78 per cent of the Grade 12 learners who sat their senior certificate exams were educated in their home language (Thomson, 2010). While there are, of course, other contributory factors such as socioeconomic status, this correlation cannot be ignored.

What is needed most is a pool of highly skilled teachers who are fluent both in the language of assessment (English) and the mother tongue of the neediest learners (for the most part, indigenous languages, affecting children who come from historically disadvantaged communities). These are scarce skills indeed, and can mostly be found amongst the graduates of South Africa's universities.

Existing Programmes

There are some models which are already trying to attract the afore-mentioned skills temporarily into the teaching fold. Models like Teach First provide an attractive means of putting such skills to good use for those students who are:

- a. aware of the programme, and
- b. so inclined.

However, the severity of the situation outlined requires more than goodwill on the part of a few volunteers to rectify – South Africa needs to call to action its young graduates from all walks of life to actively play a role in turning the tide on skills loss and economic disempowerment.

National service programmes, or community programmes, are implemented in many countries for military and other purposes. Countries with small armies such as Switzerland, Singapore and Israel, amongst many, train their citizens after specific ages to be militarily ready. Similar models are applied in countries such as Germany, which maintains a significant portion of its army as unprofessional or conscripts (Abadi, 2010).

Although national service programmes are mostly conducted around the world for military purposes, countries such as Botswana have implemented

similar programmes in other areas of community interest (Tirelo Setshaba, as the programme was called, was cancelled in April 2000). In this programme, graduates were allowed to select their area of service choice ranging from military to teaching (Weeks, 2003).

In Nigeria, an alternate youth programme called the NYSC (National Youth Service Corps) is designed to help youth with placement in companies to assist the youth to gain valuable skills to prepare them for further employment. However, this type of programme is designed with a focus on helping the participant rather than the community.

Timing of the programme enrolment varies depending on the programme. In most countries, service is compulsory and the service time generally ranges from 150 hours to two years. Participants in these programmes generally do not have a choice on where they are deployed or in which projects they will participate (Perold and Omar, 1997).

Most services require participation from a specific age (e.g. 18), thus requiring youths to pause studies to participate in these national services. Some programmes, however, require completion of higher education due to the nature of the service (e.g. the Singapore national service where it is common for university students to pause after the second year of studies to do their national service). Teaching-specific programmes are not prevalent, with most programmes rather focusing on in-service teacher training or 'teach the teacher' models as done in Thailand's School Based Training programme (Puntumasen, 2004).

As defined in Perold and Omar (1997), we present our model as a 'community commitment' service rather than an 'earning' or 'learning' project, where the main purpose of the programme is to enrich the community and deliver social benefits. South Africa already has learning programmes for doctors in which medical students in transition to becoming doctors are mandated to commit time to community service. This is an example of a fusion between a learning and earning programme. Other South African examples include SITA-run internship programmes and in-service training as required for degree completion by local universities of technology (previously known as Technikons).

SITA internship programmes provide recently graduated previously disadvantaged participants with opportunities for placement in companies across the country. This provides participants with valuable on-the-job training, as well as exposure to the working environment. Companies in return earn BEE points to improve their standing on the BEE scorecard.

There are also several community commitment programmes in South Africa that are run by tertiary education institutions. Examples include the University of Cape Town's SHAWCO and Ubunye initiatives, Stellenbosch University's USKOR

initiative and Wits University's high school partnership programme. These programmes are designed to provide students and community members with opportunities to contribute in community enrichment programmes around the country with little emphasis on learning or earning for the participants (Thomson et. al., 2008).

Proposed Model

The model² proposed in this chapter is based on two precepts regarding classroom practice: firstly that the knowledge and skills of the teacher is one of – if not the most – important factors influencing a child's attainment at school, and secondly that in order for transfer of that knowledge to happen in a meaningful way (as opposed to a superficial, rote-learning experience), the learner and the teacher must be able to engage in conversation beyond Cummins's BICS and start using the CALP level of language to discuss ideas and concepts.


We propose enlisting graduates of all types from universities and other tertiary education institutions to recycle the skills and knowledge they have acquired and use their language skills through a community service year spent teaching. Attention would be given to matching graduates to communities and schools with whom they can relate and who could use their skills and abilities best.

The following sections define this model and elaborate further on the dependencies, pros and cons to which this model is subject.

Model Definition

Figure 1 depicts, at a high level, the structure of the proposed model. The emphasis is on simplicity, scalability, sustainability and flexibility.

Figure 1: Educational Development Model



Evident from figure 1 are six distinct pillars that underpin the model. These are grouped into two streams: one stream read vertically and the other horizontally. The Enabling Stream, which comprises Community, Government and Private Sector pillars (read vertically), outlines the supporting stakeholders who will provide the resources required to enable graduates to participate in the programme. The Lifecycle Stream (read horizontally) comprises the Programme Entry, Programme Duration and Programme Exit pillars, and shows the temporal phases of the programme through which the graduate will progress.

Table 1: definition of pillars in the context of the model

Stream	Pillar	Definition
Enabling Stream	Community	A regional municipal demarcation, the social group of members of this demarcation (more specifically: teachers, scholars, household members from which these scholars come and their neighbours) as well as the cultural and heritage history of this social group of members.
	Government	A state body that governs all Communities in the state including substructures of such a body.
	Private Sector	A collection of privately controlled (rather than Government controlled) companies in a state that contribute to the state's economy.
Lifecycle Stream	Program Entry	The series of steps preceding the Program Duration pillar which a graduate goes through. These steps include: Getting recruited by a Private Sector company endorsing the program being described here Choosing a Community in which to carry out this program The maximum time allowable for the graduate to partake in this program after graduating is three years.
	Program Duration	The time period of one academic year (January to December) that this program spans. This is the period that the graduate will spend in the Community s/he chooses.
	Program Exit	The series of steps post the Program Duration pillar that the graduate, the Community, the Government and the Private Sector company go through. Those include: The evaluation of the graduate by various members of the Community The re-introduction of the graduate to the employ of the Private Sector Company.

The broader streams are described in sections that follow: however, the following anecdotal description highlights just one possible path through the programme:

[Programme Entry] James is a student who is doing his final year at a highly regarded university. He applies and gets accepted to work for The Millennium Group Inc., a leading company in its economic sector. He knows that he is expected, at some point in the first three years of employment, to take a sabbatical from his full-time job and go to teach for a year at a school of his choice, and that The Millennium Group Inc. is a BBBEE (Broad Based BEE) company which supports his obligation to teach for a year. His school choice happens to be in the community from which he originates; a rural community that could be classified as a previously disadvantaged community. He knows that he is at an advantage as he also can fluently speak all the languages local to this community. James also knows that the South African Revenue Service (SARS) is taxing him 2–3 per cent higher than his income tax bracket until he goes on his sabbatical. But this doesn't bother James because ...

[Programme Exit] At the end of the year, the scholars in the classes he taught, the teachers that he interacted with as well as some of the prominent community members he interacted with during the lifecycle of the programme get asked to evaluate James's presence in their community relative to a criteria specified by the relevant structure within the government which owns the programme. The Millennium Group Inc. accepts James to rejoin the organisation the following year. When James gets back to The Millennium Group Inc., all the extra tax he paid before he went on sabbatical plus interest (which has been accruing since the money was deducted as tax from his salary) is paid back to him as a lump sum. Because James went to work in a rural school from a disadvantaged socioeconomic area, his 'enforced savings' at SARS have appreciated at a very attractive rate. James now has a lump sum to use to pay off his student loans, put a down-payment on a house or buy a car.

The Millennium Group Inc. has accrued tax incentives and BBBEE points for letting James go. Its HR (Human Resources) department is starting to model their entire recruitment programme around hiring graduates like James, making allowance for his year of absence and reaping the benefits of his increased social experience and interpersonal skills that he gained while teaching.

Each stream is outlined in a more general sense below.

Enabling Stream

For a model or programme of this nature to function successfully, support from the key stakeholders is vital. Critically, ownership is a key requirement, ensuring sustainability and continuity as well as monitoring of year-on-year successes and identification of problems and development areas. Given that the programme is a community-benefit model, it is appropriate that a task team within a government must be responsible for the programme's maintenance and oversight.

Secondary to programme ownership, but equally as important, are funding, community support as well as government and political support. This is where the three pillars within this stream conjoin to form what ultimately drives the Lifecycle Stream. Importantly, private sector companies need to endorse this programme. Obligations from both the company and the government in the form of a contractual agreement should be adhered to. These obligations may include:

- Company obligations
 - The company will be obliged to pay a certain portion of the remuneration of the graduate while on sabbatical.
 - The company will guarantee the graduate permanent employment post programme completion.
- Government obligations
 - The government shall offer certain rebates and rewards to both the company and the graduate for participating in the programme. For the graduate, the government can use some of its structures, such as SARS, to create incentives for the graduate based on a certain set of criteria (see previous anecdotal example). For the company, the government can offer a structured set of affirmative action credentials, such as BEE and BBBEE points (as seen in the South African context), where such credentials exist. Furthermore, the government could also offer some form of tax relief to the company for participating in this programme.

Secondly, communities must support this model of development as the very nature of it is designed with the end-goal of enriching them. It is important for the programme to be introduced to communities – especially teachers – in a positive way, allowing them to be vocal and empowered participants, and highlighting the benefits and in-service skills acquisition that the programme offers to them. It is important that they fully understand that the programme has not been put in

place to threaten their jobs or their integrity or their capability of teaching, and that their pedagogical skills are critical to the graduates' success.

Finally, together with government support, there must be equal support from the political structures of the state. A way of achieving this support could be through launch and sponsorship by international Non-Governmental Organisations (NGOs) and agencies channelled through the government that would give politicians some legitimacy and momentum to launch and support the programme.

Lifecycle Stream

The Lifecycle Stream begins either by one of the private sector companies that endorses this programme recruiting a university graduate for employment, or by a university graduate choosing to be recruited by one of the private sector companies that endorses this programme. In whichever case, the graduate is expected to go on a teaching sabbatical within three years of joining the company. Graduates are encouraged to join programmes running in their areas of origin (such as James above), thus easing the burden of joining and learning about a new community for the graduates. More important, however, is that the language barrier between the graduate and the community should be eradicated where possible and minimised where not (e.g placing learners who have English as a first language into communities of their second language or offering these students language development training in conjunction with, or prior to, their teaching year). This will ensure that learners, where possible, are instructed in their vernacular, the significant benefits of which were outlined earlier in this chapter.

The core of this stream is the Programme Duration pillar. This is the very reason for the programme's existence, where the graduate benefits from the teachers by learning from their pedagogical experience. The teachers themselves will learn from the experience of the graduate acquired either at university or in the workplace prior to participating in the programme. The learners' benefits are innumerable: they have access to teaching from both the graduate with their skills and their normal teacher's pedagogical expertise. Where possible, they are presented with a role model with whom then can identify – someone who has been in their position and has gone on to make a success of his/her life and education. The knowledge and skills exchange can even go beyond the classroom. The graduate can further proactively participate in other community activities to the benefit of the community at large, helping in adult education initiatives

and participating in extracurricular and other activities which take place in and around the school.

The final part of the Lifecycle Stream is the Programme Exit pillar. This is when the programme relationship between the graduate and the community officially culminates.³ In order to ascertain the graduates' placement success as well as the overall programme's efficacy, the government structure owning the programme should conduct some form of an evaluation relative to a certain set of criteria. The graduate, whose position at the employing company is guaranteed by the contractual agreement between government and the company, then prepares to re- enter the corporate environment.

Conclusion

Comments:

1. According to the notes taken by the National Sciences and Technology Forum on the account of the 2009 senior certificate results presented by the Department of Basic Education to Parliament in February 2010, 136,184 students who sat the Maths Paper (not the Maths Literacy Paper) passed out of the 300,461 who sat the paper: this is a pass rate of 45.3%.
2. The model described in this chapter is far from comprehensive, nor should it be treated as immutable.
3. It is important to note that nothing prevents the graduate from interacting with the community

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CHAPTER 41

Africa Unknown: Addressing the Effects of an Alienating Education among Learners in South Africa

Rachel Nyaradzo Adams

Introduction

There is no such thing as a neutral education process. Education either functions as an instrument which is used to facilitate the integration of generations into the logic of the present system and bring about conformity to it, or it becomes the 'practice of freedom', the means by which men and women deal critically with reality and discover how to participate in the transformation of their world (Thompson, in Mayo, 1999: 5).

I tell them about African Humanism. I suggest how, if our education system is based on this philosophy, it will truly express our independence of mind, a decolonised mind (Mphahlele, 1984).

Most educationists agree that for an education system to be successful, it must bear some meaningful relationship to context (both historical and present), culture, political economy, society and environment. An education that fails to connect itself to these pertinent realities is both irrelevant and disempowering, and serves to alienate learners from their contexts (Woodson, 1933; Asante, 1998; Hilliard, 1999). In the absence of a rigorous and critical Africa-centred (Afrocentric) curriculum in our education system, this chapter argues that the current schooling system is disadvantaging and automatically failing African learners. The chapter deliberately moves away from the theoretical debates around Africanising education and seeks more pertinently to provide evidence of the weak product of our current education system. I draw from examples of a major turning point in my own academic journey (being a graduate of African Studies) and evidence from interactions with university learners on a scholarship programme funding over 250 excellent learners across South Africa.

The chapter will show that our current schooling system has failed and continues to fail in critically engaging learners on the realities of their own continent in a way that empowers them to be agents of transformational change. Not only do learners lack critical knowledge about important facts, historicities and

transitions (economic, political and social) relating to the continent, but what little they know has no real relevance or impact in creating vision and imagination for an empowered Africa. It is argued that this lack of critical knowledge of the African continent among learners, in this case university students, in the non-social sciences, should be considered a state of moral and strategic emergency in our current education system. Having recently introduced an African focus to the curriculum of a scholarship programme that I managed,¹ I am intrigued (and perpetually disturbed) by the lack of critical knowledge among young Africans of African political economies and the societies that they live in. Even among our finest and brightest South African learners, there is very little engagement with knowledge of other African countries. This further leads to the development of a very insular and exceptionalist mindset among young South Africans, a deterrent to regional unity and pan-Africanism as envisioned by leading African thinkers.

The chapter continues to argue that the reason for this dearth of knowledge is that the institutions of learning within which learners find themselves are reluctant and ill-prepared to facilitate critical thinking about Africa. In the writer's experience, the lack of critical engagement within learning institutions is perpetuated by the fear of the inferiority of an Africanised education and its ability to compete within a globalised world (Horstheemke in Botha, 2010: 206). This obviously stems from the assumption that what is African is inferior (although it is hardly said so explicitly). It is also perpetuated by the fear that an Africanised education system is not welcoming to processes of globalisation. Again, this is flawed thinking that is steeped in an ahistorical tendency to frame Africans as people who did not participate in global processes until they were colonised, a fallacy that unfortunately many buy into. Having discussed the limitations and backwardness of this thinking, the following are suggested as a way forward:

- Learning institutions (schools, universities, scholarship programmes) need to become actively committed to Afrocentric learning, incorporating interdisciplinary thinking into more technical faculties such as engineering and science to give learners a more holistic understanding of the African environment and to develop critical thinking skills. The aim of this would be to allow more research into understanding Africa's challenges and opportunities, and to teach learners how to engage strategically with these.
- We need to teach Africa with a greater amount of subjectivity, problematising the various mythologies that have for too long been perpetuated on this continent and externally. This should be done by valorising African authors who through their work have highlighted the achievements of the continent

and whose work can help to change the negative and ahistorical thinking that currently plagues our curricula.

- Our curricula need to engage with the psychosocial effects of colonisation that still afflict young people by the incorporation of Black Consciousness and other such theories into learning.
- African intellectuals need to become more committed to researching and collecting data on Africa, and this should then be fed into curricula. Further to this, it is argued that Africa needs to become host to more strategic conferences discussing leadership, entrepreneurship and development – with the agendas of these being driven by Africans.
- Our extracurricular activities need to encourage young Africans to volunteer across African countries. It is pathological that the current face of aid or volunteerism in Africa is white and foreign, a reality that does no favours to the image of diversity that we hope to inspire in the minds of our young people and in the Africans who are on the receiving end of aid.
- The problem of South African exceptionalism will be naturally countered in our young people by exposing them to wider African thought and debates by African intellectuals.

Ultimately the chapter attempts to show that the danger of the current education curricula is that we continue to churn out of our education system ‘educated’ elite who have no appreciation for the relevance and importance of this continent’s character and who speak for an Africa that they hardly understand.

We begin with an anecdote.

On the Oxford Experience

My decision to apply to Oxford University to read for a Masters in African Studies (MSc) in 2007 came as a result of a desire to engage on an international platform about issues concerning Africa. It seemed reasonable at the time to conclude that in a globalised world, interacting about the most complex geopolitical space in the world would be more fruitful and rich if it was done together with a multiplicity of voices from across the world. I looked forward to engaging amicably about opinions on the continent’s state of affairs, and looked even more forward to coming out of the conversation empowered by my new global outlook. The experience unfortunately was the opposite. It did not take long before I realised that my experience at Oxford unfortunately sat at the uncomfortable intersection of power and experience – the West’s power to define Africa and Africans, and my experience as an African which made me resist those theories that simplified the

complexities of my experience. The double jeopardy, however, arose in further realising that while I had very strong objections to some of the theories and the conclusions they inspired, I also found that I, like most of the other Africans in this cohort, failed to engage effectively with the very complex theories that were promoted in the curriculum.

Caught up in our anger, our inferiority complex and our protest, we often found ourselves reactionary and very unstrategic in our responses to theories that we knew to be unsound and unfounded. But most often we were engaging with these theories for the first time and our Western counterparts had been doing so throughout most of their academic careers. It did not take long to realise that these students knew more about our continent than we did. My knowledge was largely defined by the rawness of emotion and protest about how Africa had been actively underdeveloped and how this was the beginning of many of our problems. Their knowledge on the other hand, while acknowledging the legitimacy of some of our protest, was held firmly in place by ‘proven facts’, ‘participatory’ and ‘inclusive’ methodologies of studying Africans, and World Bank-approved models of development. American projects for aid and relief had taken them on trips to Ghana, Senegal, Ivory Coast, Nigeria and Sierra Leone, countries whose history and current affairs I knew something about but not enough to debate with students who had actually engaged with these contexts in real life. Their education system, in partnership with local and international organisations and public service institutions, had given them opportunities for internships with organisations wholly committed to research and interventions in Africa. These students had also read African theorists like Mbembe, Mudimbe and Mamdani. They had also read Western theorists like Collier, Illife and Meredith. They knew how to interact with critical African debates between the different schools of thought and they even knew where in the remotest part of Africa to apply these theories. It was a losing battle! Our education, even as Africans coming from a social science background, came nowhere close to that!²

We had been failed and had to accept our incompetence when it came to issues concerning our own environment. It is this very disempowering experience that raised the need within me to challenge our current education focus and to offer solutions for a different approach.

Why an Education that is so Inadequate?

Ngugi wa Thiong’o in *Decolonising the mind: The politics of language in African literature* states:

... the present predicaments of Africa are not a matter of personal choice: they arise from an historical situation. Their solutions are not so much a matter of personal discussion as that of a fundamental social transformation of the structures of our societies starting with a real break with imperialism and its internal ruling allies. Imperialism and its comprador alliances in Africa can never develop the continent (wa Thiong'o, 1986).

It is important to note, after my illustration of my experience at Oxford, that the failure of African students to engage with a level of authority on matters of their own continent is, as wa Ngugi asserts, not an issue of personal inadequacies but of inheriting an education system that was created to make subjects, and not active participants in the world's political economy, out of African learners. Unquestionably, there is much in this education system that calls for a fundamental transformation so that Africans can finally take the 'risk' of Africanising our education systems.

Bonang Mohale in *Personal growth African style* (Mohale, 2010: Foreword) states:

The world still labours under the weight of entrenched ignorance of Africa. By and large, many of our children's textbooks have not corrected that ignorance and those distorted perceptions ... Our curricula, from primary school to graduate school, are woefully inadequate. We are so overwhelmingly focused on 'western culture' that most of our educational institutions do little to open our minds or change perceptions about Africa (Mohale, 2010: xiii).

The late and very renowned educator, Asa Hilliard, stated very importantly that:

Before the problem of what to do about the education of African people can be approached, a fundamental decision must be made. It is a decision about ethnicity, rather than 'race' or class, both of which tend to be obvious, though not central. Quite simple [sic], if our ethnicity does not matter, then there is no need for this essay or for us to try to do anything as a group. But if it does matter, then we must be clear about the fact that we belong to an ethnic family with all of the responsibilities that come with that decision. That culture is not 'tribal', it is African (Hilliard, http://www.africawithin.com/hilliard/education_of_african_people.htm).

Here, Hilliard speaks of a vision that will require pan-African efforts to fulfil. Without a united agreement that our education is currently not serving young

people as Mohale suggests above,³ we will continue to feed learners into an education system that only offers abstract learning and takes away their ability to form a relationship with their continent. It is a decision that will have to be made without apology or recanting and will require the imagination and efforts of our best intellectuals, educators, researchers and curriculum developers.

The resistance to such a vision will come in the form of attacks against the so-called *demerits* of an Africanised education system, an attack that is invalidated by the very basis of its invalid Eurocentrism. It must be noted that these attackers have made the same points since the Africanisation debate began in this country in the nineties (Makgoba, 1997), and should therefore be challenged more vehemently as they were allowed to win in the past (to the detriment of our education). They will claim and display the following:

- That Afrocentric teachings are backward, militant and somehow inferior to and discriminatory of larger global processes.
- Lack of respect (and also knowledge) of African thinkers and their perspectives on how Africa could and should progress. African knowledge is secondary to that of leading Western thinkers.
- Mythology of Africa as the 'dark continent'.

The education systems have done too little to actively counter the above misrepresentations and mythology and to truly emancipate Africans from imbibing and adopting them. As a result, Africa and Afrocentrism have become dirty words that few are brave enough to grapple with or to attach to their institutional reputation.

The consequences of such thinking are dire. An education that is lacking in African examples means that our learners become alienated every day from their own contexts and realities, with their African identity failing to find a hook into their learning. An education that fails to valorise our histories (and successes within these), our traditions and our cultures, means that we continually churn out of our system an 'educated' elite who have no appreciation of the relevance and importance of this continent's character and who speak for an Africa that they hardly understand. An education that lacks in African philosophies and theories means that our learners consistently have to look to the outside world for answers, answers that often define them as subjects of and not active participants in their own transformation. An education that lacks in texts authored by African thinkers leaves learners without confidence in the power of Afrocentric ideals and subsequently without confidence in their own ability to formulate more innovative ideals. An education that gives theory but fails to extend this

theory practically as a developmental solution to the rural villages in Limpopo Province in South Africa or the bustling and crowded residential spaces of the City of Luanda in Angola is no education at all!

The assumption that Africanising the education system will result in an alienation of Africa from the rest of the world is also ludicrous as Africa's critical thinkers would observe. Hilliard illustrates that an Africanised education is better capable of engaging with the global system:

... we must always remember that the schools do not stand alone. All education and socialization processes are situated within the broader societal context of economic, political, spiritual and artistic environments. African people cannot detach the education process from their own definition of their mission, which is to be fed by the study of cultural tradition and the geo-political realities of the world today. When this is done, specific articulation of curricula in the areas of the humanities, the sciences, health and physical education, politics, economics and above all spirituality, will be formulated (Hilliard, n.d.).

Critically speaking therefore, it is only when this interrelationship of self-definition from an African perspective and learning from the larger sociocultural and geopolitical world have been understood that we can effectively and successfully reformulate our educations to benefit our learners. A denial of the globalised setting would be self-annihilation.

As illustrated in my Oxford example, young learners within a rapidly globalising world also have to come to terms with a raging inferiority complex when they compare their knowledge base of Africa and of general current affairs to that of international learners at the same level as they are. Some of our best learners attending our top universities locally find themselves incapable of defending or speaking to the realities of their continent, on a practical and theoretical level, because they quite simply do not have the knowledge base to do so: a true sign that their education has failed them.⁴ The result: an abandonment tendency which acts to exacerbate the brain drain of our youngest and brightest to foreign lands whose education is considered more attractive and offers more opportunities for real application.

Ngugi wa Thiong'o's analysis of our education systems, though made in 1986, remains true⁵ today. He asserts that to fail to restructure education so that it is more an extension of the experiences of Africans is to accept what he calls a 'cultural bomb' that acts to annihilate our very being as Africans.

The effect of a cultural bomb is to annihilate a people's belief in their names, in their languages, in their environment, in their heritage of struggle, in their unity, in their capacities and ultimately in themselves. It makes them see their past as one wasteland of non-achievement and it makes them want to distance themselves from that wasteland ... it even plants serious doubts about the moral rightness of struggle. Possibilities of triumph or victory are seen as remote, ridiculous dreams (wa Thiong'o, 1986: 2).

Such a widespread state of mind among our people is the very reason why most research on the continent happens outside of the continent itself. Indeed, it is the very reason why a lack of centralised, consistent and strategic research is still the greatest deterrent to development plans and to the work of African governments. Our young people would not know where to start if you asked them to initiate a project for research on, let us say, the economic history of the continent and how it influences the current political economy. Actually, why would they even want to follow up on such research if they understood their history to have been a wasteland – and indeed they do!

Dearth of African Knowledge among Young Learners

The writer's interactions with beneficiaries on the scholarship programme she currently works with heightened the attention to the lack of African knowledge among learners in South Africa. Spread across the faculties of Commerce, Engineering, the Sciences and a handful in the Humanities, these beneficiaries began to experience that familiar nagging feeling that despite their inevitable positions as leaders of the Southern African region in the coming years,⁶ they know very little about the issues or conditions that defined their continent. When a proposal was made to introduce an African focus to the curriculum, therefore, the object was to address this lack of knowledge and to actively create opportunities for beneficiaries to engage with African knowledge, and particularly with African thought leaders on specific issues. To gain insight into the students knowledge gaps, a compilation of a quiz with 14 questions on various issues of historical, social, economic and political significance was designed. Sixty-two beneficiaries participated in the quiz. See table 1 below for details of the questions asked and responses given.

Table 1

QUESTION	# of correct answers	# of incorrect answers	Attempts
Describe the Berlin Conference of 1884.	9	53	Abolition of slavery
Who was Kwame Nkrumah and why is he important to Africa?	30	32	A man from Ghana, a writer
What was the Mau Mau uprising?	11	51	Chinese Revolution
What is Africa's most abundant energy source?	6	56	Coal, oil, diamonds, water
Where are the libraries of Timbuktu located and why are they important to the continent?	20	42	Egypt, they are old, Tanzania
What is the South African apartheid political economy that still drives South African labour today?	7	55	Mining
What is meant by South African exceptionalism?	4	58	Ubuntu, BEE, grants and social support
What South African people group are known as Africa's barefoot billionaires?	7	55	Afrikaanders, Nguni, San, Xhosa
Name one of Africa's most influential literary writers.	45	17	Chinua Achebe most popular
Name one of Africa's most influential historians.	9	53	Mandela most popular
Who was Cheikh Anta Diop?	6	56	Somali pirate, President, a muslim man, Liberation Party president
What does Thabo Mbeki's Renaissance of Africa refer to?	32	30	
What is Africa's most rapidly growing industry?	8	54	Tourism, consumer goods, mining, agriculture
Who is Mo Ibrahim and why is he important?	5	57	Academic, writer, philosopher, musician

Analysis

Before offering some thoughts on these results, it must be stated that what stood out the most for the writer when the beneficiaries were taking this quiz was the real hurt and anger they exuded when the inadequacy of their knowledge was revealed. It was quite a shock for them to realise that in all their academic prowess and leadership roles at their respective universities, they lacked general knowledge about their own immediate environment. The immediate thoughts that came to mind were ‘What knowledge then was their academic success based on?’ ‘What exactly were they “leading” in if their leadership insight was not focused on the needs of their own environment?’ One beneficiary came up to the writer after the session and expressed how she felt ‘so cheated’ by her education system. She said that her Economics courses had always seemed irrelevant to her, and now she understood why. None of what she was learning was directly relevant to addressing the realities of her immediate environment. To experience her anger and to see the disappointment and embarrassment in her eyes, and those of the other 61 young people, was enough to restate the point of this chapter: our curricula had failed our young people. One beneficiary later stated that: ‘What upsets me most is how I am so ignorant about African topics but so enlightened about European and American issues.’

The writer explained to the learners that she had collated this quiz using the African Studies curricula from Harvard and Oxford. One fellow, hoping to redeem the situation, then suggested that the reason none of them knew the answers to these questions was that they were not studying African Studies at the university. Her look of disappointment returned when it was explained that the Harvard African Studies curriculum was for undergraduates studying Engineering, Science and Commerce, just like them, except that at Harvard it is compulsory for these learners to engage in interdisciplinary learning through taking courses such as the African Studies course.

The results of the quiz speak for themselves, and there may not be much to say except the obvious. There are a few things, however, that stand out in an analysis of these results. While there is an evident dearth of knowledge about issues concerning Africa among our learners, what is perhaps most interesting is that the questions with some of the most incorrect answers were the questions on South Africa. That the most popular answer for ‘one of Africa’s most influential historians’ was Nelson Mandela is even more concerning. One is also inclined to ask what commercial examples/case studies are being used to engage learners (who are largely studying commercial subjects) if they cannot name the most rapidly growing industry in Africa? Surely a discussion on economics in Africa should at some point raise this pertinent point; yet only eight beneficiaries could

answer that question, and only six could name Africa's most abundant energy source.

It is also intriguing to see the influence of visionary leadership and media in shaping knowledge. The fact that the Renaissance and Timbuktu were the best known facts is interesting. I make the assumption that something about the vision of the Renaissance captured the imagination of more than half of these beneficiaries and they were able to adequately and accurately define what an African Renaissance is. It can be assumed that something about the vision to unearth and translate the manuscripts at Timbuktu that was undertaken with the support of South Africa during former President Thabo Mbeki's administration had inspired them. It may also be suggested that the reason these young Africans assume that oil is the most abundant energy resource in Africa is because stories about oil in Africa are so dominant in media reportage. This should say something about how we can harness leadership and popular media to begin the project of Africanising knowledge.

Impacts of Introducing an African Pillar to the Curriculum

It has been encouraging to witness the impact of introducing an African focus to the programme's curriculum. While beneficiaries have little knowledge of the continent, their ability to engage with critical topics and to add insights into conversations about the continent is phenomenal. They come alive when they are given the opportunity. Some of the programme's panel sessions now solely address pertinent African questions. Major programme events also carry sessions that discuss topics relating to Africa.

In a recent panel discussion, a panellist spoke to beneficiaries about the need for intelligent young people in African governments, and suggested that young Africans should begin to value public service. It was fascinating, later, to hear beneficiaries who felt that they had not only been given permission and energy to contextualise African issues and understand them better, but that they now felt a responsibility to become active citizens in solving these problems. In the course of the year, some have now resolved to commit to public service as a career, and some have started projects in their own communities to empower others to be a part of the change.

If only our classrooms would encourage such a commitment to Africa. If only our leadership were unafraid to commit to this cause. If only we realised the predicament that our Eurocentric education has landed us up in. To see young people's eyes light up when they learn about the richness of their history and how it offers possibilities in the present is a gift that needs to be given across

more education institutions in South Africa and across the continent. At a time when the rest of the world is setting its sights on Africa as the next major market, there has never been a more critical and urgent time to empower our learners to think about their continent more critically.

The Way Forward

It is clear that steps to Africanise our curricula have to be pursued without apology and with greater urgency than before. The effects of failing to do so, particularly at a juncture in our history where the world is looking to Africa as the next big market, will be dire and will negatively impact on any hopes for African economic and sociopolitical progress and autonomy. A very courageous and visionary type of leadership and political will is required to begin this strategic work.

Firstly, there has to be a willingness to invest time and resources in researching and understanding what an effective Africanised curriculum could look like. Given, for example, that the African identity is defined differently across the continent, agreement needs to be reached about what aspects of Africanness are most necessary to espouse in curricula. If we are to start from the perspective of seeing Africanness not as being fragmented but as a single ‘ethnicity’, as Hilliard describes it, then we remove the frustrations of focusing on rudimentary differences. Indeed, what is critical is that key Africans in all their diversity be the ‘primary and principle communicator of the African experience’ (Ramose in Botha, 2010: 204). Added to this first point, serious research agendas need to be put in place to collate data on Africa’s critical resource bases, energy alternatives, market possibilities and social structures, among other things, and the findings need to be infused into curricula in the form of case studies. This will sharpen learners’ critical thinking skills and their confidence to tackle real African challenges.

What is also critical is that we begin to teach Africa with a great deal of subjectivity and from the perspective of what is good for Africa’s interests. There is a difference, for example, between teaching history as though it were objective and illustrating to learners that the writing of history is necessarily determined by who has the power to write. Such a politicised and subjective teaching of history will allow our educators to effectively challenge the more popular writings on Africa which fuel the mythology of ‘Africa the dark continent’ among our learners. We also need to foreground the writings of authors like Cheikh Anta Diop who write about the continent in a way that builds pride and a sense of ownership of our history.

Within an Africanised curriculum, there should also be room to engage with the psychosocial effects of colonisation. It is incredible just how many young black learners still struggle with an inferiority complex and feel particularly challenged when put on a platform with their white peers. Certainly the narratives that they tell of their experiences are reflective of this. Yet our education seems to want to ignore this very pertinent aspect of our social reality. We seem to have assumed that the integrated character of the rainbow nation post-apartheid in South Africa will somehow automatically undo the deep-seated complexes that affect so many black people in this part of the world (Fanon, 1967). The introduction therefore of Black Consciousness theory into our curriculum is something we should seriously begin to consider. Taught well and strategically, this theory need not be threatening to white learners (Steve Biko certainly did not desire for it to be so), but should create an opportunity to engage with the pertinent issue of self-realisation among black learners, who still have a tendency to hand over power to their white peers.

A major problem that we also need to challenge is the undermining of the value of the humanities and social sciences within a current system that, at least in theory, favours science and technology. What we seem to have forgotten is that a significant number of our thinkers, philosophers, visionaries, indeed our prophets come from the humanities and social sciences. In his analysis of education in South Africa, for example, Graeme Bloch (2010, *Business Day*, <http://www.businessday.co.za/articles/Content.aspx?id=108978>) argues that social scientists will contribute hugely towards progressive change in this country because they best understand the interconnectedness of systems, practices and processes and how to add value to these. Yet learners in this field are seldom supported by scholarships, bursary schemes and more importantly by the overemphasis on the importance of science and technology.

When we begin to value the humanities and social sciences anew, we should also begin to value the role of interdisciplinary learning in a developing economy. The Engineering student should be able to benefit from social science theory and be able to think more critically about the impact of her work on real social needs, social systems and development in Africa. A good example is that of Makerere University in Uganda where the Faculty of Technology teaches Cheikh Anta Diop's social science theories. Imhotep and Hippocrates are also compared in the Faculty of Medicine, allowing for critical thinking around the origins of medical procedures and technologies (Tabaro, 2008). We also need to begin to valorise the importance of African authors. Our learners need to read Cheikh Anta Diop, Molefe Kete Asante, Es'kia Mphahlele, Achille Mbembe, Mahmood Mamdani and other such African intellectuals. The writer has recently provided

a reading list for beneficiaries to explore, and the enthusiasm with which they have visited the libraries proves that young people are yearning for voices that speak a truth and an experience that they can relate to. One beneficiary who corresponded via email wrote:

I read about Queen Ndzhinga yesterday, she was quiet [sic] remarkable, wow hey? 30 years of fighting so hard for her people? Amazing stuff! its [sic] a pity we arent [sic] taught these things about our history. I certainly am going to read more about it and keep on reading some more titles from the African Writers' Series.

What is also critical is that we begin to host conferences on Africa, leadership, entrepreneurship and development (among other subjects) on African soil. Currently, the most important youth conferences are held abroad and our young people have now come to understand the West as the hub for critical engagements on the future of their own continent. We must take these young people to Ghana, to Ethiopia, to Sudan, to the DRC, and to other African countries and have them engage with other young people and with leaders and change agents from different sectors of the economy, of the civil sector and of government. This will help them not only to demystify the continent but also to appreciate the efforts that other Africans are putting into developing their own societies and economies. It will also foster strategic partnerships across the continent. The African Leadership Academy based in Johannesburg is an exceptional example of an education institution that is driven by pan-African values and has brought together young Africans from across the continent to engage about pertinent African issues under a two-year programme. Such a development in our education system should be celebrated and fostered in creative and strategic ways across the continent.

The above measures will also help us to undo the notion of South African exceptionalism. There have been fears in the past that the current political and economic domination of South Africa on the continent could result in the South African identity being upheld as the example above other African examples in the journey towards an African Renaissance. An inclusive African curriculum will counter this possibility by making knowledge about other African countries come alive to African learners within South Africa.

Finally, it is important that we encourage young South Africans to participate in volunteer programmes across Africa. It is pathological that the current face of aid or volunteerism in Africa is white and Western. It is important that we expose our young people to the many challenges that Africans have to grapple

with across the continent. This will help to stimulate their minds to come up with innovative solutions for the people. It will also allow us to strategically undo the perception, and indeed the practice, that Africans are incapable of being the solution to their own problems.

Conclusion

At a time when thinkers are beginning to tell us that imagination and good governance will be the two drivers of economic and social progress,⁷ we cannot underestimate the value of changing our education system so that it empowers and enables our learners both on a local and global platform. It was wa Thiong'o who wrote: 'it seems it is the fate of Africa to have her destiny always decided around the conference tables in the metropolises of the Western World' (1986: 4). This is a reality that we actively need to change, and education gives us a strategic opportunity to fill the minds of our young people with pertinent knowledge about their environment and with the desire to connect with that environment positively and actively. Failure to do so means that the fate of this continent will forever remain in the hands of foreign powers, and if we let this opportunity pass us by then we have no one to blame but ourselves!

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CHAPTER 42

Computing for Africa's Global Competitiveness: Examining the Use of Computational Electromagnetics as a Tool for Development


Siyanda Nazo

Introduction

In this chapter, the field of computational electromagnetics (CEM) is presented as an example of the role science and technology has to play in Africa's development. In its role as an enabling technology, CEM techniques facilitate the design process and allow the technology developer to make informed decisions in the product design cycle. Africa currently has challenges that can be solved with the use of technologies that make use of CEM techniques. It is vital that these technological solutions emanate from the people of Africa because it is in the best interests of the people to live in a region that is developed, as this will improve the quality of life of the inhabitants. It is equally important for Africans to showcase their achievements in their respective fields in order to inspire confidence in the youth of Africa. The development of these technologies by the African people also has positive advantages such as the development of human capital, which in turn leads to the intellectual development of the people on the continent. These people will be intellectuals who are excited by the prospect of finding solutions to the continent's problems.

CEM can be classified as comprising the methods that approximate solutions to Maxwell's equations. Maxwell's equations are the set of equations that govern the behaviour of electromagnetic fields in a region of space. Numerous methods are available to solve Maxwell's equations and can be grouped into three main categories: analytical methods, computational methods and asymptotic methods. The sub-methods found under the three main categories can be represented by the tree in figure 4.

Figure 4: Techniques to approximate solutions to Maxwell's equations



The analytical methods represent a group of classical mathematical techniques that are applied to Maxwell's equations. These methods apply a transformation, expansion or reordering of Maxwell's equations to solve a particular electromagnetic problem. These methods were very useful in the era before significant advances in computers were made. This is the era before the Second World War up until the early 1960s.

These computational methods, also referred to as the numerical methods, represent a closed forms approximation to Maxwell's equations and are referred to as full-wave solutions. The methods consist of integral equation (e.g. the method of moments) and differential equation methods (e.g. the finite difference time domain method) which approximate solutions to the integral and differential form of Maxwell's equations respectively. These methods typically subdivide the problem of interest into a grid where each element of the grid is stored in a matrix.

The asymptotic methods assume an asymptotic representation of the solution in the form of a series of inverse powers of the wave number k , where typically the first term is retained. This underlying assumption inherently implies that these methods work well when the dimensions of the object are large in comparison to the wavelength.

These CEM techniques find application in various fields such as energy, radio frequency (RF) propagation, telecommunications, military, biomedical engineering, mining, space science and any other fields where electromagnetic waves form part of the system of interest. In the following sections, applications of CEM to some of these fields will be demonstrated in order to highlight the role CEM plays as an enabler of technology development. These technologies are already playing an important role in the advancement of Africans and some of these will play an increasing role in meeting some of Africa's advancement objectives. The applications of CEM techniques in the following sections are in areas that are challenging Africa and its people. The knowledge base of modern economies allows space for Africa to not only be on par with the rest of the world, but be ahead of it, if further investment is made in science and technology.

Applications in Telecommunications

The field of telecommunications has played a key role in connecting people and in facilitating knowledge sharing processes. The sector has experienced tremendous growth in Africa. The growth experienced by telecommunications in Africa in the past decade has been, in part, a result of the penetration of mobile cellular, and is set to continue as more investment in telecommunications and ICT is planned for the future. Africa is currently home to more than a quarter of a billion mobile subscribers, translating to one mobile for every 4 people. The SADC region has experienced an annual growth rate of 100 per cent in mobile cellular and is home to one of the world's largest GSM networks. Through developments in telecommunications, people have been able to get access to information through the internet.

The internet is seen as a key to social and economic development in Africa. Access to the internet has been regarded as a strategic national infrastructure by many governments of developing nations. The internet impacts on the dimensions of development such as economic productivity, health, education and poverty alleviation. Benefits in these dimensions can be seen through international marketing for local companies, healthcare sites relevant to socioeconomic development and distance learning. Unfortunately, in Africa, access to the internet for all people has not grown at a similar rate to that of mobile cellular penetration.

Only about one in twenty people (a total of 50 million people) have access to the internet in Africa, with over 50 per cent of these users estimated to be in North Africa and South Africa. The major hindrance to access has traditionally been the infrastructure cost associated with delivering services to geographically dispersed people with fixed line communication technologies. Advancements in wireless technologies have served to address this problem, and this is evidenced by the rate at which wireless communication has surpassed the growth of fixed line communication in Africa. Wireless systems involve an integration of topics that can be addressed with the use of CEM techniques. These include antennas, propagation effects and RF and microwave circuit design.

The use of wireless mesh networks has been identified as a solution to bring connectivity to people in diverse areas. Wireless mesh networks are an ideal choice for regions such as Africa because they make use of the benefits of Wi-Fi, are easy to maintain and self-configure, and the infrastructure cost associated with this network is low. Each point that has access to the network is known as a node in the mesh. The nodes are comprised of clients and Wi-Fi routers. The routers consist of high microwave circuitry and antennas that receive EM signals from other nodes in the network. In the wireless mesh, each node has to be visible to the next node in order to direct EM signals to other nodes in the network. This is how each node stays connected to the network. The nodes can be connected to any device capable of connecting to the network, such as PCs and Voice over Internet Protocol (VOIP) phones.

This technology can be utilised to deliver internet access to rural communities in Africa, a task which has been undertaken by the Wireless Africa research group at the Meraka Institute of the Council for Scientific and Industrial Research (CSIR). The institute has piloted wireless mesh network projects in a rural community in Mpumalanga using low-cost routers and some easy-to-build antennas in each node of the network. Each node in the network represents the school or clinic where connectivity is desired. This project aims to deliver internet connectivity to schools and clinics in the community.

Each mesh represents a rural community, and this is connected to the internet via a long-distance wireless network that emanates from the service provider. The link to the internet service provider can be considered as the internet bubble in figure 5. The long-distance wireless network consists of repeater stations that boost the received signal over the distance of the link. The design of the repeater stations requires that each station's design maximises the line of sight between stations in the link. This involves the study of propagation effects. Propagation models can be grouped into statistical or deterministic models. CEM techniques are used in deterministic models because these models rely on numerically exact

solutions to EM scattering related equations. These techniques allow the user to build an accurate description of the physical terrain (valleys, buildings) and are the most accurate propagation techniques because they model propagation effects such as diffraction and reflection.

The Meraka Institute makes use of a computational tool to calculate the optimum location of each node in the network which includes terrain data in the model. This tool can be placed in the broad class of statistical propagation models and offers an approximate result. A more accurate answer can be obtained with the use of propagation CEM techniques, and this would result in an improved design of the long distance wireless link. The use of Wi-Fi technology also requires that each node's antenna is in the line of sight of other nodes in the network in order to stay connected. Propagation techniques are useful in determining the location of each node in the network given the geographical distribution of schools/clinics in a rural community.

Low cost, easy to assemble antennas with good performance characteristics are required in order to ensure the rollout of wireless mesh networks in rural areas. With CEM techniques, antennas with the desired performance characteristics can be designed and utilised in mesh networks. An example of such an antenna is the 'cantenna' utilised by the Wireless Africa group. This antenna is constructed from a metal can and a section of bicycle spokes soldered onto the can with a connector. This antenna can communicate with other antennas at a distance of five kilometres. Similar antenna designs constructed from cheap material that is easy enough for any member of a community to assemble can be realised with CEM techniques such as the method of moments. The advantage of CEM software is that the designer can include the properties of the material and optimise the design for maximum coverage. An added benefit of such an easy-to-construct antenna is that this process involves the transfer of radio frequency (RF) skills to members of the community.

Applications in Defence

CEM techniques have always had a close link to the military environment. Early development of these techniques was driven by military research, although commercial applications have emerged to be a driver of development of CEM techniques in recent times. The military plays a vital role in meeting the safety and security needs of any nation, and it is vital that this industry is at the forefront of technological advancement. In Africa, the defence environment has stimulated development in CEM techniques to the extent that funding provided by the Armaments Corporation of South Africa (Armscor) eventually led to a

South African company producing a leading commercial electromagnetic modelling software package, FEKO.

Radar research and development is an example of defence technology that Africa has been continually involved in since its inception. The word 'radar' was coined in 1941 as an acronym for 'radio detection and ranging'. South Africa has been involved in the development of radar since the Second World War, and a radar competence was established at what was then known as the National Institute for Telecommunications Research (NITR) in 1945. In the 1960s, the National Institute for Defence Research (NIDR) at the Council for Scientific and Industrial Research (CSIR) took over the task of providing military radar research and development to the South African Department of Defence. The CSIR has, since, built on this competence and established many radar technologies in support of the SA Department of Defence. Radar cross section (RCS) is an important design criterion in radar systems because it is a measure of an object's reflectivity. Thus, the RCS of an object (usually referred to as the target) determines how much of the radar's power the object is able to absorb and reflect back to radar. CEM prediction techniques find application in RCS prediction. It is important for the radar engineer to have knowledge of the RCS of the targets the radar is designed to track. Radars are typically found in land, airborne and sea marine applications.

An application example in which CEM is bound to play a vital role is the development of a persistent, ubiquitous surveillance system. South Africa, like the rest of Africa, faces the challenge of protecting its borders from illegal crossing, piracy, terrorism, smuggling and poaching. Food security is a key issue that will have an impact on the inhabitants of the continent, and it is vital that this is ensured for future generations. There are not enough resources to monitor and protect the large land and marine territory, and this results in an unfavourable force-to-space ratio. The New Partnership for Africa's Development (NEPAD) has also highlighted the establishment and maintenance of peace, safety and security as a prerequisite for development in Africa. Awarinet is the name given by the Defence, Peace, Safety and Security (DPSS) research division of the CSIR to the applied research and development programme of a capability in persistent, ubiquitous surveillance to be used by South African state departments and agencies to enhance national security. The radar and electronic warfare research team of the CSIR tasked itself with radar-based solutions to problems that affect the quality of life of people in South Africa.

Radar is an attractive primary sensor for such a surveillance system as it offers long-range coverage, low latency under most environmental conditions and the ability to monitor large numbers of objects simultaneously. Researchers

at the CSIR have arrived at the conclusion that the challenging requirements for a system to operate under various conditions can be met with multi-channel steering beam array radar with a large aperture. Method of moments CEM techniques are mature full-wave techniques and find frequent application in the design of radar antennas. In the presence of large structures, these techniques are often combined with high frequency techniques such as physical optics to predict antenna performance. Another key issue that has been identified in the project is the detection of small boats in sea clutter. This problem makes it difficult for the radar to detect small poaching boats in the presence of harsh sea conditions. This problem is also exacerbated by multipath effects from the sea surface. The development of EM modelling techniques that are able to model the sea surface and boats in the sea will become increasingly important, as this is one area that is not well documented in the literature. EM sea surface models will require the application of high frequency techniques, as these will be electrically large areas in the typical radar frequencies. The RCS of the small boats will require the use of CEM RCS prediction tools.

Commercially available RCS prediction tools such as CADRCS and Xpatch usually have export restriction licences with limited capabilities for countries that are not part of the North Atlantic Treaty Organisation (NATO). This will mean that defence research institutes of countries that are not part of this organisation will have to develop their own RCS prediction techniques.

Another area of application of CEM in the military environment is in the detection of landmines. There are two types of landmine, antitank and antipersonnel mines. Antitank (AT) mines are meant to disable vehicles, and antipersonnel (AP) mines are able to disable people on foot. There are an estimated 110 million AP mines buried in over 60 countries which cost 26 000 innocent lives each year. Each year, only 100 000 mines are found and destroyed, and this has become a humanitarian issue. Research into landmine detection is crucial for Africa, where there are more than 37 million landmines in at least 19 countries. Ground penetrating radar (GPR) is a key research field in this area which seeks to address the problem of landmine detection. Detecting mines with metal detectors is often difficult because most mines are made of plastic, with a firing pin as the only metal piece. In GPR for landmine detection, the radar antenna sends a short pulse/electromagnetic signal to the ground and detects the backscattered energy from beneath the ground. The radar is able to discriminate between the ground and the landmine because the dielectric constants of the two are different. The time history interaction of the radar signal and the landmine can be modelled with an FDTD simulation of the GPR. The sub-grid nature of the FDTD is used to model the ground, the radar antenna and the buried landmine. Current problems

with GPR are the probability of false alarms, because in landmines there are numerous signals that could trigger detectors. CEM techniques such as the FDTD can assist the radar engineer in reducing this problem with the performance of simulations of objects that trigger false alarms; the signature of these signals can be included in the radar design parameters so that the GPR can discriminate against false alarms. This would involve the collection of a database of false alarm triggers.

Enterprise Creation and Skills Transfer

This section serves to highlight the role CEM has played in enterprise creation in Africa. Economic growth in developing nations is often attributed to technological innovation and the commercialisation of these products. It is equally important to develop human capital in any developing nation, because higher levels of education make powerful contributions to technology creation. Many African countries remain technology colonies because, according to this definition, these countries are dependent on foreign technology or their national systems of innovation are poorly developed. Even though most African countries obtained political freedom in the 1960s, these countries still remained technologically dependent on their colonial masters. The technology colony is characterised by the technology channels illustrated in Figure 7.

There is a large gap between the research phase and the production/manufacturing and sales phase in the product development life cycle. There is still a large influx of technology from developed countries because licensed designs and finished products are marketed through subsidiaries or agents of the developed nations.

In the CEM field, South Africa has managed to successfully direct a CEM product from the research phase to the sales phase and to successfully export this product to the developed world. The commercial CEM tool FEKO was developed as a result of research funding obtained from Armscor, connections with researchers at the University of Stuttgart and an entrepreneurial mindset. The research was funded for the development of EM modelling techniques for use by the South African Defence Force, but this research eventually led to the formation of a small company. This story serves as an example of how the government, through research funding, and researchers with an entrepreneurial mindset, can collaborate in the creation of a successful enterprise. The success of EMSS can be attributed to the fact that all companies are competing in a 'flat world' as a result of the knowledge based economies the world is migrating towards. There is still scope for Africa to expand its CEM knowledge because CEM is a field that

is advancing with the corresponding advance in computational power. The establishment of the Centre for High Performance Computing (CHPC) in Cape Town, South Africa, provides an opportunity for researchers in CEM to develop parallel implementation techniques and extend the scope of problems that can be solved with CEM techniques. The CHPC's main objective is to make South Africa globally competitive and accelerate Africa's socioeconomic upliftment through high-end computer infrastructure. This centre houses Africa's most powerful computer, the Blue Gene, capable of performing 14 trillion calculations per second. Further funding into this research could enable Africa to develop other techniques that could lead to the creation of more small and medium enterprises (SMEs). Studies in emerging economies have shown SMEs to be the main drivers of growth in those countries. This, however, is a task that will require universities to train engineers with a wealth creating mindset.

CEM engineers acquire skills, through their training, that are critical for Africa's development. These are skills in mathematics and physical science, radio frequency propagation, electromagnetism, logical thinking and computer programming. A CEM trained engineer can apply these skills in other sectors of the economy. The Square Kilometre Array (SKA) project initiated by the government of South Africa serves as an example of a project that will greatly benefit from CEM trained engineers. Engineers also have a responsibility to spark an interest in CEM in young people in order for Africa and its people to benefit in the future from these skills. This can be achieved through incentives to pursue higher education studies in CEM and the exposure of young people to electromagnetism and computer programming.

EMSS serves as a good example of the benefit of investment in research that is geared towards knowledge creation. The skills realised from training in CEM can be transferred to the general African population when people of the continent are exposed to these skills. This example can be extended to other research areas that provide potential economic benefit for any nation through funding and enterprise support initiatives.

Implications for Leadership

The importance of the role of science and technology in a nation's development cannot be ignored. The information age has opened up possibilities for nations to compete globally in their chosen niche areas. In order to produce science and technology that is suited to Africa and its problems, our African centres of learning will have to train leaders in the science and technology space who are conscious of the problems that surround them. It is also equally important for

African scientists to communicate effectively, to people at large, the importance of their work and the context of the work. Science and engineering professionals are often passionate about solving complex problems, but they are not often well versed in explaining the importance of their work. African centres of higher education need to train scientists who are able to articulate the importance of their work.

African governments and the private sector have important support roles to play in science and technology. They can provide support through regulation, investment and inclusion. The government can regulate African markets in order to ensure that African technologies have an advantage over foreign technologies. The government and private sectors can provide investment in research in order to produce new products to benefit the African people and to export to the rest of the world. African governments need to include science and technology in their developmental plans, and also to make sure that these plans are communicated to all scientists. It is especially important to communicate these plans to potential scientists who are still students at educational institutions. This will allow future scientific leaders to identify their field of interest and to plan their growth in their chosen field, because they will be aware of the opportunities for innovation in that field in their respective countries.

Conclusion

In this chapter, CEM was presented as an example of a technology that can be harnessed for Africa's development. Examples of some of the applications of CEM in areas that serve to benefit the people of Africa were highlighted. These applications were focused on telecommunications and defence and in enterprise creation. Telecommunications currently plays a big role in connecting the people of Africa, and this is evident in the growth of the mobile cellular industry in Africa. CEM techniques were shown to be useful in the design of wireless communication links in telecommunications. These techniques are used in the design process in wireless system topics such as EM field propagation and antennas. The techniques serve as an enabler for technology that is beneficial to projects delivering internet connectivity to rural areas.

Defence has traditionally played an important role in the development of CEM techniques, and it has been emphasised that peace and security in Africa are a prerequisite for development. Military applications demonstrating the use of CEM in Africa are the development of maritime monitoring systems utilising radar technology and the detection of landmines. Maritime surveillance is becoming increasingly important in Africa to ensure food security for the continent's

people. CEM techniques can be applied in the design of maritime radar surveillance systems and in the design of radars for modelling landmines.

Research and development in the CEM field in Africa has led to the creation of EMSS, a CEM modelling company located in Stellenbosch, South Africa. This has made Africa an equal contributor to the rest of the world in this field and has produced people who have been able to contribute to the maturity of these techniques. This shows that Africa is capable of producing companies that are able to compete globally if enough support is given to technological entrepreneurs. The steps that have been followed in the development of an expertise in and a company that produces software for CEM in South Africa can be equally applied to other scientific areas of research

CEM by itself cannot solve all of Africa's developmental challenges, but its role as an enabler for technologies that are solutions to Africa's developmental problems has been demonstrated in this chapter. This highlights the role science and technology has to play in advancing Africa. Often, Africans and the rest of the world highlight all that is negative concerning Africa. This chapter highlights that, viewed from a science and technology perspective, some of Africa's problems present Africans with an opportunity to generate innovative solutions and contribute to human knowledge. African people need to produce leaders who will eagerly search for solutions to the problems that the continent is faced with.

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CHAPTER 43

Toward Positioning Africa at the Forefront of Science and Technology Advancements in the 21st Century

Ishmael Makitla and Jabu Mtsweni

Introduction

The African Union Commission for Science and Technology has facilitated the development of policies and guidelines to promote and encourage the adoption of science and technology (S&T) as a tool for Africa's advancement (African Union, 2005). This has seen the establishment of the African Ministerial Council on Science and Technology (AMCOST) as the overall governance structure for setting Africa's continental priorities and policies pertaining to the development and application of S&T for Africa's socioeconomic development. AMCOST stressed the urgency of building the continent's capacities to harness, adapt, apply and develop S&T in order to address some of Africa's pressing issues including poverty and diseases. This, AMCOST is convinced, as are the authors of this chapter, has the potential to improve Africa's economic competitiveness within the global space and assist Africa to achieve socioeconomic transformation targets.

The chapter points to some of the key areas within S&T in which the urgency described by AMCOST can be served. These areas have also been pointed out in the Consolidated Science and Technology Plan of Action (African Union, 2005). This plan clearly articulates Africa's common objectives and commitment to collective action to develop and apply S&T for the socioeconomic transformation of the continent, and its integration into the world economy. This also entails transformation of individual African states into market economies.

In order to actualise the plan of action, three supporting pillars were identified by AMCOST, of which the first is capacity building: this involves creation and improvement of human skills, formulation of enabling policies for developing and using S&T, building of support physical infrastructure such as roads, national research networks and energy supplies. The second pillar is research and development (R&D), which stresses the scientific and technical knowledge about Africa's problems and the need to devise ways and means to solve these problems. The third pillar is the development of specific products, processes and services which are globally competitive. All these pillars relate directly to the interventions outlined in this chapter.

The remainder of the chapter is structured as follows: The second section elaborates on the challenges that the authors view as preventing Africa from being at the forefront in the space of S&T from a global perspective. The third section discusses various approaches and interventions that could be instrumental in positioning Africa as a leader in the S&T domain, particularly for the purposes of socioeconomic advancement in Africa. The following section details the importance of finding an African niche area in S&T, especially within the R&D pillar, where the focus is on research which seeks to address Africa's challenges, and on findings and results that greatly impact and minimise the socioeconomic challenges confronting Africa's inhabitants. The final section summarises and concludes the chapter.

Challenges Preventing Africa from being at the Forefront of Science and Technology

This section discusses the state of affairs as far as research in Africa is concerned, and how Africa compares to the global community. Preliminary input to this section is used from the scientometric assessment undertaken by Pouris and Pouris (2009).

Scientometrics are essentially about monitoring, measuring, and analysing developments in *science*, and one possible way of doing this is by measuring and evaluating scientific research publications. The scientometric indicators used by Pouris and Pouris (2009) were based on the number of research publications and the number of patents awarded to inventors from Africa between the years 2000 and 2004. In the following paragraph, a summary is provided which elaborates on some of the worrying findings. Africa as a whole produced about 1,8 per cent of the world's research publications; this is 0,6 per cent less than India's 2,4 per cent contribution during the same period (2000–2004).

South Africa and Egypt are both accountable for 50 per cent of the research publications produced by Africa during this period. In terms of patents, about 88 per cent of the inventive activities are said to be concentrated in South Africa. Nevertheless, Africa as a whole delivers less than a thousand of the world's inventions (Pouris and Pouris, 2009).

Faced with these scientometric statistics, Pouris and Pouris (2009) suggest that Africa needs to carry out two urgent tasks 'simultaneously', namely

- to produce more research-trained graduates, and

- to create a conducive and intellectually stimulating environment within individual countries, so as to retain these graduates in their respective home countries.

Producing research-trained graduates who practise in Africa, and conduct scientific research studies meant to solve challenges holding Africa back in a number of domains, is one possible solution for improving the numbers of research publications and patents registered by Africans. However, this alone cannot solve challenges preventing Africa from being at the forefront in S&T. In the following paragraphs, other challenges beyond human capital development are highlighted.

In terms of the policies and strategies, most African states, particularly South Africa, are well on par with the developed economies. A number of established plans such as Africa's Science and Technology Consolidated Plan of Action (African Union, 2005) are a testimony to this fact. However, the main drawback has always been on the governance and implementation or lack thereof of these well-grounded policies, and strategies. For instance, Africa is still among the poorest continents in the world, despite being one of the rich continents in the world in terms of resources. In addition, in Africa there are countries such as South Africa which are commonly classified as developing countries, yet most countries in Africa are still classified as among the Bottom Billion countries, where a lot of challenges are still prevalent (Collier 2007). Bottom Billion nations, according to Collier, are those that are classified as being very poor and 'falling apart' rather than emerging, and have low per capita income levels, weak per capita GDP growth, and poor policies and institutional and governance capacities.

Compounding the challenges mentioned above is the fact that Africa can be classified as an S&T colony of the developed nations. Many S&T developments that we see in African countries emanate from the developed nations, and even from countries such as India, which is also classified as an emerging economy. It should be noted as well that in certain cases, solutions that come from the developed North are not always suited to the requirements, context and challenges of Africa. This was best captured during a rigorous debate in 1998 at the University of Cape Town by an African scholar, Professor Mahmood Mamdani,¹ who said:

I cannot take the design of a Swedish architect to build a house in Uganda. My design must reflect local conditions, use local resources in response to local problems.

What is common in information and communication technologies (ICTs) for instance is that Africa is in many instances adapting its research to that of developed markets. Thus, although the adoption and usage of S&T in Africa is favourable, we are still to a large extent a net importer and consumer of S&T solutions from other continents. This could change for the better in the coming years, but for this to happen, radical changes need to take place within the research and development (R&D) leadership in African countries. Moreover, Africa needs to be more than a consumer and adaptor of knowledge and technologies from the developed world; it should be an inventor of new knowledge and innovative technologies as well.

What also makes it a challenge for Africa to be at the forefront with regard to S&T is that Africa still depends heavily on international funding for addressing a number of its challenges. Of course, this is not necessarily a bad thing, but the manner in which most of the funds are acquired or allocated depends also on how the developed world could benefit from the research activities that are conducted in Africa. Hence, it is a challenge for Africa to make any breakthroughs and have local impact given that research projects funded by developed nations need to be aligned to the problems of the developed nations (eg EuroAfrica ICT partnership²). This poses the question: How can Africa accelerate the process of addressing Africa's problems when the local research 'attention' is divided?

From a global perspective, Africa is trailing behind in S&T. This is evident in the lack of mathematical and scientific development at secondary schools and tertiary institutions in a number of African institutions, plus a lack of high-level graduates (PhDs) in Africa (Anderson, 2009), particularly in Mathematics. Furthermore, Africa's most distinguished scholars tend to migrate to the developed North in search of scientific and technological enlightenment in almost all areas of S&T. As a consequence, Africa experiences a brain drain.

Regardless of all these challenges, it is our view that S&T could play a vital role in Africa's development, as it has been the case in other developed nations. However, what is needed is an improvement in the manner in which African member states govern, implement and lead in realising their research objectives, especially in the S&T domain.

Positioning Africa at the Forefront

In this section, we suggest a number of interventions as possible remedies for some of the challenges being experienced in Africa, especially in the R&D domain.

One of the important steps that needs to be taken by all African countries is *focusing on basic and applied research that is directly applicable to, and*

inspired by, African challenges. Additionally, such directed research should place Africa on the map of ‘research visibility’. Currently Africa’s contribution to global S&T research is quite limited (Adams, King and Hook, 2010; Pouris and Pouris, 2009).

The subsections that follow elaborate on three key areas that are critical in positioning Africa at the forefront of S&T advancements in the 21st century. These key areas are: (1) intellectual capital advancement, (2) intensifying collaborations among Africa’s research institutions, and (3) finding an African niche in S&T.

Importance of Human Capital Advancement

Phillip Emeagwali, one of the greatest living African computer scientists and mathematicians,³ delivered a keynote speech at the Pan-African conference in 2003 entitled: ‘How do we reverse the brain drain from Africa?’ In his speech, one of the key issues raised was the challenge of African scholars migrating to the developed North for ‘greener pastures’, and how this can be redressed. His suggestion was quite simple: ‘Africa needs to increase and nurture its intellectual capital. Knowledge is the engine that drives economic growth, and Africa cannot eliminate poverty without first increasing and nurturing its intellectual capital.’

According to the Academy of Science of South Africa (ASSAF, 2010) and South African PhD Project,⁴ South African universities produced only 26 doctoral graduates per million of the population in 2007. This was 50 per cent less than Brazil (an emerging economy), and 90 per cent less than the PhD graduates produced in the United Kingdom (ASSAF, 2010).

These numbers are worrying, and too low to sustain a knowledge economy (PhD Project, 2010). These statistics are further lamented by Karar and Pietersen (2009), who assert that human capacity development is lacking in South Africa, particularly in advancing S&T. It should be noted though that initiatives are already in place in South Africa to redress the challenges of human capital development, such as those by the PhD Project, aiming to increase five-fold the PhD graduates by 2025 with the support of government and national research funding institutions.

Nevertheless, it is important to reiterate the fact that African countries greatly need to accelerate the efforts on human capital advancements. In addition, Africa needs to develop and bring forth researchers who are capable of finding and generating solutions that are both relevant to Africa’s problems and have a universal applicability. Moreover, Africa needs to support, encourage and fund scholars who will ‘stay at home’ and innovate solutions on the S&T front that

could practically address many of the challenges that African states are facing today. Most importantly, Africa needs to also show appreciation of her research talent through various incentive schemes. This could include, but should not be limited to, creating conducive research opportunities for scholars, paying competitive salaries, stimulating balanced funding opportunities in various research projects, rewarding excellence and innovations in all domains of research and development, and promoting and supporting research collaborations among African universities and industries.

Collaborative Environment for Africa's Institutions

Collaborations among African institutions on the research front are not that visible as compared to the collaborations between African institutions, 'high-tech' universities and commissions from the developed North.⁵ Obviously in the S&T domain, there are limited experts in Africa, who are in many instances mostly concentrated in the so-called 'developed' universities or research institutions, where limited individual-based collaborations are sometimes apparent. The Global Research Report focusing on Africa (Adams, King and Hook, 2010) presents an analysis of co-authorship of papers among African researchers.

However, without strong and multidisciplinary collaborations among African scholars at institutional levels, the undertaking of high-tech and ground-breaking research, publications and patents will always be limited. Secondly, competition for the same pool of funding for the same type of research projects will always be to our disadvantage in Africa. Furthermore, duplicating efforts at various research institutions can only lead to less impact, and less ground-breaking research results. Leimu and Koricheva (2005) mention that greater collaboration leads to higher impact; thus for Africa to rid herself of the present harsh challenges, and to redress Africa's S&T misfortunes, a collaborative research environment for African institutions needs to be established by all those involved in R&D in Africa. This collaborative environment could lead to an African research hub for addressing Africa's challenges.

Practical steps to promote and support research collaborations among African universities and industries are, firstly, by setting collaboration as a requirement or condition for funding; secondly, the individual research institutions also need to set this as part of their employees' key performance indicators in order to encourage knowledge sharing and collaboration. These collaborative projects must necessarily be co-funded by participating governments and industries; this should also include student exchanges and visiting professorships.

In the following section, we detail the core contribution of this chapter, which is finding an African niche in S&T. We add to the suggestions of Pouris and Pouris (2009) already mentioned that Africa should also establish a niche area from within which more scientific and inventive activities could take place. In addition, this niche becomes a source for research publications and high quality patents. We further suggest that African realities should serve as excitations in the establishment of the niche area; as Africa tries to rid herself of these harsh conditions, scientific innovations and delivery must result.

Finding an African Niche in Science and Technology

A West African Islamic proverb goes: ‘Salt comes from the north, gold from the south, but the word of God and the treasures of wisdom come from Timbuktu.’ The ancient Timbuktu as detailed in Jeppie and Diagne (2008), should serve as an inspiration to African scientists and technologists as they seek to put Africa back on her rightful course.

The research focus on S&T in developed countries is inspired by these countries’ needs which are inherently human. Similarly, African universities and research institutions in the S&T domain need to define Africa’s research focus that is inspired by African realities. The World Summit on Sustainable Development has made a call for the support of African countries to develop effective S&T institutions, and research activities within these institutions, capable of developing and adapting world class technologies. Recognising this, we further advise that the selection of these research activities should help in developing niche areas; this could set Africa apart as the leader in such areas of research. Of course, these research activities must produce research outputs of universal significance so that researchers elsewhere in the world can also benefit. This way, the African genius is reawakened and Timbuktu is returned to her former glory.

In the following subsections, we briefly elaborate on some of the areas that could be defined as part of the African research niche areas in S&T.

Human Language Technology

The Bantu tonal languages present a unique set of challenges to the Human Language Technology (HLT) community, specifically in terms of text-to-speech (TTS) technologies, which call for advanced tonality engines and technically advanced contextualisation techniques for the recognition of Bantu tonal languages. African linguists and technologists must therefore take the lead

in creating cutting-edge voice technologies capable of recognising all spoken African languages.

Broadband Connectivity

The harsh conditions in Africa's remote rural areas undermine the established broadband connectivity and network models. Providing connectivity to these remote rural areas presents a unique set of technical and non-technical challenges. Some of these challenges are captured by Johnson and Roux (2008: 17) and Ntlatlapa (2007: 2) as key issues that arise when deploying wireless mesh networks to remote rural areas in developing countries: long distances between nodes, difficulties in getting line of sight, severe climate conditions, single low-bandwidth gateways to the internet, high cost of internet connectivity, and a lack of proper road infrastructure and of a reliable power supply. Other non-technical challenges are issues of low per capita income, theft, vandalism, and a general lack of technical personnel.

These African realities call for some important technical innovations. Lack of reliable energy supplies requires that African wireless communication devices should have built-in energy efficiency, necessitating further redevelopment of routing protocols to consider, as one of the metrics in routing, the residual energy of nodes along the shortest path to destination. Vandalism calls for tamper-proof casings of the communication nodes. Indeed, the lack of supporting physical infrastructure in most African countries demands wireless communication infrastructure which is easier and cheaper to deploy, requires minimal maintenance and can withstand the harsh conditions that the African continent has to offer.

Mobile Phones

The mobile phone penetration has been observed to be on the increase in recent times in Africa (Opera Software ASA, 2010). Thus, technologists in Africa must devise means to make intuitive services accessible through mobile phones. The African technologists must dictate the design of mobile phones as they uncover more innovative applications for mobile phones in the African context. Mobiles phone penetration presents Africa with an opportunity to leap-frog into the Information Age.

Space Sciences

The geographical and climatological position of Africa spurs scientists to develop cutting-edge, geographical information services, remote sensing and reporting techniques. Furthermore, African scientists still have more work to do to address challenges with regards to water and the energy sector.

Success in all the suggested niche areas rests as strongly on good leadership in areas of governance, development and scientific research as it does on the competence of African engineers, scientists and technologists. Africa needs to build the human capacity, specifically, the calibre of leaders capable of carrying out the tasks necessary for Africa's renewal.

Conclusion

In this chapter, we articulated ideas on how Africa can move forward to claim the 21st century as the African century. We highlighted some of the challenges that are holding Africa back, and we have suggested possible ways in which these challenges could be addressed. We indicated the need to strengthen intra-African states' collaboration in doing research, and also the need for human capital development within each African state, as this can potentially increase regional and continental skill pools.

One of the core contributions that this chapter makes is about the establishment of Africa's science and technology niche areas as strategic starting points for Africa's global contribution to the knowledge economy and competitiveness.

The chapter urges African countries to speed up the pace of increasing intellectual capital, creating conducive environments for their aspiring scientists and technologists to thrive. To kick-start Africa's development, African countries should now focus on producing more research trained graduates. The African communities must be knowledgeable in order to contribute meaningfully to the global debates in all spheres of science. African government officials charged with S&T developments should be able to interrogate the sciences and award grants for those scientific projects that are both meaningful and applicable to Africa and the world. Above all, the key lies in defining Africa's research niche areas such as in the domain of human language technologies, mobile devices, broadband network connectivity, and space sciences.

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CHAPTER 44

Exploring Developmental and Community Informatics*Kosheek Sewchurran and Eureka Sewchurran***Introduction**

The main virtue of research in the community informatics and ICT4D fields is that it offers a platform for an evaluative critique of observations and assumptions about development. Historically, development has been dominated by an emphasis on economic development, while the development on other levels has been neglected. This means that analyses of this discourse have tended to be economically or technically deterministic, with little attention paid to its social and cultural perspectives. The standard argument in ICT4D literature is that ‘economic upliftment’ will result in ‘social upliftment’. Empirical observations in the ICT4D field propose that it is instead ‘individual upliftment’ that influences social change, which might (or might not) lead to economic change (Johanson, 2011; Steyn, 2011). This chapter attempts to explain what person-dependant development is and how it is possible. It is hoped that the chapter will add value to the argument that the focus of ICT4D in Africa should shift to human development.

Recent studies indicate that access to the internet has increased tremendously in Africa. However, key concerns that remain are usage, benefits realisation and contribution to development. Each year, in excess of \$800 billion (US) is spent on ICTs in developing countries (Heeks, 2010). Africa alone is said to have spent around \$60 billion (US) in 2010 (Heeks, 2010). As a result of continued investment, internet usage in Africa has grown from one out of every 100 inhabitants (as measured in 1998) to 15 out of 100 inhabitants (as measured in 2008) (ITU, cited in Heeks, 2010: 626). Internet access and usage in Africa is achieved mainly through mobile phone usage. According to Heeks (2010), the mobile telephone usage rate in developing countries might be as high as 80 per cent of the population.

Despite improvements in internet access, Heeks (2010) and Zheng (2009) remain concerned about the absence, or poor quality, of ICT impacts. Another concern is the poor conceptual foundations of ICT4D efforts. While there are many claims that access to the internet and mobile technology can alleviate underdevelopment and poverty, these assertions are not easily translated to tangible and pragmatic benefits that people in underdeveloped communities can

strive for. The concerns of Heeks and others about internet usage and its contribution to development suggest a greater concern that the notion of development through internet usage should be explored further (Heeks, 2010; Obijiofor, 2009). The chapter therefore also attempts to theorise about development possibilities through internet usage. It is specifically directed at providing a better understanding of how ICT4D can be undertaken for human development (i.e. development that relates to education, health, social and economic wellbeing) and to offer a set of principles to enrich the ideals and conceptual foundations of development in order to maximise the transformational contribution of ICTs. Heeks (2010) refers broadly to such an initiative as ‘Development 2.0’.

The Internet and Human Development

In developed communities the internet has changed the daily discourse of those who have embraced it. It has become a key resource to undertake daily tasks and is used routinely to interact, access information, bank, shop, socialise, and so on. Internet usage has allowed a number of new socioeconomic development opportunities to emerge. Increased internet usage has increased the rate of societal change in developed communities. The dynamics and scale of interaction in cyberspace stretch beyond anything imaginable in physical space. Consequently, routine internet usage in developed communities has made it possible to imagine many new forms of socioeconomic engagement that leverage the infrastructure of the internet.

E-government, e-health, e-learning, e-education and e-banking have very quickly become popular and worthy of pursuit. Al-Saggaf (2004) claims that the internet improves citizens’ lives. He examined the effects of online communities in Saudi Arabia on social interactions in ‘the real world’ and found that internet usage has positive effects on users’ self-confidence, shyness and awareness about the world. He claims that the participants in his study had increased self-confidence, became more open-minded and less inhibited, and had a better appreciation of the opposite sex. On the negative side, he found that when participants became less shy, they neglected their family commitments, and became confused about some aspects of culture and religion. The internet can therefore benefit communities in a social manner, generate newer conceptions of the self, and allow for traditional ideals of socioeconomic development to be pursued more vigorously and (in some cases) in revolutionised ways.

Studies such as this have fuelled investment in ICT4D in emerging economies. However, the impacts of these projects on development have been mixed and there are many reports of project failure and the creation of ‘white elephants’. In

fact, instead of contributing to development, it has been observed that in some instances access to mobile phones has led to the perpetuation of underdevelopment. Researchers have noted, for example, that the success of mobile telephony in South Africa has produced an unexpected negative outcome: chronically poor communities have developed dependencies on mobile telephone services, while their high usage fees effectively deepen chronic poverty (Heeks, 2010). The evidence so far suggests a conceptual mismatch between intervention approaches and the conception of human development through the internet.

While internet usage has grown rapidly in developed communities, underdeveloped communities have not taken to the internet as rapidly or spontaneously. There are many challenges for adopting the internet in underdeveloped communities.

These include (but are not limited to) a lack of basic infrastructure such as electricity and telecommunication infrastructure, poor policy development and a severe shortage of ICT skills. The uneven adoption and use of the internet in African societies creates considerable concern because it stimulates yet another dimension of inequality. Due to the challenges of encouraging internet usage in underdeveloped communities, the very notion of development through the internet remains questionable but is worthy of further exploration. Madon (2000) gives a historical account of development and stresses that the very first phase of economic development started with decolonisation to create political independence for national development. An essential assumption of this process was that cities would become the focus of economic development initiatives by enabling scientific and industrial progress and advancement. According to Madon (2000), the modernity project did not only stimulate development because underdevelopment was also a persistent feature of the project. Underdevelopment was not an initial phase of the modernity process, but was a continuous state that often worsened (Madon, 2000). Decolonisation through modernity did not necessarily lead to what Ngũgĩ wa Thiong'o calls 'a decolonisation of minds'; decolonisation and modernity have also led to gross inequalities (Fanon, 2006; Thiongo, 1997, 2009; Wallerstein, 2006).

While research into more adequate measures of development is ongoing, researchers in the early 21st century consider development along the dimensions of social welfare, social equity, democracy, empowerment and sustainable development. Press recently provided evidence of a positive correlation between the number of internet hosts in a country and the Human Development Index (Press, cited in Madon, Sahay and Sudan, 2007). More recently, Brown and Brown (2009) asserted that rising poverty and inequality can also be linked to a lack of infrastructure and internet access. This assertion that communication and

interaction (or access to knowledge) have a direct effect on improving human development boils down to the poor not having access to the new tools to innovate and evolve in an ever-changing world. Pragmatically, it implies that economic, social and democratic progress is dependent on societal efforts through inclusive debates, social innovation and learning (Naidoo, 2010). The profound assertion that the internet can enable human development should be better explained since it is at risk of being appropriated for narrow ends. Wilson (2010) is one of many researchers who warn against oversimplifying development by not considering political and social contexts.

Outline of Research on ICTs for Development

In the past decade, there have been numerous efforts to make the internet accessible to poor communities and perceptions of the success of these efforts have been mixed. There have been several attempts to make sense of what ICT4D should strive for. Avgerou (2008b) tries to synthesise the discourses about the success of ICT4D at a macro-level by identifying and explaining three predominant discourses in the literature about ICT4D. The first predominant discourse is *the transfer and diffusion* discourse, which is based on the premise that in developing countries information systems innovation is mostly concerned with ‘catching up with the technologically advanced rich communities through transferring their technologies and emulating their institutions’ (Avgerou, 2008: 135). According to Avgerou, this discourse is underpinned by the assumption that ICT best practices can be independent from social circumstances and can be imitated in different contexts through suitable adaptation. In addition, it is assumed that the success of such a strategy depends on how carefully the differences in the recipient environment are identified and considered. Economic conditions, technology competences and attitudes towards information technology are generally identified as having the most significant influence on acceptance and use.

The second discourse is the *socially embedded innovation* discourse. This discourse promotes the notion that the *transfer and diffusion* discourse oversimplifies ICT4D to such an extent that it becomes misleading. As an alternative, the *socially embedded innovation* discourse argues that Information Systems (IS) innovation is about creating technological structures for a given context. Heeks (2010) expresses the same belief when he emphasises the need to analyse local meanings so that appropriate sociocultural change can take place. The *socially embedded innovation* discourse takes into account the viewpoint of socially constructed entities, such as the significance of human actors in their context. Avgerou (2008: 142) argues that the key challenge in this discourse is to combine

the shared ideas of the discourses by identifying the context that matters and developing theory that can address the interrelationship of the context with IS innovation. An example of a project of this discourse is given by Duveskog, Kemppainen, Bednarik and Sutinen (2009), who describe a solution for ongoing education on HIV and AIDS. The project helped to preserve the oral culture by using stories by youth that were formulated and stored in Swahili. The designers who were involved in putting this solution together relied on experts in the local culture to help them with the conceptualisation, design and implementation of the project. Krauss and Turpin (2010) also emphasise user involvement when they argue that cultural interpreters should be part of implementation teams to provide insight into the cultural effects of various implementation considerations.

The third discourse that Avgerou (2008) highlights is the *transformative discourse*, which offers a new perspective on IS innovation. Donner (2004; 2007) proposes that the *transformative discourse* addresses how ICT creates possibilities for the improvement of livelihoods, thereby placing emphasis on how it affects socioeconomic conditions. Thompson and Walsham (2010) argue that all ICT4D in Africa should embrace a more transformative discourse. They caution that in order for the ICT4D agenda to be successfully pursued in Africa, the developmental thrust should be strategised. They emphasise that the social, political and economic structures and the natural environment should be well understood so that Africa-centric innovations can be put in place. These authors point out that Africa has extreme levels of inequality, high political turbulence and a fragile natural balance (ecology) that are at present vaguely comprehended but require an Africa-centric approach. They therefore propose the formation of an 'African developmental ICT research community', which 'has not occurred to date' (Thompson and Walsham, 2010: 112). An example of a project of this discourse is the M-PESA mobile payment system that was launched first in Kenya and more recently in South Africa.

The unique solutions above are hard to replicate routinely because of their embedded nature. In addition, assertions that access to the internet can alleviate underdevelopment and poverty are hard to relate to tangible and pragmatic goals which people in underdeveloped communities can pursue. These observations attest to the fact that while ICT4D is necessary, these projects are complex and difficult to describe generically.

Is Innovation being Targeted?

The literature shows that development has mostly been reduced to mimicking practices that emerged elsewhere. The lack of success with this strategy warrants

a better exploration of what person-dependent attributes these projects aim to or can develop. This section of the chapter therefore offers a view of innovation that is congruent with the notion of progressive transformation as it is defined by Avgerou (2008). This view of is justified on the basis of the phenomenology of human experience and learning. Human experience results in learning and cultural production. From an existential perspective, human beings automatically strive to create meaning and a better life (Guignon and Pereboom, 1995). The ability to innovate and improvise is an essential and innate attribute of human beings. It is therefore reasonable to assume that these abilities will be enhanced and stimulated if people have more opportunities to acquire and participate in knowledge sharing and generation.

Theorists such as Tsoukas and Chia (2002) and Stacey (2003) see innovation as a product of social activity. There are others, however, who believe that innovation results simply from the adoption of technology (Avgerou, 2008a; Brown and Brown, 2009; Wilson, 2010). This has been a key prevailing assumption in much of the ICT4D literature to date. While Press (1997, cited in Madon, et al 2007) and Brown and Brown (2009) state simply that there is a relationship between technology and innovation, it is far more realistic from a phenomenological perspective to suggest that development is a product of social innovation that is facilitated by the internet.

Although many in the ICT4D field believe that the interrelation between ICT and development entails more than making technology available, it is hard to see to what extent interventions purposefully encourage those who are being developed to pursue ideals of social innovation. Brown and Brown (2009) conducted their study by correlating bandwidth activity against growth in human development ranking. They show that human development improvement also seems to be accompanied by a corresponding improvement in bandwidth activity. Their profound explanation (perhaps only one of many possible explanations) can be explored further and explained by using principles from learning organisations theory.

Innovation results from interaction between people. It is a vital organisational ability and many organisations expect their employees to be resilient in handling current and ongoing business environmental pressures. The terms ‘empowerment’ and ‘flattening hierarchies’ are often used to describe efforts to create resilience. At a basic level, innovation is a social phenomenon which emerges from complicated cumulative interactive processes that are created by human beings in a particular context when they display resilience (Tsoukas and Chia, 2002; Stacey, 2003). In some organisations, innovations are experienced and encouraged as products of organisational change and learning. Organisations survive

and cope with environmental pressure by ensuring that they can innovate sufficiently. If we equate the ability to innovate at a community level to the ability to innovate at an organisational level, we can infer that competitive advantage for an organisation or nation will result if there is resilience amongst the people who constitute the group. In this context, the measure of competitive advantage can be explained by the social capital that stimulates resilience. Sufficient social capital implies that there is incentive and inspiration to mediate changing conditions. The human developmental index is perhaps a measure of how much social capital a group has or how capable they are of acquiring social capital. A high measure of social capital in using the internet implies that communities have the ability to participate effectively in interactive discourses on social wellbeing, political wellbeing and the environment because their contribution will benefit them in these areas. The developed parts of these communities are already able to contribute in these areas because they are not constrained by access problems or the challenges that are associated with internet usage. The underdeveloped sections of the community, however, are excluded from participating in these areas because of a lack of access, but mostly because of lack of usage. Because of the lack of an inclusive approach, economic, governance and health systems continue to marginalise poor communities and their participation is curtailed. Naidoo (2010) calls for citizen action to save the world and thinks the internet can bring people together to advocate for desirable changes. However, developing sections of the community that are not in a position to participate as yet are excluded. Perhaps development in the context of ICT4D should be about creating resilient, innovative and imaginative internet users.

Innovation and Imagination

Wokocha and Nwokeocha (2009) give us insight into a project that was undertaken by the Teacher Registration Council of Nigeria (TRCN). It is interesting to note how the TRCN used its influence to get teachers at all levels to engage in the project by using the internet. They partnered with other government agencies to encourage internet usage by making achievable steps mandatory, for example registration with the TRCN was mandatory and registration had to be done online. A closer analysis of their strategy shows that they sought to purposely invest in and develop the imagination of the teachers in using the internet before getting them to consider rolling out e-learning initiatives. The imagination of teachers was therefore an important resource in this project. This initiative had notable successes, including that the teachers were sensitised to the different ways they could integrate ICTs in the classroom and this enabled them to subsequently raise

important issues that had to be considered and resolved before implementing e-learning initiatives. The teachers felt empowered because a conscious effort was made to develop their imaginations and this enabled them to contribute with confidence and to raise important issues about possible distractions.

wa Thiong'o (1997; 2009) believes that the modernity project, which built on the slavery and colonial eras, affected the imaginative ability of Africans because its programmes replaced African memory of African experiences with European memory. This prevents Africans from contributing in authentic African ways to solve many problems in their communities. Mangena (2010) raises a related concern by highlighting that the majority of South Africans who live in a democratic South Africa do not understand what is being done in their name. He claims that the political and socioeconomic systems do not resonate with the ethos of the people whom it is supposed to serve. He highlights the need for educated Africans to unreservedly work for their people – a notion which he calls 'authentic identity'. In his quest to understand for what purposes Africans are using the internet, Obijiofor (2009) acknowledges that internet usage is primarily limited to e-mail. He stresses that this is disappointing because the potential for research-based education, commerce, health and democracy remains undiscovered. wa Thiong'o (1997; 2010) and Mangena (2010) would also lament this because they identify the need for Africans to decolonise their minds. In a development sense they would see the internet as a means to imprint new memory and remember cultural practices to bring about renewed conception of the self and others and to enthuse imagination and innovation; in a development sense, they would likely see the internet as an instrument for cultural remembering. Perhaps this vision and ideal can inspire holistic development instead of narrow conceptions of development as a primary need to catch up with or mimic practices in developed countries.

wa Thiong'o (1997; 2009) has dedicated many decades to estimating the effects of colonialism and slavery on the imaginations of those who were subjected to these practices. A central theme in his work is the urgent need to develop the imaginative ability of Africans so that they can contribute to solving a range of complex problems regarding healthcare, food, security, education, poverty, and so on in their communities. He makes this plea because he observes that the experience of slavery and colonialism purposely obliterated the cultural memory and instituted a yearning among Africans for the culture of their colonisers. He sees this as a development trap that is far too simplistic and does not take into account the specificity of local geographies, cultures, social structures and the complexities of international politics. He argues that this yearning affects the imagination of Africans and an African Renaissance is needed to prioritise and

energise remembrance of cultural practices. He (wa Thiong'o, 2009: 71) defines the African Renaissance as a period when the quantity and quality of intellectual and artistic outputs are perceived as signalling 'a monumental historical shift' in the life of the people, nation and region. Many researchers in the ICT4D field will argue that this is a real opportunity for development through the internet. However, the sustained use of the internet in African communities remains problematic because internet usage gets marginalised and reduced to the mere function of e-mailing instead of exploiting the huge potential that it can have in restoring cultural memory. This strategic opportunity is dwindling because there is a conceptual mismatch between ideals, intervention approaches and strategic possibilities.

wa Thiong'o uses the word 'remembering' to emphasise the need to bring together the dismembered parts of culture. Along with outlining the deep effects of colonialism, slavery and its subsequent effects on the imaginative abilities of Africans, he also identifies some key priorities in resurrecting the cultural structure. He emphasises the need to promote the use of African languages. He directs his pleas to promote the development of African images to leaders in government and education and to others who influence national discourses. His ideology is sound and can be validated by many ideas about existence and culture from embodied cognition.

According to Wa Thiong'o (2009), Maturana (1978), Maturana and Poerksen (2004) and Merleau-Ponty (1945), language can conjure up images to awaken memory. Thus language is the means and medium to explore the past and project future possibilities. Maturana and Varela (1998: 198, 231) claim that consciousness is only accessible through language by using concepts, theories and analogies. Language therefore enables one to define various states of consciousness where individual words become tokens of linguistically coordinating actions by representing bodily responses that can be triggered by the nervous system. Consequently, linguistic behaviour can be seen as a form of orienting behaviour because the nervous system stores recurrent behaviour as sets of neuronal activity that anticipate a pre-given world (Maturana and Varela, 1998: 232, 233). Through linguistic means, a human being can orient others to the linguistic domain (phenomenal domain) that is relevant to the interaction. Accordingly, language is said to be connotative or symbolic instead of denotative of individual entities (Maturana and Varela, 1980: 30). Hence, wa Thiong'o makes the plea for cultural remembering. Since human beings express themselves largely through language, they acquire new knowledge by expanding their nervous systems through learning how to interact with various phenomenal domains. This evolution is constrained by the language that is available to identify the states

which are relevant for facilitating interaction. In Africa, language has been the language of the coloniser and carries the remnants of slavery and colonisation. A key idea of Heidegger that relates to memory, learning and language is that all new knowledge emerges parasitically from prior knowledge (Guignon, 1983).

Therefore, although the nervous system can expand the domain of human beings' interactions, it remains subservient to the historical functioning of the human being – a notion that Maturana and Varela call 'ontogenic'. Maturana and Varela say that the nervous system operates through structural determination because the environment triggers reactions from the human being but cannot specify the reactions (Maturana and Varela, 1998: 131). Since consciousness and mind can therefore be seen as constructions that arise from the social coupling of human beings with the self or with other human beings in virtual engagements, consciousness and mind can evolve through interactions that are made possible by the internet. Accordingly, the internet can play a powerful role in the decolonisation process. Researchers allude to this potential by highlighting the important role of the internet in generating social capital.

If we think about using the modern tools of the internet to develop imagination and cultural remembering, the internet has to be embraced not for the sake of merely using technology to mimic practices that emerged elsewhere because these do not necessarily invoke cultural remembering. Instead, the internet should be embraced because it provides a means to execute the cultural project at societal level in order to facilitate remembering images and practices that will develop the African imagination and will enable Africans to develop a new sense of self and the other. ICT4D researchers have identified possible contributions that ICT can make in human development. Although the connections are talked about, projects in this field have not been specifically framed in terms of an African Renaissance and the specific roles that can be played. A lack of purposeful aims can contribute to further cultural dismembering. The significance of wa Thiong'o's ideas to these projects requires further exploration because they appear to be in line with the literature.

The existentialists claim that human beings exist or cope by undertaking practices and innovating while they perform daily tasks on an ongoing basis. Existentialists share the view that human beings are defined by two principles. Firstly, human beings are organisms amongst other organisms in nature and their basic needs do not differ much from the basic needs of other animals. Secondly, human beings are different from animals because they can transcend basic existential concerns to reflect about and evaluate themselves in the light of an overarching vision of what their lives amount to. Heidegger and Sartre state that this ability to transcend is unique to human beings because their

existence can be questioned or is an issue for them (Guignon and Pereboom, 1995). Human beings are not content with merely satisfying their basic desires because they care about what kind of beings they are and therefore reflect on the value of the things they desire. Because of this, human beings form second-order desires about their basic desires (meta-desires) and can regulate their immediate inclinations. Human existence is therefore constantly agitated by aspirations that go beyond people's immediate needs and impressions (Guignon and Pereboom, 1995: xviii). These ideas imply that it is reasonable to suggest that chronically poor communities will have an interest in the internet if they are able to understand how it works and how to use it. Understanding, however, should be approached from the perspective of culture. The experiences of Krauss and Turpin (2010) and Wokocha and Nwokeocha (2009) show that this only seems possible if there is an investment in the imagination.

In the context of daily existence, the internet provides numerous uses to accentuate the type of person one can aspire to be. Better yet, imagine the possibility if such daily existence is unified by the common concerns of African communities. It is reasonable to assume that a number of new ideas and opportunities for development will emerge from communities. For similar reasons, the internet has become pervasive in the daily routine of people who use it because it enables them to embrace their existential needs by participating in various causes and blogs, sharing information, acquiring understanding, and communicating and interacting to accentuate the type of human beings that they are aspiring to be. A result of this activity is cultural evolution, which wa Thiong'o calls cultural remembering. If the internet is used intentionally to engage in key issues for society and humanity on the African continent, the people will become aware of their priorities and development will become an act of the people themselves. The outcomes from increased interaction are therefore bound to converge toward a deepening of democracy and active citizen participation in policy formulation and execution. As a consequence, various dimensions of human development will improve as society gets more informed about its challenges and opportunities. The developed part of society has leveraged these human developmental opportunities, while the underdeveloped has lagged behind. The debates have thus far been exclusive. In recent years, the differences and disparities have become more pronounced because cultural evolution is happening at a faster rate because of ubiquitous access to ICTs/the internet.

Some Consequences of Propagating the Marginalised use of the Internet

As long as internet usage is not provided adequately to the marginalised, there will be polarisation between poor and wealthy communities. More importantly, a lack of opportunities for internet usage is a lost opportunity to decolonise the imaginations of Africans because the internet is a powerful means to cultivate a new sense of self and of the other (which is necessary for development). The lack of an authentic and confident African identity leads to many of the problems in African societies not being resolved, and this has come to be collectively called lack of development. Cultural evolution takes place all the time and if the sociotechnical divide persists, a large part of the population will be excluded from discourses about the internet. This difference will be experienced in the multiple perceptions that are brought to bear in daily lived experiences. The internet will continue to propagate the sociotechnical divide through the creation of different mind sets as a result of ongoing learning experiences. If the disparities are not carefully managed, they will become larger and larger because human beings are evolving all the time as they learn. A likely possibility is that the knowledge differences will become so vast that social cohesion will be threatened. Because all new experiences take root in prior experiences and have a sort of parasitic existence, those who are excluded will find it increasingly difficult to transcend cultural and language barriers to acquire new phenomena that are related to internet usage and adoption as the internet evolves.

Uneven internet usage will segregate communities because of the worldviews that are brought to bear in each situation. Although uneven internet adoption and usage are to be expected in the near future, the situation has to be managed with more urgency, creativity and a strategic focus to prevent the emergence of polarised societies. Consequently, a fundamental issue that has to be explored in the context of internet proliferation is the extent and manner in which an internet environment shapes the worlds of human beings and the subsequent impact this has on their daily experiences.

Conclusion

This chapter has theorised about how the use of the internet can affect human development. It has attempted to provide a better explanation of how ICT4D can target person-dependent variables in order to speed up development to meet urgent and growing needs. The chapter first summarised the key concerns that have been reported in the ICT4D research field. Theories on organisational learning, innovation and the phenomenology of human existence were drawn on and synthesised. The chapter has shown how the internet has the mechanisms

and potential to supplant colonial memory. It has illustrated how development as mimicking practices in developed countries is not the optimal approach to development in Africa because development has to be an act of the people where the people themselves have to imagine and find solutions to their problems. An effect of colonialism has been a blind belief in development as replicating the practices of developed countries. This is especially detrimental in Africa because it seems that colonialism and slavery have obliterated the imaginative ability of Africans to find solutions for their own development needs by using their own historical and cultural roots.

The chapter has further shown how images, language and memory are intertwined in cultural production. A significant part of it is devoted to giving insight into the micro-processes of cultural production in daily existence. This has been done to make apparent the opportunity to generate social capital by using the internet to attain further development.

Lastly, but not least, the chapter attempted to look at the phenomenon of ICT4D from principles of cultural evolution, learning, expression of individual freedom and social innovation. It is by no means the final word on how to increase internet usage for development. It is hoped that it stimulates interest in pursuing cultural capital that will inspire social innovation and will ultimately amount to the advancements of Africans by Africans.

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CHAPTER 45

Innovation Gateway Provision for Rural Small Business Development for Global Competitiveness

Sivuyise Ndzendze

Introduction

The Innovation Gateway, an integrated model used to speed up development processes, conducted an assessment in order to measure the understanding of entrepreneurship in rural communities. The overall intention of the assessment was to determine a starting point for developing small rural businesses in terms of economic activity, participation, growth and competitiveness. Based on the results of the assessment, this chapter suggests innovative ways of driving entrepreneurship in rural communities.

The chapter proceeds to examine the rationale behind the Innovation Gateway model and the testing and scoring methods which can be used. This model seeks to renew and contribute to the ongoing process of leadership development and address the persistent problem of African underdevelopment. Some of the technical difficulties of standardising a new assessment tool for use with low strength; low business opportunities are also examined. Finally, the chapter looks into how the information can be used to strengthen the profile of an entrepreneur and new businesses.

Context

At the outset, it is very important to define the terms like 'rural areas', 'small business' and 'leadership'. Ashley and Maxwell (2001) identify the following as being the definitive characteristics of rural areas: low settlement and lack of infrastructure; fields, forests, water, mountains and pasture domination; farming and relatively cheap land and long distances causing high transport costs. Of course, the definitions are not exhaustive or all comprehensive. The rural areas are blessed more than urban areas with a diverse and wide array of natural and cultural resources, as contended in *The White Paper on the Development of Tourism in South Africa* (South Africa, 1996). Rural areas have the eco-cultural and adventure tourism opportunities that are ideal for holidaymakers. In providing such holiday destinations, rural inhabitants, ideally, should get opportunities

to participate and share in the benefits of development but in many cases this does not happen.

Small businesses and indigenous knowledge (hence the importance of the link with rural communities) are increasingly becoming anchors or bases of national and international economies, and decision makers are growing to recognise their importance. This therefore makes it important to capacitate business and traditional (rural) leadership in rural areas to increase the participation of rural small businesses in order to attract wider benefits to the rural areas. This may also ensure that an increase in resources and benefits for the communities are realised. Accordingly, this has could have the advantage of local ownership and management.


Small business, as defined in the 1995 *White Paper on National Strategy for the Development and Promotion of Small Business* in the South African context means a separate and distinct business entity, including cooperative enterprises and non-governmental organisations. These are managed by one owner or more, employ an average of five people and have an annual turnover of not more than R4 million, including branches or subsidiaries, if any.

Leadership involves the marshalling of skills possessed in society, supposedly, for the benefit of all. Whereas traditional leadership in terms of the South African *White Paper on Traditional Leadership and Governance* (South Africa, 2003) is about leadership forms and systems in indigenous communities – it includes established traditional courts and the administration of tribal land. Its inclusion in the new dispensation demonstrates government's willingness to affect the power and recognition of traditional authorities and leadership. Business leadership, on the other hand, may refer to the leadership of business development strategies and operations. These definitions are important to assist readers in understanding the premises underlying the discussions in this chapter.

Innovation Gateway Portfolio

This model looks at an integrative way to address the involvement of business and traditional leadership. This model seeks to help the agent/s (organisation/s) responsible for tasks that will ensure the realisation of those benefits. This model also seeks to address resource intensity, knowledge and development needs. This is in order to cut the cycle when helping those responsible for development.

Figure 1: Innovation gateway portfolio



In order to address this, an eight programme portfolio was constructed which contains Innovation Park, Innovation Networks, Innovative Lifestyle, Industrial Innovations, Innovation Technologies, Innovation Rurals, Innovation Talents and Innovative Tourism. The respective programmes are described below:

Innovation Park

Area of impact	Business skills, leadership, entrepreneurial and economic development
Summary	Provide a supportive, incubator style and pro-rural development environment for businesses and leaderships
Objectives	• Provide a supportive incubator for emerging businesses • Provide necessary operational and business services • Provide structured mentorship programmes • Grow a business network in order to share resources and inspire each other • Promote and allow entrepreneurs to focus on core business with support assurance • Provide corporate management and/or governance services • Ensure business continuity and logistics handling
Expected benefit	Strategic usage of facilities in order to spend more time on core business; transformation of company resources; achieve strategic business goals faster in higher numbers
Support required	Financial, marketing, planning
Potential problems/ risks	Availability and usage of ICTs in target areas.

Business unit support	Small businesses, consulting professionals, development organisations
Skills and resources	Construction, business development, marketing, planning.

Innovative Lifestyle

Area of impact	Lifestyle: residents, tourists, surrounding areas.
Summary	Provide convenient shopping places for community and space for franchisees
Objectives	• Convenient shopping place community • Attract residents of surrounding areas and tourists • Reduce costs and risks for residents • Develop rural economy • Create jobs for rural people • Facilitate franchising resources • Support assurance, overhead cover for business owners
Expected benefit	Reduction of people in urban areas; reduction of dependence Tourist attraction; job creation for rural people; economy boost for rural areas; transformation of innovation park resident company
Support required	Financial, planning, land
Potential problems/risks	Unavailability of municipal services and area plan
Business unit support	Community, stores, banks, consulting professionals and agents
Skills and resources	Construction, business development

Innovation Rurals

Area of impact	Rural development, rural entrepreneurship
Idea summary	Provide necessary services to commercialise communal projects
Strategic objective	• Supply residents of innovative lifestyle • Promote farming for commercialisation • Traditional Knowledge Commercialisation • Business continuity and improved logistics
Expected benefit	Economic boost, skills development and social responsibility
Support required	Financial, marketing, planning, land
Potential problems/risks	Lack of education in the rural communities, high transaction costs

Business unit support	Traditional leadership, community residents, development banks and agents, and rural development governments departments
Skills and resources	Business development, land, indigenous knowledge and planning

Industrial Innovations

Area of impact	Processing, packaging standards, health and environment
Summary	Setting up processing and/or packaging centre for primary products produced by Innovation Rurals. This is in order to supply the residents of Innovative Lifestyle in cases where they do not need Innovation Rurals output as primary product.
Strategic objective	• Improve safety, health, environment and quality and supply for innovative lifestyle • Increase and improve quality of export products in order to be competitive in the world market • Enhance technology in order to facilitate processing and controlling systems to ensure sustainable market for Innovation Rurals • Create job and business opportunities for local inhabitants • Increase secondary product processing capacity
Expected benefit	Short turnover for Innovative Lifestyle residents, improved health status
Support required	Financial, marketing, planning
Potential problems/risks	Safety, health and environmental
Business unit support	Industrial development corporations
Skills and resources	Business development

Innovation Networks

Area of impact	Business networks
Summary	Facilitation of mentorship, training, business talks and seminars, networking forums, meeting, workshop and corporate event
Objectives	• Educate business executive, managers and/or owners • Knowledge transfer from industry experts • Share experience • Build communities of practice • Help company improve capability • Build motivation network scheme • Investor finding for the Innovation Park tenants

Expected benefit	Improve knowledge and information management; enhanced communication services; building of informative business forums and networks; transformation of Innovation Park resident company
Support required	Financial, planning
Potential problems/risks	Low usage of electronic communication methods, unclear understanding of such programmes
Business unit support	Business associations, small businesses, entrepreneurs, and universities
Skills and resources	Construction, business development

Innovative Tourism

Area of impact	Arts and tourism
Idea summary	Provision of tourism facilities and attraction tourists to the areas
Strategic objective	• Traditional knowledge commercialisation • Recreational facilities provision • Facilities for passing by tourists
Expected benefit	Facilities provision, traditional knowledge development
Support required	Market research, planning
Potential problems/risks	Traditions
Business unit support	Government tourism, hospitality companies, community
Skills and resources	Business development; market research; marketing, planning.

Innovation Talents

Area of impact	Education
Idea summary	Influence the education system in surrounding areas. Development and positive usage of individual talent.
Strategic objective	• New ideas generation • Process Improvement • Improve education quality • Recognise and support natural talent
Expected benefit	Improved business process and acquisition of new businesses
Support required	Financial, marketing, planning

Potential problems/risks	Lack of entrepreneurship culture, understanding and support system
Business unit support	Academic institutions, entrepreneurial development organisations, youth development organisation
Skills and resources	Business development

Innovation Technologies

Area of impact	ICTs
Summary	Provision of advanced technologies that fit to rural development strategies. Facilitate the customisation of technologies for regional benefit. These are technologies seeking not to harm the current environmental situation in rural areas. This is also for the improvement of communication and transport
Strategic objective	• Strengthen the competitiveness of the area by implementing the targeted development and strategies • Facilitate the technological innovations, research and development for human capital management • Enhance technology in order to facilitate communications for sustainable development
Expected benefit	Better information communication and knowledge management. Increased local innovation through the supply of skilled technology and infrastructure
Support required	Financial, marketing, planning
Potential problems/risks	Lack of infrastructure in the area Rural character of the area
Business unit support	Enterprise development organisations, government science and technology department, industrial development corporations and educational institutions
Skills and resources	Business case development

Implementation Approach

In order to assess the progress of the portfolio, the following models and measuring units must be used for testing and scoring. These models seek to renew and contribute to the ongoing process of leadership development. These models will also address the difficulties while implementing the programmes outlined in the portfolio. This approach will also be a standard monitoring tool for movement from low strength/low opportunities to high strength/high opportunities. This will determine if the programmes can be used within the profile of an entrepreneur and new business.

Leadership Development Approach

This approach could be used to ensure that the areas of weaknesses are identified and thus improvements are made. This will also ensure low strength/ low opportunity (ideally would be avoided) businesses are developed for high strength/ high opportunity. The approach further suggests that the strengths be the first critical issue that is considered. This is in order to ensure that both traditional and business leadership can identify the opportunities. The approach may also be used to assess and support pre-crisis planning and a preventive crisis model. It may also be used in creating recommendations during negotiations and viability studies. Therefore the business and area leadership should always relate to the following critical issues:

Figure 2: Leadership development approach

AVOIDANCE (Low strength and low opportunity) Minimise weaknesses and avoid threats	DEFENSIVE (Moderate strength and low opportunity) Develop strengths to be used to avoid threats	DEVELOP MENTAL (High strength and low to moderate opportunity) Overcome weaknesses by taking advantage of opportunities	OFFENSIVE (High strength and high opportunity) Use strengths to take advantage of opportunities
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Development Levels

Applying S-curve Techniques in a Different Lifecycle

S-curve remains the key indicator of our advancement measurement against the efforts that are to be applied. This must work as a management tool and measure the functional performance of the technology.

S-curve explained:

- There is a need for too much effort at the initiation phase (**Grid 1**) without seeing any advancement but because of strategic focus, the programme continues. Sometimes teams may feel like pulling out but because of visionaries, the motivation does not die out.
- It will only be in the planning phase (**Grid 2**) that advancement in efforts is seen.

Programme Adoption Strategy

Referring to the figure below we can say innovators and visionaries must be the drivers of strategies. These groups help to close gaps especially when technology is still new.

Maturity Indexing

Maturity indexing will be used generally to evaluate and compare the maturity and quality of programme services. Sampling will be done from a few individual businesses and areas selected. In some cases, assessment of an area economic development of business will be done without having to sample the produce. The idea is that the condition of the sampled business is then representative of the programme as a whole. The sampling protocols must be designed to ensure that the samples are in fact statistically representative of the programme (South African Department of Agriculture, 2006). Therefore the following could be done:

- **Planning and basics:** expansive thinking, strategy definition and considered 'minimum costs'
- **Control:** planning, supervision, approval, rules, regulations, standards, specifications, acid test. this is a stage where organisations do not exactly understand what is required.
- **Congruence:** Create a balance – team member's assistance, team work and common goal.

Conclusions

Economic development action is changing in Africa and globally. Therefore there is a need to change the approach in order to ensure the development of leadership and the organisation. JF Kennedy once said: 'It is an unfinished society that we offer to the world – a society that is forever committed to change, to improvement and to growth, one that will never stagnate in certitude of ideology or the finalities of dogma' (Taylor, 2001). Using economic viability as a primary driver can bring positive consequences. Labour demands and costs are rising therefore Africa should develop leadership in order to meet these demands. The result has been a shift towards more mechanised operations with higher productivity per person. In order to ensure such a proper preparation and establishment, Innovation Gateway portfolio provides the tools to do this. New technologies are increasing and costs must be closely examined to ensure a positive return on the investment.

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TMALI Launch Conference, 11–13 October 2010, Sandton Convention Centre, Johannesburg, South Africa

The Thabo Mbeki African Leadership Institute (TMALI) was launched at a high-level international academic conference which took place from 11 to 13 October 2010 at the Sandton Convention Centre, Johannesburg, South Africa. The launch created great interest and excitement among many Africans, including the youth and young intellectuals, who are keenly interested in improving their capacity to play a positive role in shaping the future of our continent.

The objectives of the TMALI conference were to create a platform for the exchange of ideas by distinguished thought leaders on African advancement and development. It also aimed to enrich the programmes of TMALI. The target audience comprised scholars, academics, outstanding African personalities, including those in the Diaspora, young intellectuals, private sector, civil servants and civil society members who are committed to the advancement of the goal of an African Renaissance. The theme of the conference was 'Investing in Thought Leadership for Africa's Renewal'.

The conference was opened on Monday, 11 October 2010 by the Patron of the TMALI, former President Thabo Mbeki. In his opening remarks he said

The fundamental proposition from which we proceed is that the transformation which Africa needs to achieve her renaissance requires that our continent prepares the necessary human capital, the brain workers, who should both conceptualise such transformation and participate in its implementation. Immanent in this proposition is the assertion that that human capital should indeed be African, and therefore that to achieve our goals we must rely decisively on African minds. However I must hasten to add that I am not hereby suggesting an African intellectual autarky, but seek to emphasise the imperative that we do everything we can to build the critical mass of the human capital we need.

The Chancellor of Unisa, Honourable Judge Bernard Ngoepe said:

as a key stakeholder, not only in knowledge production through teaching,

learning, research and community engagement, but also in the creation of intellectuals and future leaders, the University of South Africa (Unisa), with its significant footprint on the continent and globally, aims to ensure that it facilitates thinking in Africa, on Africa, by African scholars, so as to arrive at an African understanding that is acknowledged by our global society. Unisa aims to make a direct and ongoing contribution to this country and this continent's intelligentsia – to our thought leaders and to our leadership. We are proud and honoured to be able to make that contribution.

As Chancellor of the University of South Africa I am able to tell you that the TMALI is fully supported by the Council of the University, who no doubt, are at the TMALI launch conference cognisant of the imperative to ensure that this pan-African centre of excellence will foster critical engagement on the continent – with like-minded institutes, scholars and other parties or bodies in pursuit of the renewal of our continent. The purpose of this conference ladies and gentlemen, is to ensure an agenda for a programme for the TMALI, which TMALI will lead in pursuit of its goals and objectives. We are most honoured that through your attendance and participation you have signalled your support for the Institute. There can be no doubt that your respective contributions will add gravitas and lustre to the body of knowledge that will flow from the TMALI, which in time to come will surely be regarded continentally and globally as the repository of knowledge on Africa, by Africans.

The Vice Chancellor and Principal of Unisa, Prof Barney Pitso Rantso said:

Gone are the days when Africans were educated for service in the colonial administration, or as future generations for servitude, or in the church as ministers of an alien religion. What we do know is that these best laid plans (of mice and men) collapsed because, instead of producing docile Africans, the quest for freedom was accentuated. The elites soon claimed the humanity of Africa; they demanded the right to assert the soul of Africa.

And he further said

The Thabo Mbeki Foundation should, alongside its purpose of eradicating poverty and underdevelopment, also attend to this matter of the poverty of the mind, to set free the intellectual potential of Africa if Africans are set to become their own liberators and subjects of their own development. I am afraid, that is what Black Consciousness taught me, and our country today

is crying out for a dose of Black Consciousness years after Steve Biko was murdered and many pioneers of the movement are no more at centre stage.

The partnership and collaboration between the Thabo Mbeki Foundation and the University of South Africa in the establishment of the Thabo Mbeki African Leadership Institute should marshal these intellectual forces and critical voices to Africa's betterment. This international conference should set an agenda that will draw Africa's intellectual resources, stimulate young Africa to become achievers bristling with new ideas and set the tone for a new positive inclination for Africa that honours its past, engages the present and shapes the future.

The Vice Chairperson of Council at Unisa, Dr Sebiletso Mokone-Matabane said:

When Unisa's Council heard of an envisaged partnership to form the Thabo Mbeki African Leadership Institute (TMALI), we were pleased to give it our full support. As a pan-African centre of excellence the TMALI will undoubtedly foster in its students the principles of sound governance and moral and ethical leadership. As the single dedicated comprehensive open and distance learning institution in South Africa and one of the largest in the world, Unisa is well placed and equipped to contribute to a 'borderless' region where, in the process of critical engagement, collaboration and the production of new cadres of thought leaders, sound principles of open and transparent corporate governance will permeate the continent and, ultimately, underpin and inform leadership.

It could be suggested that AU and NEPAD initiatives on our continent have not achieved their undoubted promise because of the many debilitating power struggles that both disrupt and stunt socioeconomic and cultural development. It is our view as the Council of the University of South Africa (Unisa), that Unisa's partnership with and involvement in TMALI will provide the opportunity to entrench – nationally, continentally and internationally – an underlying ethos of sound management and moral and ethical leadership that will help break that cycle and lend impetus to the African renewal that we all desire.

Subsequent to this a high level panel, moderated by Ms Lerato Mbele, discussed the topic 'What needs to be done to achieve the African Renaissance?' The high level panel was comprised of former presidents John Kufuor of Ghana and Joaquim Chissano of Moçambique, former prime minister of Italy and former president of the European Commission, Mr Romano Prodi of Italy, as well as Prof

Bathily, a Senegalese historian and politician and Ms Christine Qunta a leading South African lawyer and social commentator. President Kufuor said that former President Thabo Mbeki has always been a pace-setter; even in establishing the TMALI he is setting the pace for other former heads of state in Africa to also consider establishing foundations and/or institutes in partnership with universities. President Chissano emphasised the role of ubuntu in building a strong movement of African Renaissance practitioner. Mr Prodi emphasised the need for economic integration in Africa. He said African universities have an important role to play in changing the perception of the quality of knowledge produced in Africa. For example, there is no reason why it is mainly African students who are going to Europe to study and not European students coming to Africa to study.

Professor Abdoulaye Bathily stressed that while it is good to learn from other models of political and economic integration like the European Union and the Association of American States, no model can be transferred from one continent to another without the necessary adaptation. He said Africa must set its own policy agenda and take leadership on its own challenges. While regretting negative tendencies like regression to one-party states in some African countries, monarchical succession and the privatisation of state resources by the ruling elites for looting. He noted however that there are some positive tendencies as well. For example there is a movement towards economic integration at a sub-regional level, for example, SADC, ECOWAS, etc.

In the afternoon of Monday, 11 October 2010, the conference programme consisted of lead presentations of academic papers by eminent African scholars and international scholars on African affairs. Four thematic papers were presented by Prof Catherine Odora Hoppers from Unisa, Prof Locksley Edmondson from Cornell University, Prof Elias Bongmba from Rice University and Dr Ebrima Sall, the Executive Secretary of CODESRIA. This was followed by plenary discussions among over two hundred other scholars, including both established experts in their fields and young academics. Tuesday was dedicated to parallel sessions where over 50 papers were delivered by both established and emerging scholars.



On Wednesday, 13 October 2010 reports were received from the parallel sessions. Generally, the speakers addressed their topics with rigour and a great deal of depth. The papers were well researched and thought provoking. The discussion was also enhanced by the intellectual, generational, gender and disciplinary diversity of participants and interlocutors of the themes.

Perspectives on Thought Leadership for Africa's Renewal

This book outlines perspectives of emerging and established African scholars on what one could describe as the debate on leadership and the articulation of the life of the mind in Africa's socio-economic, political and cultural life from the time of independence to date. The papers contained in the book cover the following thematic areas: Alternative Leadership Paradigm for Africa's Advancement; African Perspectives on Globalisation and international relations; Pan-Africanism and the African Renaissance; Scientific, Technological and Cultural Dimensions of African Development.

The first section deals with alternative leadership paradigms for Africa's advancement. It also debates the 'thin line' separating management studies from leadership studies and untangles the hermeneutic complexities in the term 'leadership'. Section two examines among other things, the crucial challenge of globalisation and public ethics and offers African perspectives. The section also interrogates the current complexities and credibility deficits in the global governance of trade and towards the end engages philosophical questions about conscience and consciousness in African development and progress.

The debates in section three continue to section four and focus on the overall issues of language and liberation, the significance of Multi-, Inter- and Trans-Disciplinary Approaches in the analysis of the African continent, appropriate indigenous paradigms for promoting the African renaissance as well as a series of debates on the meaning and prospects of regional integration in Africa's renewal. This provides just a snapshot of a very wide ranging and interesting debate contained in the publication.



Thabo Mbeki
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THABO MBEKI AFRICAN LEADERSHIP INSTITUTE

Investing in Thought Leaders for Africa's Renewal



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